Accountability Time for Sri Lanka’s Rajapakse Clan?

In a groundbreaking order issued October 7, Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court ordered five members of the Rajapakse family and accomplices to answer for driving the once prosperous nation into bankruptcy.  

While Gotabaya was president and three brothers and a nephew ministers, the government took on ever greater levels of foreign debt while recklessly cutting taxes and pursuing unsustainable monetary policies. The result: the economy is expected shrink by 8.7 percent this year, inflation recently exceeded 60 percent, and an additional 2.7 million Sri Lankans will likely fall into abject poverty (here and here).

As economic conditions deteriorated in late spring, the four Rajapkse ministers resigned, and Gotabaya later fled the country as protesters stormed the presidential residence (here). But though out of office, the Rajapakses are not out of power. They still control parliament, and it picked a Rajapkse crony to serve the remainder of Gotabaya’s term as president.

With parliament unlikely to hold the Rajapkses accountable for economic mismanagement and the corruption that underlay it, civil society turned to the one institution in the country that remained largely untouched during the Rajapakse’s misrule: the judiciary.  Last June Transparency International Sri Lanka and three prominent Sri Lankans asked the nation’s highest court to hear their claim that the result of the Rajapakses’ economic mismanagement their constitutional rights to equal treatment, freedom to pursue gainful work, and access to government information had been denied. The petition further asks that:

  • the Central Bank, Finance Ministry, and other agencies be required to produce documents chronicling the mismanagement,
  • a committee be empaneled to examine the documents and compile a report, and
  • the Attorney General be directed to investigate and prosecute any wrongdoing disclosed.

For those fortunate enough to live in functioning democracies, this action would be extraordinary.  A request that a court assume the powers of a legislature and hold those in charge of the government accountable for their actions.

But given the power the Rajapakses accumulated during their long period in office, it appears to be the only path to accountability.  And to the restoration of the democratic freedoms Sri Lanka’s constitution promises all citizens.  Citizen activists, believers in the rule of law, and democrats everywhere will be hoping Sri Lanka’s judiciary can meet this unprecedented challenge.

Sri Lanka Should Cancel Not Renegotiate Corrupt Loans 

It will be years if not decades before the once prospering nation of Sri Lanka recovers from the financial and humanitarian crisis brought on by the fiscal profligacy of the Rajapaksa family. During the 10-year rule presidential rule of Mahindra (2005 -2015), the government began borrowing ever larger sums, principally from China, to build ports, roads, and other infrastructure. Younger brother Gotabaya continued the family tradition when elected president in 2019, borrowing more and more to keep the project pipeline full and the business community happy.

For many projects, the terminus of the pipeline was the Rajapaksa’s home district. A herd of white elephants poured forth: an unused airport (Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport), a deserted cricket stadium (Mahinda Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium), and a useless international conference center. Whether the loans for these projects were the result of corrupt dealings has been much discussed but never investigated. Same with many other loans taken out during Mahinda and Gotabaya’s reigns.

The Rajapaksa’ reckless borrowing was accompanied by other equally irresponsible fiscal policies: state-owned enterprises that bled resources, a regressive, poorly enforced tax code. Gotabaya’s 2019 cuts in personal and corporate taxation and its almost halving the VAT (from 15% to 8%) put an economy headed over the cliff into overdrive. The inevitable result of borrowing too much and taking too little in: last May the government announced it could not pay its debts, the sovereign equivalent of a corporation or person declaring bankruptcy.

The International Monetary Fund has now come to the rescue, offering to lend the government $2.9 billion while it renegotiates the some $35 billion it owes the Asian Development Bank, China, India, Japan, the World Bank, and private lenders.

But not all Sri Lanka’s debts should be renegotiated. Where a loan was taken out because a government official was bribed, Sri Lanka has a clear right to cancel or rescind it. That right to walk from a loan procured through corruption is recognized under international law (article 8(2) of the Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention Against Corruption, article 34 of the UN Convention Against Corruption, UNICTRAL Principles of International Contracts 3.3.1) and the domestic laws of most legal systems. Indeed, it is a part of the common law of Sri Lanka (Review Sri Lanka UNCAC Compliance) and article 52 of China’s contract law expressly states “A contract is void [if] 1. either party enters into the contract by means of fraud. . ..”

Sri Lankans will suffer for years for the wrongs done to them by the Rajapaksas and accomplices. They should not have to bear the burden of paying off one single dollar, yuan, rupee, or yen of a loan taken out corruptly. Where there are suspicions that a loan, as those to support the elephant herd in the Rajapaksas’ home district, was tainted with corruption, an investigation should be opened. And during loan renegotiations, Sir Lanka should make it clear that no matter the terms, it reserves the right to cancel or rescind any contract procured through corruption.

Guest Post: How One Family Is Capturing the Sri Lankan State

Today’s guest post is from Professor Liz David-Barrett, Director of the Centre for the Study of Corruption at the University of Sussex.

Sri Lanka, a fragile democracy that emerged from a 26-year civil war only in 2009, is on the verge of becoming a captured state, thanks to a concerted power grab by the Rajapaksa family. When Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected president in late 2019, he appointed his brother Mahinda to serve as both premier and Finance Minister. He later relieved Mahinda of the latter role, but replaced him with another brother. A fourth brother is Minister of Irrigation, and Mahinda’s son runs another two ministries. All told, Ministries run by the Rajapaksa family control an estimated 24% of the state budget. And another six Members of Parliament are members of the family. The Rajapaksas have further extended their control by appointing allies (including other family members) to other high-ranking government jobs and leadership roles in state-owned enterprises.

Even more troubling than the extent of the Rajapaska family’s dominance over Sri Lankan government is the way in which the Rajapaksas are using the familiar state capture playbook to ensure that they stay in power:

Continue reading

Recovering Damages for Corruption — Bribery Victims

There is no longer any doubt that corruption does enormous harm – to individuals, businesses, governments, and whole societies.  Nor is there any dispute that those harmed should have a right to recover damages for their injuries.  In drafting the UN Convention Against Corruption, governments agreed quickly and without dissent upon what is now article 35. It requires parties to ensure their domestic law permit any person or entity harmed by corruption to “initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for the damage to obtain compensation.”

Yet what evidence there is shows article 35’s promise remains largely unfulfilled.

For the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the StAR Initiative, I am examining just how far there is to go for that promise to be met. With their resources and the help of the International Bar Association, I have reviewed the case law in close to one-third of the 187 UNCAC states parties.  The most common victim recovery cases I find are those where a government agency or state-owned corporation has recovered damages when an employee took a bribe. In a few, courts have also awarded damages to third-parties harmed by the bribery. There are in addition a miscellany of actions I am still digesting covering actions by the competitors of a bribe-payer, consumers, and NGOs.

Below are the bribery victim cases I have located to date. A second post will review the other cases. Reader contributions and comments warmly solicited.

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New Podcast, Featuring Asoka Obeysekere

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this week’s episode, I interview Asoka Obeysekere, the Executive Director for Transparency International’s Sri Lanka chapter (TI-SL). Our conversation covers TI-SL’s various approaches to combating corruption in Sri Lanka, including both “retail” legal aid efforts to assist individual citizens in dealing with corrupt bureaucrats, as well as efforts to secure broader legal and institutional reforms, as well as broader cultural change. On that latter subject, the interview also covers the system of corruption in Sri Lanka, how corruption has become normalized, and whether an dhow attitudes about corruption can be changed. We also discuss how TI-SL, drawing inspiration from a civil society initiative in Ukraie, has compiled its own registry of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) using publicly available, and how the creation of such a database can be helpful in detecting suspicious activity and exposing potential wrongdoing. The interview concludes with the advice Mr. Obeysekere would offer to other civil society leaders operating in similarly challenging environments on how they can be most effective in advancing an anticorruption agenda.

You can find this episode here. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations:

KickBack is a collaborative effort between GAB and the ICRN. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends! And if you have suggestions for voices you’d like to hear on the podcast, just send me a message and let me know.

Will Hosting the UNCAC Meeting Prompt the UAE to Comply with the Convention?

The largest, most important anticorruption conference of the year is underway this week in the United Arab Emirates. Formally known as the eighth session of the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the 186 nations that have ratified UNCAC are convening to examine how they can strengthen the fight against corruption.  They have not said why they chose to meet in the UAE, a collection of seven tiny, wealthy monarchies.  Perhaps it is because the Emirates’ location on the eastern end of the Arabian Peninsula makes it an easy place to reach from anywhere on the globe. Or perhaps it is because of its top-notch conference facilities and first-rate restaurants and hotels.

Or perhaps something more subtle is at work.

It’s no secret that the UAE and the governments of its seven federated emirates, especially Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have repeatedly flouted their UNCAC obligations.  In researching The Despot’s Guide to Wealth Management, author Jason Sharman was told by staff from the World Bank/UNODC Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, the IMF, and the governments of Switzerland and the United States that “the UAE and particularly Dubai . . . were the leading haven for international corruption funds,” a conclusion Susan Hawley confirmed on this blog, writing that an “increasing numbers of corrupt money trails lead” to the UAE. Mozambique’s Prosecutor General reports that the UAE has stonewalled her request for help in prosecuting the accused in the “hidden debt” scandal, and evidence presented in the recently concluded U.S. trial of one of the accused revealed numerous violations of its anticorruption laws that the UAE has ignored.

Perhaps the other 185 parties to UNCAC hope that holding the meeting in the UAE will persuade its government to finally meet the nation’s obligations as an UNCAC party. Five indicators of whether their stratagem is succeeding: Continue reading

What Will It Take To Pass the Sri Lankan Audit Bill?

Regular, effective auditing of public programs by an independent body is widely recognized as a crucial anticorruption tool. Yet in Sri Lanka, the legal framework that would enable such effective auditing is still not in place. Although Sri Lanka’s Auditor General’s Department (AG) has been in operation for more than 200 years, it derives most of its functions from executive practice and regulations, rather than legislation. For this reason, the office is largely toothless: It cannot take any action to enforce its findings beyond submitting reports to two parliamentary committees, but these have little to no impact, as any follow-up actions are largely dependent on executive discretion. For years, experts and citizens alike have recognized the urgent need for a National Audit Law to govern and empower the Auditor General’s Department.

Yet despite repeated efforts and a constitutional mandate, the government has still not succeeded in enacting such a robust statutory framework to govern public audits. A National Audit Bill has been in the process of “being drafted” since the early 2000s, but an actual draft bill didn’t appear until 2013. No further action was taken on that bill. When President Sirisena took office in January 2015, he declared that the government would pass a National Audit Act by March 2015 as part of his 100-day programme. But although a new Audit Bill was proposed to Cabinet in April 2015, the proposal was deferred by the Cabinet a shocking 24 times, up until October 2017. Eventually, there were encouraging reports that the “impasse” had ended and that the Audit Bill had been approved by the Cabinet. But it was not to be: it turned out that what had been approved were amendments to the proposed bill, and not the bill itself. Subsequently, the government stated that it will not be submitting the Bill to Parliament – back to square one.

Why the seemingly interminable delay? It appears that the main reason for the impasse, at least since 2015, is a contentious section which vests the AG with the power to impose a surcharge—that is, to disallow public expenditure and require monies found to have been used improperly to be refunded by the guilty parties. This has met with resistance, mainly because it would take decisions concerning enforcement out of the hands of politicians. (Opponents of the bill also claim that it would hinder the carrying out of public duties by politicians, such as when urgent funds are required to respond to natural calamities.) Yet many reformers insist that giving the AG the surcharge power is necessary and non-negotiable.

If progress on the Audit Bill is to move forward, something has got to give. In my view, despite all the policy arguments for granting the AG the surcharge power, it’s better to move ahead and enact an Audit Act that lacks this provision, rather than allowing this sticking point to further hold up its passage. This is one of those situations where we can’t let the perfect become the enemy of the good. Continue reading

Can Sri Lanka Clean Up Its Elections?

Schools bags, school books, seed and fertilizer, clothes, sewing machines, clocks, calendars, and mobile phones – these are just some of the items that were distributed to the public during the 2015 Sri Lankan Presidential election campaign as “election bribes”. Indeed, this election was plagued by widespread violations of election law and the blatant misuse of state resources, including the illegal display of cut-outs, distribution of money during political meetings, the use of vehicles belonging to state institutions for propaganda purposes, and the construction of illegal election offices. Moreover, overall spending on election activities by the two main candidates was colossal. Incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa (the losing candidate) is reported to have spent over 2 billion Rupees (approximately US$13 million) of public funds on his advertising campaign alone, excluding the cost of production, while the winning candidate, Maithripala Sirisena, is reported to have had a budget of 676 million Rupees (approximately US$ 4.4 million) for electronic and print media.

In this context, reports that the Cabinet of Sri Lanka has unanimously approved a proposal to amend the country’s election laws in order to place more controls on campaign-related expenditures is good news. Such reform would address a gaping void in the existing legal framework: although Sri Lanka has laws prohibiting vote-buying and similar practices, there are currently no laws regulating campaign finance. The specifics of the approved Cabinet Memorandum are still not publicly available, and it is therefore not yet possible to offer a detailed evaluation of the proposed changes. Nonetheless, given what we already know about election campaigns in Sri Lanka—especially regarding the corruption risks associated with the lack of adequate regulation—it is possible to offer a few general observations and recommendations. Continue reading

Guest Post: Global Forum or Global Farce on Asset Recovery?

GAB is delighted to welcome back Susan Hawley, Policy Director at Corruption Watch, to contribute today’s guest post:

The global record on recovering assets looted from public treasuries is not good. The World Bank and UNODC estimate that between $20-40 billion is stolen each year. Between 2006 and 2012, $2.6 billion stolen assets were frozen in so-called “destination” countries, and $423.5 million was returned. That means of the roughly $120 billion (taking the lowest end of the World Bank and UNODC’s estimate) thought to have been potentially looted globally in that 6 year period, only 0.3% was actually recovered.

To strengthen international efforts to combat this problem, the 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit called for the creation of a Global Forum on Asset Recovery (GFAR); the World Bank and UNODC’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative organized the inaugural Global Forum on Asset Recovery (GFAR), in December 2017 in Washington, D.C., with the US and UK governments as co-hosts. The GFAR, which welcomed over 300 participants from 26 jurisdictions, focused on four countries: Nigeria, (thought to have to have lost $32 billion to corruption under previous President Goodluck Jonathan); Sri Lanka (where former President Rajapaksa allegedly stole up to $5.38 billion); Tunisia (where former ruler Ben Ali and his family are thought to have amassed wealth of over $13 billion); and Ukraine (where former president Yanukovych and his associates are thought to have stolen around $7.5 billion). These countries were selected for their political will to recover stolen assets and the considerable assets they have to recover.

The stated objectives for the GFAR were “progress on cases achieved by the four focus countries, increased capacity through technical sessions, renewed commitment to advancing asset recovery cases, and increased collaboration among involved jurisdictions.” As measured against these objectives, was the GFAR a success? Should it be a regular event? More generally, do asset recovery forums like this have sufficient positive impact to justify their cost? Continue reading

London Anticorruption Summit–Country Commitment Scorecard, Part 2

This post is the second half of my attempt to summarize the commitments (or lack thereof) in the country statements of the 41 countries that attended last week’s London Anticorruption Summit, in four areas highlighted by the Summit’s final Communique:

  1. Increasing access to information on the true beneficial owners of companies, and possibly other legal entities, perhaps through central registers;
  2. Increasing transparency in public procurement;
  3. Strengthening the independence and capacity of national audit institutions, and publicizing audit results (and, more generally, increasing fiscal transparency in other ways); and
  4. Encouraging whistleblowers, strengthening their protection from various forms or retaliation, and developing systems to ensure that law enforcement takes prompt action in response to whistleblower complaints.

These are not the only subjects covered by the Communique and discussed in the country statements. (Other topics include improving asset recovery mechanisms, facilitating more international cooperation and information sharing, joining new initiatives to fight corruption in sports, improving transparency in the extractive sector through initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, additional measures to fight tax evasion, and several others.) I chose these four partly because they seemed to me of particular importance, and partly because the Communique’s discussion of these four areas seemed particularly focused on prompting substantive legal changes, rather than general improvements in existing mechanisms.

Plenty of others have already provided useful comprehensive assessments of what the country commitments did and did not achieve. My hope is that presenting the results of the rather tedious exercise of going through each country statement one by one for the language on these four issues, and presenting the results in summary form, will be helpful to others out there who want to try to get a sense of how the individual country commitments do or don’t match up against the recommendations in the Communique. My last post covered Afghanistan–Malta; today’s post covers the remaining country statements, Mexico–United States: Continue reading