Tag Archives: Canada

Too Nice? Why Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) Needs Revamping

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Capping off a series of scandalous events that shook Canadian politics to its foundation, in February 2019, Jody Wilson-Raybould––the country’s then-Justice Minister and Attorney General––resigned from the cabinet and alleged that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s office had pressured her to intervene in a criminal case against the Canadian construction firm SNC-Lavalin. Wilson-Raybould claimed the Prime Minister’s office ordered her to arrange a more lenient remediation agreement with the firm, which was facing bribery and fraud charges for its 2001–2011 dealings with the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya, because of its economic significance. (SNC-Lavalin employs more than 9000 Canadians).

These revelations brought some much-needed attention to deficiencies in Canada’s enforcement of its laws against foreign bribery. While this scrutiny is welcome, and allegations of political interference are especially troubling, the SNC-Lavalin affair may be a somewhat misleading illustration of the most pervasive problems with Canadian authorities’ anti-bribery efforts. In fact, the SNC-Lavalin affair is anomalous because, notwithstanding the alleged interference from the Prime Minister’s office, the company was actually convicted and punished in the end—to the tune of a hefty $280 million CAD fine. In Canada, such prosecutions and convictions are quite rare—not because of political meddling, but because of structural deficiencies that prevent authorities from even pursuing such investigations in the vast majority of cases.

Read more: Too Nice? Why Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) Needs Revamping

Canada enacted its federal prohibition on bribing foreign public officials, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act/Loi sur la corruption d’agents publics étrangers (CFPOA), in 1998, shortly after it ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Much like the U.S.’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the CFPOA prohibits the bribery of foreign officials, and also requires companies to maintain accounting practices and internal controls sufficient to ensure that bribery does not occur.

Unfortunately, Canada’s track record of enforcing the CFPOA does not match the United States’ track record of enforcing the FCPA. Indeed, as early as 2005, Canada’s lackluster anti-bribery efforts attracted scrutiny and criticism from the OECD Working Group on Bribery, which evaluates how well member countries abide by the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. In response, the Canadian Parliament amended the CFPOA in 2013 to strengthen its anti-bribery provisions. Yet, enforcement of the CFPOA continued to be infrequent, and when enforcement actions took place, the penalties were typically quite low. The 2010s saw slightly more high-profile investigations, with Niko Resources fined $9.5 million CAD in 2011 and Griffiths Energy fined $10.35 million CAD in 2013. And then, of course, there was the SNC-Lavalin case, which involved alleged CFPOA violations, though the company eventually negotiated a plea bargain that removed bribery-related charges in exchange for a fraud conviction. (Doing so avoided triggering the CFPOA’s debarment provisions, which would have prevented the company from doing further business in Canada).

But these few notable enforcement actions did not change the overall picture: As recently as October 2023, the OECD Working Group on Bribery described the Canada’s anti-bribery enforcement activity as “exceedingly low” relative to the strength of the Canadian economy and in comparison to similar countries. A recent Transparency International report similarly gave Canada poor marks in enforcing its laws against foreign bribery, comparing Canada disfavorably to peer countries. As the report noted, Canada did not initiate any CFPOA investigations in 2020 or 2021; during the same time span, the United States initiated 15 foreign bribery cases, and Switzerland initiated 28. In fact, charges have only ever been laid in nine cases in the CFPOA’s entire history, with only two individuals and four companies ever having been sanctioned. Canada’s anemic CFPOA enforcement is particularly worrisome given that Canadian exports and investments are disproportionately in high-risk sectors, such as energy and mining. 

Canadian anti-bribery efforts would benefit greatly from a revised approach that does three main things: Continue reading →

A Spirited Discussion of the Proposal To Create an International Anticorruption Court

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As longtime readers of this blog are likely aware, over the years I’ve had the opportunity to participate in debates over the proposal to create an International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC), modeled on but separate from the International Criminal Court. Though sympathetic to the motives behind this proposal, I have been consistently skeptical (see, for example, here and here). Despite skepticism from me and others, dogged and effective advocacy by IACC proponents have convinced some governments to formally embrace the idea. Perhaps most notably, in Canada both the Liberal and Conservative parties have endorsed the idea, and Canada’s Foreign Minister has been formally instructed by the Prime Minister to work with international partners to help establish an IACC.

Inspired by these developments, the Anti-Corruption Law Program at the University of British Columbia’s Allard School of Law held an online webinar two weeks ago on the proposal to create an IACC. I was invited to be a part of this conversation, along with three distinguished co-panelists: Juanita Olaya Garcia (a lawyer and member of the International Expert Panel for the Open Government Partnership), Peter MacKay (former Canadian Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper), and Allan Rock (former Canadian Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien). Although we had quite diverse perspectives–with Mr. MacKay and Mr. Rock advocating for the IACC, and Ms. Garcia and I sounding more skeptical notes–the conversation, ably moderated by Roy Cullen, was, in my humble opinion, respectful and constructive, and I hope readers interested in this debate will find the discussion helpful in clarifying some of the important questions and issues that this provocative proposal raises..

Those who are interested can find a recording of the webinar here. (There are some introductory remarks at the beginning; for those who want to skip right to the substantive debate, that begins at about the 6:10 mark.)

Defining Corruption: What Do Readers Say?

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Recent posts have treated readers to a discussion of what corruption means.  Professor Rothstein suggested coming at it from its opposite and offered “impartiality” so corruption would mean the absence of impartiality or bias. [Note: I had flubbed Prof. Rothstein’s view in the original text as per his comment below.] Professor Johnson argued that at its core corruption is about an imbalance of power and suggested tying the definition to notions of “justice.” Transparency International’s “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” was also examined.

I think it time for GAB readers to be heard. Rather than asking which one of these definitions they prefer, or whether they have another candidate, however, I thought it more interesting to see how a definition of corruption helps them judge actual conduct in the real world. 

Below are six cases where at least some have alleged corruption was afoot. What say, GAB readers? Do any of the cases described below involve corruption as you define it?

A yea or nay on each in a comment to this post will suffice. Extra credit for explaining how one of the definitions proffered helped you decide. Lifetime subscription to GAB at the current rate to the best entry or entries. How each played out in court and in the court of public opinion will be revealed in a future post.

Case 1. To defeat a motion of no confidence, Vanuatu’s Unity of Change government offered two MPs parliamentary appointments in return for withdrawing their support for the motion.  Another MP was offered the position of Minister of Health, and a fourth Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries. All four accepted the offers, and the government defeated the motion. Bribery?

Continue reading →

Will Canada Help Curb Haitian Corruption?

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Many Haitians fear for their safety and that of their family as their country slips into anarchic violence after the assassination of their president. But not Haitian Senator Rony Célestin and his family

Courtesy of the Canadian government, they are ensconced in the mansion pictured above. Located in the toniest of tony areas in Quebec, the couple recently settled on it for some $4 million.

 What did the Canadian government have to do with Célestin’s acquisition of the mansion? Everything. Célestin is a high-ranking official of a foreign country.  Any Canadian real estate agent or bank he contacted about buying the mansion was obliged by Canadian law to ask a simple question: How does a public official of one of the world’s poorest countries amass enough to buy such a luxurious home?  

If the July 11 New York Times story on the Senator and the mansion is correct, an inquiry would quickly have raised suspicions that the money did not come from a legitimate source. That in turn would have further obliged the real estate agent or banker to alert Canadian authorities.

Reports by the Financial Action Task Force and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering have repeatedly warned Canadian officials that controls on money laundering in the real estate sector were toothless, that for years corrupt foreign officials have been hiding their money in Canada through the purchase of pricey real estate.  Indeed, in their latest, joint report, issued in 2016, the two flagged the rise of “criminally-inclined real estate professionals, notably real estate lawyers” to cater to the money laundering needs of criminals of all kind.

Is it too much to ask Canadian authorities to stop looking the other way when corrupt officials come to their country to shop for real estate?  Perhaps the picture of the Senator’s mansion juxtaposed with anyone of the thousands of Haiti’s poor might prompt action?  Canadian civil society, where are you?

Recovering Damages for Corruption — Bribery Victims

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There is no longer any doubt that corruption does enormous harm – to individuals, businesses, governments, and whole societies.  Nor is there any dispute that those harmed should have a right to recover damages for their injuries.  In drafting the UN Convention Against Corruption, governments agreed quickly and without dissent upon what is now article 35. It requires parties to ensure their domestic law permit any person or entity harmed by corruption to “initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for the damage to obtain compensation.”

Yet what evidence there is shows article 35’s promise remains largely unfulfilled.

For the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the StAR Initiative, I am examining just how far there is to go for that promise to be met. With their resources and the help of the International Bar Association, I have reviewed the case law in close to one-third of the 187 UNCAC states parties.  The most common victim recovery cases I find are those where a government agency or state-owned corporation has recovered damages when an employee took a bribe. In a few, courts have also awarded damages to third-parties harmed by the bribery. There are in addition a miscellany of actions I am still digesting covering actions by the competitors of a bribe-payer, consumers, and NGOs.

Below are the bribery victim cases I have located to date. A second post will review the other cases. Reader contributions and comments warmly solicited.

Continue reading →

Canadian Legislation to Permit Use of Stolen Assets for Humanitarian Relief

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Ontario Senator Ratna Omidvar has introduced legislation to allow the Canadian government to use frozen assets for humanitarian end. The Frozen Assets Repurposing Act (Loi sur la réaffectation des biens bloqués) would authorize the Attorney General or a designee to request the court where an asset is frozen to seize it. If after a hearing the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the asset is “associated with a foreign national who is responsible for or complicit in” corruption or human rights violations, the asset would be liquidated and the proceeds paid into the court. The court may then distribute the funds to any person, organization, or foreign state for a “just and appropriate” purpose.

The Senator’s bill solves a problem both Canada and the European Union faced in the wake of the Arab Spring.  Canada’s federal government and EU executive both had the power to freeze assets where there was evidence that they were obtained through corruption. But the law allowed them to do no more.  The laws of both assumed the governments from which the assets had been stolen would initiate return proceedings in accordance with chapter V of UNCAC.  But thanks to some combination of a lack of capacity and political wherewithal, successor governments in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen did not. The freezes either ended and the funds went back to the crooked leader or they remain frozen indefinitely.

Although the legislation leaves it to the court to decide how to use the confiscated funds, Senator Omidvar’s bill explicitly states that consideration be given to helping foreign states accommodate refuges. She suggests for example that the frozen funds of Venezuela’s corrupt rulers could be distributed to Colombia and other neighboring countries to alleviate the suffering of Venezuelans who have sought refuge in them.

The confiscation process follows that in the U.K.’s Unexplained Wealth Order law. The holder of the asset would be given the opportunity to show he or she had obtained it through lawful means.  Only if the holder failed to convince the court that it was would confiscation follow.

The legislation was inspired by this 2018 World Refugee Council paper.  The Senator’s “Make Corrupt Foreign Officials Pay,” an article in the online journal Policy Options Politique, makes a strong case for its enactment.  The arguments are not Canada-specific. Perhaps legislators in other countries where the corrupt hide their money will be inspired to copy her bill?  The text is here.

Canada’s SNC-Lavalin Scandal: Why Prime Minister Trudeau Was Wrong To Interfere, Even Though He Was Right on the Merits

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This past year, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has been embroiled in allegations that he improperly intervened in one of Canada’s biggest-ever foreign bribery prosecutions. That prosecution, of the Canadian construction firm SNC-Lavalin, began back in 2015, when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) announced they would be bringing charges against the firm for paying approximately CA$48 million in bribes to Libyan government officials to win contracts, and for related misconduct including the defrauding of Libyan companies. This past February, the Globe and Mail reported that Prime Minister Trudeau and his closest advisors had inappropriately attempted to influence the SNC-Lavalin prosecution, and a subsequent inquiry by the Ethics Commissioner found that Trudeau had indeed acted unethically in attempting to influence key prosecutorial decisions that are supposed to be made by the Attorney General. The scandal had political consequences: although Prime Minister Trudeau and his Liberal Party managed to hang on to a minority government in October’s elections, the Liberal Party lost 27 seats and the popular vote.

The specific prosecutorial decision that Prime Minister Trudeau attempted to influence concerned whether the government should negotiate a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with SNC-Lavalin. A DPA is a settlement in which the defendant agrees to penalties or other remedial measures, and in return the government agrees to suspend the prosecution, and eventually drop the charges if after an agreed period of time the defendant has complied with the terms of the agreement. A DPA is similar to a plea bargain, but it does not require the defendant to plead guilty, and so avoids imposing on the defendant the stigma and collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. The prosecutor who brought the charges denied SNC-Lavalin’s request for a DPA in late 2018, and the acting Attorney General, Jody Wilson-Raybould, declined to overrule that decision. The Attorney General’s decision is supposed to be final on such matters. Nonetheless, Ms. Wilson-Raybould claims she fielded ten phone calls from the Prime Minister’s office, and was invited in for ten in-person meetings with the Prime Minister and his advisors, regarding this decision—and that the Prime Minister was pushing her to pursue a DPA with SNC-Lavalin. Ms. Wilson-Raybould refused to reconsider her stance on the matter, and shortly afterwards she was removed from her position as Attorney General and named instead Head of Veteran Affairs. In the end, the interference was exposed, the pressure failed, and, unless there’s some other unexpected turn of events, SNC-Lavalin will be going to trial.

This affair raises two questions: First, was Prime Minister Trudeau correct that the prosecutors should negotiate a DPA in this case? Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, was it appropriate for the Prime Minister to press his Attorney General to pursue that approach? My answer is yes to the first question, but no to the second. On the one hand, Prime Minister Trudeau was correct, and Acting Attorney General Wilson-Raybould was incorrect, about the appropriateness of a DPA in this case. However, the principle of prosecutorial independence from political influence—especially in corruption cases—is far more important, and the Prime Minister should never have compromised this core value even if he was right on the merits of this individual decision. Continue reading →

The OECD Convention’s Article Prohibiting the Politicization of Foreign Bribery Enforcement Is in Desperate Need of Clarification

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Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention provides that the policing of foreign bribery by Convention Parties shall not be influenced by (1) “considerations of national economic interest,” (2) “the potential effect upon relations with another State,” or (3) “the identity of the natural or legal persons involved.” Collectively, these mandates are known as the “Article 5 factors.” Article 5 is intended as a safeguard against the politicization or instrumentalization of foreign bribery laws. It is therefore vital to impartial foreign bribery enforcement, as well as to the integrity of foreign bribery enforcement generally.

The most well-known instance of an alleged Article 5 breach is the United Kingdom’s decision in 2006 to stop investigations into bribes paid by BAE Systems to public officials in Saudi Arabia. Then-Attorney General Peter Goldsmith argued that this decision was justified because the investigation could have damaged national security interests, as Saudi Arabia had threatened to end counterterrorism cooperation with the UK if the investigation continued. Goldsmith expressly denied that terminating the investigation for this reason constituted a breach of Article 5 because, as he put it, the decision to join the OECD Convention didn’t mean that the UK had “agreed to abandon any consideration of national security. [The Convention] certainly doesn’t say that and I don’t believe that’s what we could have intended or any other country could have intended.” The UK’s decision to suspend the BAE investigation, though challenged in court, was ultimately upheld.

More recently, the OECD has called attention to two other potential Article 5 breaches. First, an OECD news release stated that Turkey’s Article 5 compliance was in doubt due to inexplicably low level of foreign bribery enforcement, which the release suggested might be partly due to improper economic or political considerations. Second, another OECD news release raised concerns that Canada may have breached Article 5 by cancelling investigations into allegations that SNC Lavelin had bribed Libyan officials—a decision that observers believed was motivated by a desire to protect Canada’s national economic interests.

While it is encouraging to see the OECD adopt a more assertive approach to recognizing Article 5 breaches than it has in the past, these statements serve as stark reminders that there is not really an effective means for enforcing Article 5. And unfortunately, the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of Article 5 complicates the task of achieving Article 5 compliance. Continue reading →

G7 Hypocrisy on Illicit Enrichment Crimes

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Last month, I saw a news report about the international reaction to the Ukrainian Constitutional Court’s decision striking down Ukraine’s criminal offense of “illicit enrichment” as unconstitutional. For those unfamiliar with this topic, the crime of “illicit enrichment” makes it a criminal offense for a public official to realize a significant increase in his or her assets that the public official cannot reasonably explain. The crime of illicit enrichment is related to, but distinct from, civil asset forfeiture systems under which the government may seize—as presumptively the proceeds of unlawful activity—assets that the owner cannot reasonably explain. The main difference is that a civil forfeiture order results in the loss of assets, while a criminal offense can result in fines or incarceration, as well as the other collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. Some anticorruption activists support the criminalization of illicit enrichment on the grounds that it is often difficult or impossible to prove the underlying corruption offenses, but a substantial unexplained increase in a public official’s wealth is sufficient to prove that the official is corrupt. Critics warn that criminalizing illicit enrichment is incompatible with traditional notions of the presumption of innocence. (The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), perhaps unsurprisingly, fudges the issue, with UNCAC Article 20 calling on States Parties to “consider” adopting an illicit enrichment offense, “[s]ubject to [that country’s] constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system.”)

In its decision last February 26, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court went with the critics, holding that the criminalization of illicit enrichment a criminal offense was an unconstitutional infringement on the presumption of innocence. This decision met with swift condemnation from the G7, which issued a joint statement with the World Bank declaring that the “recent elimination of the illicit enrichment offence from [Ukraine’s] criminal code is a serious setback in the fight against corruption” that has “weakened the impact of the whole anti-corruption architecture.” Illicit enrichment, the G7 and World Bank admonished, “is not a new offence. In 2010 there were more than 40 countries that criminalized illicit enrichment,” and “[c]ourts around the world have recognized that the criminalization of illicit enrichment is a powerful tool in the fight against corruption, while at the same time respecting fundamental human rights and constitutional principles such as [the] presumption of innocence[.]” The G7-World Bank joint statement closed by calling on Ukrainian authorities to “reinstat[e] criminal liability for illicit enrichment in line with UN, OECD, and [European Court of Human Rights] principles.”

Now, as a policy matter, I tend to agree with the G7-World Bank position here. I think that appropriately tailored and cabined illicit enrichment offenses can be useful tools, and (as others have also pointed out), it’s not true that such offenses have any inherent conflict with the presumption of innocence. Nonetheless, I found the letter an exercise in outrageous, condescending hypocrisy, one that the G7 countries in particular should be ashamed to have written. Continue reading →

Putting Elected Officials in Charge of Elections Is a Recipe for Corruption: Evidence from U.S. States

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One of the stories that figured prominently in last November’s U.S. elections was that of Brian Kemp, then Georgia’s Secretary of State and now the state’s new Governor. As Secretary of State, Kemp was responsible for administering the state’s elections—but in 2018 he was administering the very election in which he was running for governor, which creates an inherent conflict of interest. Indeed, there was plenty of evidence that Kemp used his position as Secretary to increase his odds of winning the election: He attempted to close polling locations in neighborhoods likely to vote for his opponent, promulgated abnormally stringent voter registration rules that put thousands of voters’ eligibility into question, and launched what most observers considered to be a groundless investigation into his opponent’s campaign in the week before the election. Ultimately, after ignoring calls for him to recuse himself, Kemp announced that he would resign as Secretary of State two days after the election, while the votes were still being counted. Kemp was eventually declared the winner, though his opponent, Stacey Abrams, never fully conceded, vowing to sue Kemp for “gross mismanagement of the election.”

It’s hard to see how an election administrator’s use of his power to benefit his own political campaign is anything other than corrupt. Indeed, Kemp’s controversial election illustrates how the U.S. electoral process is particularly vulnerable to this sort of corruption. (And, it’s worth noting, while Kemp drew most of the attention, there were two other candidates in the 2018 elections that found themselves in the same position, with one choosing to recuse himself from the recount process back in August 2018 during a close primary.) In most U.S. states, the Secretary of State (who is responsible for administering the state’s elections) is an elected official, and in over half of the states, Secretaries of State can run for public office while serving as Secretaries. This is out of step with most of the developed world, where election administration is independent and apolitical. Reformers have called for changes to this system before, so far without much success. But the atmosphere may now be ripe for anticorruption advocates to propose referenda to create new, independent, and non-partisan systems for election administration. A well-designed system could eliminate the clear conflicts of interest raised by people like Brian Kemp, while also tackling the more insidious and less obvious forms of corruption that arise when party members use their power over election administration to ensure that their party stays in power.

What might such a system look like? Canada may provide a useful model, given its similarities to the U.S., particularly with respect to its federalist structure. In Canada, each province is responsible for administering its provincial elections, while the Canadian national government administers national elections. The Canadian election administration systems share a few key components that keep the electoral commissions independent and non-partisan, and that all U.S. states should adopt: Continue reading →