Look it Up: Two Invaluable New References Books on Corruption

The learning on corruption has exploded over the past two decades plus. Where once one scratched around for material on subjects like conflict of interest, the measurement of corruption, and whistleblower protection, a plethora of books, articles, reports, monographs, and, yes, even blog posts are available today on these and other once recondite topics. Great news for specialists and students. 

But bad news for those who aren’t. For policymakers, reporters, citizens, and other non-experts who need to know the basics about a corruption-related topic for a parliamentary debate, a story deadline or what-have-you but don’t have all day, or days, to read up on it.

Until recently they were at the mercy of an internet search engine. If they were lucky, one of the first entries that came up provided a useful summary of the learning. Or maybe it was misguided or out-of-date. Or, as now happens more frequently, maybe the search engine produced a hallucinogenic note, text generated by a large language model that sounds authoritative but the content of which is anything but.  

Now, thanks to two recent publications, the days of hoping a search engine or a LLM will provide a short, reliable introduction to a key corruption related concept are over.

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Corporate Transparency Is the Next Step in Switzerland’s Fight Against Corruption

In response to abuses of the corporate form by corrupt actors and other criminals, an increasing number of countries have been requiring companies and other legal entities to provide information on their “beneficial owners” (that is, the real human beings who own or control the entity) and compiling that information in centralized registries. Additionally, more governments are also requiring professionals in designated high-risk areas (not just finance) to verify the identity of clients behind the corporate veil and the risks of doing business with them.

Switzerland is lagging well behind this global movement towards more corporate transparency. Although Switzerland has done a lot recently to shake off its historic reputation as a haven for illicit funds, Swiss law still makes it too easy for bad actors to hide behind corporate constructs. Switzerland currently only requires a fraction of its domestic corporations to keep internal lists of their largest shareholders. Even this limited information – which focuses on legal ownership only and therefore does not necessarily reflect actual control over a company – need not to be verified, and the information can be difficult for Swiss authorities to access. Just this past year, Switzerland adopted rules requiring Swiss professionals who manage corporate cash flows, such as bankers and asset managers, to verify the identity of clients behind corporate constructs, but other professionals can continue to do business without any such obligations.

But this might be about to change.

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New Podcast Episode, Featuring Andreas Bågenholm and Rekha Diwakar

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Dan Hough interviews Andreas Bågenholm (University of Gothenburg) and Rekha Diwakar (University of Sussex) about anticorruption political parties. These parties have proliferated in different parts of the world in the last two decades. Andreas and Rekha draw on their research in Europe and India respectively to talk about where these parties come from and what they stand for. They discuss how these parties have actually performed when they have entered into government, assessing in particular the track record of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in Delhi. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Brazil’s Car Wash Operation May Be Over, But Its Legacy Will Endure 

Brazil’s Lava Jato (“Car Wash”) Operation, launched in 2014, exposed one of the largest corruption schemes ever, resulting in the conviction of over 361 people for corruption, money-laundering, procurement fraud, and other crimes. Those convicted included prominent members of the Brazilian business and political elite, including the current President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known as Lula). Over the last few years, however, the Car Wash Operation has unraveled, with several of its most important achievements reversed. In 2019 a Brazilian hacker publicized text messages allegedly exchanged between Sergio Moro, the presiding judge in many of the Car Wash cases (including Lula’s), and the Car Wash prosecutors, prompting allegations of bias. The specialized Car Wash prosecutorial task force was disbanded in February 2021, and the Brazilian Supreme Court annulled Lula’s conviction on procedural grounds in April 2021, paving the way for his re-election to a third presidential term in October 2022. Most recently, as I discussed in a post here, the Brazilian Supreme Court held that key evidence obtained by Car Wash prosecutors in a settlement agreement with one of the companies at the heart of the scandal was inadmissible due to procedural irregularities, potentially rendering dozens of additional convictions subject to reversal.

So, was it all for nothing? I don’t think so. True, some of the operation’s most important successes are vanishing. But Car Wash helped strengthen Brazil’s legal and institutional framework for anticorruption and has helped pave the way for the country to embrace a more transparent, honest, and efficient system. More specifically, Car Wash has left a positive legacy with respect to the Brazilian approach to (1) corruption prevention; (2) corruption investigations; and (3) the resolution of corruption cases. Continue reading

Guest Post: Despite Serious Flaws, U.S. Safeguards Against Political Corruption Can Serve as Model for the World

Today’s guest post is from Scott Greytak, the Director of Advocacy at Transparency International US.

As much of the world converges on Atlanta for the 10th Session of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Conference of the States Parties (CoSP), the urgent need for a renewed, reinforced, and relevant global anticorruption framework takes center stage. Among the most important issues to address concerns political finance transparency, an issue that the current version of the UNCAC does not directly cover. The United States is well-positioned to provide leadership on this issue. While U.S. laws on money in politics have failed to keep pace with America’s evolving political dynamics, aspects of these laws nevertheless can and should serve as inspirations for much of the world as it struggles with political corruption. The CoSP presents a chance for the U.S. to share its experiences and lessons learned with other countries, and to support resolutions and amendments to include commitments on political finance transparency in the UNCAC itself.

Suggesting that the U.S. can be a leader or a model on the issue of regulating money in politics may sound surprising. My colleagues and I at Transparency International US are all too aware of the many failings of American democracy, including the American approach to political finance regulation. More than in any other major developed country in the world, for example, people in the United States believe that rich people buy elections, and U.S. political finance laws are in urgent need of updating, to address persistent problems like the influence of “dark money” in elections, and the need for adequately funded public financing programs for political campaigns. But comparatively speaking, some pieces of the U.S. legal framework can serve as a useful benchmark. For instance, a survey by the Global Data Barometer Political Integrity Module and the International IDEA’s Political Finance Database revealed that of 181 countries surveyed, 100 do not have any limits whatsoever on how much money can be given to a candidate for office. In contrast, the United States has comprehensive contribution limits for candidates, political parties, and traditional political action committees (even though such limits are infamously absent when it comes to “independent” expenditure committees, or Super PACs). Emphasizing this best practice, among others, on the global stage in Atlanta could help jumpstart a much-needed exchange and collaborative approach that could raise the bar for all democratic and emerging-democratic countries.

To this end, the United States should support resolutions and amendments that require countries to enact and enforce laws that disclose campaign contributions to candidates and political parties, as well as expenditures made by those candidates and parties, in a timely and publicly accessible fashion. The U.S. can also support requirements that countries to establish and appropriately fund independent oversight bodies that monitor political spending and enforce political finance laws. The U.S. delegation can support protections for whistleblowers who call out political finance violations and can urge countries to expressly commit to sharing information, best practices, and resources in fulfillment of these commitments, and to engage with civil society closely and consistently when developing and implementing these measures.

Amidst yet another year of increasing global political unrest and accompanying anxieties, successful examples of U.S. laws can and must serve as inspirations to others. In an era of seemingly limitless challenges to democracy in all regions of the world, it is this collaboration and commitment that can fortify its foundations. A first step can and must be taken by the U.S. in Atlanta.

Victims of Corruption Focus of Today’s COSP Events

Four events at today’s meeting of the Council of State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption put the damage corruption does to individuals and organizations front and center. The subject and starting hour (U.S. East Coast time) of each:

  • 9:00: Strategic Litigation: Advocacy Tool for Policy Change (details here)
  • 13:00: Victims of Corruption, New York Meeting Room (details here)
  • 16:00: Righting the wrong: Tools for Asset Recovery in Global Corruption Cases, New York Meeting Room
  • 18:00: A Victim-Centered Approach to Anticorruption Actions, Seattle Meeting Room (details here)

Among the highlights will be a review and discussion at Victims of Corruption session of StAR’s just published volume Victims of Corruption: Back for Payback. A heroic effort to bring together the diverse sources and approaches to compensating victims of corruption (to which I was honored to contribute), it represents a major step forward in focusing the attention of UNCAC states parties, jurists, and civil society activists on article 35, UNCAC’s most overlooked provision –

Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation.

Announcement: ICRN Forum — Call for Applications

The Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN), on whose Board of Advisors I serve, will be holding its eighth annual ICRN Forum this coming June June 27 to 29, 2024 at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon. The ICRN Forum is a brings together early career researchers from diverse disciplines, including but not limited to anthropology, economics, history, law, political science, psychology, and sociology. Participant will have the opportunity to present their research (at different stages), exchange ideas, and take part in co-creation sessions.

Those who are interested in submitting an application to present at the Forum (including a registration form and a 300-word abstract) may do so here. The ICRN’s instructions for applicants indicates that the Forum organizers welcome theoretical and empirical contribution on corruption, anticorruption, and/or integrity–from practitioners as well as academic researchers–and that applicants may apply for any of the three types of sessions:

  • Research Findings: In these sessions, authors will present research at a more advanced stage. (That is, where the researcher has already carried out their fieldwork, collected data, conducted some degree of analysis, produced some results, even if preliminary.) We also encourage submissions focused on the promotion of completed papers, the discussion of fieldwork challenges, and/or possible analytical pathways based on already-collected materials.
  • Work in Progress: In these sessions, researchers will present early-stage ideas, with the main objective to help these researchers get useful feedback on research design, framing, and related issues.
  • Co-Creation-: These sessions will focus on developing new research ideas and/or open collaboration projects; these may include ideas for a joint publication, teaching activities, or the organization of conference panels, as well as more innovative ideas that may advance corruption research. Applicants to a co-creation session are expected to volunteer to moderate (chair) the session. Proposals for a co-creation session must include a clear description of objectives, procedure, guiding questions, and any other elements considered relevant for the successful holding of discussions.

The deadline for submitting applications is Friday, February 9, 2024. Notification of acceptance will be sent out in March 2024. There is no registration fee, but participants will bear their own travel and accommodation expenses. Any questions can be sent to the organizing team at icrn2024@ics.ulisboa.pt

Shifting Goalposts: How FIFA Has Failed In Its Transparency Reforms

FIFA, the body that oversees world football (soccer), has a long history of corruption well-documented on this blog, particularly during the tenure of former president Sepp Blatter (see, for example, herehereherehereherehereherehere, and here). A series of groundbreaking indictments of numerous FIFA officials for wire fraud, racketeering, and money laundering by United States prosecutors, starting from 2015, led to multiple convictions, and revealed the widespread bribery involved in the awarding of 2010 World Cup hosting rights to South Africa. This scandal led to Blatter’s resignation in June 2015. (Blatter was later fined millions of dollars and banned from any involvement in FIFA activities for more than ten years by the organization’s Ethics Committee.) There have also been frequent allegations that Russian and Qatari officials allegedly bribed some FIFA executives and voters to win hosting rights to the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, though United States Attorneys probing FIFA have not elected to bring charges in relation to those allegations.

After Blatter’s resignation, FIFA pledged to clean up its act. In early 2016, Gianni Infantino was elected FIFA President. Infantino had campaigned on promises to crack down on corruption in the organization, and he pledged greater transparency in his first post-victory remarks. Shortly after assuming office, Infantino took steps to hire a chief compliance officer, publicly disclose the compensation of executive management, and bring FIFA’s accounting and auditing in line with industry best practices. But how has Infantino fared in increasing transparency when it comes to picking the host of the World Cup? 

Not very well. True, FIFA and Infantino widely touted the rigor of the process used to pick the United States, Canada, and Mexico as joint hosts for the 2026 Cup: an extensive consultation process introduced new standards for bidders, bids were subject to a years-long review window, new “technical requirements” for sustainable event management and environmental protection were created, and voting rights were expanded to FIFA’s entire 211-member body in place of being vested solely in FIFA’s executive committee. But the rather bizarre series of events this past October—culminating in FIFA picking the hosts of the 2030 and 2034 World Cups in a span of less than a month, with the winning bidder uncontested in both cases—demonstrates that the organization’s leadership has engineered rather ingenious methods of subverting nearly all of these reforms. Continue reading

New Podcast Episode, Featuring Robert Klitgaard

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Dan Hough interviews Professor Robert Klitgaard, one of the most well-known and influential academics in the corruption field. In the conversation, Professor Klitgaard talks us through the origins of his ideas in applying institutional economic theory to understanding corruption issues, as originally set out in his 1980 book Controlling Corruption. He then discusses several other issues, including challenges related to elitism in developing and developed countries, the role of “culture” in anticorruption analysis, and his recent research in Bhutan and the lessons it might hold for other countries pursuing anticorruption reforms. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Any Change is Progress? African Citizens Hope the Coups will Leave the Fight against Corruption in Better Hands

Africa has seen a recent spate of military coups—from Mali to Guinea to Burkina Faso to Niger to Gabon. Most Western powers have condemned these coups. But many Africans have rejoiced, or at least have been far less concerned. For example, a survey conducted shortly after the coup in Niger suggests that most people in four other West African countries (Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast) believed that the Niger coup was justified. Why the dissonance between Western and African reactions to these coups?

The answer has to do with the dysfunction and corruption of many nominally “democratic” African governments. Endemic corruption has destroyed public trust in African democracy, and coup leaders have made it clear that corruption is one of the core justifications for their takeovers. Whether this is sincere, a pretext, or a combination, it is clear that the coup leaders are tapping into a sense of genuine public grievance, and that many citizens in these countries have become so frustrated with their elected governments that they would willingly trade electoral democracy for a government with the political will to fight corruption and improve living conditions.

For this reason, it would be an error to see African citizens’ support for these coups as evidence of a turn against genuine democracy. But there is an enormous gap between genuine democracy and the reality of electoral democracy as it exists in many African countries. Westerners who are surprised by African citizens’ support for the recent coups have underestimated just how poorly the corruption of the previous regimes had devastated public trust.

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