The Fake News and Corruption Behind the Criminal Investigation of Transparency International

Transparency International and its Brazilian chapter are now the subject of a criminal investigation in Brazil. As GAB readers know (here), the investigation is part of Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli’s crusade to reverse the convictions handed down in Lava Jato, the landmark Brazilian corruption case. The aim is to ensure defendants escape all punishment in Brazil and are protected from prosecution in the dozen other Latin American and African countries where they paid bribes.

Today’s Guest Post by a Brazilian insider reveals just how groundless the investigation of TI is and Justice Toffoli’s direct conflict of interest in letting one of the Lava Jato defendants off the hook. The author explains that it starts, as the respected Brazilian journal Crusoé explains in the headline to its February 16 issue, with “A HISTORY OF FAKE NEWS AGAINST TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL: How the narrative was planted, leaked, refuted and reheated in the PGR [Federal Attorney General Office] to retaliate the anti-corruption NGO.”

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Brazil’s Anticorruption Backsliding

In a recent post I discussed the positive legacy of Brazil’s Car Wash Operation and argued that this operation, for all its missteps, strengthened the country’s legal and institutional framework against corruption. The operation not only increased public awareness of corrupt practices but also inspired the development of effective tools for corruption prevention, investigations, and case resolution, significantly contributing to a more transparent, honest, and efficient business and political environment. Nevertheless, actions taken by Brazilian leaders in the past year have intensified concerns—already present under the previous Administration—about the government’s commitment to sustaining and expanding this legacy. Transparency International (TI) raised some of these concerns in its recent comment on Brazil’s worsening performance on TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Now, there are well-known reasons to be cautious about drawing strong conclusions from the CPI or other perception-based international indexes, but in Brazil’s case, there are good reasons to be alert. Senior leaders in both the political and judicial branches have made a series of worrisome decisions that seem likely—indeed, may be intended—to set back Brazil’s fight against high-level corruption. Among those setbacks, the following are the most serious and troubling: Continue reading

Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Orders Investigation of Transparency International

Six days after it reported in its annual survey of corruption perceptions that the fight against corruption in Brazil was losing steam, Transparency International was placed under investigation by Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli (here). The ostensible reason is that the internationally renowned corruption fighting organization, headquartered in Berlin with a Brazilian chapter, misused public funds.  According to the justice, the group is a “foreign” organization and thus funds received in Brazil for its anticorruption work should have been allocated to the national treasury.

TI immediately issued a statement denying all wrongdoing. In the statement it pointed not only to the close connection between release of the 2023 CPI and Justice Toffoli’s decision to open an investigation, but to the criticisms the international organization and its Brazilian chapter have levelled against Justice Toffoli’s continuing efforts to gut Lava Jato, the case where a cartel led by the Brazilian engineering and construction firm Odebrecht bribed some 415 politicians and 26 political parties in Brazil as well as dozens officials in ten Latin American and two African countries (here).

Last September the justice tore up 2017 cooperation agreement between prosecutors and Odebrecht, making it difficult if not impossible for prosecutors in other nations to pursue charges against the company and those it bribed in their countries (here). Last week, as the Financial Times reported in breaking the investigation story, Toffoli issued another ruling letting Odebrecht off the hook; this one suspends a multimillion-dollar fine the company had been ordered to pay.

Brazilian citizens, opposition parties, and Brazil’s friends in the international community have all begun to speak against this effort to undo one the largest — and for its faults (as rehearsed on this blog (latest post here)) — one of the most important steps forward in recent years in the fight against corruption. In Brazil, its neighbors, and indeed globally.  

Let’s hope Brazilian authorities hear them.

Breakthrough in the Use of Artificial Intelligence to Fight Corruption

Whatever peril or promise the future of artificial intelligence holds, Brazilian, Colombian, and Italian researchers show it is a powerful tool for targeting corruption investigations.

Each year Colombia and Italy let thousands of contracts for goods, services, and public works, and each year some percentage is awarded thanks to bribery, conflict of interest, or other corrupt behavior. Each year Brazil’s central government transfers millions of dollars to the countries’ 5,500 plus municipal governments, and each year employees of some governments steal a portion.

Corruption is discovered through audits or whistleblowing, but a significant percentage goes undetected. The work done in Brazil, Colombia, and Italy shows how AI helps governments to deploy their investigative resources to boost the odds of finding a much larger percentage.

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Brazil’s Car Wash Operation May Be Over, But Its Legacy Will Endure 

Brazil’s Lava Jato (“Car Wash”) Operation, launched in 2014, exposed one of the largest corruption schemes ever, resulting in the conviction of over 361 people for corruption, money-laundering, procurement fraud, and other crimes. Those convicted included prominent members of the Brazilian business and political elite, including the current President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known as Lula). Over the last few years, however, the Car Wash Operation has unraveled, with several of its most important achievements reversed. In 2019 a Brazilian hacker publicized text messages allegedly exchanged between Sergio Moro, the presiding judge in many of the Car Wash cases (including Lula’s), and the Car Wash prosecutors, prompting allegations of bias. The specialized Car Wash prosecutorial task force was disbanded in February 2021, and the Brazilian Supreme Court annulled Lula’s conviction on procedural grounds in April 2021, paving the way for his re-election to a third presidential term in October 2022. Most recently, as I discussed in a post here, the Brazilian Supreme Court held that key evidence obtained by Car Wash prosecutors in a settlement agreement with one of the companies at the heart of the scandal was inadmissible due to procedural irregularities, potentially rendering dozens of additional convictions subject to reversal.

So, was it all for nothing? I don’t think so. True, some of the operation’s most important successes are vanishing. But Car Wash helped strengthen Brazil’s legal and institutional framework for anticorruption and has helped pave the way for the country to embrace a more transparent, honest, and efficient system. More specifically, Car Wash has left a positive legacy with respect to the Brazilian approach to (1) corruption prevention; (2) corruption investigations; and (3) the resolution of corruption cases. Continue reading

Guest Post: The OECD’s Report on Brazil Should Be a Wake-Up Call

Today’s guest post is from Guilherme France, the Research and Advocacy Manager at Transparency International Brazil and a PhD candidate at the Institute for Social and Political Studies at the State University of Rio de Janeiro.

The OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) conducts periodic reviews (in successive “phases”) on how well signatories to the OECD Convention on Preventing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. Recently, the WGB published its Phase 4 report on Brazil. The picture it paints is rather bleak, and should be a wake-up call for Brazilian citizens and, one hopes, the Brazilian government. While the WGB also acknowledged some improvements in Brazil’s anticorruption framework (such as better inter-institutional cooperation, an increase in funding for law enforcement agencies, and efforts to enact a stronger whistleblower protections), Brazil is underperforming with respect to enforcement, and backsliding with respect to institutional independence. Continue reading

Guest Post: The Brazilian Supreme Court’s Erroneous Nullification of the Car Wash Evidence

Today’s guest post is from Eduardo Carvalho, a Brazilian prosecutor from the State of Rio de Janeiro.

There has been a great deal of commentary in the Brazilian and global anticorruption community – including on this blog (see here, here, and here) – on a recent decision by Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli concerning important evidence on which Brazilian prosecutors relied in securing numerous convictions in the so-called Lava Jato (Car Wash) Operation. The evidence in question—principally files stored on computer disks—was obtained from the Odebrecht company as part of settlement agreements with Brazilian, Swiss, and US authorities. Justice Toffoli, expanding on a previous ruling by Justice Lewandowski, found that this evidence was obtained in violation of Brazilian laws on international cooperation and evidence handling, and therefore could not be used in court. As a result, an enormous number of Car Wash convictions are likely to be nullified. From an anticorruption perspective, this is a disaster, undoing years of hard work and allowing scores, perhaps hundreds, of corrupt politicians to go free.

But according to Adonis Brozoza’s post last week on this blog, the responsibility for this lies with the prosecutors, not the Justices. Mr. Brozoza argues that the prosecutors, in their zeal to secure corruption convictions, ignored relevant laws and procedures on international cooperation and evidence handling. This sloppiness, he maintains, so compromised the reliability of this crucial evidence that the Justices were obligated, under the relevant Brazilian laws, to rule this evidence inadmissible.

Respectfully, this assertion is both legally questionable and factually incorrect. While I do not impugn the good faith of either the Justices or Mr.Brozoza, careful attention to the relevant laws, and to what the relevant authorities actually did, demonstrates that Justice Toffoli’s ruling ought to be overturned by the full Court. Continue reading

The Perils of Taking Shortcuts: How Brazilian Prosecutors Alleged Carelessness with Evidence May Undo Years of Hard Work 

Brazil’s so-called Lava Jato (Car Wash) Operation, launched in 2014, exposed one of the largest corruption schemes ever. The investigation resulted in over 361 convictions (for corruption, money-laundering, procurement fraud, and other crimes); among those convicted were numerous prominent members of the Brazilian business and political elite, including the current President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known as Lula). In building its cases against these defendants, Brazilian federal prosecutors made extensive use of “leniency agreements,” offering some companies lighter penalties in exchange for evidence against other parties. One of the most important of these leniency agreements was the one Brazilian prosecutors, working in conjunction with U.S. and Swiss prosecutors, reached with the Odebrecht company, a major Brazilian infrastructure conglomerate at the center of the corruption scheme.

But over the last few years, the Car Wash operation has started to unravel, with several of its most important achievements reversed. In 2019 a Brazilian hacker publicized text messages allegedly exchanged between Sergio Moro, the presiding judge in many of the Car Wash cases (including Lula’s), and the Car Wash prosecutors, prompting allegations of bias. The specialized Car Wash prosecutorial task force was disbanded in February 2021, and the Brazilian Supreme Court annulled Lula’s conviction on procedural grounds in April 2021, paving the way for his re-election to a third presidential term in October 2022. The most recent setback to the Car Wash Operation, already discussed and debated on this blog (see herehere, and here), is a decision by the Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli this past September. In that decision, Justice Toffoli declared that, due to procedural errors, none of the evidence acquired in the leniency agreement with Odebrecht could be used in any judicial proceeding. This ruling puts numerous Car Wash convictions at risk: Defense attorneys may now seek to annul convictions in cases in which their clients were convicted primarily on the Odebrecht evidence.

Many in the anticorruption community, in Brazil and abroad, have denounced Justice Toffoli’s ruling, and have suggested that it may have been improperly influenced by political or personal considerations. But as a technical legal matter, Justice Toffoli’s decision was probably correct. While it is understandably frustrating to see so much hard work wiped away and the prospect of convicted corrupt actors going free, the responsibility here appears to lie more with the Car Wash prosecutors than with the Supreme Court. Indeed, the recent developments in the Car Wash saga should serve as a cautionary tale for investigators and prosecutors. In their understandable zeal to catch and convict bad actors, law enforcement authorities must be careful to scrupulously and rigorously observe all legal requirements. Continue reading

Guest Post: The Odebrecht Ruling and Prosecutorial Transparency in Brazil–A Rejoinder

Two weeks ago, we published a guest post is from Professor Gregory Michener and Breno Cerqueira, based on an op-ed they had originally published (in Portuguese) in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper, concerning an important decision last by Justice Toffoli of the Brazilian Supreme Court. That decision nullified the evidence that Brazilian prosecutors had acquired from the Odebrecht firm as part of the agreement to settle the corruption charges against that firm; Justice Toffoli’s decision thus called into question ever subsequent corruption conviction that had relied on this evidence. That guest post prompted a response, which we published last week, from a Brazilian lawyer who took issue with many of the assertions that Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira had made in their piece. (The author of that post asked to remain anonymous. While GAB does not usually publish anonymous pieces, after considering the reasons for the anonymity request, I decided to grant it in that case.) Today’s guest post is from Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira, who offer a rebuttal to last week’s criticisms of their piece.

I realize that some readers may find this a bit excessive, especially since the issues here involve some fine technical points of Brazilian law. But in my view the issues are so important—going to the heart of one of the largest and most important anticorruption investigations in the world over the last decade (the “Car Wash” Operation)—and the legal issues are sufficiently difficult even for attentive outsiders to understand, that a thorough debate about what the most recent decision does and does not mean, that this exchange serves a useful purpose. I am grateful to all the parties involved for being willing to engage in this important conversation..

Without further adieu, here is Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira’s rebuttal to the criticism of their post on Justice Toffoli’s ruling:

The Odebrecht case spanned twelve countries and involved nearly a billion dollars of elaborate payments made from Odebrecht’s in-house bribery department to corrupt governments on three continents. (Perhaps the best way to understand the case is through the documents posted with the US Department of Justice press release about the settlement of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act charges in the case.)

The primary objective of our editorial was to discuss the deficient transparency of corruption cases in Brazil, an understudied aspect of corruption that should be of concern to citizens everywhere. Transparency of corruption cases can assign responsibility and promote accountability, deter graft among businesses and public officials, identify institutional weaknesses that need to be fixed and, perhaps most importantly, provide an important historical archive to keep the record straight – not only of crimes committed but of retributive government efforts in favor of the public interest. In the case of Brazil, we argued, a lack of transparency worked in favor of corruption and impunity, which is currently on the upswing.

We find it ironic that the critic of our article, a Brazilian lawyer (“Anonymous”), would ask for anonymity if his or her critiques were squarely fair handed and factual. (As an aside, anonymity is illegal as per the Brazilian Constitution (Article 5 IV – “the expression of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden”). As a leading anticorruption specialist and friend commented on the Anonymous post a day after it appeared, it attempts to “muddy the waters.” Rather than “setting the record straight” it simply creates doubt where little should exist. The following explains why: Continue reading

Guest Post: The Recent Brazilian Ruling on Use of Evidence from the Odebrecht Case—Setting the Record Straight

Last week, this blog featured a guest post from Gregory Michener and Breno Cerqueira on the recent decision by Justsice Toffoli of the Brazilian Supreme Court, which concerned the settlement that Brazilian prosecutors had previously reached with the Odebrecht company—and the evidence against other defendants that Odebrecht had provided prosecutors as part of that settlement. A Brazilian lawyer with first-hand knowledge of the case submitted the following guest post, which takes issue with a number of the claims made in the previous post. Although it is not GAB’s usual practice to publish anonymous posts, in this case the sensitivity of the matter and the importance of raising these issues led me to exercise my editorial judgment to publish the post below without the author’s name.

The recent guest post on this blog regarding the recent judicial ruling on the settlement in the Odebrecht case is inaccurate in certain respects.

  • The first and most important inaccuracy is that, in contrast to what the post indicates, Justice Toffoli’s ruling did not annul the settlement in the Odebrecht case. Rather, the ruling held that the evidence included in certain important Odebrecht databases contained in hard drives, obtained by the Brazilian prosecutors from Swiss authorities, may not be lawfully used in criminal or civil investigations. The guest post properly states this aspect of the ruling—that it prohibited the use of this evidence —but the suggestion that the ruling annulled the settlement itself is not accurate.(A potentially important issue is whether the ruling would apply with the same force to the evidence turned over directly to the Brazilian prosecutors by Odebrecht, rather than obtained by the Brazilian prosecutors from the Swiss authorities. But the guest post fails to make that distinction.)
  • Second, the guest post seems to treat Justice Toffoli’s decision as a surprise, or at least unanticipated. But in fact, several prior decisions by other Brazilian Supreme Court Justices (particularly Justice Lewandowsky) had reached essentially the same conclusion, though with regard only to particular defendants. Justice Toffoli’s ruling extends and generalizes those prior decisions, ruling that the evidence in question cannot be used at all, thus obviating the need for individual defendants to obtain a similar ruling by the court in their individual cases.
  • Third, the post seems to imply that Justice Toffoli decided this case because he was appointed by President Lula, and previously served in senior positions in Lula’s first administration. But this is a gross simplification, especially when one remembers that Justice Toffoli handed down several decisions that went against against Lula’s interests (including rulings against prominent members of Lula’s party in the Mensalao case, and during Lula’s time in jail). Notably, Justice Toffoli apologized for some of those earlier decisions in the more recent decision currently being discussed. Therefore, rather than favoring Lula and his party consistently, a more plausible hypothesis, based on Justice Toffoli’s record, is that he seems inclined to decide cases in favor of the interests he sees as commanding the current political agenda. This may be at least as objectionable as guest post’s suggestion that he is decides cases systematically out of loyalty to Lula, but as a matter of empirical analysis of judicial trends, it is importantly different. (And Lula himself is, or should be, attentive to that.)
  • Fourth, another inaccuracy in the post, though admittedly a less important one, is the claim that prosecutors had not made public the Odebrecht agreement’s legal framework until last week. This is not true. The agreement has been publicly available for more than five years on the Ministry of Federal Prosecution’s website, which provides easy access to several of the resolutions that the federal prosecutors have concluded.
  • Finally, it is worth addressing the suggestion at the end of the post that transparency regarding the facts reported by Odebrecht under the settlement agreement might have reduced the chance of a decision such as Justice Toffoli’s. This cannot be characterized as a factual inaccuracy, as it is inherently a speculation about what might have happened under different conditions. Nevertheless, that assertion seems too rudimentary. There may be good reasons why prosecutors (and other control agencies, such as, in the case of Brazil, the Comptroller General and the Attorney General’s office) elect not to disclose all of the facts contained in the evidence turned over by the company right away. The most obvious reason for not publicly disclosing this evidence right away is that the evidence may be relevant to ongoing investigations. And it is not true that the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) would make public comparable factual material, if doing so would jeopardize ongoing investigations. (Some also claim that the DOJ decides on the degree of disclosure of facts in statements of facts attached to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act negotiated resolutions based more on, or at least with an eye to, strategic or geopolitical considerations than transparency concerns.) Again, though, the claim that more transparency about the settlement and the associated evidence would have helped seems reasonable, and is not strictly speaking inaccurate. There is certainly room for reasonable disagreement about the prosecutors’ approach to disclosure. But the issue is far more nuanced than the post suggests.

I want to emphasize that these comments are not meant to contradict the importance of making pointed critical assessments of judicial decisions in general and Justice Toffoli’s ruling in particular. Nor do I wish to offer any further opinion on these fraught, highly controversial legal and political issues. But given the intensity of the discussion in Brazil, and the unfortunate tendency for all sides in these debates to hurry over or oversimplify key facts, I thought it was important to advocate for subtlety and raise these problems about the recent guest post on this blog.