When the Victim Is a Gatekeeper: What Korea’s Cartoon-Money Embezzlement Exposed

GAB welcomes this Guest Post by Marta Liduma, a corporate lawyer at E-Global Trade & Finance Group specializing in cross-border payment processing agreements. She is presently an LLB candidate at the University of Groningen and is writing in her personal capacity.

This January, a branch manager at a Saemaul Geumgo community credit cooperative in Gyeongju, South Korea, took about 70 million won (roughly US$50,000) from the branch vault. He covered the gap with play money: cartoon 50,000-won notes printed with ducks and bears, ordered online. The branch had two employees. He handled the vault himself, and he bet that nobody would open the bundles. A colleague eventually grew suspicious and reported him up the chain.

Photographs of the toy notes went around the world, and the coverage settled into the shape of an odd-news item: clumsy thief, silly props, tidy ending. The tidy ending deserves more scrutiny than the theft. For it shows a serious gap in the Republic of Korea’s anticorruption laws, one that other nations may share.

When the cooperative’s internal investigation confirmed what had happened, it dismissed the manager, recovered the money, and stopped there. The South Korean broadcaster SBS reported that the institution did not refer the matter to investigative authorities, and what it told its own federation, if anything, is not public; the police became involved only because the manager turned himself in about two weeks later, and he has since received a summary indictment, meaning the prosecution asked the court to impose a fine on the papers rather than send him to trial. Asked about the case months afterward, a cooperative official said it was closed, the employee’s dismissal and full repayment having settled the matter.

For most theft victims, that position is unobjectionable. Korean law, like the law of most nations, imposes no general duty to report a crime one has suffered, and a shopkeeper who quietly takes restitution from a light-fingered employee wrongs no one. A deposit-taking institution is a different kind of victim, because it is also a gatekeeper: an entity the law charges with guarding a system that extends beyond its own interests. Its losses are never only its own. An insider theft affects the members who own the cooperative, the depositors who trust it, the supervisor whose picture of the sector depends on accurate incident data, and the deterrent effect that evaporates once staff learn that looting the vault can be settled for the price of returning the money. An institution that stays silent to protect its reputation is deciding a question of public interest in its own favor. Reporting duties exist to take that decision away from it, and the serious ones contain no restitution exception.

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Review of Robert Barrington’s Corrupted Kingdom

Corruption now threatens one of the oldest and most established democratic nations. In a 2024 poll, two-thirds of Britons said politics is becoming more corrupt (here), and in 2025 nearly 9 in 10 expressed concerns about potential corruption among politicians (here). Over the past year 16% reported being asked for a bribe, and 11% were asked to facilitate money laundering (here).

U.K. anticorruption fighters are taking heed. None more than Robert Barrington. In Corrupted Kingdom, out July 16 (preorder here), the former Transparency International U.K. head and Chair of T.I. International’s Council chronicles the ways corruption has begun to infect venerable U.K. institutions: from the Monarchy, where the now deflowered Prince Andrew’s flacked for a Kazakh oligarch in return for £ 3 million to Parliament, where MPs are secretly paid to question Ministers and seats in the House of Lords are on offer for hefty campaign contributions, to Scotland Yard, local governments, businesses small and large.

It is even seeping into the academy. Currently Professor of Anti-Corruption Practice at Sussex University’s Centre for the Study of Corruption, Barrington argues that the growing willingness of universities to accept dark money compromises their independence and their integrity.

British and non-British readers will both find much to recommend in the pages of Corrupted Kingdom.

British readers are likely to be most interested in the reforms Barrington advances, from beefing up “dull sounding” but important accountability institutions such as the Auditor General for Wales and the Northern Ireland Audit Office to teasing out whether the U.K. should create a formal, institutional structure, even an independent anticorruption agency, to replace the current arrangement, a patronage position in the PM’s office whose occupant has no official status and whose advice is easily, and often, ignored.

Citizens of other liberal democracies will find (reassuringly or depressingly) that theirs is not the only country where abuses stemming from large donations to political parties orchestrated by lobbyists is a front-page problem. Americans may take some solace from learning that Boris Johnson’s short-lived reign as PM approached Trumpian-levels of corruption.

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July 2 Webinar: MEASURING CORRUPTION TO TRIGGER ACTION AND TRACK PROGRESS

UNODC and three member states (United Kingdom, Dominican Republic and Madagascar) will highlight the UNODC Statistical framework to measure corruption as a practical tool for countries to develop national information systems able to detect the presence, measure the magnitude and monitor trends involving different forms of corruption.

Details and registration link here.

Call centers, cash, and power: Georgia’s hidden political economy — Revised

Yesterday’s post incorrectly identified a source of information on the Georgia call center scam and its relationship with current members of the government. It also failed to note it was authored by Giorgi Meladze, Associate Professor, Ilia State University School of Law, Visiting Scholar at Freie Universität Berlin.

Georgia’s recent corruption scandals are often described as an internal purge within Georgian Dream. That may be partly true. Former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili has been sentenced to five years in prison after pleading guilty to large-scale money laundering, following investigations in which officials said they seized more than USD 7 million in cash and valuables from properties linked to former officials. Former State Security Service chief Grigol Liluashvili has also been arrested on bribery charges, including allegations linked to the protection of scam call centers. These cases are real legal developments. But treating them only as corruption prosecutions may miss the larger political story.

In an interview, Givi Targamadze, former MP who chaired the Defense and Security Committee Chairman, offers a different reading. He explains that these arrests and reshuffles should not be seen as a genuine anti-corruption campaign but as symptoms of a deeper struggle over control of illicit finance, security institutions, and political loyalty. According to him, the current turbulence inside Georgian Dream reflects an attempt to reorganize the relationship between state power, criminal networks, and cash-generating schemes, especially Georgia’s now notorious scam call-center industry.

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Call centers, cash, and power: Georgia’s hidden political economy

GAB welcomes this Guest Post by Giorgi Meladze, Associate Professor, Ilia State University School of Law, Visiting Scholar at Freie Universität Berlin.

Georgia’s recent corruption scandals are often described as an internal purge within Georgian Dream. That may be partly true. Former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili has been sentenced to five years in prison after pleading guilty to large-scale money laundering, following investigations in which officials said they seized more than USD 7 million in cash and valuables from properties linked to former officials. Former State Security Service chief Grigol Liluashvili has also been arrested on bribery charges, including allegations linked to the protection of scam call centers. These cases are real legal developments. But treating them only as corruption prosecutions may miss the larger political story.

In an interview, Givi Targamadze, former MP and now Director of the Media Center at the Georgian Strategic Analysis Centre, offers a different reading. He explains that these arrests and reshuffles should not be seen as a genuine anti-corruption campaign but as symptoms of a deeper struggle over control of illicit finance, security institutions, and political loyalty. According to him, the current turbulence inside Georgian Dream reflects an attempt to reorganize the relationship between state power, criminal networks, and cash-generating schemes, especially Georgia’s now notorious scam call-center industry.

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The Word Is Not Enough: Testing the Effects of Information Treatments on Perceived Corruption in Ukraine

GAB is pleased to reprint the article below from Vox Ukraine Idea, an independent analytical platform dedicated to helping Ukraine move into the future. Authors Professor Yuriy Gorodnichenko of the University of California, Berkeley, and Ilona Sologoub, Vox Ukraine’s Scientific Editor, have taken a major step forward in explaining how policymakers can manage the vexed and misunderstood issue of corruption perception measures.

In March 2026, Ukrainians reported that corruption was the second most important problem after the war. 12% of people even put it in the first place. Between  70% and 90% of Ukrainians believe that corruption is a serious problem. At the same time, the incidence of corruption was much lower: in 2025, between 5% (in administrative services) and 32% (in the construction sector) of people found themselves in situations where a bribe was necessary to address their issues. This divergence between perceived and experienced corruption has been persistent: the gap has reached 60-70 percentage points at least since the early 2000s, when the data became available. 

This situation is not unique to Ukraine. In many countries, perceived corruption differs from experienced corruption. Furthermore, when objective measures of corruption are available (Sarullo et al. 2026), they are only weakly correlated with perceptions. One explanation is that surveys measure only petty corruption, whereas perceptions of grand corruption are shaped by the media. Consistent with this explanation, freedom of speech is related to perceived corruption (Gutmann et al. 2020, Costa 2013). This can lead to the integrity paradox: more information about officials prosecuted for corruption can increase popular beliefs about the extent of corruption in a country. 

How can one then defeat the corruption narrative?

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Seychelles Constitutional Court Ruling: A Victory in the Global Fight Against Corruption

In a landmark decision the Constitutional Court of Seychelles refused to dismiss a corruption case against one of the island nation’s most powerful individuals. The Court’s May 14 opinion rejected prominent businessman Mukesh Valabhji’s effort to dismantle the legal foundations of his prosecution.

The decision puts the lie to fears courts don’t have the spine to back prosecutors seeking to hold the wealthy and politically influential to account.

The case arose from what the Seychelles media dubbed the “missing $50 million” scandal. In 2002, the United Arab Emirates gave the Seychelles government $50 million to fund food imports and help overcome a balance-of-payment deficit. But the funds never reached the public purse. Instead, they were apparently siphoned into a UK bank account and later laundered back into Seychelles where they facilitated the corrupt privatization of state-owned hotels under the Compagnie Seychelloise de Promotion Hôtelière (COSPROH).

Defendant Valabhji was at the time the managing director of the Seychelles Marketing Board (SMB) and executive chairman of COSPROH. The prosecution alleges that Valabhji used the siphoned UAE funds to purchase the very hotels he was tasked with privatizing, effectively acquiring massive private assets using misappropriated public money. The Chief Justice of Seychelles aptly noted that these funds “should have ended in the coffers of the Government… and assist in our national development,” but instead “ended up back up in smoke”.

The Anticorruption Commission of Seychelles (ACCS) arrested Mukesh and his wife, Laura Valabhji, and the investigation quickly expanded, leading to the arrest of several high-profile figures, including Sarah Zarqani Rene, the widow of the late President France Albert Rene, and former senior government ministers. The discovery of a massive cache of weapons—including 72 guns and over 43,000 bullets— prompted additional charges of terrorism and illegal arms possession.

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Contributions Requested for Symposium on Supranational Responses to Corruption: Turning Illicit Gains into Development Outcomes

The World Bank’s Office of Suspension and Debarment, Sanctions Board Secretariat, Legal Vice Presidency, and Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative together with partners will convene the third Symposium on Supranational Responses to Corruption: Turning Illicit Gains into Development Outcomes in Vienna November 9-10, 2026.

The sponsors seek papers both published and unpublished on the Conference theme. A 300-500 word proposal is due by July 6; successful applicants will be notified by August 6. The deadline for submission is September 30. Details here.

Seychelles’ Case Sets Precedent for Asset Forfeiture

U.K. Magistrate District Judge Sam Goozée ruled April 22 that the statute of limitations in a civil forfeiture starts to run only when the National Crime Agency learns of the existence of the assets and their illegal origin (here). As a result, he ordered the forfeiture of some $260,000 in the London bank account of Marinette Soumery, a secretary of Mukesh Valabhji, a former Seychelles government official charged with 11 counts of corruption, abuse of authority of office and money laundering (here).

In its forfeiture application, the NCA linked the money to companies and individuals associated with Valabhji and showed he and Soumery had taken elaborate steps to disguise its source. Because of the “highly suspicious” actions taken to hide where the funds came from, their links to Valabhji and associates, and Soumery and Valabhji’s inability to offer a credible explanation for their origin, the court ordered the money forfeited pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act, ruling:

there was “cogent and compelling” evidence giving “rise to an irresistible inference that the money in the account could only have been acquired through criminal activity.”

Statute of Limitation Defense

Soumery’s main defense was that however the funds were acquired, the PCA’s six-year statute of limitations, which runs from when “the property was obtained,” had expired in 2007, the date of the last deposit to the account.

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A Bad Bet for Judicial Vetting: Moldova’s Parliament Echoing Polish Politics

GAB is pleased to cross-post Tilman Hoppe’s April 22 post on judicial vetting policy from Verfassungsblog, a leading source of analysis and informed commentary on public law issues.

In 2022, Moldova launched an ambitious judicial vetting process to fight corruption in the justice system. To that end, it created special commissions tasked with reviewing the integrity of members of judicial self-governing bodies, as well as senior judges and prosecutors. Because such bodies exercise far-reaching powers over judicial careers and discipline, their own independence is crucial.

In Moldova, this independence is now at stake: the ruling majority of Parliament lowered the threshold for appointing members to a simple majority. What may appear to be a technical adjustment points to something more fundamental. Read in light of the ECtHR’s case law on Poland’s contested justice reforms, the new Moldovan threshold risks undermining the Commission’s independence under Article 6 ECHR and, unfortunately with it, the legitimacy of the vetting process itself.

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