Performance Over Promises: The MCC’s Formula for Fighting Corruption

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Can foreign aid be used to spur anticorruption reforms? Many donor agencies have tried. The typical approach is to make aid to a recipient country conditional on the adoption of a series of substantive anticorruption or good governance reforms. Unfortunately, there is little data to suggest conditional aid buys reform. To the contrary, grants of conditional aid have been associated with increases in corruption, slower policy reform, and the deterioration of governance generally. While one might expect that, all else equal, conditional aid would result in relatively more aid flowing to more honest governments, it seems the opposite is true: after controlling for a country’s poverty level, regime type, and other factors, it appears that more aid goes to more corrupt countries.

Twenty years ago, a small U.S. federal agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), took a different approach to spurring anticorruption reform through foreign aid. The MCC, which provides large ($100M+) grants to low-income countries, embraced a strategy that differed from traditional aid conditionality in two ways. First, rather than selecting aid recipients on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, the MCC determines eligibility using a uniform scorecard. As relevant here, the MCC requires that, to become eligible for MCC grants, a country must score above an absolute level on the World Bank Institute’s “control of corruption” index. (Countries must also score above the median for their income class on ten of twenty additional indicators.) The MCC provides grants to most countries that do meet those criteria. (Of the 80 countries are eligible under this scheme, at least 50 have received funding.) Second, and relatedly, once countries are deemed eligible, no further conditions are attached to MCC funding, which can be directed towards any purpose and is rarely withdrawn. On average, countries receive $160M in unconditional funding, though grants have been as large as $698M.

At the time the MCC was created, this approach was labelled “crude and dogmatic.” Critics complained that the MCC approach would divert aid away from the countries in greatest need of both aid and reform, and towards countries that already outperformed their peers. But the evidence strongly suggests the MCC’s approach has spurred meaningful anticorruption reforms, at least among countries near its eligibility threshold. Researchers have compared countries are right above the threshold to others right below the threshold, and found that up to 38% of countries just below the threshold have implemented substantive anticorruption reforms as a result of MCC’s creation (see here and here). Analysis of statements and correspondence with officials from MCC candidate countries (from, for example, leaked embassy cables, meeting transcripts, and the like) provides corroborating evidence that countries near the threshold utilized the scorecard to galvanize reform.

Why has the MCC’s performance-based approach been more successful in catalyzing anticorruption reform than traditional conditional aid? It’s impossible to say for sure, but the research to date suggests a few intriguing hypotheses: Continue reading →

Working Smarter, Not Harder: Using Secondary Sanctions to Strengthen the Global Magnitsky Act

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Arkady Rotenberg, Vladimir Putin’s childhood judo partner, is living large. Despite using his relationship with Putin to facilitate state capture, gaining lucrative contracts for everything from constructing the bridge between Russia and Crimea to hosting spurious “anticorruption trainings” for state employees, and being subject to American sanctions since 2014, Rotenberg maintains extensive links with the global economy. He has used Deutschebank to move millions of dollars out of Russia, channeled investments through a technology firm co-owned with a member of the British royal family, and hired a well-connected Monegasque lawyer to manage his taxes and PR. Rotenberg is not alone: Corrupt officials around the world, and their cronies, use Western professional service providers to facilitate their use of corrupt funds.

The United States has a powerful and under-utilized tool to control connections between corrupt officials and the professionals service providers who enable them: the Global Magnitsky Act (sometimes shortened to “GloMag”), which authorizes the U.S. government to impose targeted sanctions on individuals engaged in serious human rights abuses and/or high-level corruption. To date, the U.S. has imposed GloMag sanctions on 299 persons deemed to have been involved in official corruption. Yet despite some high profile successes (see here, here, and here), critics have pointed out that GloMag remains too limited in scope to seriously impact many of its targets. Sanctions against corrupt officials remain mostly unilateral tools, with governments often failing to coordinate their sanctions, leaving opportunities for evasion (see here and here). And while GloMag has inspired similar efforts by 35 additional countries, many of these governments—and the European Union—use GloMag-inspired programs only to target human rights abusers, not those engaged in grand corruption (see here and here).

There have been proposals to increase the comprehensiveness of GloMag sanctions, ranging from simply listing more corrupt officials to convincing the EU to broaden its sanctions regime to cover those engaged in high-level corruption. While these are worthwhile efforts, the United States possesses an extremely powerful tool that it could use unilaterally to drastically increase the heft of GloMag sanctions, one which is already authorized by statute and executive order: secondary sanctions. Secondary sanctions are sanctions that are imposed on a set of persons or entities that transact with an individual who is subject to primary sanctions under GloMag or a comparable regime. The U.S. can and should impose secondary sanctions on the professional service providers (such as accountants, wealth managers, bankers, and real estate agents) that provide individuals covered by GloMag sanctions with the services they need to launder the proceeds of their corruption. Under such a regime, for example, if Deutchebank helps Arkady Rotenberg (already the target of sanctions) to move his money around the world, then the U.S. would also sanction Deutschebank—restricting its ability to transact using U.S. dollars, a disastrous outcome for many firms.

Continue reading →

Too Nice? Why Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) Needs Revamping

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Capping off a series of scandalous events that shook Canadian politics to its foundation, in February 2019, Jody Wilson-Raybould––the country’s then-Justice Minister and Attorney General––resigned from the cabinet and alleged that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s office had pressured her to intervene in a criminal case against the Canadian construction firm SNC-Lavalin. Wilson-Raybould claimed the Prime Minister’s office ordered her to arrange a more lenient remediation agreement with the firm, which was facing bribery and fraud charges for its 2001–2011 dealings with the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya, because of its economic significance. (SNC-Lavalin employs more than 9000 Canadians).

These revelations brought some much-needed attention to deficiencies in Canada’s enforcement of its laws against foreign bribery. While this scrutiny is welcome, and allegations of political interference are especially troubling, the SNC-Lavalin affair may be a somewhat misleading illustration of the most pervasive problems with Canadian authorities’ anti-bribery efforts. In fact, the SNC-Lavalin affair is anomalous because, notwithstanding the alleged interference from the Prime Minister’s office, the company was actually convicted and punished in the end—to the tune of a hefty $280 million CAD fine. In Canada, such prosecutions and convictions are quite rare—not because of political meddling, but because of structural deficiencies that prevent authorities from even pursuing such investigations in the vast majority of cases.

Read more: Too Nice? Why Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) Needs Revamping

Canada enacted its federal prohibition on bribing foreign public officials, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act/Loi sur la corruption d’agents publics étrangers (CFPOA), in 1998, shortly after it ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Much like the U.S.’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the CFPOA prohibits the bribery of foreign officials, and also requires companies to maintain accounting practices and internal controls sufficient to ensure that bribery does not occur.

Unfortunately, Canada’s track record of enforcing the CFPOA does not match the United States’ track record of enforcing the FCPA. Indeed, as early as 2005, Canada’s lackluster anti-bribery efforts attracted scrutiny and criticism from the OECD Working Group on Bribery, which evaluates how well member countries abide by the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. In response, the Canadian Parliament amended the CFPOA in 2013 to strengthen its anti-bribery provisions. Yet, enforcement of the CFPOA continued to be infrequent, and when enforcement actions took place, the penalties were typically quite low. The 2010s saw slightly more high-profile investigations, with Niko Resources fined $9.5 million CAD in 2011 and Griffiths Energy fined $10.35 million CAD in 2013. And then, of course, there was the SNC-Lavalin case, which involved alleged CFPOA violations, though the company eventually negotiated a plea bargain that removed bribery-related charges in exchange for a fraud conviction. (Doing so avoided triggering the CFPOA’s debarment provisions, which would have prevented the company from doing further business in Canada).

But these few notable enforcement actions did not change the overall picture: As recently as October 2023, the OECD Working Group on Bribery described the Canada’s anti-bribery enforcement activity as “exceedingly low” relative to the strength of the Canadian economy and in comparison to similar countries. A recent Transparency International report similarly gave Canada poor marks in enforcing its laws against foreign bribery, comparing Canada disfavorably to peer countries. As the report noted, Canada did not initiate any CFPOA investigations in 2020 or 2021; during the same time span, the United States initiated 15 foreign bribery cases, and Switzerland initiated 28. In fact, charges have only ever been laid in nine cases in the CFPOA’s entire history, with only two individuals and four companies ever having been sanctioned. Canada’s anemic CFPOA enforcement is particularly worrisome given that Canadian exports and investments are disproportionately in high-risk sectors, such as energy and mining. 

Canadian anti-bribery efforts would benefit greatly from a revised approach that does three main things: Continue reading →

New Podcast Episode, Featuring Richard Nephew

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A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Liz Dávid-Barrett speaks to Richard Nephew, the US Department of State’s Coordinator on Global Anti-Corruption. The conversation focuses principally on the US strategy on countering corruption, including the practicalities involved in implementing different pillars of the strategy, such as attempts to strengthen the multilateral anti-corruption architecture. The conversation also touches on the key outcomes to emerge from the recent UN Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Anti-Defamation Laws: Politicians Abuse Them, But Can Anticorruption Activists Use Them?

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Defamation is a scary word for the anticorruption community. After all, anti-defamation laws are frequently abused to harass, deter, and discredit people who accuse politicians of misconduct. But defamation suits can also be an important tool for anticorruption activists to defend against false and misleading attacks designed to undermine their work. As smear campaigns deter and diminish anticorruption advocacy, we must be cautious in our attempts to weaken or repeal anti-defamation laws, for they may prove to be a necessary line of defense.

To understand why anti-defamation laws can be so important to activists, take the case of Peruvian journalist Gustavo Gorriti. Gorriti has spent much of his life trying to investigate and expose corruption. When the Lava Jato scandal rocked Latin America, his publication, IDL-Reporteros, helped uncover millions in bribe payments to public officials. Gorriti played an important role in what shaped up to be one of the most consequential anticorruption investigations in the continent’s history.

Unsurprisingly, Gorriti came under fire for his investigative work. Among other lines of attack, stories started to pop up in some media outlets falsely accusing Gorriti of having ties to directors of the bribe-paying construction company that he had investigated; these stories were clearly part of a campaign to undermine his credibility by spreading false or misleading information. This is no isolated case. Corrupt politicians and their supporters routinely make use of disinformation campaigns to discredit accusers. The problem is only getting worse, and the consequences are serious. Such campaigns often spark violence and harassment against anticorruption activists, and they can even lead to the opening of criminal investigations purporting to act on the (fabricated) allegations. Other times, disinformation undermines public support for important reforms. These consequences make life harder for the people who, like Gorriti, want to expose corruption.

What did Gorriti do about this problem? Trying to persuade the public through counterspeech wasn’t very helpful. But Gorriti had another idea: sue for defamation. If persuasion couldn’t overcome the lies thrown at him, then perhaps he could use the legal system to hit his attackers where it hurts—their pocketbooks. Claiming to have borrowed the idea from a Finnish journalist who tried the same, he did his research on who was spreading lies and brought them to court. His strategy was successful, and Gorriti scored some important victories, including getting his opponents to retract their false statements and apologize.

Although anticorruption activists and journalists rarely file suits against their attackers, more might (and for that matter, should) start to follow Gorriti’s example. Recent defamation suits against media companies and politicians show that they have a real impact. They correct the record and deter people from initiating smear campaigns in the first place. Continue reading →

Gretta Fenner 1975–2024 Website for Messages & Tributes

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GAB sadly reports passing of Gretta Fenner, Managing Director of the Basel Institute on Governance and Director of its International Centre for Asset Recovery. A close friend of this writer and a true champion of the global fight against corruption, she died Saturday evening in an automobile accident in Nairobi. A message from Basel Institute’s President is here.

Dear friends and followers of the Basel Institute,

You will doubtless by now be aware of the tragic passing of our Managing Director Gretta Fenner last weekend.

Even as we grieve, we have appreciated the countless messages of condolence and tributes that have been flooding in from all corners of the world. Their depth and breadth are testimony to the extraordinary woman that Gretta was and the passion that she inspired in the anti-corruption community and beyond.

Many have shared their sympathy and memories on LinkedIn, X and Facebook.

For those close to Gretta who wish to transmit a message to the Institute’s team or her family and partner, please fill in this form. 

A selection will also be displayed on a public tribute web page that is under development.

Many thanks from all of us at the Basel Institute on Governance

IMF Staff: British Virgin Islands A Haven for Fraudsters, Tax Cheats, Corrupt Officials, Other Assorted Financial Crooks

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The IMF staff doesn’t put the conclusion to their report on the British Virgin Islands’ antimoney laundering controls as starkly as the headline to this post does. But its February 27, 330-page assessment of the island nation’s efforts to curb money laundering leaves no doubt the headline is accurate.

The report finds regulatory oversight of the financial sector is sparing at best, and in the rare instance when a violation is detected, the penalty is laughably weak. What seals the deal for those needing a safe place to stash money from corruption, drug dealing, and other financial crimes is the “who cares about others” attitude of the authorities for crimes committed elsewhere.

“The relevant authorities and key reporting institutions broadly view the illicit activities of the foreign beneficial owners as having an insufficient nexus with the territory and do not consider that VI entities are directly involved in such activities.”

IMF Country Report No. 24/55. British Virgin Islands: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering And Combatting The Financing Of Terrorism

In other words, if you want to put money you stole from the citizens of your country in our banks or take advantage of our lax approach to verifying who really owns a BVI corporation to keep your country from finding your assets, fine by us. Not our problem.

Continue reading →

The Price of Rhetoric: Anticorruption Narratives and Violence Against Doctors in China

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In China, violence against doctors and other healthcare professionals has become a worrisome trend. Much as Americans have gotten depressingly used to the expression “school shooting,” Chinese citizens are now familiar with “hospital stabbings.” While still quite rare events relative to China’s enormous population, these incidents are both troubling in themselves and indicative of larger problems, including distrust and anger toward medical professionals and the healthcare establishment.

Could this distrust and anger have something to do with the rhetoric that has accompanied some of China’s high-profile anticorruption campaigns? It is hard, perhaps impossible, to prove a direct link, but consider the following suggestive evidence: Continue reading →

African Countries and the Corruption Perceptions Index: Don’t Blame the Messenger

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Transparency International (TI) released its annual Corruption Perception Index earlier this year. As many readers of this blog are likely aware, the CPI is quite controversial, particularly in developing countries that typically fare poorly on the index. When I was a Board Member of the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) and President of the Network of Anti-Corruption Institutions in West Africa (NACIWA), it seemed that every time the CPI came up in our meetings, the typical reaction ranged from disapproval to outrage, with many challenging the legitimacy and authenticity of the index. More broadly, many African government officials and business people see the CPI, as well as TI’s accompanying commentaries, as part of a Western-driven smear campaign against African countries.

I do not share this view. I agree that the CPI has significant flaws and limitations, which are familiar enough that they need not be rehearsed at length: the CPI relies on subjective and potentially unreliable perceptions, the underlying sources are not always being sufficiently transparent as to the qualifications of the “experts” who assign scores, and the CPI does not cover some of the crucial issues that antigraft fighters focus on, such as tax fraud, money laundering, and illicit financial flows. I share concerns about the way the CPI is sometimes used by TI and other parties to paint an inaccurate and sometimes unfair picture of how well anticorruption fighters are doing their job. Yet despite these shortcomings, the CPI helps put pressure on governments worldwide to do more about corruption, and the index can be helpful in guiding efforts to combat graft in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, while many African government officials and business elites criticize the CPI, most African civil society actors appreciate it and find it a credible reflection of the situation in their countries, and it gives them a powerful rhetorical tool to call on their governments to do more on this issue.

Therefore, while it is, of course, reasonable to point out the CPI’s flaws and limitations, African government officials—particularly those who work in anticorruption agencies (ACAs)—would do better to focus their energies not on denouncing the CPI but rather on reforms that can present a better picture of their respective countries. Continue reading →

U.S. Justice Department Does What Mongolia’s Government Wouldn’t

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GAB readers will remember posts in late 2020 and early 2021 recounting damning evidence implicating Mongolian political kingpin S. Batbold in a massive corruption scheme (here, here, and here). Although Batbold fiercely and forcefully denied the allegations to GAB (here), the evidence that corruption during his tenure as Prime Minister netted him tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars seemed overwhelming.

So overwhelming that it prompted the Mongolian government to open a corruption investigation in Mongolia and initiate litigation in the United States to recover New York real estate press reports showed he had bought with corruption proceeds. Nothing came of either, however. Batbold runs the country’s dominant political party, the Mongolian People’s Party, and after a protégé won the June 9, 2021, presidential election, both the Mongolian and New York cases were shut down.

But the evidence did not go away. Yesterday, the U.S. Department of Justice took up what Mongolia had dropped, filing suit to seize the two New York apartments Batbold owns. As the head of the Department’s Criminal Division explained in disclosing the suit:

“Sukhbataar Batbold used his position as prime minister to award lucrative contracts to sell copper concentrates from a Mongolian state controlled mine to entities that were owned and controlled by his known associates or his son. These intermediaries, who had little to no experience in the copper trade, played no part in providing financing for the purchase of the copper concentrates or in arranging the sale or shipment of the commodities. They simply concealed the fact that Batbold and his family were violating Mongolian anti-corruption laws by benefiting from the sale of millions of dollars’ worth of Mongolian natural resources.

“The former prime minister of Mongolia abused his position as prime minister to profit from the sale of his country’s natural resources.  He and his family used the proceeds of their corrupt scheme to buy $14 million in high-end real estate in the United States.”

The Department’s Kleptocracy unit is responsible for the case, and consistent with its kleptocracy policy, the Department said it would work to see that the proceeds of whatever property of Batbold is recovered would go to the people of Mongolia, “the people harmed by these acts of corruption and abuse of office.”

Mongolians elect a new parliament June 9.  Suppose they might want to ask why it was left to the Department of Justice to do what their government should have done long ago?