Will Hosting the UNCAC Meeting Prompt the UAE to Comply with the Convention?

The largest, most important anticorruption conference of the year is underway this week in the United Arab Emirates. Formally known as the eighth session of the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the 186 nations that have ratified UNCAC are convening to examine how they can strengthen the fight against corruption.  They have not said why they chose to meet in the UAE, a collection of seven tiny, wealthy monarchies.  Perhaps it is because the Emirates’ location on the eastern end of the Arabian Peninsula makes it an easy place to reach from anywhere on the globe. Or perhaps it is because of its top-notch conference facilities and first-rate restaurants and hotels.

Or perhaps something more subtle is at work.

It’s no secret that the UAE and the governments of its seven federated emirates, especially Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have repeatedly flouted their UNCAC obligations.  In researching The Despot’s Guide to Wealth Management, author Jason Sharman was told by staff from the World Bank/UNODC Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, the IMF, and the governments of Switzerland and the United States that “the UAE and particularly Dubai . . . were the leading haven for international corruption funds,” a conclusion Susan Hawley confirmed on this blog, writing that an “increasing numbers of corrupt money trails lead” to the UAE. Mozambique’s Prosecutor General reports that the UAE has stonewalled her request for help in prosecuting the accused in the “hidden debt” scandal, and evidence presented in the recently concluded U.S. trial of one of the accused revealed numerous violations of its anticorruption laws that the UAE has ignored.

Perhaps the other 185 parties to UNCAC hope that holding the meeting in the UAE will persuade its government to finally meet the nation’s obligations as an UNCAC party. Five indicators of whether their stratagem is succeeding: Continue reading

Anticorruption Bibliography–December 2019 Update

An updated version of my anticorruption bibliography is available from my faculty webpage. A direct link to the pdf of the full bibliography is here, and a list of the new sources added in this update is here. As always, I welcome suggestions for other sources that are not yet included, including any papers GAB readers have written.

Canada’s SNC-Lavalin Scandal: Why Prime Minister Trudeau Was Wrong To Interfere, Even Though He Was Right on the Merits

This past year, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has been embroiled in allegations that he improperly intervened in one of Canada’s biggest-ever foreign bribery prosecutions. That prosecution, of the Canadian construction firm SNC-Lavalin, began back in 2015, when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) announced they would be bringing charges against the firm for paying approximately CA$48 million in bribes to Libyan government officials to win contracts, and for related misconduct including the defrauding of Libyan companies. This past February, the Globe and Mail reported that Prime Minister Trudeau and his closest advisors had inappropriately attempted to influence the SNC-Lavalin prosecution, and a subsequent inquiry by the Ethics Commissioner found that Trudeau had indeed acted unethically in attempting to influence key prosecutorial decisions that are supposed to be made by the Attorney General. The scandal had political consequences: although Prime Minister Trudeau and his Liberal Party managed to hang on to a minority government in October’s elections, the Liberal Party lost 27 seats and the popular vote.

The specific prosecutorial decision that Prime Minister Trudeau attempted to influence concerned whether the government should negotiate a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with SNC-Lavalin. A DPA is a settlement in which the defendant agrees to penalties or other remedial measures, and in return the government agrees to suspend the prosecution, and eventually drop the charges if after an agreed period of time the defendant has complied with the terms of the agreement. A DPA is similar to a plea bargain, but it does not require the defendant to plead guilty, and so avoids imposing on the defendant the stigma and collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. The prosecutor who brought the charges denied SNC-Lavalin’s request for a DPA in late 2018, and the acting Attorney General, Jody Wilson-Raybould, declined to overrule that decision. The Attorney General’s decision is supposed to be final on such matters. Nonetheless, Ms. Wilson-Raybould claims she fielded ten phone calls from the Prime Minister’s office, and was invited in for ten in-person meetings with the Prime Minister and his advisors, regarding this decision—and that the Prime Minister was pushing her to pursue a DPA with SNC-Lavalin. Ms. Wilson-Raybould refused to reconsider her stance on the matter, and shortly afterwards she was removed from her position as Attorney General and named instead Head of Veteran Affairs. In the end, the interference was exposed, the pressure failed, and, unless there’s some other unexpected turn of events, SNC-Lavalin will be going to trial.

This affair raises two questions: First, was Prime Minister Trudeau correct that the prosecutors should negotiate a DPA in this case? Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, was it appropriate for the Prime Minister to press his Attorney General to pursue that approach? My answer is yes to the first question, but no to the second. On the one hand, Prime Minister Trudeau was correct, and Acting Attorney General Wilson-Raybould was incorrect, about the appropriateness of a DPA in this case. However, the principle of prosecutorial independence from political influence—especially in corruption cases—is far more important, and the Prime Minister should never have compromised this core value even if he was right on the merits of this individual decision. Continue reading

Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Forum (June 2019)–Call for Papers

The Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN), an important and influential organization on whose advisory board I am proud to sit, hosts an annual forum that brings together junior researchers (graduate students, post-docs, assistant professors, and the like) who are doing cutting-edge work on corruption-related issues from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. This year’s forum will be held from June 11-13, 2020, in Bergen, Norway at the Christian Michelsen Institute. The call for papers is now open, and the submission deadline is February 1, 2020. You can find more information about the Forum, along with the application form, here.

Tracking Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in the Trump Administration–December 2019 Update

Earlier this week the U.S. House of Representatives filed articles of impeachment against Donald Trump. Understandably, those articles focused narrowly on the Ukraine scandal (specifically, that President Trump abused his power by improperly pressuring the Ukrainian government to open investigations, and obstructed Congress’s investigation into this wrongdoing), rather than also including other charges, such as that President Trump has improperly, and possibly illegally, leveraged the power of the presidency to enrich himself. Yet these concerns remain important, even if they will not feature prominently in the impeachment debate. So at GAB, we’re continuing the project we started over two years ago, to track and catalogue credible allegations of this sort of profiteering by President Trump and his family and cronies. Unfortunately, each month brings a new incidents, or new information about old incidents, and so we try to do regular updates of this catalogue, and the newest update is now available here.

A previously noted, while we try to include only those allegations that appear credible, many of the allegations that we discuss are speculative and/or contested. We also do not attempt a full analysis of the laws and regulations that may or may not have been broken if the allegations are true. (For an overview of some of the relevant federal laws and regulations that might apply to some of the alleged problematic conduct, see here.)

Asset Recovery: Report from Angola

Angola appears at last to have turned the corner in the fight against corruption.  The long-awaited trial of two “big fish,” the son of the former president and a former central bank governor, for looting the sovereign wealth fund began December 9.  While the international media have focused on what the trial means for the government’s fight against corruption  (Reuters story here, Bloomberg here, and BBC here), a less heralded equally significant development is quietly unfolding in Eduarda Rodrigues’ office. Deputy prosecutor general and since January head of the newly created asset recovery agency (Serviço Nacional vai Recuperar Activos), Rodrigues has begun slowly clawing back assets corrupt Angolan officials have stolen over the years. 

Below is an account the results to date taken from a November presentation to the Norwegian Corruption Hunters Network.

AssetQuantityAmount Kz
Properties2519,438, 912, 257
Vehicles2110,000,000
Cash Kwanza33,879,229
Cash Dollars322,832
  19,482,791,487
approx $40 million

As the table shows, Rodrigues’ agency has recovered assets worth more than 19 billion Angolan Kwanza or some $40 million along with more than $300,000 in U.S. currency. 

Rodrigues’ efforts began with the expiration of the Law of Repatriation of Financial Resources.   Passed June 26, 2018, it gave those holding stolen assets 180 days to voluntary return them without sanction.  Few took the government up on its offer (here), apparently believing the law was meant simply to show the international community the government was doing something to fight corruption. 

As Rodrigues and her growing team of experts expand their work, an ever larger number of corrupt official will regret passing on amnesty.   Law enforcement authorities in jurisdictions where Angolan stolen assets may be stashed now have a trustworthy partner to work with to see that monies stolen from the Angolan people are returned.

 

New Podcast, Featuring Leonor Ortiz Monasterio and Miguel Meza

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, I interview Leonor Ortiz Monasterio and Miguel Meza of the Mexican civil society organization Mexicanos Contra Corrupcion y la Impunidad (MCCI) (“Mexicans Against Impunity and Corruption). They describe how MCCI works to fight corruption in Mexico, and critically evaluate the anticorruption efforts of Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), who ran in large part on an anticorruption platform, but whose approach to anticorruption during his first year in office has been met with significant controversy.

You can find this episode, along with links to previous podcast episodes, at the following locations:

KickBack is a collaborative effort between GAB and the ICRN. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends! And if you have suggestions for voices you’d like to hear on the podcast, just send me a message and let me know.

Italy’s Mafia Corruption Laws Are Causing More Confusion than Clarity

Italy has a long history with organized crime, and that history has had a fundamental impact on the country’s experience with corruption. Italy has three traditional mafia associations (the Camorra of Campania, the ‘Ndrangheta of Calabria, and Sicily’s Cosa Nostra), along with a number of smaller groups. For decades, these groups have secured their power not only by exercising violence against local populations, but also by their ability to influence politicians. Historically, it has been common for politicians in mafia-dominated regions to engage directly with the criminal groups, for instance by exchanging lucrative public works contracts for vote mobilization (for example, see here and here).

In the 1980s and 1990s, following an explosion of mafia-related violence, the Italian government began to crack down on organized crime, and this crackdown included new measures that targeted the criminals’ political benefactors. In 1982, the parliament passed Article 416-bis c.p., which defined for the first time the crime of “mafia-type association” (associazione di tipo mafioso). With the passage of this law, anyone who was found to be a member of a mafia-type association could be punished with 10-15 years in prison. In order to be considered a mafia-type association, the group has to follow the mafia method—that is, the use of 1) the force of group intimidation; 2) subjugation; and 3) the code of silence (omertà)—to commit crimes. In recognition of the importance of political alliances for mafia crimes, the procurement of votes is explicitly mentioned in the law as a possible mafia activity. In 1992, the law was amended to more directly target mafiosi’s political allies by criminalizing a rather narrow set of corrupt relationships. In particular, the law specified that politicians who worked with mafia groups by exchanging vote procurement for money would be subject to 7-12 years imprisonment. This amendment (denoted 416-ter) was subsequently reformed in 2014 and again in May 2019, with the result that the culpable conduct for politicians was expanded to include the exchange of votes for money or other benefits. This change reflects the reality that politicians rarely give money directly to mafia contacts but are more likely to provide other benefits, such as securing government contracts or providing jobs.

However, this regime was deemed insufficient, as most government officials are not actually members of mafia groups, and there are many ways in which mafias may benefit officials that do not involve elections. For instance, one might imagine a magistrate who consistently provides favorable rulings for mafia defendants, or a police officer who provides information about ongoing investigations in exchange for money or other benefits. To address these gaps, Italian courts have developed the concept of concorso esterno (external participation). Concorso esterno is not a separate crime in the Italian criminal code, but rather a concept that courts have derived from the combination of Article 416-bis and Article 110 c.p., the provision that establishes that when more than one person is complicit in a crime, each is subject to the same punishment for that crime. Italian courts have reasoned that the conjunction of these two provisions implies that prosecutors may charge individuals who support mafia actors—including politicians and other government officials—almost as if they were mafiosi themselves, and those convicted may be subject to the harsh sentences that await convicted mafiosi.

The concorso esterno regime reduces the ability of corrupt officials to avoid prosecution, and empowers Italian law enforcement to target the political corruption that has undergirded mafia activity. Where the law is used effectively against high-level politicians, it may also help to combat the public perception that politicians who work with the mafia groups enjoy impunity. Moreover, by labeling politicians and other “non-mafia” criminal associates as functionally equivalent to mafiosi themselves, this approach sends a powerful symbolic message, one that is appropriate given the historic symbiosis between politicians and organized crime in Italy. Nevertheless, the concorso esterno theory, which has long been controversial in Italian legal scholarship (for example, see here and here), has some very real downsides.

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Don’t Believe the Spin on the Mozambican Acquittal

The jury in the federal criminal trial in Brooklyn of  Jean Boustani acquitted him December 2 of charges arising from a scheme to pay Mozambican officials tens of millions of dollars in bribes in return for the government borrowing hundreds of millions of dollars to pay for ships it could not afford. No sooner was the verdict announced than Privinvest — Boustani’s employer, the supplier of the ships, and a major beneficiary of the scheme — crowed it had been completely vindicated.  Despite evidence produced at the trial, charges pending in Mozambique, and allegations in a civil action in the United Kingdom, Privinvest lawyers are telling the press the acquittal proves the company had no part of the scheme.  That it did not pay bribes to win the business.

If it were true the company paid no bribes, three Credit Suisse executives would not have pled guilty to accepting bribes from it in the same court where Boustani was acquitted. Nor would they have named its CEO Iskander Safa, CFO Najib Allam, and Boustani as bribe payers (here). Nor would a trial witness have explained that Government Exhibit 2758, an April 2014 e-mail from Boustani to Allam, is a list of bribes the company paid Mozambican officials.  A list that includes President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi (“Nuy” in the e-mail), former Finance Minister Manuel Chang (“Chopstick”), and former intelligence chief António Carlos do Rosário (“Ros”). (Complete decoded list here.)

No, the verdict of acquittal does not exonerate Privinvest.  Nor anyone else for that matter.  What it shows is two things.

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If the International Community Takes Corruption in Sports Seriously, Russia Should Be Banned from the 2020 Olympics

Corruption in sports has been recognized as a serious and systemic problem (see here and here). One of the most egregious examples of sports-related corruption is Russia’s state-sponsored doping program. A 2015 report issued by an independent commission of the World Anti-Doping Agency found that this program involved athletes, coaches, trainers, doctors, and Russian institutions. Some of the most serious allegations were that members of the Russian secret service (the FSB) had pressured lab workers to cover up positive drug testing results (with one lab destroying more than 1,400 samples), top Russian sports officials submitting fake urine samples, and athletes assuming false identities, paying for destruction of positive doping results, and bribing anti-doping authorities. The former director of Russia’s anti-doping lab, Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov, has provided additional explanations as to how he and others, including FSB agents, enabled doping for the country’s athletes.

In light of these revelations, WADA recommended that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) ban Russia in the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics; however the IOC permitted each sport to consider individual athletes for participation. After an additional 2016 investigation known as the McLaren report produced additional evidence regarding Russian violations, the IOC did ban Russia from the 2018 Winter Olympics, and banned several individual athletes for life, but the IOC permitted 168 Russians to compete neutrally as “Olympic Athletes from Russia.” WADA reinstated Russia’s Anti-Doping Agency as compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code in September 2018, subject to two conditions: (1) Russian anti-doping authorities must accept the McLaren report findings; and (2) Russia must make data in its Moscow laboratory available to WADA inspection.

Yet Russia has not learned its lesson:

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