Guest Post: Global Lessons from Sri Lankan Civil Society for Post-Crisis Governance Reform

Today’s guest post is from Nishan de Mel and Inoshini Perera of Verite Research and Nikhil Wilmink of the Open Society Foundations.

In 2022, Sri Lanka experienced the most severe economic crisis of its post-independence history. Foreign reserves were emptied as the currency depreciated by over 80% and essential imports such as fuel and medicine were curtailed. Sri Lanka was forced to default on its external debt of over USD 40 billion. In desperation, the government went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance—the seventeenth time Sri Lanka has done so since 1965. The IMF’s rescue program, which prioritized price stabilization above all else, inflicted substantial hardship, as interest rates spiked, poverty doubled to around 30%, and the previous eight years of GDP growth were wiped out.

The crisis triggered an awakening among the Sri Lankan people about the consequences of corrupt governance. Protests proliferated and grew into an avalanche known as the Aragalaya (mass uprising), the largest democratic protest in Sri Lanka’s history. Protestors viewed Sri Lanka’s economic collapse as rooted in corruption, impunity, and the abuse of political power. The protests ultimately forced then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to resign and flee the country.

Given that concerns about corruption and misgovernance were so central to the discussion of Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, in early 2023 the IMF reached an agreement with the Sri Lankan government to conduct a “Governance Diagnostic Assessment” (GDA) – the first one in Asia. Civil society in Sri Lanka was not overly impressed, however. Sri Lankan civil society organizations (CSOs) were concerned that IMF consultations with civil society would be largely performative. CSOs were also concerned that there would not be sufficient accountability for implementation of the anticorruption measures that the IMF designed with the government. Leading think tanks and CSOs in Sri Lanka came together to form the Civil Society Initiative on Anti-Corruption Reform for Economic Recovery (CSI-group). The CSI-group initially requested that the IMF transcribe and publish its consultations with CSOs, but the IMF would not agree to this. Therefore, the CSI-group took an independent path by bringing hundreds of other CSOs together into a process for producing a “Civil Society Governance Diagnostic Report”. This was the first time any country’s civil society sector had ever drafted a governance report to guide the IMF’s GDA. That GDA, produced after the civil society diagnostic, was an excellent document that aligned closely with what had been produced by the CSOs. Sri Lankan CSOs also created of an independent IMF Tracker to monitor the government’s implementation of its IMF program commitments and to provide more transparency about the significant failures to comply with commitments on governance and anticorruption, even when these were not highlighted in the IMF’s reviews.

Recognizing the core governance weaknesses needed a multi-pronged approach. The Sri Lankan think tank Verité Research decided to involve bondholders as well. In June 2024, Verité Research proposed a new debt instrument: a “Governance-Linked Bond” (GLB), designed to reduce reducing the risk of repeated defaults in countries with poor governance. Through the GLB, creditors agree to reduce the borrowing country’s coupon payments if that country takes certain governance-improving actions—actions that benefit the creditors as well by reducing the risk of default. Thus, GLBs make the adoption of these governance improvements a win-win for both debtor countries and creditors. The GLB proposal was adopted by private creditors in Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring in December 2024. The final GLB issue made up about 13.5% of Sri Lanka’s new restructured debt (USD 1.44 billion) with a coupon reduction of 75 basis points, from 2028-2035 if three key performance indicators (KPIs) are met: (1) a target revenue-to-GDP ratio; (2) the publication of a fiscal strategy that complies with the new public finance management act that Sri Lanka adopted in August 2024; and (3) compliance with the information disclosure covenant in the restructured bond contracts. Notably, these KPIs were drawn from a set of sensible set of compliance actions related to the existing laws of the country, its macroeconomic targets, and stipulations on the bond contract; there was no need to link them to the IMF’s GDA.

In sum, CSOs’ engagement in Sri Lanka resulted in a number of meaningful improvements, including the IMF’s adoption of a much-improved GDA and the innovation of the GLB, a new global instrument to improve governance. With Kenya now undertaking a similar process, some key lessons from Sri Lanka include: being able to take advantage of windows of opportunity and momentum swings (such as the momentum from popular protests around corruption and the IMF program in Sri Lanka); and building diverse coalitions able to take a systemic approach (Sri Lanka’s significant achievements have come from partnerships with unusual partners including bondholders).

Sri Lankan Bill on Proceeds of Crime and Corruption Damage Actions

A distinguished group of Sri Lankan judges and lawyers recently released draft legislation to recover the proceeds of crime and compensate corruption victims. Prepared at the request of Justice Minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, enactment of such a bill is one of conditions of the $2.9 billion International Monetary Fund loan to stabilize the economy and restore economic growth.

While the proposed legislation exceeds the IMF requirement, providing for both criminal and non-conviction-based forfeiture of the proceeds of any crime, its overriding significance is it offers means for recovering the hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars corrupt officials have stolen from Sri Lankan citizens. The bill also establishes administrative procedures for compensating those injured by the corrupt act that generated the confiscated assets and granting anyone harmed by corruption the right to bring a civil action for damages.

The bill is accompanied by a clearly written report spelling out its provisions and explaining their rationale. A very nice diagram illistrates how the various freezing, seizure, and confiscation provisions will operate. Those in other nations struggling to write their own asset recovery or victim compensation legislation will find much of value in the Sri Lankans’ effort. (Text of bill with report and diagram here.)

At the same time, the bill is still in draft. Its authors welcome comments and critiques from Sri Lankans and international observers. Comments can be sent directly to the Ministry of Justice. Or GAB will be pleased to forward them to the appropriate personnel.

UPDATE. GAB just learned that Transparency International Sri Lanka has also posted a request for comments on the bill along with a brief explanation of the bill importance and the need for public input in English, Sinhalese, and Tamil here. The link includes an address to which comments can be sent.

New Podcast Episode, Featuring Sankhitha Gunaratne

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Liz David-Barrett interviews Sankhitha Gunaratne, Deputy Executive Director of Transparency International Sri Lanka. Ms. Gunaratne emphasizes how the recent economic crisis in Sri Lanka has laid bare the extent to which kleptocratic actors have captured key pillars of the state, and she provides more detail on the methods that these actors have used to effectuate their state capture, including the suppression of accountability institutions and militarization of key government positions.Ms. Gunaratne then outlines the strategies TI Sri Lanka has employed to respond to this challenge, including the use of strategic litigation and leveraging the influence of international financial institutions. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Lankan Civil Society and IMF Staff: Allies in Sri Lanka’s Fight Against Corruption

Sri Lanka is recovering from one the worst bouts of kleptocratic rule in modern times. That recovery crucially depends of course on ending its rulers’ wholesale theft of the nation’s resources, an effort where the International Monetary Fund staff and Sri Lankan civil society have wittingly or unwittingly joined forces.

The alliance has Its roots in events of 2022. That spring citizens had had enough. With the economy cratering and poverty skyrocketing, they joined to force the latest in a string of kleptocrats from office (pictured here). That summer the replacement government pledged to fight corruption. That fall IMF staff recommended approval of a $2.9 billion loan to help the country dig out of the hole corruption dug.

Sri Lanka’s corruption was so blatant, and the link between it and the economy’s free fall so clear that IMF’s staff insisted that in return for the loan the government promise to enact a program “reducing corruption vulnerabilities through improving fiscal transparency and public financial management, introducing a stronger anti-corruption legal framework, and conducting an in-depth governance diagnostic, supported by IMF technical assistance.”   

One year on, as the IMF board considers whether to release a second tranche of the loan, that promise remains unfulfilled.  The evidence is in two reports released in September, one by Sri Lankan civil society (here) and the other by the IMF staff (here). Both chronicle the government’s numerous failures to implement promised reforms. Both point the same underlying problem: the impunity high level officials continue to enjoy.

Continue reading

Comments on Sri Lanka Proposed Anticorruption Bill

Sri Lanka is known for the quality of its legal scholarship, and the draft anticorruption bill the government gazetted April 6 leaves little doubt the reputation is warranted. It contains many thoughtful, well drafted provisions other nations looking to reform their laws will want to borrow. Too bad for the drafters they can’t copyright their work.

At 162 pages I did not have time to give it the the intensive review the legislature will want to conduct before approving it. But I did find several provisions that I would urge legislators should examine as part of that review —

Continue reading

Accountability Time for Sri Lanka’s Rajapakse Clan?

In a groundbreaking order issued October 7, Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court ordered five members of the Rajapakse family and accomplices to answer for driving the once prosperous nation into bankruptcy.  

While Gotabaya was president and three brothers and a nephew ministers, the government took on ever greater levels of foreign debt while recklessly cutting taxes and pursuing unsustainable monetary policies. The result: the economy is expected shrink by 8.7 percent this year, inflation recently exceeded 60 percent, and an additional 2.7 million Sri Lankans will likely fall into abject poverty (here and here).

As economic conditions deteriorated in late spring, the four Rajapkse ministers resigned, and Gotabaya later fled the country as protesters stormed the presidential residence (here). But though out of office, the Rajapakses are not out of power. They still control parliament, and it picked a Rajapkse crony to serve the remainder of Gotabaya’s term as president.

With parliament unlikely to hold the Rajapkses accountable for economic mismanagement and the corruption that underlay it, civil society turned to the one institution in the country that remained largely untouched during the Rajapakse’s misrule: the judiciary.  Last June Transparency International Sri Lanka and three prominent Sri Lankans asked the nation’s highest court to hear their claim that the result of the Rajapakses’ economic mismanagement their constitutional rights to equal treatment, freedom to pursue gainful work, and access to government information had been denied. The petition further asks that:

  • the Central Bank, Finance Ministry, and other agencies be required to produce documents chronicling the mismanagement,
  • a committee be empaneled to examine the documents and compile a report, and
  • the Attorney General be directed to investigate and prosecute any wrongdoing disclosed.

For those fortunate enough to live in functioning democracies, this action would be extraordinary.  A request that a court assume the powers of a legislature and hold those in charge of the government accountable for their actions.

But given the power the Rajapakses accumulated during their long period in office, it appears to be the only path to accountability.  And to the restoration of the democratic freedoms Sri Lanka’s constitution promises all citizens.  Citizen activists, believers in the rule of law, and democrats everywhere will be hoping Sri Lanka’s judiciary can meet this unprecedented challenge.

Sri Lanka Should Cancel Not Renegotiate Corrupt Loans 

It will be years if not decades before the once prospering nation of Sri Lanka recovers from the financial and humanitarian crisis brought on by the fiscal profligacy of the Rajapaksa family. During the 10-year rule presidential rule of Mahindra (2005 -2015), the government began borrowing ever larger sums, principally from China, to build ports, roads, and other infrastructure. Younger brother Gotabaya continued the family tradition when elected president in 2019, borrowing more and more to keep the project pipeline full and the business community happy.

For many projects, the terminus of the pipeline was the Rajapaksa’s home district. A herd of white elephants poured forth: an unused airport (Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport), a deserted cricket stadium (Mahinda Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium), and a useless international conference center. Whether the loans for these projects were the result of corrupt dealings has been much discussed but never investigated. Same with many other loans taken out during Mahinda and Gotabaya’s reigns.

The Rajapaksa’ reckless borrowing was accompanied by other equally irresponsible fiscal policies: state-owned enterprises that bled resources, a regressive, poorly enforced tax code. Gotabaya’s 2019 cuts in personal and corporate taxation and its almost halving the VAT (from 15% to 8%) put an economy headed over the cliff into overdrive. The inevitable result of borrowing too much and taking too little in: last May the government announced it could not pay its debts, the sovereign equivalent of a corporation or person declaring bankruptcy.

The International Monetary Fund has now come to the rescue, offering to lend the government $2.9 billion while it renegotiates the some $35 billion it owes the Asian Development Bank, China, India, Japan, the World Bank, and private lenders.

But not all Sri Lanka’s debts should be renegotiated. Where a loan was taken out because a government official was bribed, Sri Lanka has a clear right to cancel or rescind it. That right to walk from a loan procured through corruption is recognized under international law (article 8(2) of the Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention Against Corruption, article 34 of the UN Convention Against Corruption, UNICTRAL Principles of International Contracts 3.3.1) and the domestic laws of most legal systems. Indeed, it is a part of the common law of Sri Lanka (Review Sri Lanka UNCAC Compliance) and article 52 of China’s contract law expressly states “A contract is void [if] 1. either party enters into the contract by means of fraud. . ..”

Sri Lankans will suffer for years for the wrongs done to them by the Rajapaksas and accomplices. They should not have to bear the burden of paying off one single dollar, yuan, rupee, or yen of a loan taken out corruptly. Where there are suspicions that a loan, as those to support the elephant herd in the Rajapaksas’ home district, was tainted with corruption, an investigation should be opened. And during loan renegotiations, Sir Lanka should make it clear that no matter the terms, it reserves the right to cancel or rescind any contract procured through corruption.

Guest Post: How One Family Is Capturing the Sri Lankan State

Today’s guest post is from Professor Liz David-Barrett, Director of the Centre for the Study of Corruption at the University of Sussex.

Sri Lanka, a fragile democracy that emerged from a 26-year civil war only in 2009, is on the verge of becoming a captured state, thanks to a concerted power grab by the Rajapaksa family. When Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected president in late 2019, he appointed his brother Mahinda to serve as both premier and Finance Minister. He later relieved Mahinda of the latter role, but replaced him with another brother. A fourth brother is Minister of Irrigation, and Mahinda’s son runs another two ministries. All told, Ministries run by the Rajapaksa family control an estimated 24% of the state budget. And another six Members of Parliament are members of the family. The Rajapaksas have further extended their control by appointing allies (including other family members) to other high-ranking government jobs and leadership roles in state-owned enterprises.

Even more troubling than the extent of the Rajapaska family’s dominance over Sri Lankan government is the way in which the Rajapaksas are using the familiar state capture playbook to ensure that they stay in power:

Continue reading

Recovering Damages for Corruption — Bribery Victims

There is no longer any doubt that corruption does enormous harm – to individuals, businesses, governments, and whole societies.  Nor is there any dispute that those harmed should have a right to recover damages for their injuries.  In drafting the UN Convention Against Corruption, governments agreed quickly and without dissent upon what is now article 35. It requires parties to ensure their domestic law permit any person or entity harmed by corruption to “initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for the damage to obtain compensation.”

Yet what evidence there is shows article 35’s promise remains largely unfulfilled.

For the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the StAR Initiative, I am examining just how far there is to go for that promise to be met. With their resources and the help of the International Bar Association, I have reviewed the case law in close to one-third of the 187 UNCAC states parties.  The most common victim recovery cases I find are those where a government agency or state-owned corporation has recovered damages when an employee took a bribe. In a few, courts have also awarded damages to third-parties harmed by the bribery. There are in addition a miscellany of actions I am still digesting covering actions by the competitors of a bribe-payer, consumers, and NGOs.

Below are the bribery victim cases I have located to date. A second post will review the other cases. Reader contributions and comments warmly solicited.

Continue reading

New Podcast, Featuring Asoka Obeysekere

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this week’s episode, I interview Asoka Obeysekere, the Executive Director for Transparency International’s Sri Lanka chapter (TI-SL). Our conversation covers TI-SL’s various approaches to combating corruption in Sri Lanka, including both “retail” legal aid efforts to assist individual citizens in dealing with corrupt bureaucrats, as well as efforts to secure broader legal and institutional reforms, as well as broader cultural change. On that latter subject, the interview also covers the system of corruption in Sri Lanka, how corruption has become normalized, and whether an dhow attitudes about corruption can be changed. We also discuss how TI-SL, drawing inspiration from a civil society initiative in Ukraie, has compiled its own registry of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) using publicly available, and how the creation of such a database can be helpful in detecting suspicious activity and exposing potential wrongdoing. The interview concludes with the advice Mr. Obeysekere would offer to other civil society leaders operating in similarly challenging environments on how they can be most effective in advancing an anticorruption agenda.

You can find this episode here. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations:

KickBack is a collaborative effort between GAB and the ICRN. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends! And if you have suggestions for voices you’d like to hear on the podcast, just send me a message and let me know.