When Did EU Anticorruption Conditionality Work, and When Did It Fail?

When countries apply for membership in the European Union (EU), the EU has substantial leverage to insist on various economic, political, and governance reforms—including anticorruption reforms. The EU has used this leverage, mandating (among other things) various anticorruption measures as a condition for accession. Has this worked? Does this form of conditionality help galvanize meaningful improvement in the corruption situation in candidate countries?

One of the most systematic attempts to answer this question, a 2014 study by Mert Kartal, compared corruption trends from 1995-2012 in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that did and did not apply for EU membership. The study found that applicant countries made significant progress during the accession process—but after accession, these countries’ anticorruption performance tended to deteriorate substantially. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the EU loses its leverage after accession takes place. Nevertheless, the finding is disheartening, in that it casts doubt on whether the EU was able to spur meaningful, lasting anticorruption reform. Notably, though, the results were not uniform across the twelve applicant countries studied: In some, the improvement that occurred prior to accession almost completely reversed after accession, but in others, the improvements appeared more sustainable. Diving into individual stories of accession suggests several factors that may have played an important role in the success or failure of EU attempts at using the carrot of membership to spur sustainable anticorruption reform. Continue reading

Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in Africa’s Anticorruption Struggle

Even the most educated African citizens and public officials often have attachments to their cultural heritage. Perhaps for this reason, many African countries have retained traditional practices alongside modern governance institutions. While this has many advantages, such as increasing legitimacy and social cohesion, some of these traditional practices and attitudes are in tension with the contemporary state’s demands for accountability and transparency, and it can be challenging to differentiate acceptable and unacceptable practices at the intersection of the traditional and modern spheres.

Consider, for example, Sierra Leone. Prior to the establishment of the modern state, much of Sierra Leone consisted of chiefdoms. Sierra Leone considers the traditional institution of the chiefdom so vital that the Constitution reserves twelve seats in Parliament for Paramount Chiefs under customary law. What is the appropriate practice regarding gift-giving to chiefs who are also serving in Parliament? In traditional Sierra Leonean culture, visitors and petitioners are expected to give chiefs expensive gifts. However, under Sierra Leonean law, public officials, including Members of Parliament, are not allowed to accept gifts above a certain value. Similarly, in many of Sierra Leone’s chiefdoms, by custom, the chief would have the authority to determine land use rights, including those for activities like mining. However, under Sierra Leone’s written law, particularly the Mines and Minerals Development Act, the Ministry of Mines and the National Minerals Agency are empowered to grant licensing rights pursuant to the provisions of that Act. Mining company representatives often offer gifts to chiefs to acquire mining rights in their Chiefdoms—as tradition dictates. But offering such gifts to ministry officials would be an unlawful bribe under Sierra Leone’s anticorruption laws. More broadly, in many African societies—like most societies the world over—the traditional practice is to favor one’s family. This traditional kinship preference can create serious tensions for public servants: the expectations of their families and communities may conflict with ethical and professional rules that embrace universalism and prohibit nepotism as a form of corruption. Continue reading

New Podcast Episode, Featuring Ketakandriana Rafitoson

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Tom Shipley interviews Ketakandriana Rafitoson, the Executive Director of Transparency International Madagascar and the Vice Chair of Transparency International. The interview focuses on the problem of “state capture” in Madagascar, emphasizing how this problem has manifested in key sectors such as natural resources, and how outside actors (countries and international firms) have contributed to the problem, and how civil society actors are using innovative approaches to fight back against networks of corrupt actors. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

African Countries and the Corruption Perceptions Index: Don’t Blame the Messenger

Transparency International (TI) released its annual Corruption Perception Index earlier this year. As many readers of this blog are likely aware, the CPI is quite controversial, particularly in developing countries that typically fare poorly on the index. When I was a Board Member of the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) and President of the Network of Anti-Corruption Institutions in West Africa (NACIWA), it seemed that every time the CPI came up in our meetings, the typical reaction ranged from disapproval to outrage, with many challenging the legitimacy and authenticity of the index. More broadly, many African government officials and business people see the CPI, as well as TI’s accompanying commentaries, as part of a Western-driven smear campaign against African countries.

I do not share this view. I agree that the CPI has significant flaws and limitations, which are familiar enough that they need not be rehearsed at length: the CPI relies on subjective and potentially unreliable perceptions, the underlying sources are not always being sufficiently transparent as to the qualifications of the “experts” who assign scores, and the CPI does not cover some of the crucial issues that antigraft fighters focus on, such as tax fraud, money laundering, and illicit financial flows. I share concerns about the way the CPI is sometimes used by TI and other parties to paint an inaccurate and sometimes unfair picture of how well anticorruption fighters are doing their job. Yet despite these shortcomings, the CPI helps put pressure on governments worldwide to do more about corruption, and the index can be helpful in guiding efforts to combat graft in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, while many African government officials and business elites criticize the CPI, most African civil society actors appreciate it and find it a credible reflection of the situation in their countries, and it gives them a powerful rhetorical tool to call on their governments to do more on this issue.

Therefore, while it is, of course, reasonable to point out the CPI’s flaws and limitations, African government officials—particularly those who work in anticorruption agencies (ACAs)—would do better to focus their energies not on denouncing the CPI but rather on reforms that can present a better picture of their respective countries. Continue reading

New Podcast Episode, Featuring Gretta Fenner and Daniel Eriksson

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Liz Dávid-Barrett speaks with Gretta Fenner, the Managing Director of the Basel Institute on Governance, and Daniel Eriksson, the CEO of of Transparency International. The episode was recorded shortly after Gretta and Daniel attended the Munich Security Conference, where they raised the issue of corruption as a key national security concern, and the podcast conversation focuses on that issue as well. The discussion touches on the new global context of heightened insecurity and the implications this has for those working to counter corruption. They also discuss the phenomenon of “strategic corruption,” defined in the U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption as “when a government weaponizes corrupt practices as a tenet of its foreign policy,” and how addressing this sort of corruption, though essential, may raise challenging questions for anticorruption campaigners about the problem of “picking sides” in global political conflicts. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Brazil’s Anticorruption Backsliding

In a recent post I discussed the positive legacy of Brazil’s Car Wash Operation and argued that this operation, for all its missteps, strengthened the country’s legal and institutional framework against corruption. The operation not only increased public awareness of corrupt practices but also inspired the development of effective tools for corruption prevention, investigations, and case resolution, significantly contributing to a more transparent, honest, and efficient business and political environment. Nevertheless, actions taken by Brazilian leaders in the past year have intensified concerns—already present under the previous Administration—about the government’s commitment to sustaining and expanding this legacy. Transparency International (TI) raised some of these concerns in its recent comment on Brazil’s worsening performance on TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Now, there are well-known reasons to be cautious about drawing strong conclusions from the CPI or other perception-based international indexes, but in Brazil’s case, there are good reasons to be alert. Senior leaders in both the political and judicial branches have made a series of worrisome decisions that seem likely—indeed, may be intended—to set back Brazil’s fight against high-level corruption. Among those setbacks, the following are the most serious and troubling: Continue reading

Would the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act Help the U.S. Counter China?

The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) makes it a criminal offense for U.S. domestic concerns, firms that issue U.S. and any anyone acting in U.S. territory from offering or paying bribes to foreign government officials. The FCPA does not, however, apply to the foreign officials who receive those bribes. (On occasion some prosecutors have advanced the theory that a foreign government official who takes a bribe can be convicted for aiding and abetting, or conspiring in, an FCPA violation, but courts have generally rejected these theories.) Additionally, while U.S. criminal law prohibits domestic government officials from soliciting or accepting bribes, the relevant statutory provisions do not apply to foreign officials who engage in comparable conduct.

Many U.S. anticorruption activists believe that U.S. law ought to target the demand side of foreign bribery transactions (that is, the bribe-takers), not just the supply side, and have therefore advocated for the adoption of the so-called Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA). These advocacy efforts appear to be paying off: In late July, the Senate adopted FEPA as an amendment to the Senate’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act. This does not guarantee that FEPA will become law, as the House of Representatives has yet to vote on a comparable bill, and there is no guarantee that the FEPA language will remain in the bill after final negotiations conclude. But the odds have gone up significantly.

Would FEPA be a good idea? I think the answer is probably yes, though the impact is likely to be modest, and probably somewhat less than FEPA’s proponents hope. I may post again later about my own assessment of FEPA’s likely impact, should it pass in something like its current form. But for now, I want to focus on a striking argument in favor of FEPA that appeared in an op-ed a couple of weeks ago. That op-ed, coauthored by Elaine Dezenski (Senior Director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) and Scott Greytak,(Director of Advocacy at Transparency International’s US office), argued that FEPA would “blunt China’s malign economic influence” by countering the practice of Chinese government or government-affiliated entities using bribes to secure access to valuable resources and to expand China’s political sway over developing countries.

There are many good arguments in favor of FEPA, but I’m not sure that this is one of them. I don’t want to dismiss it outright, as it’s entirely possible that I’ve missed something. But it seems to me that FEPA would have little to no impact on corrupt overseas bribery by Chinese entities, and at least in the short term might make that problem (slightly) worse. So let me lay out the source of my confusion: Continue reading

New Podcast Episode, Featuring John Githongo

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Liz David-Barrett interviews John Githongo, the legendary Kenyan anticorruption activist John Githongo about his extraordinary career, including his background in journalism, his government service as Kenya’s Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics in the early 2000s, and his role as a civil society activist, including his work with Transparency International. The conversation also covers recent developments in Kenya, and what lessons can be learned from Kenya’s anticorruption efforts, particularly the the role of anticorruption institutions. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Twentieth International Anticorruption Conference December 6-10 in Washington, D.C.

One mark of the progress in putting the fight against corruption on the global agenda is the size and scope of this year’s International Anticorruption Conference. The first one drew less that 200 people, mostly law enforcement personnel from the United States and 12 other nations (here). Organizers expect this year’s — December 6 through 12 in Washington — to attract more than 2,000 representatives of government, civil society, and the private sector from 135+ nations with many more attending virtually.

Jointly organized by Transparency International and the the U.S. government, speakers include: Delia Ferreiro, Chair of the Transparency International Board of Directors; David Malpass, President of the World Bank; Adesina Akinwumi, President of the African Development Bank; Ghada Waly, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Samantha Power, Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development; the heads of the Open Government Partnership, the Financial Action Task Force, CIVICS, and the chief executives of several multinational corporations.

The theme of this year’s conference is “Uprooting Corruption, Defending Democratic Values.” Plenary sessions will address the “grand issues:” global security, defending the defenders, kleptocracy and illicit finance.  There will be over 60 workshops, and multiple special thematic events and social gatherings.

More on who is coming, workshop and thematic events, and how to register is here.

New Podcast, Featuring Gary Kalman

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. As our regular listeners are aware, for the last couple of months we have featured a series of special episodes focusing on how corruption issues relate to Russia’s war on Ukraine. While the war goes on, and we hope to continue to feature experts who can focus on that topic, this week we return to, for lack of a better term, our “regularly scheduled programming,” with an interview with Gary Kalman, the Director of Transparency International’s United States office. Gary has appeared on our podcast twice before (in February 2020 and February 2021), so this interview, which was conducted this past February, can be seen as the continuation of what has become an annual tradition. As in our previous conversations, we focus on anticorruption developments in the United States. More specifically, we discuss ongoing rulemaking proceedings to implement the Corporate Transparency Act, the significance and potential impact of the Biden Administration’s Countering Corruption strategy document, the impact of the December 2021 Summit for Democracy on global anticorruption efforts, proposals for new US anticorruption legislation (such as the proposed ENABLERS Act and Foreign Extortion Prevention Act), and, going forward, what Gary believes are the most important challenges and agenda items for Transparency International’s US office.

You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations:

KickBack is a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends! And if you have suggestions for voices you’d like to hear on the podcast, just send me a message and let me know.