Last February, Massachusetts Congressman Stephen Lynch introduced the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Act (KARRA), which seeks to improve detection of stolen assets housed in American financial institutions by paying whistleblowers for reports that lead to the identification and seizure of these assets. The logic of paying rewards to whistleblowers is straightforward, and nicely summarized in the draft KARRA itself:
The individuals who come forward to expose foreign governmental corruption and kleptocracy often do so at great risk to their own safety and that of their immediate family members and face retaliation from persons who exercise foreign political or governmental power. Monetary rewards and the potential award of asylum can provide a necessary incentive to expose such corruption and provide a financial means to provide for their well-being and avoid retribution.
Paying whistleblowers for information is a sound economic idea. But in light of the cogent explanation for these rewards, the original draft of the KARRA legislation doesn’t go nearly far enough. Indeed, this original proposal provides much weaker incentives and protections for whistleblowers than several other existing US whistleblower rewards programs. It is unlikely that this bill has a real chance of being enacted in the current Congress, but if its introduction this year is a harbinger of a more sustained effort to enact legislation of this kind—and I hope it is—then I also hope that the next time around KARRA supporters will introduce a more ambitious bill, one that provides much higher potential rewards, fewer limitations on which whistleblowers are eligible for rewards, and more robust anti-retaliation protections.
There are many ways to design a whistleblowing program, as demonstrated by the spectrum of existing programs that use whistleblowing to tackle fraud in other domains. We can examine the effectiveness of the proposed legislation through comparison to existing whistleblowing programs:
Among those who follow Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement practices, there’s been a spate of commentary on a few recent cases in which the Department of Justice (DOJ) has resolved FCPA cases with a formal decision not to prosecute (a “declination”) that includes, as one of the reasons for (and conditions of) the declination, the target company’s agreement to disgorge to the U.S. Treasury the profits associated with the (allegedly) unlawful conduct. Disgorgement is a civil remedy rather than a criminal penalty (as the U.S. Supreme Court recently emphasized); it is often employed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which has civil FCPA enforcement authority over issuers on U.S. exchanges. Until recently, however, the DOJ – which has civil FCPA enforcement authority with respect to non-issuers, and criminal enforcement authority in all FCPA matters – had not sought disgorgement very often, and the recent “declination-with-disgorgement” resolutions appear to be something new, at least in the FCPA context.
Not everyone is happy with this development. Last week, for example, Professor Karen Woody posted an interesting commentary over at the FCPA Blog (based on a longer academic paper) on why the emergence of declinations-with-disgorgement in FCPA cases is an “alarming” development that makes her “queasy.” Professor Woody is an astute and knowledgeable FCPA commentator, and I’m hesitant to disagree with her—especially since I’m not really an FCPA specialist in the way that she is—but I’m having trouble working up a comparable level of alarm. Indeed, my knee-jerk reaction is to view the declination-with-disgorgement as a useful mechanism, one that would often be the most appropriate one to employ to resolve FCPA violations by a company that is not subject to SEC jurisdiction, and eliminating this mechanism might force the DOJ to employ a worse alternative.
Let me start by laying out the affirmative case for declinations-with-disgorgement, and then I’ll turn to Professor Woody’s concerns. Continue reading →
In the past year, we have twice seen voters make a significant turn toward nationalism. In June 2016, in a move that was largely motivated by protectionist views, the UK voted to leave the EU, and in November, the United States elected Donald Trump, who campaigned on an “America First” promise. What do these developments mean for US and UK enforcement of their respective laws against overseas bribery (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and UK Bribery Act (UKBA), respectively)? Many worry that, insofar as government leaders view anticorruption laws as harming their country’s international competitiveness (a dubious assumption), then nationalistic fervor can lead to weaker enforcement. This is a reasonable concern in both countries—but a more careful analysis of the situation suggests uncertainty is greater in the UK than it is in the US.
[Kaitlin Beachprovided helpful research and thoughtful contributions to this post.]
Since Donald Trump’s election, critics have asserted that his presidency presents unprecedented risks of corruption, cronyism, and conflict of interest. Many argue that President Trump and members of his administration are already engaging in conduct that is not only unethical, but also illegal. Because it can be hard for non-specialists to keep track of the myriad rules that have been referenced in the context, this post provides a brief, non-technical overview of the most important federal laws and regulations that are designed to prevent corruption, conflict-of-interest, and self-dealing in the U.S. government, focusing on those that have been most widely or most creatively discussed in relation to fighting a purportedly corrupt Trump administration.
As most readers of this blog are likely aware, despite the valiant lobbying efforts of a broad and bipartisan swath of the anticorruption community (as well as a last-minute plug from GAB), the United States House and Senate recently passed a joint resolution, pursuant to a statute called the Congressional Review Act (CRA), to repeal the “Publish What You Pay” (PWYP) rules for the extractive sector (oil, gas, mining) that the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) had promulgated pursuant to a statutory mandate contained in Section 1504 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. Once President Trump signs the CRA joint resolution disapproving the PWYP rule, it is wiped off the books. Professor Bonnie Palifka’s post last week explained some of the reasons why PWYP rules are so important to fighting corruption in the extractive sector, and why this repeal is the first sign that the new administration, and the Republican-controlled Congress, threaten to undermine U.S. anticorruption efforts and leadership. (For another very good analysis along similar lines, see here.) What I want to do in this post is to consider a somewhat more specific question: What are the implications of the CRA repeal of the SEC rule for the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s PWYP mandate going forward?
This turns out to be a tricky legal question, involving some unexplored and untested issues concerning the relationship between the Dodd-Frank Act, the implementing regulations, and the CRA. Let me start with a quick summary of the key legal provisions, keeping this as non-technical as possible: Continue reading →
Bonnie J. Palifka, Assistant Professor of Economics at Mexico’s Tecnológico de Monterrey (ITESM) contributes today’s guest post:
Last Friday, following the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate voted to repeal a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation that required oil, gas, and minerals companies to make public (on interactive websites) their payments to foreign governments, including taxes, royalties, and “other” payments. The rule was mandated by Section 1504 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, but had only been finalized last year. President Trump’s expected signature of the congressional resolution repealing the rule will represent a major blow to anticorruption efforts, and a demonstration of just how little corruption matters to his administration and to Congressional Republicans.
The extractive industry had lobbied against this rule, arguing that having to report such payments is costly to firms and puts them at an international disadvantage. Some commentators have supported their efforts, arguing, for example, that the Section 1504 rules are unnecessary because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) already prohibits firms under SEC jurisdiction—including extractive industry firms—from paying bribes abroad. This argument misses the mark: The extractive sector poses especially acute and distinctive corruption risks, which the FCPA alone is unlikely to remedy if not accompanied by greater transparency. Continue reading →
As many readers of this blog are likely aware, the U.S. Congress is poised to invoke a statute called the “Congressional Review Act” to override the rules that the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated last year to implement a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act (Section 1504) that required companies in the extractive industries (oil, gas, and mining) to publicly disclose the amounts that they pay to foreign governments in connection with projects abroad. (A timeline of the legislation and its implementing regs is here.)
The vote is scheduled for this coming Monday. Like many in the anticorruption community, I think eliminating the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) regs would be a bad idea. Alas, I don’t have time to write up a substantive discussion of the issue before the Monday vote. Fortunately, there are already a fair number of discussions of the issue elsewhere; for example, Jodi Vitori of Global Witness, who previously served as an intelligence officer in the Air Force, has a succinct explanation of why eliminating these PWYP rules would be bad for U.S. national security here.
While I usually don’t use this blog to engage in direct activism/advocacy, in this case I wanted to reach out to those GAB readers who are based in the U.S., particularly those whose representatives are Republicans, and encourage you to call your House Representative and Senator to express your opposition to the invalidation of the rules implementing Section 1504. (If you’re not sure who your House Representative is, you can find that here, and you can find a list of contact information here. Senate contact information is here.)