GAB welcomes back Guest Blogger Anton Moiseienko, Associate Professor of Law at the Australian National University. Professor Moiseienko specializes in financial crime and economic sanctions, with particular expertise in global anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) regulation. He is the author of the 2025 volume Doing Business with Criminals considered an indispensable guide to the global AML/CTF system.
How to harness the promise of corruption sanctions while minimizing their unintended consequences is the issue at the heart of a recent report I wrote for the Basel Institute on Governance, a leading Swiss anti-corruption research center, entitled “Corruption Sanctions: What Governments Need to Know.” In this post, I will offer brief reflections based on its analysis.
The Evolution of Corruption Sanctions
It is useful to start by canvassing the history of corruption sanctions. Targeted sanctions are financial and travel restrictions imposed by governments against individuals or companies outside any judicial process. They emerged in the 1990s as a prominent response to various forms of alleged wrongdoing, including terrorist financing, nuclear proliferation and drug trafficking.
Prior to that, sanctions tended to take the form of comprehensive economic measures against entire countries, such as travel embargoes. By contrast, targeted sanctions enable governments to surgically focus on individuals and companies deemed to be involved in a particular form of malfeasance. Some targeted sanctions programs target affiliates of a rogue government – say Russia, North Korea or Iran – whereas others are “thematic” and therefore address a certain type of wrongdoing regardless of where it takes place in the world.
Corruption sanctions are a form of thematic sanctions. Their evolution began in the U.S. in the early 2000s. In 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law Proclamation 7750 that authorized confidential visa sanctions against corrupt foreign officials and their family members. From 2008 onwards, this sanctions program has been augmented by the sanctions provisions under section 7031(c) of the annual Consolidated Appropriations Acts, which provide for public visa bans. Finally, Congress adopted the Magnitsky Act in 2012 and the Global Magnitsky Act in 2016. Both grant the President the authority to impose financial and travel sanctions against those suspected of corruption and human rights abuse.
Other jurisdictions soon followed suit, including Canada, the UK, and Australia – but, curiously enough, not the EU. The EU legislated to introduce a human rights sanctions regime, but it stopped short of enacting a corruption sanctions program, despite the pledge to do so by the European Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen. While one might be tempted to criticize the EU’s reticence, the real question is: why should governments consider introducing corruption sanctions, and how can they use them effectively?
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