Towards Preventing Corruption During Ukraine’s Reconstruction: Bilingual Compilation of Ukrainian Procurement Laws

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has inflicted massive damage on the country’s infrastructure, a half trillion dollars and growing daily (here). While Ukraine’s government is just beginning the massive task of letting contracts for the reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and other public works destroyed by Russian bombs and artillery shells, reports are already circulating that corruption has infected the procurement of some large works.

Fighting corruption in procurement is about much more than tightening and strictly enforcing laws on what to buy from whom. Rules governing political contributions, gifts to officeholders, conflicts of interest and business practices that facilitate bid rigging are all part of the equation. But preventing and detecting corruption in government contracting starts with what the law does (or doesn’t) say about who makes purchasing decisions and how specifications are drawn, contractors selected, and performance assured.

The fight against corruption in Ukrainian reconstruction just got an important boost. An online data base of some 450 Ukrainian statutes and Cabinet decrees along with English summaries is now available here. Included is everything from the text of ProZorro, Ukraine’s award-winning e-procurement law to statutes on permitting and land use to detailed rules governing the construction of roads and ports. A dropdown menu allows users to search by topic – critical infrastructure, damaged property, public procurement, urban development – or hone in on a specific area such as construction standards, PPPs, or telecommunications.

The database will help frontline corruption fighters – in the Ukrainian government, civil society organizations, and those overseeing reconstruction funding – determine if procurement rules are being observed in a project. Vigorous competition for procurement contracts is perhaps the most important way to curb corruption. By offering a free guide to Ukrainian procurement law, the database reduces the cost to new or foreign firms of preparing bids, increasing the chances more companies will bid on a project and thus spurring competition.

The database is the result of a heroic, pro bono effort by a squad of multilingual lawyers at the international law firm Debevoise & Plimpton aided by Ukraine’s Institute for Legislative Ideas. It was the brainchild of Jennifer Widner, Princeton University professor and director of the University’s Innovations for Successful Societies, and Oksana Nesterenko, head of the Anticorruption Research & Education Centre at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Both provided guidance and overall direction. Worth MacMurray, president and chief executive officer of the Coalition for Integrity, oversaw Debevoise’s work on behalf of ISS. The project is part of a larger effort by ISS and ACREC to prevent corruption during Ukrainian reconstruction.

The Invisible Front: Russia’s Corruption-Themed Propaganda War Against Ukraine

The concept of “strategic corruption”—defined by the U.S. government as “when a government weaponizes corrupt practices as a tenet of its foreign policy”—has recently gained prominence as an important way to understand Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet republics, and elsewhere. The country that has faced the most sustained and systematic Russian state-sponsored strategic corruption campaign is almost certainly Ukraine. For the two decades preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia employed a wide variety of corrupt measures to influence Ukrainian politics, including the sale of vast quantities of discounted fossil fuels to bribe pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs and create a political class aligned with Kremlin interests (as exemplified by the “outrageously corrupt” tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych after his election in 2010); the cultivation of sympathetic media empires in the country; and money-driven attempts to discredit American officials perceived as obstacles to Russian influence. 

Much has been written on Russia’s use of this sort of strategic corruption. But there’s another aspect of Russia’s strategy that has become especially prominent since the 2022 invasion: using propaganda and disinformation to spread and amplify the narrative that Ukraine is pervasively corrupt. Here lies a paradox: for two decades, Russia deliberately fostered corruption in Ukraine to keep its neighbor firmly under its influence, and now Russia is seeking to leverage Ukraine’s reputation for corrupt practices to undermine Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s invasion.

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Has Russia’s Invasion Empowered President Zelensky in His Fight Against Corruption?

A national crisis can have a wide range of effects on a country’s commitment to fighting corruption. Sometimes, the sense of crisis leads countries (for better or worse) to de-prioritize corruption, out of a sense that other matters are higher priority, or even out of a sense that tolerance for a certain degree of corruption is a price worth paying to achieve other more pressing objectives. But in other situations, a sense of national crisis can strengthen a government’s resolve to crack down aggressively on corruption. There seem to be at least two closely related reasons why this may sometimes occur. First, corruption might be seen as directly and significantly impeding the country’s ability to tackle the emergency at hand. Second, a time of crisis can strengthen the position of the nation’s chief executive (the president or prime minister)—both in the formal legal sense (in that during times of crisis the chief executive may be able to wield extraordinary emergency powers) and in the softer more political sense (in that the chief executive may enjoy a surge in popularity if the country is under threat, and the public perceives the chief executive as providing strong leadership in the crisis). If that chief executive is genuinely committed to fighting corruption (a big if), then he or she may be able to leverage this unusual power to move aggressively against corruption, in a manner that would be politically difficult or impossible in “normal” times.

My impression, based on news stories and informal conversations with actual experts (which I am not!), is that the latter characterization is more apt for what is happening in Ukraine right now. It was not obvious that things would go this way initially—particularly given that, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian parliament suspended the asset declaration requirement for public officials, which though justified at the time as a way to keep potentially sensitive information from the Russians, was viewed with understandable concern. But a series of developments since then has demonstrated what looks to an outsider (at least to this outsider) like a consistent and quite aggressive effort to crack down on corruption, even at the risk of some (temporary) disruption to aspects of the war effort.

At least for me, one of the most notable and encouraging signs was the arrest, earlier this month, of Ihor Kolomoisky, one of Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs, on fraud charges. Continue reading

Why We Shouldn’t Be Overly Concerned About Corruption in the Reconstruction of Ukraine

Though the war in Ukraine continues to rage, scholars and policymakers around the world have already begun to look ahead to what it will take to help rebuild the country—a project that the Ukrainian government estimates will cost upwards of $750 billion, and which will likely entail substantial international assistance from a broad coalition of countries. Any project of this magnitude—one that involves large government contracts for construction, supplies, and other services—raises concerns about corruption. Indeed, concerns about the potential for widespread corruption in the reconstruction of Ukraine have already been voiced on this blog and elsewhere (see, for example, here, and here). But while this concern should be taken seriously, it should not be exaggerated. There are at least three reasons why the potential for corruption in the Ukrainian reconstruction process, while real, may not be nearly as severe as some of the current pessimistic commentary suggests:

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From the World Cup to the Olympics: Why Are International Sporting Events So Corrupt?

The recently-concluded FIFA World Cup in Qatar has served as yet another reminder of the corruption that seems to accompany the awarding of hosting rights for major international sporting events. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), in 2010 representatives of Qatar bribed three South American FIFA officials to win the run-off vote against the United States to host the 2022 World Cup. And this came after two members of the FIFA selection committee had already been barred from voting after they had been caught agreeing to sell their votes. This was not an isolated incident. The DOJ also alleged that Russia bribed FIFA officials to host the 2018 World Cup, and indeed more than half of those FIFA officials involved in the 2018 and 2022 host country votes—including FIFA’s then-president Sepp Blatter—have been accused of improper behavior. Nor has this sort of behavior been limited to FIFA. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has had numerous similar scandals. The IOC has launched an investigation into nine members who were bribed to vote for granting Brazil the hosting rights for the 2016 Olympic Games; Sérgio Cabral, the former governor of Rio de Janeiro, admitted to paying $2 million to the former president of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) to buy votes to select Rio as the 2016 Olympic host city, and the head of Brazil’s Olympic committee, Carols Nuzman, was sentenced to over 30 years in prison as a result. And when Russia secured the 2014 Winter Olympics bid, it did so with the assistance of the then-vice president of the Olympic Council of Asia, Gafur Rakhimov, an organized crime leader and heroin kingpin.

Why is the process of selecting host cities and countries for major international sporting events so constantly captured by bribery and corruption? There are several inter-related reasons for this ongoing problem:

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Greasing the Wheels: How Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Ended Up Financing Russian Corruption

Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) is one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world. Established in 1990 to diversify Norway’s oil wealth and minimize negative consequences associated with fluctuations in commodities markets, GPFG has amassed close to $1.3 trillion in assets. In keeping with Norway’s sterling reputation for integrity, GPFG has embraced anticorruption as one of the fund’s guiding principles. In fact, GPFG requires the companies in which it invests “to identify and manage corruption risk, and to report publicly on their anti-corruption efforts.” The fund’s Council of Ethics has also declared that the fund will keep “gross corruption” out of its portfolio, and GPFG has been widely praised for its social responsibility (see here and here).

Yet despite all this, GPFG has not avoided corruption-related scandals, particularly with respect to its investments in Russia. Understanding how things went wrong offers more general lessons for how sovereign wealth funds can strengthen their safeguards against investing in corrupt companies and supporting corrupt regimes. Continue reading

Bribe to Survive: Sextortion and LGBTQ Discrimination

In February 2019, a gay man from Krasnodar, Russia named Stanislav arranged to go on a date with a young man he had met on a dating app. When he arrived at their agreed-upon location, however, the young man was nowhere to be seen. Instead, Stanislav was greeted by police officers, who later beat him and threatened him with criminal prosecution unless he paid a bribe. Just a year earlier, another man, Fedor, similarly found himself on a “fake date” with a man he had met on the same dating app, which ended with him being forced to pay police a US$2,500 bribe after also being beaten and threatened with prison. In both cases, Russian prosecutors refused to carry out any investigations of extortion or police misconduct.

It isn’t just in Russia that police have begun turning to online dating sites and other forms of technology to entrap their victims. By arbitrarily seizing cell phones or creating profiles to set up “fake dates,” law enforcement officers around the world (including in Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Moldova, just to name a few places) have been able to obtain screenshots and photographs to blackmail LGBTQ people into paying them bribes. Not only are victims coerced into paying these bribes to end their torture and humiliation, but they also do it in response to threats of having their arrests publicized on national television, or revealed to their family and employers. In this way, laws criminalizing homosexual activity are imposed not only, or even primarily, to enforce moral ideologies, but rather to expand opportunities for the corrupt extraction of money from vulnerable communities.

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Time to Make the OECD Antibribery Convention an Antikleptocracy Convention Too

Confiscating assets acquired through corruption is a critical part of the fight against corruption. If those who would profit from corruption know they will be denied the benefit of their wrongdoing, there is no incentive to be corrupt.

As Justin explained Monday, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given asset confiscation a major boost. Many of Putin’s superrich backers, oligarchs or kleptocrats, became wealthy through corrupt deals, and the seizure of their mega-yachts, mansions and other properties now located outside Russian territory offer the West a way, albeit indirectly, to pressure Putin to end the aggression. Italian, German, and other Western prosecutors are thus now aggressively invoking domestic forfeiture statutes to confiscate them.

But as the Washington Post reports today, with the help of pricey lawyers and other enablers (here and here), the oligarchs have hidden their assets inside complex legal thickets of offshore companies that make confiscation hard if not impossible. In response, last Thursday President Biden asked Congress to give U.S. prosecutors new powers to cut through this underbrush (here).

The President’s initiative is welcome. But it also invites the obvious question: Why shouldn’t other Western nations follow suit?  All are united in their opposition to the war and desire to make Putin’s associates suffer consequences. Why shouldn’t every Western state ease the task their prosecutors face to the rapid seizure of oligarchs’ assets? And indeed to the seizure of any asset corruptly obtained or unlawfully possessed found in their territory?

The most straightforward way to realize this goal would be to amend the OECD Antibribery Convention.

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The Anticorruption Campaigner’s Guide to Asset Seizure

Anticorruption campaigners have long argued that Western governments should be more aggressive in freezing and seizing the assets of kleptocrats and corrupt oligarchs. While targeting illicit assets has been part of the West’s anticorruption arsenal for many years, attention to this tactic has surged in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Almost as soon as Russian troops crossed the border into Ukrainian territory, not only did Western governments impose an array of economic sanctions on Russian institutions and individuals close to the Putin regime, but also—assisted by journalists who identified dozens of properties, collectively worth billions—Western law enforcement agencies began seizing Russian oligarchs’ private jetsvacation homes, and superyachts.

Many people who are unfamiliar with this area—and even some who are—might naturally wonder about the legal basis for targeting these assets. And indeed, the law in this area has some important nuances that are not always fully appreciated in mainstream media reporting and popular commentary. Continue reading

New Podcast, Featuring Anastasia Kirilenko

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. During the ongoing emergency in Ukraine, as Russia’s unprovoked military aggression throws the region and the world into crisis, my colleagues at the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN) and I featuring on KickBack experts who can shed greater light on how issues related to corruption relate to the ongoing crisis. And rather than keeping to our usual schedule of releasing new episodes every two weeks, we will release new episodes as soon as they are available. In the new episode, my ICRN colleague Christopher Starke interviews Anastasia Kirilenko, an investigative journalist and the co-producer of Putin and the Mafia, a documentary about Vladimir Putin’s connections with organized crime. In their conversation, Christopher and Anastasia discuss the themes of this documentary, and also discuss the role of media and civil society in Russia, the role of oligarchs in Russian politics, and what the international anticorruption community could do to more effectively promote change within Russia. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack is a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends. And if you have suggestions for voices you’d like to hear on the podcast, just send me a message and let me know.