Would the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act Help the U.S. Counter China?

The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) makes it a criminal offense for U.S. domestic concerns, firms that issue U.S. and any anyone acting in U.S. territory from offering or paying bribes to foreign government officials. The FCPA does not, however, apply to the foreign officials who receive those bribes. (On occasion some prosecutors have advanced the theory that a foreign government official who takes a bribe can be convicted for aiding and abetting, or conspiring in, an FCPA violation, but courts have generally rejected these theories.) Additionally, while U.S. criminal law prohibits domestic government officials from soliciting or accepting bribes, the relevant statutory provisions do not apply to foreign officials who engage in comparable conduct.

Many U.S. anticorruption activists believe that U.S. law ought to target the demand side of foreign bribery transactions (that is, the bribe-takers), not just the supply side, and have therefore advocated for the adoption of the so-called Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA). These advocacy efforts appear to be paying off: In late July, the Senate adopted FEPA as an amendment to the Senate’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act. This does not guarantee that FEPA will become law, as the House of Representatives has yet to vote on a comparable bill, and there is no guarantee that the FEPA language will remain in the bill after final negotiations conclude. But the odds have gone up significantly.

Would FEPA be a good idea? I think the answer is probably yes, though the impact is likely to be modest, and probably somewhat less than FEPA’s proponents hope. I may post again later about my own assessment of FEPA’s likely impact, should it pass in something like its current form. But for now, I want to focus on a striking argument in favor of FEPA that appeared in an op-ed a couple of weeks ago. That op-ed, coauthored by Elaine Dezenski (Senior Director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) and Scott Greytak,(Director of Advocacy at Transparency International’s US office), argued that FEPA would “blunt China’s malign economic influence” by countering the practice of Chinese government or government-affiliated entities using bribes to secure access to valuable resources and to expand China’s political sway over developing countries.

There are many good arguments in favor of FEPA, but I’m not sure that this is one of them. I don’t want to dismiss it outright, as it’s entirely possible that I’ve missed something. But it seems to me that FEPA would have little to no impact on corrupt overseas bribery by Chinese entities, and at least in the short term might make that problem (slightly) worse. So let me lay out the source of my confusion: Continue reading →

Some Backlogged (and Very Interesting!) Podcast Episodes

As our regular readers have probably noticed, I haven’t been posting as much recently–first because I was on sabbatical (a nice perk of academic jobs) and then, most recently, for a bit of summer vacation. But I hope to be back to semi-regular posting soon! In the meantime, I wanted to mention several new episodes of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast, which came out earlier in the summer. (Sorry for failing to announce these earlier — again, I’ve been on a bit of a break.) For those of you who haven’t already heard them, they’re worth checking out!
  • The June 22 episode features and interview with journalist Michela Wrong, who is perhaps best known for her award-winning book It’s Our Turn to Eat, which tells the story of Kenyan anticorruption activist and whistleblower John Githongo (also featured in a recent KickBack episode!). In the interview, Sam Power interviews Ms. Wong about the issues raised in the book, as well as her other writing, including her most recent book, Do Not Disturb, about the abuses of power by the Kagame regime in Rwanda.
  • The July 6 episode is a bit of a change of pace from the usual episodes. Rather than featuring an interview with an expert, three of the hosts or the KickBack podcast at the Sussex Centre for the Study of Corruption (Dan Hough, Liz David-Barrett, and Sam Power) have a conversation (after some opening banter about British weather) about the leading theories for corruption analysis, including rational choice, collective action, and social norms approaches.
  • The July 28 episode returns to the interview format, featuring a conversation with Huma Yusuf, the Director of Business Integrity at the impact investing firm British International Investment. Tom Shipley interviews Ms. Yusuf about how anticorruption and business integrity fit into the global business agenda and highlighting some of the key concepts and debates in this area.
You can find these episodes and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Guest Post: Curbing Political Finance Abuse in Moldova

GAB is pleased to welcome this post on political finance in Moldova by the Independent Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee. Established by reformist President Maia Sandu in 2021, the committee reports regularly on Moldova’s progress in curbing corruption and what more needs to be done. Thanks to its members expertise and their independence, its work carries great weight — both within Moldova and the international community.

The most recent report addresses perhaps the most challenging issue any democracy faces: enforcement of the rules governing contributions to and expenditures by political candidates and political parties. A challenge all the greater in Moldova as post-Soviet oligarchs have yet to be fully tamed and Russia continues to pour black money into campaigns to strengthen anti-Ukraine, pro-Russian candidates.

The report is here, the committee’s summary below.

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Ukraine’s Fight Against Corruption: Whistleblowing

Last Friday, July 7, some 50 civil society representatives, media personnel, and government policymakers spent the day discussing the law and practice of whistleblowing in Ukraine. They heard from among others National Anticorruption Prevention Committee (NAPC) officials explain how whistleblowing fit into the government’s anticorruption efforts, Anticorruption court Judge Oleksiy Kravchuk on measures for fostering respect for whistleblowers, and how the law protected Oleh Polishchuk after he blew the whistle on his employer’s corruption.

I spoke at the closing panel with TI Ukraine head Andrii Borovyk and Serhiy Derkach, Deputy Minister for Community, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine. The English version of the program is here and the slides I spoke from here. Minister Derkach’s closing remarks are below —

“Whistleblowing during the recovery process in Ukraine is even more important. It is not only about corruption but also about the security and efficiency of how funds and resources are used.

“There are three key conditions for whistleblowers to report wrongdoing:

✔️ Official channel for reporting
✔️ Confidence that the reports will be reviewed and the perpetrators brought to justice
✔️ Protection from retaliation by management

“At the Ministry of Renovation, we support a zero-tolerance culture towards corruption and are actively working to implement an effective compliance system.

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Mitigating Corruption Risks in Ukrainian Reconstruction: Princeton University/Kyiv Anticorruption Research and Education Centre’s Joint Program

Princeton University’s Innovations for Successful Societies program and Kyiv’s Anticorruption Research and Education Centre are together helping the Ukrainian government fight corruption during reconstruction. Their first output is a four-day program that began today to share experiences elsewhere in curbing corruption in construction projects. Attending are frontline staff from the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development, the State Agency for Reconstruction and Development, and other agencies and departments responsible for reconstruction.

Funded by the International Renaissance Foundation and USAID, Deputy Infrastructure Minister Serhiy Derkach opened the program. Princeton Professor Jenifer Widner, head of the Princeton program, Oskana Nesterenko, ACREC Executive Director, and representatives of AID and the Renaissance Foundation also spoke. Hamish Goldie-Scot, CoST Technical Director, and I will lead the discussions. The agenda is here, my opening remarks below.

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How Open Data Will Prevent Corruption in Ukraine Reconstruction

Ukraine is creating the world’s most transparent system for the procurement of public works. To assure citizens and donors that the billions needed to reconstruct the nation’s infrastructure will be wisely and honestly spent, it has developed DREAM, the Digital Restoration EcoSystem for Accountable Management. DREAM will provide citizens, investors, and donors access to microlevel data on every single reconstruction project — from the initial feasibility study through the procurement process to the completion of construction.

Analysis of DREAM data will show when bills of quantity are unbalanced, when bids were likely collusively prepared, and suggest if not reveal other signs of project-level corruption.  Analysis of DREAM data across all procurements will disclose if cost estimates vary too much from the bid price and the final price, suspicious patterns in initial versus actual completion date, variation orders, or subcontracting, and similar indicators of possible weaknesses in the procurement and oversight of projects.

In a talk next week I will recommend the Ukrainian government use DREAM data to conduct the analyses listed below. Surely there are more I am missing. Comments/additions welcome.

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Public Funding of Political Parties Is Unlikely To Reduce Corruption

Today’s guest post is from Dr. Sergiu Lipcean of the University of Bergen and Professor Iain McMenamin of Dublin City University.

Does public funding of political parties reduce corruption? Intuitively, there are good reasons to believe that it does. After all, when parties receive a substantial portion of their funding from public sources, they are less dependent on private contributions—both legal and illegal. That straightforward logic has led many scholars and prestigious organizations to recommend higher levels of public funding for parties and candidates. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, for example, recommends public funding of political parties and electoral candidates as an anticorruption measure, and the OECD, while not explicitly using the language of corruption, recommends public funding as part of a holistic system of political finance regulation to limit policy capture.

But the empirical evidence on the anticorruption impact of public funding for parties is surprisingly thin, and results that initially seem to show the sort of effect described above often turn out to be quite fragile and unreliable. We recently published our own study, which examines how the level of public funding for political parties affects enterprise managers’ perceptions of the impact of payments to government officials, using World Bank survey data from 27 post-communist countries. Although we find an association between higher public funding and lower corruption, this result is extremely sensitive to minor changes in method, and the results are too uncertain to recommend public funding as a policy intervention to reduce corruption.

We suspect that one of the reasons that empirical research has failed to find robust anticorruption effects of public funding is that many of the unlawful payments to politicians are used for their personal consumption, rather than for political purposes. As noted above, the economic logic of the view that public funding reduces corruption is that if parties can rely more on public funding for election campaigns and other legitimate political expenses, they will be less tempted to accept bribes, because they will have less need to fill their campaign coffers with dirty money. But if much of the illegal money given to politicians is used for their personal gratification, rather than for political purposes, than public funding of campaigns will not have much of an effect.

This is not to say that countries should not significantly increase public funding of political parties. Corruption is enormously damaging, and even very high levels of public funding for parties are unlikely to have much impact on most national budgets, so even the possibility that significant public funding might reduce corruption, at least in some contexts, may make this investment of resources worthwhile, even if we lack strong direct evidence of effectiveness. And of course there are many other reasons, besides anticorruption, to favor public funding of political campaigns. That said, an honest appraisal of the existing research compels the conclusion that, to date, the evidence that public funding will substantially reduce corruption is weak and speculative, and we should therefore not get too excited about its potential as a general anticorruption measure.

New Podcast Episode, Featuring John Githongo

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. In this episode, host Liz David-Barrett interviews John Githongo, the legendary Kenyan anticorruption activist John Githongo about his extraordinary career, including his background in journalism, his government service as Kenya’s Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics in the early 2000s, and his role as a civil society activist, including his work with Transparency International. The conversation also covers recent developments in Kenya, and what lessons can be learned from Kenya’s anticorruption efforts, particularly the the role of anticorruption institutions. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

New Podcast Episode, Featuring Magnus Öhman

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. (This one actually came out a couple weeks ago, so it’s not so new–apologies for the tardiness in posting this announcement.) In this episode, hosts Nils Kobis and Christopher Starke, interview Magnus Öhman, senior political finance adviser at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, about challenges associated with the problem of illicit political finance, as well as broader issues concerning declining political trust and democratic backsliding. The interview also touches on the potential of artificial intelligence to improve political transparency. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

Trump Indictment’s Lesson for Prosecutors Charging Senior Political Figures

At long last federal prosecutors have filed charges against former President Donald Trump for crimes arising from his unlawful possession of classified documents. The charges are contained in what is called an indictment in the United States.

One aspect of the indictment merits the attention of prosecutors everywhere. Or at least for those considering charging senior government officials or ex-officials who, like Trump, can be expected to try to sway public or elite opinion by any means to escape convictions.

The Trump indictment is what American prosecutors call a “speaking indictment.”

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