Tracking Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in the Trump Administration–October 2017 Update

Last May, we launched our project to track credible allegations that President Trump, as well as his family members and close associates, are seeking to use the presidency to advance their personal financial interests.Just as President Trump’s son Eric will be providing President Trump with “quarterly” updates on the Trump Organization’s business affairs, we will do our best to provide readers with regular updates on credible allegations of presidential profiteering. Our October update is now available here.

There were relatively few new developments this month, though the list of existing conflicts and related concerns is still plenty long.. We will continue to monitor and report on allegations that Trump, or his family and close associates, are seeking to profit from the presidency.

As we are always careful to note, while we try to sift through the media reports to include only those allegations that appear credible, we acknowledge that many of the allegations discussed are speculative and/or contested. We also do not attempt a full analysis of the laws and regulations that may or may not have been broken if the allegations are true. For an overview of some of the relevant federal laws and regulations that might apply to some of the alleged problematic conduct, see here.

Ferreting Out Kleptocrats’ Buddies: The Ukrainian Solution Part I

Every kleptocrat needs a buddy.  Someone to serve as an intermediary between the corrupt official and the bankers, real estate agents, and others in London, New York, and elsewhere happy to profit from handling dirty money.  A kleptocrat can’t just walk into a bank or real estate office in the United Kingdom, the United States, or other preferred offshore haven with a pile of money to invest.  As a public official, the antimoney laundering (AML) laws would oblige the banker or real estate agent to ask searching questions about how the kleptocrat came into the money and the law would likely also require them to report the transaction or proposed transaction to the authorities.  A buddy, particularly one who has remained out of the public limelight, is the perfect solution.  So long as they don’t know a potential customer is close to a senior public official, the banker or real estate agent meets their obligation to ascertain the source of the would-be customer’s funds by asking a few pro forma questions.

To plug the buddy loophole, the AML laws require banks and real estate agents to determine if anyone wanting to do business with them is a “close associate” of a senior official — a “politically exposed person” in the inelegant term coined by AML specialists.  If a potential customer is a PEP, the bank or real estate agent must ask the same searching questions about the origins of the individual’s funds that they must ask of a senior official.  Recognizing that bankers and real estate agents can’t be expected to know whether a foreign national wanting to do business with them is a close associate of a senior official in 190 plus countries, AML regulators allow them to rely on one of the several PEP lists peddled by commercial firms.  So long as the potential customer doesn’t appear on whatever PEP list they use, the banker or real estate agent need not conduct a detailed inquiry (“enhanced due diligence” in AML-speak) into where their money came from.

So how well do these commercial PEP lists do at identifying kleptocrats’ buddies?  Continue reading →

Using the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT) to Elicit More Accurate Answers on Corruption Experience Surveys

With apologies to those readers who couldn’t care less about methodological issues associated with corruption experience surveys, I’m going to continue the train of thought I began in my last two posts (here and here) with further musings on that theme—in particular what survey researchers refer to as the “social desirability bias” problem (the reluctance of survey respondents to truthfully answer questions about sensitive behaviors like corruption). Last week’s post emphasized the seriousness of this concern and voiced some skepticism about whether one of the most common techniques for addressing it (so-called “indirect questioning,” in which respondents are asked not about their own behavior but about the behavior of people “like them” or “in their line of business”) actually works as well as is commonly assumed.

We professors, especially those of us who like to write blog posts, often get a bad rap for criticizing everything in sight but never offering any constructive solutions. The point is well-taken, and while I can’t promise to lay off the criticism, in today’s post I want to try to be at least a little bit constructive by calling attention to a promising alternative approach to mitigating the social desirability bias problem in corruption experience surveys: the unmatched count technique (UCT), sometimes alternatively called the “item count” or “list” method. This approach has been deployed occasionally by a few academic researchers working on corruption, but it hasn’t seemed to have been picked up by the major organizations that field large-scale corruption experience surveys, such as Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (WBES), or the various regional surveys (like AmericasBarometer or Afrobarometer). So it seemed worthwhile to try to draw more attention to the UCT. It’s by no means a perfect solution, and I’ll say a little bit more about costs and drawbacks near the end of the post. But the UCT is nonetheless worth serious consideration, both by other researchers designing their own surveys for individual research projects, and by more established organizations that regularly field surveys on corruption experience.

The way a UCT question works is roughly as follows: Continue reading →

Bribery in College Basketball: What the Corruption Ring Means for the Future of Collegiate Athletics

Last Tuesday, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Joon H. Kim, shined light onto the “dark underbelly of college basketball” by charging a number of individuals with violating federal bribery, fraud, and corruption statutes. Among those charged were James Gatto, Director of Global Sports Marketing for Adidas, and assistant basketball coaches at the University of Arizona, Auburn University, Oklahoma State University, and the University of Southern California. Additional investigations are currently ongoing at the University of Louisville and the University of Miami.

U.S. Attorney Kim outlined two distinct schemes that were uncovered during FBI investigations. The first involved Adidas executive James Gatto, who allegedly bribed high school basketball stars to sign with certain colleges that were sponsored by Adidas. The second scheme involved financial advisers and agents bribing assistant coaches at universities in exchange for convincing their players to hire those advisers when they became professional athletes.

For those who follow college sports, particularly football and basketball, the illicit activity is not surprising. As longtime collegiate sports journalist Pat Forde explained, “Every basketball program in America is running scared right now, because this is how business gets done. A lot of people knew it, but nobody was able to lay it out with proof like the feds did on Tuesday. It’s a dirty sport, and today we know how dirty.”

It’s nevertheless a bit surprising that the Department of Justice decided now was the time to get involved, as if the corruption has not been going on for decades. The recent charges raise two questions: First, given the longstanding history of bribes in college basketball, why did the Department of Justice finally decide to get involved? Second, what does this mean for the future of collegiate athletics?

Continue reading →

Populist Plutocrats Conference–Video Available

Last Saturday, on September 23, Harvard Law School organized (in collaboration with the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago) a conference on “Populist Plutocrats: Lessons from Around the World,” which I previously advertised on this blog (see here and here). The event was video-recorded for those who are interested but were not able to attend in person. At the moment, the available video is a full, unedited recording, which you can find here (on the Stigler Center’s YouTube channel). We’re hoping to get the video edited and uploaded in a more convenient format soon, but for those who are interested, I’ll provide in this post the time locations for different sessions of the event:

I hope and expect that we’ll have some more posts in the coming weeks that reflect and engage substantively with some of the discussions at the conference, and in particular how they relate to issues of corruption and related topics, but for now I hope some of you will check out some of the video recording.

 

Anticorruption Bibliography–September 2017 Update

An updated version of my anticorruption bibliography is available from my faculty webpage. A direct link to the pdf of the full bibliography is here, and a list of the new sources added in this update is here. As always, I welcome suggestions for other sources that are not yet included, including any papers GAB readers have written.

Preventing Corruption in Development Projects: The World Bank’s La Guajira Project

Report Number No: 38508-CO for a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$ 90 Million to the Department of La Guajira with the Guarantee of the Republic of Colombia for a Water and Sanitation Infrastructure and Service Management Program is probably not the first place one would turn for advice on preventing corruption in development projects.  But it should be.  For annex 11 contains a text book example of how to identify and mitigate the risk of corruption in a donor-funded project.

The annex is part of the project appraisal document, the paper the World Bank’s Board of Directors relied upon in February 2007 in approving a $90 million loan to the Department of La Guajira in Colombia to upgrade the department’s water and sanitation services.  The loan was for the purchase of equipment and construction of civil works in some dozen or so municipalities and pilot water and sanitation projects in several remote rural areas.  While the project document made a strong case for the project’s benefits, it minced no words when it came to the risks of corruption the project faced: “The Department of La Guajira has a reputation for weak governance, corruption, and the continued presence of parallel institutions which have prevented public sector efforts to meet citizen needs in an equitable and effective manner.”  To be sure the message was not lost on board members, the authors went on to warn that “corruption, public sector malfeasance, capture by elites and special interests, and the paucity of accountability and transparency” is endemic in La Guajira and is the reason why the department remains so poor.

After reading such a clear, candid statement of the project’s corruption risks, one might question the sanity of any board member who voted to put $90 million of World Bank funds at risk.  But in fact an unvarnished analysis of the risk of corruption in the project is the first reason why the board was right to approve the loan the corrupt environment in La Guajira notwithstanding.  Project managers cannot prevent corruption in their projects if they are in denial about the risks they face.

The second reason why the board was right to approve the project loan is the chart that appears in the annex. Continue reading →

Can Indirect Questioning Induce Honest Responses on Bribery Experience Surveys?

As I noted in my last post, bribery experience surveys – of both firms and citizens – are increasingly popular as a tool not only for testing hypotheses about corruption’s causes and effects, but for measuring the effectiveness of anticorruption policies, for example in the context of assessing progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals’ anticorruption targets. Bribery experience surveys are thought to have a number of advantages over perception-based indicators, greater objectivity chief among them.

I certainly agree that bribery experience surveys are extremely useful and have contributed a great deal to our understanding of corruption’s causes and effects. They’re not perfect, but no indicator is; different measures have different strengths and weaknesses, and we just need to use caution when interpreting any given set of empirical results. In that spirit, though, I do think the anticorruption community should subject these experience surveys to a bit more critical scrutiny, comparable to the extensive exploration in the literature of the myriad shortcomings of corruption perception indicators. In last week’s post, I focused on the question of the correct denominator to use when calculating bribery victimization rates – all citizens, or all citizens who have had (a certain level of) contact with the bureaucracy? Today I want to focus on a different issue: What can we do about the fact that survey respondents might be reluctant to answer corruption questions truthfully?

The observation that survey respondents might be reluctant to truthfully answer questions about their personal bribery experience is neither new nor surprising. Survey respondents confronted with sensitive questions often have a tendency to give the answer that they think they “should” give (or that they think the interviewer wants to hear); social scientists call this tendency “social desirability bias.” There’s quite robust evidence that social desirability bias affects surveys on sensitive topics, including corruption; even more troubling, the available evidence suggests that social desirability bias on corruption surveys is neither constant nor randomly distributed, but rather varies across countries and regions. This means that apparent variations in bribery experience rates might actually reflect variations in willingness to truthfully answer questions about bribery experience, rather than (or in addition to) variations in actual bribery experience (see here, here, and here).

So, what can we do about this problem? Existing surveys use a range of techniques. Here I want to focus on one of the most popular: the “indirect questioning” approach. The idea is that instead of asking a respondent, “How much money does your firm have to spend each year on informal payments to government officials?”, you instead ask, “How much money does a typical firm in your line of business have to spend each year on informal payments to government officials?” (It’s perhaps worth noting that the indirect questioning method seems more ubiquitous in firm/manager surveys; many of the most prominent household surveys, such as the International Crime Victims Survey and the Global Corruption Barometer, ask directly about the household’s experience rather than asking about “households like yours.”) The hope is that asking the question indirectly will reduce social desirability bias, because the respondent doesn’t have to admit that he or she (or his or her firm) engaged in illegal activity.

Is that hope justified? I don’t doubt that indirect questioning helps to some extent. But I confess that I’m skeptical, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, that indirect questioning is the silver bullet solution for social desirability bias that some researchers seem to suggest that it is. Continue reading →

Regulatory Discretion and Corruption in the FDA

In the United States, the regulatory agency responsible for ensuring safe food and medicine, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), has been marred by numerous scandals – from a 2016 insider trading prosecution to a 2009 politicized medical device approval to a 2013 ProPublica investigation that found the FDA overlooked fraudulent research and let potentially unsafe drugs stay on the market. These scandals have, understandably, undermined public confidence in the FDA. What’s the explanation for these problems? Why is there such a large public perception of corruption, and so many questionable incidents, at the FDA?

Much of the explanation has to do with institutional design: Corruption blooms where transparency and accountability are lacking, yet the FDA has vast discretion over the regulations it sets, incredibly loose restrictions on the money it can receive from industry, and little public accountability. The following steps can be taken to reform the FDA, in the interest of rooting out corruption and restoring public confidence in the agency:

Continue reading →

Populist Plutocrats Conference–Reminder

This is just a quick reminder, for those who are interested, that the Harvard Law School conference on “Populist Plutocrats: Lessons from Around the World” (co-sponsored by the University of Chicago’s Stigler Center) is happening tomorrow, September 23, starting at 9 am (Eastern Time). The full conference agenda and speaker list is here, and for convenience I’ll also include it in this post after the break. If you’re interested in the event but can’t make it in person, you can catch the live stream here. The event will also be video-recorded, and I plan to post links to some of the videos (along with some commentary) over the next couple of weeks.

Also, in case any of you would like a bit more background, this morning the Harvard Gazette ran a short interview with me about the conference and what motivated me to organize it. (Spoiler: The main motivation rhymes with “Ronald Grump.”)

Here’s the full program and speaker list: Continue reading →