The Philippines Must Break the Power of Political Dynasties

Democratic systems are no strangers to political dynasties. In the United States, some well-known families have been in politics for generations—the Kennedys held an impressive 64-year streak in Congress until 2011 (and staged a comeback only two years later), and earlier this month George P. Bush won the race for Texas Land Commissioner, carrying on the political legacy of his father Jeb Bush, his uncle George W. Bush, and his grandfather George H.W. Bush. Although the idea of political royalty inheriting power seems to cut against equal opportunity, members of such families have been revered throughout history. But political dynasties present a much greater threat to democracy when they control a majority of power in the country. In the Philippines, one study estimated that political dynasties comprised up to 70% of the last Philippine Congress (compared to 6% of the last U.S. Congress). During the last election, one notorious political clan had 80 members running for office. Indeed, Philippine political clans have evolved into the most efficient (and at times, deadly) means of monopolizing power. Various members of the same family often cycle through the same congressional, gubernatorial, and mayoral seats in their home province, and it’s not unusual to see an electoral race pitting two members of the same family against each other. In many ways, the dynastic culture of politics has removed meaningful choice from the voters, and exacerbated the pervasiveness of corruption in government.

A possible solution is before the Philippine Congress right now—the Anti-Political Dynasty Bill. This bill would prohibit any spouse or first-degree relation (including parents, siblings, and children) of an incumbent elected official from seeking elected office. Although individuals may run once their relative’s term is up, they may not immediately succeed that relative in the same elected office. (The bill would have a enormous effect on the upcoming 2016 elections—Vice President Jejomar Binay, who has already announced his candidacy, and whose daughter’s term in the Senate runs until 2019, would be precluded from running for President.) At first blush, the bill may seem antidemocratic, as it (temporarily) suspends the rights of many individuals to seek elected office. Still, in the Philippines, where the concentration of political power has bred such a strong culture of corruption, certain rights may need to be sacrificed. It is a drastic problem in need of a drastic solution.

There are several reasons why Congress should pass this bill and limit the influence of political families: Continue reading

A First Draft of a Training Course for Anticorruption Investigators: Comments Please!

Last week I complained about the poor quality of the training provided to investigators in developing country anticorruption agencies.   Here I offer a (very) rough draft of the topics I think a quality course should cover.  Comments, additional sources, and (gentle) critiques requested. Continue reading

The Hidden Dangers of Anticorruption Education Initiatives

A little while ago, in a post reflecting on the role of academics in the anticorruption movement, I noted the distinction between anticorruption classes that focus on “teaching of skills” (helping students become effective lawyers, policy analysts, critical thinkers, etc.) and “teaching of values” (using education to inculcate anticorruption norms and reduce cultural tolerance for corrupt activities). In this post I want to pick up on that latter theme, which has become increasingly important to anticorruption activists and policymakers. Fighting the “culture of corruption,” many have persuasively argued, requires not just changing incentives and formal institutions, but also changing norms and values. And one way to change values may be through education–not only formal classroom education at all levels, but other forms of educational campaigns. For example, many attribute the success of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption not only to its law enforcement efforts, but to its broad-based educational campaigns to change the attitude of the Hong Kong population. Many countries have tried to emulate some version of this broad-based “anticorruption advertisement” campaign, and there are at least anecdotal examples of such programs making a difference (though not, to my knowledge, and rigorous assessment through something like a randomized controlled trial).

But these sorts of education efforts, if not carefully designed, can prove not only ineffective, but counterproductive. I recently came across a very nice analysis by the political scientist Frederic Charles Schaffer making this point, drawing on a detailed case study of anti-vote-buying campaigns in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent in Thailand. (I haven’t yet had a chance to read Professor Schaffer’s 2008 book, The Hidden Costs of Clean Election Reform, but I gather it goes into much more depth and discusses a range of other issues and countries as well.)  The paper is from 2005, so it’s possible some of the specific examples and criticisms might no longer be apt, but my sense is that the larger points are still highly relevant, and quite important to anticorruption reformers who want to use mass education/advertisement campaigns to change citizen attitudes and behaviors toward corrupt practices. I won’t try to summarize all of Professor Schaffer’s nuanced account, but here’s what I take to be the essential argument: Continue reading

Spy Tapes, Scorpions, and Bribe Solicitation: Prosecutorial Decisions in South Africa

South African President Jacob Zuma is currently embroiled in a corruption investigation associated with the so-called Nkandla scandal. This is hardly the first time President Zuma has had to contend with corruption accusations, but he as so far managed to escape unscathed. One of those earlier incidents involved allegations that President Zuma received bribes from a defense contractor, but the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) dropped its investigation of those allegations in 2009. In explaining his decision to drop the investigation, Mokotedi Mpshe, the acting head of the NPA, cited “collusion between the former heads of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) and NPA to manipulate the prosecutorial process.” The evidence of this ostensible collusion? Wiretapped recordings of conversations between a former NPA head and then-DSO head Leonard McCarthy, who was responsible for directing some of the investigation into President Zuma. Mpshe claimed that the recordings, which have since become known as the “spy tapes,” showed an “abuse of process” via interference in the timing of the prosecution, forcing him to end the investigation.

This 2009 case has been in the news again, both because of the current corruption allegations against President Zuma, and also because the South African Supreme Court of Appeals recently ordered the NPA to hand over the spy tapes and associated documents to the opposition Democratic Alliance. Although the audio recordings themselves have not been made public, excerpts from their transcripts can be read online. From these excerpts (which are more extensive than those previously released in 2009), it appears the NPA’s decision to drop the case against Zuma was wrong-headed.

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FIFA’s Faustian Bargain: Corruption for the Cup?

In a Road to Damascus twist, on Tuesday FIFA President Sepp Blatter asked the Swiss government to launch a criminal investigation into corruption related to Qatar being chosen to host the 2022 World Cup. This unprecedented move comes on the heels of a week of backlash to the FIFA Ethics Committee’s final conclusion on the Qatar question: “The potentially problematic facts and circumstances identified by the report concerning the Qatar 2022 bid were, all in all, not suited to compromise the integrity of the 2018/2022 bidding process as a whole.”  These “potentially problematic facts” include a swath of bribes (“improper payments”) paid by Mohamed bin Hamman, a chief supporter of the Qatari bid and former Asian Football Confederation president, which the report concludes were not directly related to securing the Cup, as well as payments by Qatari officials themselves, which made a “negative impression” but did not technically fall afoul of FIFA rules. The Committee’s decision was quickly and repeatedly slammed as a farce, and was followed by strong calls for the investigative report upon which it was based to be made public. Blatter adamantly refused to release the report, which made it all the more surprising when he seemed to go a step further by calling for the Swiss Office of the Attorney General to investigate. Should a criminal investigation proceed, not only would the government’s findings be made public, but corrupt FIFA officials would find themselves facing something entirely new: the pinch of handcuffs rather than a pinch to their finances.

While FIFA lodging the criminal complaint should be applauded, singing halleluiahs over Blatter’s conversion to the church of anticorruption would be a bit premature. In fact, this may be his most strategic move yet.

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More on CPI Changes Over Time (or Not)

OK, in my post from a few weeks back, I asserted that year-to-year changes in a country’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score are not meaningful, even after the thoughtful and welcome changes that Transparency International made to its methodology in 2012. My concern was — and remains — that the underlying data sources that TI uses to create the index are themselves not likely to be comparable across years, which means that the CPI inherits the problem. But for purposes of this post, I’m going to completely disregard my own warning in that earlier post, and take a look at whether there have been fact been any notable changes in individual countries’ perceived corruption between 2012 and 2013.  Based on a very quick scan of the data, the answer appears to be (mostly) no.

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Better Training for Anticorruption Investigators: Another Dull, Boring, Humdrum, Modest, Unimaginative Proposal to Combat Corruption?

U.S. Federal Judge Mark Wolf’s proposal to create an international court for corruption crimes was recently the subject of a briefing organized by a commission of the U.S. House of Representatives.  The briefing was the latest example of the attention Judge Wolf’s recommendation for fighting corruption has garnered, attention that has included an appearance on public television where he extolled the merits of his proposal and an interview in a serious policy journal where he expanded on his idea for the court.

Given Matthew’s devastating critique of the court proposal, the attention the judge’s idea continues to attract is surprising to say the least.  What it no doubt reflects is the publicity value of an idea that, at least on its face, appears to be an innovative, imaginative, and “outside the box” way to fight corruption.  Given this media bias, it would do no good to point to further flaws in the judge’s idea (indeed one might write that it would be blogging a dead horse to do so).  What I intend here instead is to protest the media bias for headline grabbing ideas to combat corruption by advancing one that is dull, boring, humdrum, modest, and unimaginative.  The proposal is thus diametrically different in PR value from the judge’s.  It also differs in two substantive ways: it is 1) realistic and 2) will help reduce corruption if followed.

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Can a Private Right of Action Solve State Capture in the Philippines?: A Skeptical View

Last month, as a part of the LIDS Global initiative (discussed here), a research team at the University of the Philippines (U.P.) put forth an ambitious legal proposal to combat corruption in the Philippines. The centerpiece of the proposal is a private right of action that would allow individual citizens to bring civil claims against public officials for violations of the Philippines’ Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The proposal is designed to overcome the problem of “state capture”–the shaping of laws, rules, and regulations through illegal and non-transparent payments to public officials. Because state capture is so severe in the Philippines—reaching even high-ranking officials within the country’s own anticorruption agencies—citizens cannot “rely solely on the political will of government officials to prosecute their peers in the government.” The private cause of action is intended to address (or at least circumvent) this problem by enabling private citizens injured by corruption to go directly to court, without having to rely on public enforcers.

While I agree that state capture presents a huge problem for anticorruption efforts, I’m skeptical that the proposed private right of action will be effective–at least in the Philippines. The roots of my skepticism are threefold: Continue reading

Investment Arbitration as a Check on Corruption: The Yukos Award

In a previous post on this blog, Sam raised the possibility that under the logic of World Duty Free v. Kenya, investment treaty arbitration rules might actually encourage state officials to engage in corruption, because corrupt acts by an investor (even when the state is also implicated) can be used to escape state liability in investment arbitration. Even if Sam’s point is true, however, it is important to acknowledge that investment arbitration can be a check on corruption in many instances. In fact, as the Yukos v. Russian Federation award issued against the Russian government this past summer demonstrates, Sam may be pointing out the exception, not the rule. Indeed, this $50 billion award – the largest international arbitration award in history – demonstrates the power of investment arbitration to bring corruption to light and act as an outside check on corrupt states. Continue reading

Should Anticorruption Agencies Be Able to Veto Cabinet Appointments?: The Case of the Indonesian KPK

Independent anticorruption agencies (ACAs) have become a vital component for many countries in combating corruption. Generally, these ACAs function like independent police or prosecutors, taking on one or both of those roles in settings where the ordinary law enforcement apparatus cannot be relied on to investigate, arrest, and prosecute corrupt officials. In addition to these prosecutorial responsibilities, ACAs sometimes oversee asset disclosures, and may also perform a public education function. But for the most part, ACAs do not play a direct role in selecting or vetting senior political officials. Should they?

This question is not merely hypothetical: Indonesia recently elected as its new president Joko Widodo, a reform-minded candidate who promised “zero-tolerance towards corruption” during his campaign (see a previous post discussing his election here). Last month, President-Elect Widodo took the unprecedented step of submitting his list of proposed nominees for cabinet positions to Indonesia’s powerful Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or “KPK”) for evaluation–and approval–before the list of nominees was finally made public. The KPK rejected eight of his submissions, with the result that President Widodo delayed the announcement of his cabinet compositions until he replaced these eight candidates with other nominees approved by KPK. Four days later, Widodo announced his cabinet composition, which presumably did not include the eight individuals to whom the KPK objected.

While the decision to give the KPK a de facto veto over cabinet appointments is in some ways an encouraging development–one that many Indonesians might appreciate as brave, progressive move, which enlarges the power of the popular KPK–it is troubling in certain respects, and should prompt more careful scrutiny and regulation. Continue reading