The biggest anticorruption-related news to come out of Brazil since the election of the far-right Jair Bolsonaro as Brazil’s next president has been the announcement that President-Elect Bolsonaro has tapped Judge Sergio Moro—the federal judge who oversaw the trials of several high profile Brazilian politicians in the Car Wash (Lava Jato) operation, including former President Lula Inácio de Silva—to be the next Minister of Justice. Some are hopeful that Judge Moro, who has emerged as an anticorruption hero to many Brazilians, will be well-positioned to use this new high-level post to push forward with systemic anticorruption reforms, including the “New Measures Against Corruption” championed by Transparency International and other civil society activists. Others, including Professor Stephenson in a recent post on this blog, worry that Judge Moro’s acceptance of this position would be a step backward for Brazil’s struggle against corruption, because his appointment could further politicize not only the Lava Jato trials, but the entire country. While President-Elect Bolsonaro wants to portray his appointment of Judge Moro as the first step toward making good on Bolsonaro’s promise to make anticorruption a priority of his administration, this appointment could be seen by centrists or the left as adding insult to injury by giving more power to the man who put Lula behind bars.
If Judge Moro accepts the appointment, then, he will be in a difficult and delicate position. He will have the power to influence the anticorruption agenda (assuming Bolsonaro follows through on his promise to give Moro autonomy in deciding how to deal with organized crime and corruption), but he needs to be sensitive to the fact that his very appointment risks entrenching the view in some quarters that the anticorruption agenda is really a politically-motivated conspiracy against left-wing politicians. There are four things Judge Moro can and should do in his new position to minimize this risk: Continue reading