Tag Archives: Politics

Opportunity for Civil Society Organizations Concerned with Corruption to Provide Input to 4th International Conference on Financing for Development

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The UNCAC Coalition, a global network of close to 400 civil society organizations in over 120 countries committed to furthering implementation and monitoring of the UN Convention against Corruption, urges CSO’s working on corruption to provide input to the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4).

UN Member States will there decide how to resource the pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals, international development, and support reform of the international financial architecture. 

The Conference will take place from 30 June to 3 July 2025 in Spain. The consultation that will inform the negotiations is open until 15 October COB EST (find more details below).For corruption to feature prominently as a cross-cutting issue, it is crucial that as many civil society organizations and other stakeholders as possible make their own submissions.

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Invaluable Guide to Fighting Corruption — at a Bargain Basement Price

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Mark Pyman and Paul Heywood’s Sector-Based Action Against Corruption: A Guide for Organizations and Professionals is not for everyone. If your goal is to improve a nation’s CPI score, attack grand corruption, or realize some other broadly stated, national level objective, stop here.

But if, as the authors explain, you “need to acquire competence in recognizing, analyzing and dealing with corruption” in a particular organization or process, and if you believe that “corruption Is as much a management issue as it is a political one,” download it immediately. (And thank whoever made this must-have book open-source.)

Pyman’s and Heywood’s careers both combine hands-on work helping government agencies and corporations curb corruption with serious engagement with the learning on corruption. And it shows. From the rigor they insist be brought to bear to specify identifiable, tractable corruption problems (corruption due to a non-meritocratic civil service is not one; conflict of interest in hiring is) to the disciplined approach they present for selecting the best measures for remedying them.

They break the process for “recognizing, analyzing, and dealing with corruption” into four steps labeled SFRA:

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Guest Post: From Revolution to Reform — Tracing Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Landscape

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It is now two decades plus since the fight against corruption emerged as a major issue. One that has been a particular challenge in nations still struggling to overcome the legacy of communism. Today’s Guest Post tracks recent progress Armenia, where voters in 2018 traded a deeply corrupt, semi authoritarian government for one promising both less corruption and more democracy. Its authors: Jeffrey Hallock, a PhD candidate at American University researching anti-corruption reform strategies, and a researcher at the Accountability Research Center utilizing open government data to analyze U.S. foreign funding trends, and Karine Ghahramanyan, a senior at the American University of Armenia pursuing a degree in Politics and Governance.

Armenia, a landlocked country of 2.8 million, sits in the middle of a region defined by political uncertainty. Six years after Nikol Pashinyan spearheaded Armenia’s Velvet Revolution with a promise to eradicate systemic corruption, many regard Prime Minister Pashinyan’s efforts as stalling. Although corruption has noticeably decreased since 2018 (here), the government’s initial emphasis on anti-corruption measures has been overtaken by urgent security considerations, its 2020 defeat by neighbor and long-time adversary Azerbaijan followed by unsettling developments in neighbors Georgia, Turkey, and Iran.

Armenia’s burgeoning democracy and recent reforms have helped strengthen its position amid broader volatility, contributing to economic growth and deepening relations with democratic allies. Yet the government is under mounting pressure to recommit to the principles of transparency and accountability that gave legitimacy to the 2018 revolution.

The Pashinyan administration offers lessons on how to capitalize on a window of opportunity to advance consequential anti-corruption gains, as well as insights on when the spark of the revolution fades into the reality of quotidian government reform.

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Towards Preventing Corruption During Ukraine’s Reconstruction: Bilingual Compilation of Ukrainian Procurement Laws

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Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has inflicted massive damage on the country’s infrastructure, a half trillion dollars and growing daily (here). While Ukraine’s government is just beginning the massive task of letting contracts for the reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and other public works destroyed by Russian bombs and artillery shells, reports are already circulating that corruption has infected the procurement of some large works.

Fighting corruption in procurement is about much more than tightening and strictly enforcing laws on what to buy from whom. Rules governing political contributions, gifts to officeholders, conflicts of interest and business practices that facilitate bid rigging are all part of the equation. But preventing and detecting corruption in government contracting starts with what the law does (or doesn’t) say about who makes purchasing decisions and how specifications are drawn, contractors selected, and performance assured.

The fight against corruption in Ukrainian reconstruction just got an important boost. An online data base of some 450 Ukrainian statutes and Cabinet decrees along with English summaries is now available here. Included is everything from the text of ProZorro, Ukraine’s award-winning e-procurement law to statutes on permitting and land use to detailed rules governing the construction of roads and ports. A dropdown menu allows users to search by topic – critical infrastructure, damaged property, public procurement, urban development – or hone in on a specific area such as construction standards, PPPs, or telecommunications.

The database will help frontline corruption fighters – in the Ukrainian government, civil society organizations, and those overseeing reconstruction funding – determine if procurement rules are being observed in a project. Vigorous competition for procurement contracts is perhaps the most important way to curb corruption. By offering a free guide to Ukrainian procurement law, the database reduces the cost to new or foreign firms of preparing bids, increasing the chances more companies will bid on a project and thus spurring competition.

The database is the result of a heroic, pro bono effort by a squad of multilingual lawyers at the international law firm Debevoise & Plimpton aided by Ukraine’s Institute for Legislative Ideas. It was the brainchild of Jennifer Widner, Princeton University professor and director of the University’s Innovations for Successful Societies, and Oksana Nesterenko, head of the Anticorruption Research & Education Centre at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Both provided guidance and overall direction. Worth MacMurray, president and chief executive officer of the Coalition for Integrity, oversaw Debevoise’s work on behalf of ISS. The project is part of a larger effort by ISS and ACREC to prevent corruption during Ukrainian reconstruction.

Look it Up: Two Invaluable New References Books on Corruption

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The learning on corruption has exploded over the past two decades plus. Where once one scratched around for material on subjects like conflict of interest, the measurement of corruption, and whistleblower protection, a plethora of books, articles, reports, monographs, and, yes, even blog posts are available today on these and other once recondite topics. Great news for specialists and students. 

But bad news for those who aren’t. For policymakers, reporters, citizens, and other non-experts who need to know the basics about a corruption-related topic for a parliamentary debate, a story deadline or what-have-you but don’t have all day, or days, to read up on it.

Until recently they were at the mercy of an internet search engine. If they were lucky, one of the first entries that came up provided a useful summary of the learning. Or maybe it was misguided or out-of-date. Or, as now happens more frequently, maybe the search engine produced a hallucinogenic note, text generated by a large language model that sounds authoritative but the content of which is anything but.  

Now, thanks to two recent publications, the days of hoping a search engine or a LLM will provide a short, reliable introduction to a key corruption related concept are over.

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“Elect a Government That Works”: A Case Study in Populism and Corruption from India 

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As the United States was reeling from President Richard Nixon’s resignation following the Watergate scandal, another imperiled leader—Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi—was fighting for her political life thousands of miles away. Although Gandhi and Nixon never got along, their stories overlap. Both barely squeaked into power after close elections in the late 1960s, but then won resounding reelection victories in the early 1970s. Gandhi’s political fortunes, like Nixon’s, took a turn for the worse shortly after reelection, in light of substantiated accusations of illegal campaign activity. But at this point, Nixon and Gandhi’s stories diverge. Unlike Nixon, Gandhi stayed the course and refused to resign. And in the end she prevailed: Gandhi was popularly elected three times with some of the largest governing majorities in Indian history.

How did Gandhi convince the public to reelect her, despite her known, widespread abuses of authority? How did a leader ensnared in scandal and corruption hold onto power to become one of the most beloved leaders in the world’s largest democracy? The answer to these questions may lie in Gandhi’s concentrated emphasis on left-wing populism. She argued to voters that she alone was most capable of effectuating change for India and its most needy citizens by enacting social programs and redistributing wealth. Additionally, Gandhi spent much of her time as Prime Minister consolidating her power within the party and the central government. This enabled much of the corruption that marked her rule but was also what allowed her to argue to the public that she was uniquely capable of fixing the nation’s problems.

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How Can India Cleanse Its Politics of Dirty Money?

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India’s 875 million voters make it the world’s largest democracy. Yet Indian elections, though generally seen as free and fair, have become the country’s “fountainhead of corruption.”Parties and candidates spend billions getting themselves elected—current forecasts predict $8.5 billion will be spent in the 2019 election, making it the most expensive election globally. Much of that money comes from illegal or at least questionable sources, a problem exacerbated by the fact that campaign financing in India is a black box, with no transparency into donors or income sources. Recent changes by the Modi government have made the process even more opaque. And much of the money raised is spent illegally. For example, up to 37% of Indian voters have received money for votes. 

The massive amount that politicians are willing to raise and spend to win elections is understandable when the payoff to the winning candidate is considered. Putting aside any ideological or egotistical motives for seeking public office, there’s also a material incentive: studies have found that, in the years following an election, winning candidates’ assets increase by 3-5% more than losing candidates’ assets, and this “winner’s premium” is even higher in more corrupt states and for winners holding ministerial positions. The material benefits of office may also partly explain the alarming percentage of Indian politicians with criminal histories. Currently, over a third of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the Lok Sabha (the Lower House of the National Parliament), are facing at least one serious criminal charge, and politicians with cases pending against them are statistically more likely to win elections. Moreover, the ever-greater spending on elections means that winners, in addition to lining their own pockets and saving for the next election, need to repay those who helped them prevail. The more money politicians spend on elections, the more they need to earn back or repay through political favors.

The high payoff to candidates who win elections (often because of the opportunities for corruption) both attracts dishonest individuals to seek office and encourages ever-higher election spending, which in turn inspires corrupt behavior to repay debts, whether through money or political favors. Therefore, any serious attempt to reduce corruption in India has to begin with electoral reform. The constitutional body tasked with administering elections in India is the Election Commission (EC). The EC oversees the election process, and it also can issue advisory opinions (though not binding decisions) regarding the post-election disqualification of sitting MPs and Members of State Legislative Assemblies (MLAs). The EC is also responsible for scrutinizing the election expense reports submitted by candidates. But the EC is in many ways a toothless tiger, able only to recommend actions and electoral reform to Parliament, without any real power to fix the electoral system. 

There are, nonetheless, a few things that the EC could do now, acting on its own, to help address at least some of these problems. But more comprehensive and effective reform will require action by the legislature or the Supreme Court.

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Fighting Corruption in Brazil Requires More Than Tough Talk—Does the New President Have the Necessary Skills?

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Much has already been written, on this blog and elsewhere, about the what the election of Jair Bolsonaro as President of Brazil means for the future of the anticorruption agenda in that country. (See, for example, here and here.) Bolsonaro’s appeal rested in part on the Brazilian electorate’s disgust with the entrenched corruption of the Brazilian political elite in all the major parties. Bolsonaro promised a rejection of “old politics,” positioning himself both as a “disruptive” figure and as someone who would and could “get tough” on corruption—a new sheriff in town, as it were, who would put the bad guys behind bars.

Yet fighting corruption is not just about “toughness” or making fiery speeches or enforcing laws (though strong enforcement is certainly necessary). In a country like Brazil—a complicated multiparty democracy desperately in need of significant institutional reform—an effective anticorruption agenda requires the President and his senior ministers not only, or even primarily, to be the merciless watchdogs cracking down on wrongdoing, but rather the country’s political leaders need to take the lead in articulating a coherent vision, mobilizing and coordinating with multiple stakeholders both in and out of government, and negotiating with other power centers in order to ensure not only the independence and cohesion of law enforcement efforts, but also to promote the necessary legal and institutional reforms. Promoting public integrity requires a broader set of skills, ones that have unfortunately become associated with “old politics” in a negative way: building coalitions, negotiating with different interest groups, and coordinating multiple stakeholders.

There are at least three sorts of coordination, engagement, and negotiation that Brazil’s new president must undertake if his purported commitment to fighting corruption is to yield results:

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Getting the Right People on the Global Magnitsky Sanctions List: A How-To Guide for Civil Society

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Last December, pursuant to the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act, President Trump issued Executive Order 13818, which declared that “the prevalence and severity of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States … threaten the stability of international political and economic systems,” and authorized the Treasury Secretary to impose sanctions against (among other possible targets) a current or former government official “who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in: (1) corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery; or (2) the transfer or the facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption.” Pursuant to this Executive Order, the Treasury Department imposed powerful economic sanctions against 37 entities and 15 individuals, including Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, Israeli billionaire Dan Gertler, and Artem Chaika, the son of Russia’s Prosecutor General.

This was big news, for a couple of reasons. Most obviously, Trump doesn’t exactly have a reputation as a “human rights guy,” let alone a Russia hawk. Given that the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act (unlike its predecessor, the 2009 Magnitsky Act) enables but does not require the imposition of sanctions, it was far from inevitable that the Trump Administration would make use of it. Perhaps just as newsworthy was where the specific names on the list came from: nearly half of those names were provided to the Administration by civil society organizations (CSOs) or by Congress (and in the latter case, it was likely CSO efforts that brought individual names to the attention of Congressional staffers).

The Global Magnitsky Act and EO 13818, then, seem to create promising opportunities for anticorruption CSOs to impose consequences on kleptocrats and their cronies. Because the process is so new, it’s not yet clear how it will develop, yet it is nevertheless useful to draw lessons from the first round of Global Magnitsky sanctions for how CSOs can be maximally effective in using this new tool. The Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe (also known as the Helsinki Commission) hosted a workshop in early March 2018 to discuss this issue. I was fortunate enough to attend this gathering, and in this post I’ve attempted to distill a handful of key lessons that the participants’ discussion identified. I’ve framed the lessons as a “how-to” guide addressed to members of a hypothetical anticorruption CSO: that would like to take advantage of this powerful tool.

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India’s Political Party Finance Reform Falls Short of Ensuring Complete Transparency—But Is Still a Step in the Right Direction

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On March 1, 2018, India began its latest effort to clean up the financing of political parties and elections. This efforts involves the sale of so-called “electoral bonds” at select state banks across the country. The term “electoral bonds” is a misnomer, for these “bonds” are not linked to elections, nor do they involve paying back a loan or yielding interest. Rather, these instruments are simply a new means to facilitate financial donations to political parties, and are intended to displace the undocumented cash transfers that form the lifeblood of Indian politics. As India’s Finance Minister argued, this cash-based system causes two problems: First, “unclean money from unidentifiable sources” facilitates corruption and money laundering. Second, the reliance on cash allows parties to underreport both their budgets and spending. These concerns led the government last year to reduce the limit on anonymous cash donations from $300 to $30. Electoral bonds intend to further disrupt the system and achieve at least some increases in transparency of political spending.

Announcement of the new system has generated significant commentary, with the few admirers crowded out by the numerous detractors (see, for example, here, here, and here). The main focus of criticism is the new scheme’s guarantee of donor anonymity: Electoral bonds will carry no name and nobody, other than the bank and donor, can know who made the donation unless the donor willingly discloses her identity. The government has defended the anonymity guarantee as a way to prevent reprisals against donors, but critics understandably argue that the lack of transparency means that much political financing will continue to come from “unidentifiable sources,” allowing big business to keep lobbing money in exchange for policy favors while the public remains in the dark. (Moreover, the government’s emphasis on fear of reprisals as the rationale for anonymity suggests the government is unduly concerned with protecting the only class of donors for whom this would be a significant concern, namely large capitalists.) The electoral bond scheme has thus been painted as a move that potentially strengthens the crony capitalism responsible for India’s dire economic situation.

This strong negative reaction to the electoral bond scheme is, in my view, overwrought. True, the new policy does not solve the deep and serious problems with political finance in India. But it does have some notable advantages over status quo. Additionally, critics of the electoral bond system sometimes seem to treat donor transparency as an unalloyed good, when in fact donor transparency may have some drawbacks as well (even if one doesn’t take too seriously the government’s official line on political reprisals). Let me elaborate on each of these points: Continue reading →