Tag Archives: asset recovery

U.S. Department of Justice/Civil Society — 1; Kleptocrats — 0

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October 10, 2014, deserves mention in any future history of the anticorruption movement, for it was on this date that a ruling kleptocratic family (colloquially known as thugs in power) conceded the obvious: that the money to fund a kleptocratic lifestyle — in this case a mansion in Malibu, a Ferrari 599 GTO, and Michael Jackson memorabilia – did not come from the family’s hard work on behalf of the citizens they rule.  Rather, it came the easy way: from the wholesale theft of the nation’s patrimony.

This startling, if obvious, concession came in the settlement of a civil suit filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, with the support and encouragement of civil society, against an unlikely group of defendants.  In the order listed in the complaint, they are: 1) One White Crystal Covered Bad Tour Glove and Other Michael Jackson Memorabilia, 2) One Gulfstream G-V Jet Airplane Displaying Tail Number VPCES, 3) Real Property Located on Sweetwater Mesa Road In Malibu California, 4) One 2007 Bentley Azure, 5) One 2008 Bugatti Veyron, 6) One 2008 Lamborghini Murcielago, 7) One 2008 Rolls Royce Drophead Coupe, 8) One 2009 Rolls Royce Drophead Coupe, 9) 2009 Rolls Royce Phantom Coupe, and 10) the Ferrari 599 GTO.

Although defendants stood mute before the court, their owner, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea and (surprise?) son of the country’s president, was anything but.  Through the mouths of expensive American legal talent he complained loudly and bitterly that the ten named defendants were innocent.  But in settling the case, he agreed in effect that three – the mansion, the Ferrari, and some of the Michael Jackson memorabilia, were indeed guilty.  Guilty? Of what? Continue reading →

Some Encouraging Signs from the Recent White House Statement on Global Anticorruption

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A couple of weeks ago, the White House published a “Fact Sheet” on the U.S. Global Anticorruption Agenda. Though I don’t normally ascribe all that much importance to documents like this — they’re mostly for PR, after all — there were a few things about this particular release that caught my eye, and that I found fairly encouraging.

Perhaps most notably, although the release includes some obligatory–and deservedly self-congratulatory–discussion of the U.S. leadership role in enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and pushing for stronger enforcement of anti-bribery laws through the OECD Convention, most of the Fact Sheet focuses on what many in the anticorruption community have emphasized as important, cutting-edge issues that go beyond traditional anti-bribery law, including:

  • Asset recovery and anti-money laundering as a top priority (including the recognition of the need to close loopholes in U.S. law and strengthen international cooperation in this area);
  • Closely related to this, the Fact Sheet emphasizes the importance of preventing the abuse of anonymous shell companies–including a discussion of recent regulatory initiatives on this front that we’ve noted elsewhere on this blog.
  • A special focus on the extractive sector
  • Emphasizing the importance of engagement and cooperation with the private sector, in particular the announcement of an intention to develop a “National Action Plan to promote and incentivize responsible business conduct, including with respect to transparency and anticorruption, consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises.”

Of course, concrete action matters more than high-minded general statements, and I know many in the anticorruption activist community have reasonable concerns about whether the U.S. is prepared to do what it takes to make good on these pledges. Still, one must give credit where credit is due–not only to the U.S. government, but to the civil society activists and others that have succeeded in changing the conversation about global anticorruption in ways that are reflected by the White House document.

One other quick thing to note about the Fact Sheet: At one point it declares that the U.S. government “will hold responsible governments that tolerate or commit corrupt practices in contravention of international norms, including by adjusting our bilateral relations and advising our businesses and investors accordingly.” It’s not clear what, exactly, this means. Maybe it means nothing significant. But if the U.S. is serious about “adjusting [its] bilateral relations” with countries that tolerate or contravene international anticorruption norms, that might actually represent a significant departure from past practice. After all, though the U.S. routinely condemns corruption, I’m not aware of any cases in which another country’s failure to adhere to anticorruption norms has had broader collateral consequences for U.S. foreign policy toward that country. Again, maybe this doesn’t really mean much–what does “adjusting” relations mean, anyway?–but it would be interesting to see whether the U.S. (or perhaps some in the U.S. who had a hand in drafting the Fact Sheet’s language) want corruption concerns to start to play a role perhaps more similar to concerns related to human rights abuses.

UNCAC Does Not Require Sharing of Foreign Bribery Settlement Monies with Host Countries

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Maud Perdriel-Vaissiere, the Advisor on Asset Recovery for the UNCAC Coalition (a global civil society network committed to promoting compliance with the UN Convention Against Corruption) recently published a post on the UNCAC Coaltion blog entitled, “Is there an obligation under the UNCAC to share foreign bribery settlement monies with host countries?” Her answer is yes. Indeed, she says that the contrary position is based on a “gross misreading” of UNCAC, that UNCAC’s asset recovery provisions (in Chapter V) apply even to “stolen or embezzled funds over which foreign governments cannot establish prior ownership” (emphasis hers), and that there is “no doubt [that] there is an obligation under the UNCAC [for supply-side enforcers] to share foreign bribery settlement monies with host countries!” (The exclamation mark is hers as well.)

As readers of this blog may be aware, I think this is wrong, based on a sloppy and tendentious misreading of the language of the treaty. Though I’ve written on this before, I think Ms. Perdriel-Vaissiere’s analysis deserves a rebuttal. Continue reading →

Don’t Give Back that Glove General Holder!

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Although few readers likely can find Equatorial Guinea on a map (hint: it’s that small square wedged between Cameroon and Gabon), many have heard its name in connection with the annual contest to identify the “most corrupt country.” For despite the always stiff competition from the likes of such states as Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, year-in-year-out Equatorial Guinea always manages to place at or near the top.  Observers attribute its perennially strong showing to a combination of two factors: 1) the country’s vast mineral wealth and 2) its rulers’ skill and ruthlessness in keeping it all for themselves. Continue reading →

America’s Broken System for Helping Friendly Nations Prosecute Corruption Cases

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Gaborone, Botswana, is not the place one would expect to find a group advocating that the United States government get tough on crime, but then the advocates were not the typical Washington cabal of interest group representatives, activists, lawmakers, and media.  Rather, they were investigators and prosecutors from 14 African anticorruption agencies attending a workshop on corruption investigations sponsored by the Association of Anticorruption Agencies in Commonwealth Africa.  Why the advocacy?  What is the complaint with the U.S.?

Especially in the smaller African countries, any significant corruption case almost inevitably requires a cross-border investigation.  The alleged corrupter is in one jurisdiction, the alleged corruptee in a second, and what may be the proceeds of the crime in a third.  Although the U.S. would seem to be a long way from Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, and other Sub-Saharan nations, workshop participants explained that not only are corrupters sometimes located in the U.S., but many African elites favor parking assets acquired corruptly in American banks, real estate, and financial assets.  Hence the anticorruption authorities of Sub-Saharan states frequently seek help from the U.S. to locate stolen assets, obtain business records, and depose witnesses.  In a session devoted to the mechanics of investigating cross-border cases, however, not one of the 30 participants identified a single instance where the U.S. had timely responded to their request to provide evidence they needed to help convict corrupt public officials or freeze or seize his or her assets.  Indeed, several said they had been forced to dismiss charges or allow freezing orders to lapse because the U.S. had failed to reply to their requests. Continue reading →

UNCAC, Asset Recovery, and the Perils of Careless Legal Analysis

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A little while back I posted a critical commentary on the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative’s Left Out of the Bargain report.  The report described – and implicitly but clearly criticized – the fact that although the U.S. and other “supply-side” jurisdictions had recovered substantial amounts of money in settlements with bribe-paying firms, only a relatively small percentage of those settlements were transferred to the “demand-side” countries where the bribery took place.  These demand-side countries (which the report, to its credit, carefully avoids calling “victim countries”) are the ones that are “left out” of the “bargain” (that is, the settlement) between bribe-paying firms and supply-side governments.

I read the report as calling for, among other things, greater redistribution of settlement proceeds to demand-side governments, and expansion of the ability of those governments (or private parties) to pursue “follow-on” actions.  My main criticism was that the report neglected to consider the effect that either change would have on the incentives of firms and supply-side enforcers.  Two of the report’s authors, Ji Won Park and Jacinta Odour, posted an interesting reply to my post, which I recommend (along with my rejoinder, which can be found in the comments section of the original post).  But although the main focus of my critique and their response was the incentives issue, our exchange also revealed an important difference of opinion regarding the meaning and significance of the UN Convention Against Corruption, particularly its provisions on asset recovery.  It’s that issue that I want to explore here.

In my original post, I remarked in passing that the StAR report “elides … the distinction between asset recovery actions—in which a country seeks the repatriation of assets stolen by the country’s own nationals (usually former officials or their family members)—and actions for penalties or disgorgement brought against a firm or individual for allegedly bribing foreign officials.” In their response, Park and Odour “disagree that the [Left Out of the Bargain] study does not distinguish between repatriation of assets stolen by public officials and monetary sanctions imposed in foreign bribery settlements.”  The report does this, they say, “through the lens of UNCAC.” They explain that UNCAC Article 51 (the first Article in Chapter V, on asset recovery) states that “[t]he return of assets pursuant to this chapter is a fundamental principle of [UNCAC], and States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard.”  Park and Odour then declare that this obligation to assist in the return of assets “applies not only to the mandatory return of assets that proceed from embezzlement and misappropriation […] but also to proceeds of corruption from other offences covered by UNCAC (such as Article 16 on Foreign Bribery) and compensating victims.”

If I’m reading this right, Park and Odour seem to be suggesting that, for purposes of States Paries’ obligations under UNCAC Article 51, there is no significant difference between stolen assets recovered in a forfeiture action, fines recovered in anti-bribery enforcement actions, disgorged profits, compensatory damages, and the like; they are all “assets” within the meaning of Article 51 – which implies, presumably, an undifferentiated obligation to “repatriat[e]” (in Park & Odour’s word) both stolen assets and “monetary sanctions imposed in foreign bribery settlements.”

I don’t believe this assertion can withstand close legal analysis, and I certainly think it is misguided as a matter of policy.

Continue reading →

What’s Left Out of “Left Out of the Bargain”

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A couple months back I finally had a chance to read the Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (StAR)’s latest report, Left out of the Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and Implications for Asset Recovery. It’s a very useful report (though a lot of the preliminary material is pretty dull, but fortunately fairly skimmable). The key descriptive finding is that “significant monetary sanctions have been imposed [in foreign bribery cases] with hardly any of the respective assets being returned to the countries whose officials have allegedly been bribed.” The overall tenor of the report is that this is a problem. Although the report uses careful, measured language, I interpreted it as as a call for more aggressive action to force companies that admit to foreign bribery to pay significant fines, penalties, or other damages to the countries in which the bribery took place (either to those countries’ governments, or to NGOs or special funds). The report discusses, and seems to endorse, a range of related measures designed to further this overarching goal.

I’m sympathetic with StAR’s objectives, and with the idea that more can and should be done to help the victims of corruption. But the Left out of the Bargain report suffers from a number of serious flaws—chief among them the failure to give more than cursory attention to the possible adverse incentive effects of promoting duplicative enforcement or substantial redistribution of settlement proceeds. Continue reading →

US Moves to Freeze and Seize Nigerian Dictator Abacha’s Assets–But Who Will Get the Money?

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Last week, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it had frozen about $458 million in corruption proceeds that former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha and his conspirators allegedly embezzled from Nigeria’s central bank, laundered through U.S. financial institutions, and deposited in bank accounts around the world. The freeze is a first step in the DOJ’s largest-ever forfeiture action under its recent Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative (KARI).  There is much to say about this development, but the question that most immediately comes to my mind (and likely many Nigerians’ minds) is: What will the DOJ do with all this money? Continue reading →

A Cautionary Note on the “World Anticorruption Police”

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In an Op-Ed in the New York Times this past Wednesday, Alexander Lebedev, former KGB officer and current owner of the Moscow newspaper Novaya Gazeta, calls for “an international body to police corruption.” Lebedev astutely describes how “international banks, law firms and accountants” make it far too easy to hide the proceeds of corrupt activities, and far too difficult to bring the perpetrators to justice.  Yet his proposed solution–an international anticorruption police force–is likely to have costs that far outweigh whatever benefits it may have. Continue reading →