What’s Left Out of “Left Out of the Bargain”

A couple months back I finally had a chance to read the Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (StAR)’s latest report, Left out of the Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and Implications for Asset Recovery. It’s a very useful report (though a lot of the preliminary material is pretty dull, but fortunately fairly skimmable). The key descriptive finding is that “significant monetary sanctions have been imposed [in foreign bribery cases] with hardly any of the respective assets being returned to the countries whose officials have allegedly been bribed.” The overall tenor of the report is that this is a problem. Although the report uses careful, measured language, I interpreted it as as a call for more aggressive action to force companies that admit to foreign bribery to pay significant fines, penalties, or other damages to the countries in which the bribery took place (either to those countries’ governments, or to NGOs or special funds). The report discusses, and seems to endorse, a range of related measures designed to further this overarching goal.

I’m sympathetic with StAR’s objectives, and with the idea that more can and should be done to help the victims of corruption. But the Left out of the Bargain report suffers from a number of serious flaws—chief among them the failure to give more than cursory attention to the possible adverse incentive effects of promoting duplicative enforcement or substantial redistribution of settlement proceeds. Continue reading