Guest Post: U.K. Court Refuses to Compensate Victims of Foreign Bribery

Today’s Guest Post is by Dr Helen Taylor, senior legal researcher at Spotlight on Corruption, a charity that shines a light on the United Kingdom’s role in corruption at home and abroad. Helen leads Spotlight’s court monitoring programme, tracking the enforcement of the UK’s anti-corruption law in major court cases and building an evidence base for advocacy and policy recommendations on asset recovery, victim compensation, and other corruption-related issues.

Last week a London court fined commodities giant Glencore for bribing officials in five African oil producing nations in return for getting “special deals” on their oil. While the court ordered the company to pay £280 million (just over $318 million) for its numerous violations of the U.K. foreign bribery law, it refused to direct Glencore to compensate those its bribes injured: the governments and citizens of the five nations. In fact, victims did not even get a foot in the courtroom door — the Serious Fraud Office, which prosecuted the case, refused to put a compensation request before the court, and the court itself rejected the Nigerian government’s application for compensation.

The case brings home the pressing need to reform the UK’s compensation framework to ensure overseas victims are represented and compensated in complex corruption cases.

Continue reading

Chile’s Way Forward: Corruption and Disqualification:

Many democracies have sought to preserve the integrity of their governments by prohibiting individuals who have been convicted of corruption-related offenses (or other serious crimes) from holding public office, either for a period of time or permanently. Such a prohibition was on the ballot this past September in Chile, when citizens voted on whether to adopt a new constitution. That proposed constitution included, among its many provisions, a specific article (Article 172) that would have disqualified from public office any person who had been convicted of a corruption offense. The provision did not become law, however, because Chilean voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposed constitution for reasons that had almost nothing to do with the relatively obscure Article 172.

The inclusion of that article in the proposed constitution does, however, invite the consideration of two distinct but related questions: First, should Chile—or another similarly situated democracy—adopt a law disqualifying those convicted of corruption from holding public office? Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, should that disqualification rule appear in the constitution (as opposed to an ordinary statute), which is, by design, much harder to change?

The answer to the first question, at least for Chile, is probably yes. The answer to the second question, though, is no. Chile should experiment with a disqualification law, but should not constitutionalize it.

This conclusion arises from a careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of disqualification laws and, perhaps more importantly, the conditions that must obtain for those laws to be beneficial:

Continue reading

November 2 OSCE Webinar: Asset Recovery and the Concept of Social Reuse

The OSCE Polish Chairpersonship and the Office of the Coordinator of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities are holding a series of three webinars on the contribution of the OSCE in preventing corruption and promoting transparency and good governance as part of resilient economic recovery.

The first webinar is entitled:  Innovations in Asset Recovery in the OSCE: The Concept of Social Reuse was held today November 2, 2022, 3:00 to 4:15 pm CET via Zoom webinar.

Opening remarks 

Ms. Courtney Austrian, Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Mission to the OSCE 

Ambassador Igli Hasani, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities 

Ambassador Alena Kupchyna, OSCE Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats 

Speakers: 

Mr. Tristram Hicks, OSCE Asset Recovery Advisor 

Mr. Andrea D’Angelo, Senior Project Manager, Balkan Asset Management Interagency Network (BAMIN) Secretariat  

Ms. Melika Sahinovic, OSCE Expert on Social Re-Use in BiH 

Moderator: Prof. Anita Ramasastry, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairmanship on Combating Corruption 

Asset recovery is a powerful anti-corruption tool ensuring that stolen assets and proceeds of criminal activities are given back to societies and victims of crime.  It remains one of the most effective ways to disrupt serious and organized crime as organized crime groups survive and thrive through illicit financial gains. 

Since 2019, OSCE has been implementing a cross-dimensional project that aims at building the capacities of national authorities and civil society organizations (CSOs) in Southeast Europe and improving regional collaboration in the seizing, confiscating, managing and re-using of criminal assets. Phase II of the project that has just been launched has also been extended to Eastern Europe (Moldova and Ukraine). The project adopts a comprehensive approach to asset recovery and includes three areas of intervention: i) financial investigations, asset seizure and confiscation; ii) asset management; and iii) asset re-use. 

Details for connecting —

Continue reading

Curbing Corruption in India’s Healthcare System

The Indian healthcare system is rife with corruption, and much of this corruption arises from the way that healthcare is regulated (or not). Because healthcare in India is inexpensive, at least by Western standards, private health insurance is relatively rare, and a sizeable majority of total health expenditures are made out-of-pocket. With little regulation, and without much meaningful price negotiation by either the government or private insurance companies, India’s healthcare system has become a vast “network of unregulated private sector hospitals.” This lack of regulation, coupled with intense competition, encourages doctors (who are often under substantial financial pressure) “to enter a happy axis of corruption where they routinely prescribe expensive investigations and perform operations which a patient might not need” in order to increase their profit margins. Doctors have also been known to take bribes from other healthcare entities in return for patient referrals, or to accept kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies disguised as “professional fees” in order to outcompete other private hospitals. As a recent WHO-Eurohealth publication concluded, health sector corruption in India includes not only “collusion, bribes and kickbacks in procurement which may result in overpayment for goods and contracted services” and doctors’ willingness to accept “payments in exchange for special privileges or treatment,” but also “distort[ions in] medical professionals’ prescribing practices.” 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has sought to address some of these concerns through a healthcare initiative known as PMJAY. The main objective of this program is to increase access to healthcare for the poorest 50% of the population—approximately 700 million people—who are given biometric government “smart cards” to purchase eligible inpatient healthcare services at both private and public hospitals. But while PMJAY is principally designed as a system for subsidizing healthcare for low-income people, it also serves as an anticorruption tool by bringing under government oversight millions of previously unregulated out-of-pocket healthcare transactions, requiring enrolled physicians to acquire digital pre-authorization before administering nonemergency services to PMJAY beneficiaries, and giving the government more power to negotiate with private hospitals participating in the program over healthcare rates. PMJAY’s computerized billing platform also serves a surprising secondary role as an AI-powered “comprehensive fraud analytics solution” for millions of transactions that were previously beyond the government’s reach. The program has already detected over 18,000 fraudulent insurance transactions, leading to penalties against hundreds of healthcare entities so far. The government has even made a list of “corrupt” hospitals available on the PMJAY website. Given PMJAY’s early successes, the government should expand the program. Not only would this increase healthcare access in general—a worthy aim in its own right—but it would further reduce corruption in the healthcare system. This is more easily said than done, however, in light of several practical obstacles to further expansions.

Continue reading

A U.S. Court Just Opened a Huge Loophole in Anticorruption Campaign Finance Laws

A New Jersey election law prohibits any “corporation carrying on the business of a bank” from donating to political parties. The New Jersey Bankers Association (NJBA), a trade group representing the interests of 88 banks in the state, challenged that law as unconstitutional. For those who follow disputes over U.S. campaign finance law, one might have expected that this case would be decided within a familiar framework: Under the Supreme Court’s well-established principle that campaign contributions are a constitutionally protected form of political speech, the restriction would only be permitted if it is narrowly tailored to advance the government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.

The federal appeals court’s surprising decision in this case, though, sidestepped that usual inquiry entirely. Instead, the court determined that the law in question did not apply to the NJBA in the first place. The court reasoned that the law applies only to “corporation[s] carrying on the business of a bank,” and because the banks’ trade association (the NJBA) does not itself make loans and receive deposits, the NJBA is not a “bank,” meaning the law does not prohibit the NJBA (as distinct from its member banks) from making political donations.

That reasoning is at least questionable as a purely linguistic matter. To “carry[] on” a business activity can mean both “to engage in or conduct” business oneself and “to develop [a business] beyond a stage already attained.” While a bank trade association does not do the former, it arguably does do the latter—for example, by lobbying against capital constraints that would impede the loan-making capacity of banks. But more importantly, the court’s narrow, literalist reading of the statute is inappropriate in light of its dangerous consequences for New Jersey’s efforts to restrict corruption and the appearance of corruption in the campaign finance system. The court’s ruling permits (at least for now) New Jersey to restrict banks’ campaign contributions, but allows the representative of those banks to make contributions on their behalf. That’s like saying your child isn’t allowed to reach in the cookie jar, but his friend can grab the cookie for him. This misguided decision has thus created a potentially gaping loophole, one allowing affluent industry groups to engage in campaign-related spending that would ordinarily be deemed to present such a high risk of corruption (or its appearance) that government regulation is justified.

Continue reading

Brazilian Anticorruption Experts Weigh in on the Presidential Election

The upcoming presidential election in Brazil, which pits right-wing incumbent Jair Bolsonaro against former President Lula–leader of the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT)–puts voters who care primarily about government integrity in a tough spot. Some of the leading figures in Brazil’s so-called “Car Wash” anticorruption operation have publicly embraced President Bolsonaro, pointing (explicitly or implicitly) to the corruption scandals under Lula and the PT. Others, including Victoria on this blog, have argued that between the two, Bolsonaro would be worse for the fight against corruption than would Lula.

Recently, a group of 59 Brazilian scholars who research and teach on anticorruption and related topics weighed in on this issue with an open letter, originally published in Portuguese. This is an important contribution to the discussion, of interest not only to Brazilians but to the international community that cares about this issue. With the permission of the letter’s organizers, their English translation of the letter is below, with the list of signatories: Continue reading

Twentieth International Anticorruption Conference December 6-10 in Washington, D.C.

One mark of the progress in putting the fight against corruption on the global agenda is the size and scope of this year’s International Anticorruption Conference. The first one drew less that 200 people, mostly law enforcement personnel from the United States and 12 other nations (here). Organizers expect this year’s — December 6 through 12 in Washington — to attract more than 2,000 representatives of government, civil society, and the private sector from 135+ nations with many more attending virtually.

Jointly organized by Transparency International and the the U.S. government, speakers include: Delia Ferreiro, Chair of the Transparency International Board of Directors; David Malpass, President of the World Bank; Adesina Akinwumi, President of the African Development Bank; Ghada Waly, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Samantha Power, Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development; the heads of the Open Government Partnership, the Financial Action Task Force, CIVICS, and the chief executives of several multinational corporations.

The theme of this year’s conference is “Uprooting Corruption, Defending Democratic Values.” Plenary sessions will address the “grand issues:” global security, defending the defenders, kleptocracy and illicit finance.  There will be over 60 workshops, and multiple special thematic events and social gatherings.

More on who is coming, workshop and thematic events, and how to register is here.

Anticorruption Bibliography–October 2022 Update

An updated version of my anticorruption bibliography is now available from my faculty webpage. A direct link to the pdf of the full bibliography is here, and a list of the new sources added in this update is here. Additionally, the bibliography is available in more user-friendly, searchable form at Global Integrity’s Anti-Corruption Corpus website. As always, I welcome suggestions for other sources that are not yet included, including any papers GAB readers have written.

OECD Denounces Italy’s Failure to Enforce the Antibribery Convention

GAB readers know that Italy has repeatedly failed to meet its obligations under the OECD Antibribery Convention (herehere, and here). That in recent high-profile cases where evidence Italian companies bribed officials of foreign governments was overwhelming, the companies, their executives, and accomplices were all acquitted.  And that civil society organizations in Italy, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom have urged the OECD in no uncertain terms to condemn the Italian government’s blatant violation of its obligation to levy “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal penalties” on those who bribe foreign public officials (here).  

Last Friday, the OECD did exactly that. In a comprehensive, well-reasoned report, a model for future compliance reviews, its Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions fingered both the legislature and the judiciary for Italy’s noncompliance. The legislature because the sanctions for foreign bribery are too low to deter anyone or any company from paying a bribe, the judiciary for interpreting the rules of evidence in ways that almost invariably end in acquitting defendants.

Indeed, it is hard to read the Working Group’s analysis of the decisions in recent cases without concluding as I have that underneath the strained reasoning in the recent acquittals is some mix of bribery, favoritism, or threats.

Continue reading

When it Comes to Corruption, Lula is Toxic, but Bolsonaro is Lethal

The second round of Brazil’s presidential election—which pits incumbent right-wing President Bolsonaro against left-wing former President Lula—is a no-win situation for those who principally care about anticorruption. Both candidates have been embroiled in corruption scandals, and though both have deployed corruption allegations against their opponent, neither has articulated anything resembling a meaningful anticorruption agenda. For those voters whose top priority is increasing integrity and accountability within the Brazilian government, the question at the ballot box on October 30 will be: which candidate is the lesser of two evils?

Though painful, that question has a clear answer: Bolsonaro poses by far the greatest threat to anticorruption efforts in Brazil, and to the integrity of Brazilian democratic institutions as a whole. Lula is by no means an ideal candidate, and it is entirely understandable that many Brazilian voters are deeply concerned about the numerous corruption scandals involving his party, the PT (see here, here, and here). But Bolsonaro’s administration has been ripe with scandals as well (see here, here, here, and here). Ultimately, whatever Lula’s personal ethical failings may be, he is far more likely than Bolsonaro to preserve the institutional accountability mechanisms that are necessary to address corruption over the longer term.

To get an idea of why, it is useful to take a look at Bolsonaro and Lula’s track records:

Continue reading