Category Archives: Commentary

U.S. Justice Department Does What Mongolia’s Government Wouldn’t

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GAB readers will remember posts in late 2020 and early 2021 recounting damning evidence implicating Mongolian political kingpin S. Batbold in a massive corruption scheme (here, here, and here). Although Batbold fiercely and forcefully denied the allegations to GAB (here), the evidence that corruption during his tenure as Prime Minister netted him tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars seemed overwhelming.

So overwhelming that it prompted the Mongolian government to open a corruption investigation in Mongolia and initiate litigation in the United States to recover New York real estate press reports showed he had bought with corruption proceeds. Nothing came of either, however. Batbold runs the country’s dominant political party, the Mongolian People’s Party, and after a protégé won the June 9, 2021, presidential election, both the Mongolian and New York cases were shut down.

But the evidence did not go away. Yesterday, the U.S. Department of Justice took up what Mongolia had dropped, filing suit to seize the two New York apartments Batbold owns. As the head of the Department’s Criminal Division explained in disclosing the suit:

“Sukhbataar Batbold used his position as prime minister to award lucrative contracts to sell copper concentrates from a Mongolian state controlled mine to entities that were owned and controlled by his known associates or his son. These intermediaries, who had little to no experience in the copper trade, played no part in providing financing for the purchase of the copper concentrates or in arranging the sale or shipment of the commodities. They simply concealed the fact that Batbold and his family were violating Mongolian anti-corruption laws by benefiting from the sale of millions of dollars’ worth of Mongolian natural resources.

“The former prime minister of Mongolia abused his position as prime minister to profit from the sale of his country’s natural resources.  He and his family used the proceeds of their corrupt scheme to buy $14 million in high-end real estate in the United States.”

The Department’s Kleptocracy unit is responsible for the case, and consistent with its kleptocracy policy, the Department said it would work to see that the proceeds of whatever property of Batbold is recovered would go to the people of Mongolia, “the people harmed by these acts of corruption and abuse of office.”

Mongolians elect a new parliament June 9.  Suppose they might want to ask why it was left to the Department of Justice to do what their government should have done long ago?

ECOWAS Must Get Serious About Corruption—or the Coups Will Continue

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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 to foster economic cooperation within West Africa. Over time, ECOWAS’s mission has expanded to include the promotion of democracy and political stability. And for a while, it looked like the region was indeed making progress on this front: Between 2015 and 2020, all fifteen ECOWAS member countries were democratic states. But since 2020, West and Central Africa have been hit with a wave of eight military coups, the most recent ones occurring this past July (in Niger) and August (in Gabon). ECOWAS’s response to this democratic backsliding has been unimpressive. For example, ECOWAS looked on passively when, in 2020, both Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara and Guinea’s then-President Alpha Condé ignored or circumvented constitutional limits on their terms. Just this month, Senegal President Macky Sall unilaterally delayed presidential elections for the first time in the nation’s history. Recently, ECOWAS—under pressure from the US and EU—did impose sanctions against Niger in response to the coup, but these sanctions were insufficient to get the coup leaders to step down. In fact, these sanctions were so ineffective that they caused coup-hit Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from the bloc, citing “illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions” and failure to support their fight against “terrorism and insecurity.” All this has begun to jeopardize ECOWAS’s credibility even in the eyes of local populations.

Perhaps more seriously, ECOWAS has lost credibility not only for its response to the coups, but also for its failure to address the root causes of these coups, including not only economic woes, but also endemic corruption. As a coalition of West African civil society organizations recently asserted, ECOWAS operates as “a club of Head of States, whose sole preoccupation is regime protection of the various West African leaders, and their penchant for appropriating the benefits of office to themselves, while the ordinary citizens of countries in the sub-region wallow in extreme poverty, misery, and penury.”

ECOWAS could and should take concrete steps to bolster its waning authority. One of the most effective ways it could do so is by taking a strong stand against corruption. This would not be taking ECOWAS far outside the scope of its existing mandate. The ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption authorized ECOWAS to take action “whenever an act of corruption is committed or produces some effects in a State Party.” More generally, given the threat that corruption poses to both democracy and stability, ECOWAS is justified in more decisive action to address this scourge.

In particular, there are three things that ECOWAS ought to do:

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Brazil’s Anticorruption Backsliding

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In a recent post I discussed the positive legacy of Brazil’s Car Wash Operation and argued that this operation, for all its missteps, strengthened the country’s legal and institutional framework against corruption. The operation not only increased public awareness of corrupt practices but also inspired the development of effective tools for corruption prevention, investigations, and case resolution, significantly contributing to a more transparent, honest, and efficient business and political environment. Nevertheless, actions taken by Brazilian leaders in the past year have intensified concerns—already present under the previous Administration—about the government’s commitment to sustaining and expanding this legacy. Transparency International (TI) raised some of these concerns in its recent comment on Brazil’s worsening performance on TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Now, there are well-known reasons to be cautious about drawing strong conclusions from the CPI or other perception-based international indexes, but in Brazil’s case, there are good reasons to be alert. Senior leaders in both the political and judicial branches have made a series of worrisome decisions that seem likely—indeed, may be intended—to set back Brazil’s fight against high-level corruption. Among those setbacks, the following are the most serious and troubling: Continue reading →

Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Orders Investigation of Transparency International

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Six days after it reported in its annual survey of corruption perceptions that the fight against corruption in Brazil was losing steam, Transparency International was placed under investigation by Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli (here). The ostensible reason is that the internationally renowned corruption fighting organization, headquartered in Berlin with a Brazilian chapter, misused public funds.  According to the justice, the group is a “foreign” organization and thus funds received in Brazil for its anticorruption work should have been allocated to the national treasury.

TI immediately issued a statement denying all wrongdoing. In the statement it pointed not only to the close connection between release of the 2023 CPI and Justice Toffoli’s decision to open an investigation, but to the criticisms the international organization and its Brazilian chapter have levelled against Justice Toffoli’s continuing efforts to gut Lava Jato, the case where a cartel led by the Brazilian engineering and construction firm Odebrecht bribed some 415 politicians and 26 political parties in Brazil as well as dozens officials in ten Latin American and two African countries (here).

Last September the justice tore up 2017 cooperation agreement between prosecutors and Odebrecht, making it difficult if not impossible for prosecutors in other nations to pursue charges against the company and those it bribed in their countries (here). Last week, as the Financial Times reported in breaking the investigation story, Toffoli issued another ruling letting Odebrecht off the hook; this one suspends a multimillion-dollar fine the company had been ordered to pay.

Brazilian citizens, opposition parties, and Brazil’s friends in the international community have all begun to speak against this effort to undo one the largest — and for its faults (as rehearsed on this blog (latest post here)) — one of the most important steps forward in recent years in the fight against corruption. In Brazil, its neighbors, and indeed globally.  

Let’s hope Brazilian authorities hear them.

Should Officials’ Asset Declarations Be Public? Why I Changed My Mind About Sierra Leone

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Many countries have some form of asset declaration requirement for public officials, but there is substantial country-by-country variance as to the actual design of the process. There is especially wide variation with respect to the public accessibility of the disclosed information. In Sierra Leone, under current law, government officers’ asset declarations are kept confidential. Before I was appointed head of Sierra Leone’s Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), I was part of a civil society consortium that called for making all of these declarations public. A few months after my appointment, I was asked if I would support changing the law to make asset declarations public, in line with what I had advocated as a member of civil society. In reflecting on this question, I found that I had changed my mind.

Part of the reason I did not advocate changing the law to make asset declarations public was simply that there was no way our Parliament would pass such an amendment in the short-to-medium term. It did not seem sensible to waste political capital on such a controversial proposal—especially since doing so might provoke a backlash and jeopardize other important reforms. But the reasons for my change of view were not merely pragmatic political calculations. I have also come to believe that, at Sierra Leone’s current stage of development, making asset declarations public could do more harm than good. Continue reading →

Moneyball: The Financial Entanglement Threatening the Integrity of Spanish Football

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The Spanish Professional Football League (La Liga) is the most popular and profitable sports league in Spain. (In the 2022-2023 season, La Liga had a record-setting revenue of 1.99 billion euros and more than 11 million spectators.) But the league has been beset by a string of corruption allegations. In an especially prominent recent case, one of La Liga’s most well-known teams, FC Barcelona, confirmed that between 2001 and 2018, the club had paid a total of 7.3 million euros to a consulting company owned by Jose Maria Enriquez Negreira, who during that time was the vice president of the Technical Committee of Referees (CTA) of the Royal Spanish Football Federation (RFEF), the national governing body of all football-related activities, including La Liga. Though FC Barcelona acknowledged the payments, the club insisted that the payments were solely for lawful consulting services unrelated to refereeing decisions. FC Barcelona further noted that such consulting arrangements are standard practice among La Liga clubs. (Indeed, a former police commissioner accused Real Madrid CF of paying Negreira as well.)

While the allegations against FC Barcelona are still under investigation, many outside observers would likely conclude that, even if there was no direct quid pro quo, this is a textbook case of a serious conflict of interest. The problem, though, is that it does not appear that there are any rules—under Spanish law, the RFEF Disciplinary Code, or the league’s own regulations—against such conflicts: Continue reading →

Why Is There No Zurichgrad? Protectionism in Swiss Real Estate

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Anonymous investments in foreign real estate markets have become a popular way to launder money and evade taxes. Opaque offshore structures now control a substantial share of high-end real estate in many major cities across the world. While the international sharing of financial data has made it harder to hide assets in offshore accounts, overseas property remains an easy target for illicit actors due to a lack of equivalent cross-border reporting. The city that has come to symbolize this problem is London—sometimes derisively referred to as “Londongrad” due to the extent to which Russian oligarchs own many of the city’s luxury homes.

Many might be surprised to learn that Switzerland, despite its longstanding reputation as a haven for illicit financial funds, has no major problem with money laundering in real estate. This is all the more surprising given that the Swiss property market would seem to be an exceptionally attractive target for dirty money in a number of ways. Swiss law affords extensive anonymity to individuals behind the corporate veil and does not require any licensing in the real estate sector. Furthermore, unlike many other countries, Switzerland still does not subject real estate agents, lawyers, or notaries – the key actors in property acquisition – to its anti-money laundering laws, as long as the property transaction in question does not involve a payment of more than the equivalent of about $110,000 in cash. At the same time, real estate prices in Switzerland are high and have risen dramatically in recent decades, especially in the cities and tourist areas. Illicit actors, who already roam financial centers such as Zurich, should thus have an easy time parking their assets in Swiss real estate. So why is there no “Zurichgrad”? Continue reading →

Breakthrough in the Use of Artificial Intelligence to Fight Corruption

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Whatever peril or promise the future of artificial intelligence holds, Brazilian, Colombian, and Italian researchers show it is a powerful tool for targeting corruption investigations.

Each year Colombia and Italy let thousands of contracts for goods, services, and public works, and each year some percentage is awarded thanks to bribery, conflict of interest, or other corrupt behavior. Each year Brazil’s central government transfers millions of dollars to the countries’ 5,500 plus municipal governments, and each year employees of some governments steal a portion.

Corruption is discovered through audits or whistleblowing, but a significant percentage goes undetected. The work done in Brazil, Colombia, and Italy shows how AI helps governments to deploy their investigative resources to boost the odds of finding a much larger percentage.

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A “Necessary Evil?” The Migrant Crisis and Corruption in the Darien Gap

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The Darien Gap—the rugged, marshy isthmus straddling the rainforests of Colombia and Panama—has become a bottleneck in the flow of migrants from South America to the United States. In recent years, migrants have begun pouring across the previously impassible narrow crossing. Though human rights advocates have lamented the tremendous suffering that this dangerous path entails for migrants, relatively little attention has been paid to the reasons underlying Darien Gap’s “opening.” The nearly 400,000 migrants who have traveled from South America to the US-Mexico border this year alone would not have been able to cross the Darien Gap save for the egregious corruption of local Colombian authorities. Corruption has enabled people to escape the abuses of repressive regimes in Venezuela and elsewhere. Yet in so doing, it has created its own humanitarian disaster by facilitating a journey full of death and despair.

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Addressing the Root Causes of Municipal Corruption in U.S. Cities

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Nearly a year ago, former Los Angeles City Councilman José Huizar pleaded guilty to racketeering and tax evasion, admitting that he took over $1.5 million in bribes during his tenure. As representative for the rapidly gentrifying Boyle Heights neighborhood and Downtown Los Angeles, Huizar used his office to shape urban development in line with the interests of corrupt real estate investors. Throughout his seven years as Chair of the Planning and Land Use Management Committee, he vouched for developers who paid him bribes, received kickbacks in exchange for favorable votes, and even negotiated with labor unions who threatened to block projects from which he stood to benefit financially. The U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California called the Huizar saga one of the most “wide-ranging and brazen public corruption cases” in the city’s history.

Local-level land use decisions are frequently rife with corruption, even in developed countries such as the United States. The elaborate web of regulations that govern zoning and urban planning practices, combined with relatively weak ethical standards for municipal lawmakers, encourage powerful investors to run afoul of the law. The Huizar case stands out as but one glaring example of the corruption that inhabits the world of variances, special use permits, and environmental impact reviews. Faced with mountains of paperwork and political uncertainty, real estate developers are drawn to corruption’s easy fix. Public officials such as Huizar are well-positioned to offer simple and efficient permitting in engage for generous campaign contributions and personal gifts.

While prosecuting corrupt officials like Huizar is necessary, addressing the root causes of this sort of corruption requires significant structural reforms. Three such reforms are particularly important: a reduction in the discretionary authority of political decision-makers in specific land use decisions, the abolition of councilmanic privilege, and the adoption of a universal municipal code of ethics for local lawmakers.

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