Any Change is Progress? African Citizens Hope the Coups will Leave the Fight against Corruption in Better Hands

Africa has seen a recent spate of military coups—from Mali to Guinea to Burkina Faso to Niger to Gabon. Most Western powers have condemned these coups. But many Africans have rejoiced, or at least have been far less concerned. For example, a survey conducted shortly after the coup in Niger suggests that most people in four other West African countries (Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast) believed that the Niger coup was justified. Why the dissonance between Western and African reactions to these coups?

The answer has to do with the dysfunction and corruption of many nominally “democratic” African governments. Endemic corruption has destroyed public trust in African democracy, and coup leaders have made it clear that corruption is one of the core justifications for their takeovers. Whether this is sincere, a pretext, or a combination, it is clear that the coup leaders are tapping into a sense of genuine public grievance, and that many citizens in these countries have become so frustrated with their elected governments that they would willingly trade electoral democracy for a government with the political will to fight corruption and improve living conditions.

For this reason, it would be an error to see African citizens’ support for these coups as evidence of a turn against genuine democracy. But there is an enormous gap between genuine democracy and the reality of electoral democracy as it exists in many African countries. Westerners who are surprised by African citizens’ support for the recent coups have underestimated just how poorly the corruption of the previous regimes had devastated public trust.

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Developing an Effective Corruption Prevention Strategy: Insights from Sierra Leone

It is often said that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and this is nowhere truer than in the fight against corruption. That insight has helped shape the approach of Sierra Leone’s campaign against corruption over the last several years. In 2018, Sierra Leone’s Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), of which I am the Commissioner (Head), made a deliberate policy decision to emphasize prevention over enforcement. The ACC created a designated “Prevention Department,” which was empowered to work, in conjunction with other oversight bodies such as the Supreme Audit Institution and the Public Sector Reform Agency, to ensure that corruption prevention systems and processes are embedded in the national administrative and governance architecture.

Of course, talking generally about “prevention” is easier than actually implementing effective corruption prevention mechanisms. So, what are some of the key tools that Sierra Leone has deployed to enhance its corruption prevention system? I will highlight five that have been especially important and effective: Continue reading

TI Senegal to IMF: Hold Our Government to its Anticorruption Commitments

Last June the International Monetary Fund approved $1.8 billion in loans to Senegal to stave off a debt crisis. Funds were conditioned among other measures on the government’s promise to strengthen the fight against corruption, a condition the government accepted wholeheartedly and without reservation. Indeed, IMF Deputy Director Kenji Okamura assured the IMF board before voting the loan that the Senegalese government was serious about anticorruption reform, that it recognized it was “critical to the restoration of growth and fiscal stability” (here).

The government’s promises and Okamura’s assurances are now in doubt. Forum Civil, the Senegal chapter of Transparency International, reported in late October that the government has done virtually nothing to keep its promises.  

The Fund is not helpless in the face of the government’s broken promises. The loan funds are being disbursed in tranches; each tranche requires board approval and a meeting to okay the first tranche set for December. Moreover, four of the anticorruption reforms – enforcing the asset declaration system, strengthening the anticorruption agency and the prosecution, and tightening the civil service ethics code — are “structural benchmarks. That is, IMF procedures require the Board to assay progress on each before okaying a tranche.

In its October report, reprinted below, the Forum Civil documents the government’s failure to live up to its promises, lays out immediate steps it should take to demonstrate it intends to keep them, and urges the IMF, for the sake of the citizens of Senegal and their future, to hold the government to its commitments

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A New Page in the Populist Playbook: Imran Khan Frames Anticorruption as Foreign Manipulation

In Pakistan, former Prime Minister Imran Khan—who, if declared eligible, would be seeking a return to office in the 2024 elections—faces numerous allegations of corruption and other financial impropriety. More than 200 cases have been filed against him in Pakistan’s courts, and he continues to sit behind bars in Adiala Jail. Yet these legal troubles have had little effect on Khan’s popularity in pre-election polls. Part of the reason, as I discussed in my last post, is that Pakistan’s long history of politicized anticorruption enforcement has left Pakistanis deeply apathetic about corruption allegations and weary of their frequently cynical use. But Khan has also been unusually successful in convincing the public that the charges against him are politically motivated. What accounts for his ability to rally the public to his side when similarly situated Pakistani politicians have failed before him? The answer may lie in Khan’s concerted focus on what he claims is evidence of American meddling. Continue reading

The More You Know About Chief Prosecutors, the Less You Trust Their Office?

Prosecuting elected officials for corruption is often an uphill battle. The power and resources of the defendants, combined with the general difficulty of proving corrupt deeds (which usually happen behind closed doors), make it difficult to secure convictions. Moreover, prosecutors who bring charges against elected officials frequently face accusations that the decision to prosecute was politically motivated or biased. Such accusations, which are often fueled by the politicians themselves, have potential grave consequences. Not only can they result in public distrust in particular criminal proceedings against politicians, but also—and perhaps more importantly—these accusations can undermine the legitimacy of the legal system more broadly.

Some public criticism—fair or unfair—of prosecutors is inevitable. However, prosecutors can (and should) try to minimize the harmful effects such criticism might have on the overall legitimacy of the institutions of justice. How can they do so? In a recent and highly recommended article, Ori Aronson, Julia Elad-Strenger, Thomas Kessler, and Yuval Feldman suggest that one way prosecutors can increase the perception that their offices and investigations are objective and unbiased is by refraining from highlighting the personal traits or biographical details of the individuals who lead those offices. To use the jargon of the authors, “non-personalization” of prosecutors’ offices is superior to their “personalization,” at least in terms of offices’ perceived objectivity. The authors base this conclusion on a series of experiments involving reactions to decisions made by Israel’s head of prosecution—former Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit—concerning the corruption allegations against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (a topic that was featured on the blog numerous times; see, for example, here, here, and here).

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UNCAC Coalition to UNCAC State Parties: Ensure Corruption Victims Can Recover Damages

As Carlos Guerrero explained here last week, corruption is anything but a victimless crime. Citizens are injured or killed when corruptly constructed buildings collapse on them. Others are denied the right to education, life saving medical treatment, and the fair resolution of their disputes thanks to bribery, embezzlement, and conflicts of interest.

The drafters of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption were not blind to the tremendous damage corruption does to identifiable persons or groups of persons. That is why they included a specific provision making it absolutely clear that all parties must grant victims of corruption an opportunity to seek compensation for any injuries sustained. In no uncertain terms article 35 requires state parties to open their courts to any individual or entity injured “as a result of an act of corruption.”

But UNCAC state parties have yet to take article 35 seriously. Academics, civil society organizations, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime all report that only a few victims in a handful of states have recovered damages. In the vast majority of the 190 countries that have ratified the Convention, not a single person injured by corruption has been compensated for their loss.

The UNCAC Coalition‘s Working Groups, a global network of over 350 civil society organizations in 100 countries, is demanding change. The parties to UNCAC meet this December in Atlanta to review each other’s progress in complying with the convention. Below is the Coalition’s letter to them urging that compliance with article 35 by all 190 be a priority.

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Pakistanis Are Sick of Hearing About Anticorruption

Anticorruption experts have long grappled with the enduring puzzle of why voters continue to support allegedly corrupt politicians. Why is it that the same people who point to corruption as a significant problem in their societies nevertheless cast their votes for candidates who have been credibly accused, or even indicted or convicted for, corruption offenses? Consider, as a particularly striking example of this paradox, the case of former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. At the time of writing, Khan continues to languish behind bars in the high-security Adiala Jail, incarcerated on charges stemming from one of the more than 200 cases that have been filed against him in various courts around the country. Many (though not all) of these cases allege corruption or related forms of financial impropriety. Khan’s incarceration might prevent his candidacy in Pakistan’s upcoming elections. But if he is permitted to run, he is expected to win easily. If Pakistanis detest corruption—as all evidence suggests that they do—then what explains Khan’s overwhelming popularity, notwithstanding the numerous and serious graft-related investigations ongoing against him?

The answer—which may shed light on this puzzle in other contexts as well—is rooted in the politicization of judicial proceedings and the long-term effects of recurrent corruption allegations in politics. Continue reading

Institutionalizing People Power: How Switzerland Overcame Systemic Corruption

How do states escape pervasive corruption? Expanding the small set of success stories, a burgeoning line of research (see herehereherehere, or here) seeks answers to this question through the study of polities that have achieved control of corruption before Second World War. This group of so-called “early achievers” mostly consist of Western and Northern European countries as well as territories that seceded from them. One lesson that has been drawn from the study of early achievers is that the gradual depoliticization of governance is an essential step on a society’s path to becoming free from endemic corruption. Indeed, some have suggested that transitioning to a robust democracy before building a sufficiently effective and clean state is a recipe for corruption and state capture, as political parties will organize on clientalist lines and focus mainly on capturing rents. The key to combating systemic corruption, on this account, is building a strong and professional class of civil servants and judges who are insulated from politics.

The case of Switzerland, which has received little attention so far, presents a puzzle in this regard. Now a textbook example of effective (domestic) corruption control, early nineteenth century Switzerland shared many of the klepocratic governance patterns we find in low- and middle-income countries today. Long dominated by a handful of wealthy families, from the 1830s onwards Swiss state institutions fell under the sway of a group of entrepreneurs involved in the financing and organization of railway construction. These “Railway Barons” dominated Swiss politics through a web of patronage networks and used the captured institutions of the state to assert their individual interests. But by the beginning of the twentieth century, Switzerland was free from such systemic corruption. Remarkably, and contrary to conventional thinking about early achievers, Switzerland accomplished this not by limiting democracy, but by doubling down on it. Continue reading

The Perils of Taking Shortcuts: How Brazilian Prosecutors Alleged Carelessness with Evidence May Undo Years of Hard Work 

Brazil’s so-called Lava Jato (Car Wash) Operation, launched in 2014, exposed one of the largest corruption schemes ever. The investigation resulted in over 361 convictions (for corruption, money-laundering, procurement fraud, and other crimes); among those convicted were numerous prominent members of the Brazilian business and political elite, including the current President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known as Lula). In building its cases against these defendants, Brazilian federal prosecutors made extensive use of “leniency agreements,” offering some companies lighter penalties in exchange for evidence against other parties. One of the most important of these leniency agreements was the one Brazilian prosecutors, working in conjunction with U.S. and Swiss prosecutors, reached with the Odebrecht company, a major Brazilian infrastructure conglomerate at the center of the corruption scheme.

But over the last few years, the Car Wash operation has started to unravel, with several of its most important achievements reversed. In 2019 a Brazilian hacker publicized text messages allegedly exchanged between Sergio Moro, the presiding judge in many of the Car Wash cases (including Lula’s), and the Car Wash prosecutors, prompting allegations of bias. The specialized Car Wash prosecutorial task force was disbanded in February 2021, and the Brazilian Supreme Court annulled Lula’s conviction on procedural grounds in April 2021, paving the way for his re-election to a third presidential term in October 2022. The most recent setback to the Car Wash Operation, already discussed and debated on this blog (see herehere, and here), is a decision by the Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli this past September. In that decision, Justice Toffoli declared that, due to procedural errors, none of the evidence acquired in the leniency agreement with Odebrecht could be used in any judicial proceeding. This ruling puts numerous Car Wash convictions at risk: Defense attorneys may now seek to annul convictions in cases in which their clients were convicted primarily on the Odebrecht evidence.

Many in the anticorruption community, in Brazil and abroad, have denounced Justice Toffoli’s ruling, and have suggested that it may have been improperly influenced by political or personal considerations. But as a technical legal matter, Justice Toffoli’s decision was probably correct. While it is understandably frustrating to see so much hard work wiped away and the prospect of convicted corrupt actors going free, the responsibility here appears to lie more with the Car Wash prosecutors than with the Supreme Court. Indeed, the recent developments in the Car Wash saga should serve as a cautionary tale for investigators and prosecutors. In their understandable zeal to catch and convict bad actors, law enforcement authorities must be careful to scrupulously and rigorously observe all legal requirements. Continue reading

Lankan Civil Society and IMF Staff: Allies in Sri Lanka’s Fight Against Corruption

Sri Lanka is recovering from one the worst bouts of kleptocratic rule in modern times. That recovery crucially depends of course on ending its rulers’ wholesale theft of the nation’s resources, an effort where the International Monetary Fund staff and Sri Lankan civil society have wittingly or unwittingly joined forces.

The alliance has Its roots in events of 2022. That spring citizens had had enough. With the economy cratering and poverty skyrocketing, they joined to force the latest in a string of kleptocrats from office (pictured here). That summer the replacement government pledged to fight corruption. That fall IMF staff recommended approval of a $2.9 billion loan to help the country dig out of the hole corruption dug.

Sri Lanka’s corruption was so blatant, and the link between it and the economy’s free fall so clear that IMF’s staff insisted that in return for the loan the government promise to enact a program “reducing corruption vulnerabilities through improving fiscal transparency and public financial management, introducing a stronger anti-corruption legal framework, and conducting an in-depth governance diagnostic, supported by IMF technical assistance.”   

One year on, as the IMF board considers whether to release a second tranche of the loan, that promise remains unfulfilled.  The evidence is in two reports released in September, one by Sri Lankan civil society (here) and the other by the IMF staff (here). Both chronicle the government’s numerous failures to implement promised reforms. Both point the same underlying problem: the impunity high level officials continue to enjoy.

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