For the Love of Money: Capitalizing on Corrupt Officials’ Opulent Spending Habits to Fight Corruption

Corruption is notoriously difficult to track and discover, not least because both sides in a corrupt exchange have strong incentives to avoid getting caught. So how can enforcement officials, journalists, and anticorruption activists catch corrupt actors? Pay close attention to flagrant and excessive spending by public officials. After all, most people who benefit from corruption, whether they are officials receiving bribes or industrialists benefitting from the government action they purchased, do it for the money. And what’s the point of taking on so much personal risk to make more money if you can’t spend it on nice things? This is why you’ll see Chinese officials wearing wristwatches worth four times their annual salary and presidents spending millions on designer clothes and shoes and other luxury goods. The additional risk of being caught seems to be outweighed by the perceived social benefits of public displays of wealth. Throwing lavish weddings and banquets seems to be a particularly common trap that captures this phenomenon. The very public nature of these events, the massive guest lists, and the attendance of well known figures all but guarantee public scrutiny. But current and former government officials just can’t seem to help themselves. For example, in the middle of India’s recent anticorruption crackdown a former government minister held a lavish wedding for his daughter at a cost of over $75 million. This is in a country where a former state chief minister and potential prime minister was recently sentenced to four years in prison, banned from politics for a decade, and fined $16 million after an investigation sparked by an astonishingly opulent wedding she hosted.

Over the past decade, the spending habits of dozens of high-ranking officials have produced a number of viral news stories and have, in some cases, led to effective enforcement actions. The fact that people are willing to spend their corruptly acquired wealth so publicly, in spite of the risks involved, provides enforcement officials and anticorruption advocates with a unique and important opportunity in three respects:

Continue reading

Corruption as a Jurisdictional Barrier in Investment Arbitration: Consequences and Solutions

As has been explored on this blog and elsewhere, corruption is a controversial topic in investor-state arbitration disputes. First emerging as a defense by states seeking to avoid liability, multiple tribunals have refused to enforce arbitration contracts tainted by corruption (see World Duty Free v Kenya and Plama Consortium v Bulgaria). Corruption has also been used as a cause of action by investors claiming unfair treatment (see Yukos v Russian Federation and here). The unclear incentive effects of corruption in arbitration proceedings have been analyzed from different angles—whether it provides countries with perverse incentives that might encourage corruption or instead buttresses anticorruption principles and promotes accountability.

Unfortunately, less attention has been paid to the procedural step at which tribunals discuss corruption. In the past ten years, an increasing number of tribunals are evaluating evidence of corruption at the jurisdictional stage of arbitration rather than at the merits stage. Those readers who are not lawyers (and even those who are), may be wondering, “Who cares? Why does it matter if corruption is treated as a ‘jurisdictional’ issue as opposed to a ‘merits’ issue?”

Actually, it matters a lot.  Continue reading

Entrepreneurs Care About Corruption – Here’s How to Help Them Fight It.

A friend of mine has been trying to start an artisanal liquor business in a small Latin American country. He learned to ferment fruit, crafted a logo, scrounged for and sanitized several hundred glass bottles, registered his corporation with all the various agencies, and paid all of his initial taxes. After producing his first batch and selling it to a number of small shops, he decided it was time to expand. Unfortunately, when he began to negotiate sales to larger restaurants and grocery stores he ran into a major complication: liquor taxes. The high level of liquor taxation made his business model completely unprofitable. Trying to understand how any other liquor business stayed afloat, he discovered that one liquor manufacturer and importer dominated the market, and didn’t pay any taxes. How? Corruption. In order to stay in business, my friend had a choice: (A) he could stay small, fly under the radar, and avoid paying taxes, or (B) he could navigate the perilous and uncertain process of bribing his way out of paying taxes. He ended up choosing a third option: he closed up shop and went back to his day job.

Ultimately, the fate of one small liquor business is not that important. But my friend’s experience illustrates a much more general phenomenon, one that is likely familiar to readers with experience in countries where corruption is widespread: corruption protects incumbent firms, undermines entrepreneurship, and constrains growth and job creation—particularly by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are often the primary drivers of economic growth, employment, and innovation. Corruption can be a critical roadblock to entrepreneurs and small business owners who can’t bribe their way out of regulation. In fact, pervasive corruption can shift business incentives to such a significant extent that it can impact the shape of an economy dramatically. Continue reading

When and Why Do Corrupt Politicians Champion Corruption Reform? A Character Study

Can corrupt leaders enact effective anticorruption reform? The brief answer seems to be yes: Leaders who are (perceived as) corrupt can initiate and support effective anticorruption reform efforts. For example, as this blog has previously discussed, President Peña-Nieto (who has repeatedly been accused of corruption and graft) supported constitutional anticorruption reforms in Mexico. Egypt’s current President, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, has similarly launched various anticorruption campaigns, even while fending off numerous corruption allegations.

But why do corrupt leaders institute anticorruption reforms? While there’s no universal explanation, there appear to be at least three archetypes that might help anticorruption activists identify and push unlikely reformers: The Power Player, The Top-Down Director, and The Born-Again Reformer. Continue reading

Appearances Can Be Revealing: The Trump Administration’s Corruption Perceptions Problem

In the wake of President Trump’s Executive Order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (also known as the “Muslim Ban”), numerous media outlets published articles highlighting the fact that Trump’s order excluded several predominantly Muslim countries where the Trump organization conducts business (see here, here and here). The implication was that this exclusion was intentional, and demonstrates the extent to which Trump’s business ventures create conflicts of interest that influence his policy decisions. Although this explanation is plausible, another likely explanation is that the list of countries targeted by the ban tracked the visa waiver program restrictions Congress passed in 2015 and the Obama administration expanded in 2016 (see here).

Were the limitations on the ban driven by corruption or policy priorities? We don’t know—and that’s the problem. Even if Trump’s executive order had no connection with his business, Trump’s extensive conflicts of interest and unwillingness to divest from foreign holdings casts a shadow of corruption over any decision made by the administration. The fact that every decision Trump makes could be tainted with the appearance of self-interest, regardless of whether his administration actually is doing what it believes is in the public’s interest, is incredibly damaging, delegitimizing, and destabilizing. This is why we have ethics rules for government officials that seek to prevent not only corruption, but also the appearance of corruption. Trump’s failure to clear his presidency of any potential conflicts of interest has a few particularly pernicious effects:

Continue reading

How Corrupt Are Your Courts? Too Corrupt To Be Fair?

In complex transnational litigation, ensuring the rights of all parties is especially challenging. Consider the following situation: A plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a US multinational in US court, alleging wrongful conduct in some foreign country; the defendant corporation moves to dismiss the case on the ground that the courts of the country where the alleged conduct took place are a more appropriate forum for adjudicating the suit, and the plaintiff should therefore be required to pursue the suit there; but the plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the foreign country’s courts are so corrupt that it would be impossible to get a fair trial. What should the US court do when confronted with that sort of situation?

The technical legal term for a motion to dismiss a case because the plaintiff ought to file the suit in a different (and more convenient) judicial forum is the forum non conveniens motion. To successfully win on such a motion in a US federal court, the defendant must convince the court that an alternative forum would provide “basic fairness.” When the alternative forum is the judiciary of a foreign country, plaintiffs sometimes try to oppose these motions by pointing to judicial corruption in the foreign forum. But as one court highlighted, “the argument that the alternative forum is too corrupt to be adequate does not enjoy a particularly good track record.” Indeed, as I noted in my previous post on the Chevron-Ecuador litigation, the district judge in that case rejected the plaintiff’s claim that Ecuadorian judicial corruption made it impossible to get a fair trial in Ecuador, remarking that “the courts of the United States are properly reluctant to assume that the courts of a sister democracy are unable to dispense justice.” Even when confronted with clear and undisputed evidence of corruption in a foreign court, US courts have generally been unwilling to accept this as a sufficient reason to keep the case in US court. (In one case a US court reaffirmed a forum non conveniens decision even after the plaintiff successfully bribed a Mexican judge to have the case sent back to the US court.) Consistent with this deferential approach, there are very few cases where a US court has found a foreign forum inadequate due to credible allegations of widespread judicial corruption. (There are admittedly a handful of such cases, including Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas, Ltd., in which the court found that the extensive delay, unreliability, and general corruption of the Indian judiciary made it an inadequate forum for the plaintiff.)

By contrast, other jurisdictions take allegations of foreign judicial corruption more seriously as a reason not to dismiss a lawsuit and insist that it remain in the forum of the plaintiff’s choice. Notably, although the forum non conveniens analysis is very similar in US and Canadian courts, Canadian courts have been more willing to find foreign forums inadequate because of pervasive corruption. For example, in Norex Petroleum Limited v. Chubb Insurance Company of Canada, a US court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds, while the Canadian court took jurisdiction, denying the defendant’s forum non conveniens motion in light of the Canadian court’s finding that—even though every other factor weighed heavily in favor of Russia as the better forum—extensive judicial corruption in Russia would prevent the plaintiff from accessing a fair and impartial court. It’s certainly not the case that Canadian courts have been consistently receptive to these sorts of arguments—for example, a recent Canadian ruling found Guatemala an appropriate forum despite significant corruption concerns—but the contrast between Canada and the US demonstrates that the US courts’ “see no evil” approach is far from inevitable.

Although it may be helpful for the purposes of international comity for courts to presume that foreign judiciaries are fair, and there are legitimate reasons to dismiss a case in favor a foreign forum (such as easier access to evidence and witnesses), the reluctance of US courts to accept credible allegations of judicial corruption as a reason to deny a forum non conveniens motion likely goes too far. Respect for foreign courts is a good thing in principle, but in practice it can undermine the ability of plaintiffs to get a fair hearing. US courts should hesitate before dismissing cases to foreign forums when there are plausible claims of corruption for two reasons:  Continue reading

Corruption’s Gendered Double Standard

On November 8, 2016 the United States almost elected Hillary Clinton as its first female president. But, if Donald Trump and many of his supporters were to be believed, Secretary Clinton was also one of the most corrupt politicians of all time. This argument appears to have swayed many American voters, who ended up electing Donald Trump (who might actually be the most corrupt person recently elected to the presidency, see here, here, and here). That Trump’s unprecedented accusations of corruption were leveled against the first female presidential candidate nominated by a major political party was not a coincidence.

A great deal of commentary has considered whether women (and especially female politicians and public officials) behave less corruptly than men. (For some prior discussion on this blog, see here.) But I’d like to focus on a different question: Are female politicians accused of corruption treated differently—and judged more harshly—than male politicians? Existing research suggests that they are, which in turn may explain both why allegations of corruption can be more damaging to female politicians, and why female public officials are on the whole less corrupt. Continue reading

US Courts’ Evaluation of Foreign Judicial Corruption: Different Stages, Different Standards

Last August, a US appeals court may have finally brought to a close a case that the court described as “among the most extensively chronicled in the history of the American federal judiciary”: a lawsuit, initially filed in 1993, seeking damages for adverse environmental and health consequences of oil exploration and drilling by Texaco (later acquired by Chevron) in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Chevron and the plaintiffs each have their own version of the long, complicated, and contentious litigation. (For a concise, relatively balanced summary see here.) For present purposes, the essential facts are as follows: After eight years of US litigation, in 2001 Chevron persuaded a US court to send the case to Ecuador. In 2011, after an additional decade of litigation in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian courts ultimately found in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Chevron to pay an $18.5 billion judgment (later reduced to $9 billion). Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Chevron doesn’t have any assets in Ecuador, so the plaintiffs have been trying to enforce their judgment in a number of other jurisdictions, including the United States. In its August ruling, the US appeals court affirmed the district court’s 2014 holding that the Ecuadorian judgment could not be enforced in the United States because it was a product of fraud and corruption—including the shocking finding that plaintiff’s attorneys had bribed the judge with a promise of $500,000, and ghostwrote the multi-billion dollar judgment.

At first glance, there appears to be a contradiction, or at least a tension, between how the US courts treated allegations of judicial corruption in Ecuador at two different stages in the proceedings. After all, Chevron was able to successfully persuade a US court to send the case to Ecuador in 2001 because Chevron had successfully argued that Ecuador’s judiciary was sufficiently insulated from corruption to prevent injustice, yet in the most recent ruling, Chevron convinced the court not to enforce the judgment on the grounds of judicial corruption in an Ecuadorian court. But what might at first glance appear to be a contradictory set of rulings can be explained by the fact that US courts apply divergent standards when assessing judicial corruption at different stages of litigation.  Continue reading