Author Archives: Richard Messick

Money in Politics: Can’t Experience Teach Us Anything?

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My complaint in last week’s post that Checkbook Elections, the recent study of campaign and party finance rules in 11 countries, failed to offer any guidance for reformers drew a sharp and quick retort from University of Sussex researcher Samuel Power.  Power says I didn’t like the study because it didn’t produce a “one-size fits all” solution to the problem of controlling money in politics.  That search for the holy grail of campaign and party finance is misguided, he says, for reforms are context specific.  When a reformer, Power writes, asks a money-in-politics guru “. . . for ‘guidance on what works,’ the (sensible) answer is very likely to be ‘well it depends. . . .’”

But depends on what Mr. Power?  Climate?  Latitude?  Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization?   Continue reading →

Money in Politics: Can it be Controlled?

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The research consortium Money, Politics, and Transparency recently released Checkbook Elections, a summary of a two year, multi-million dollar project to examine the role of money in politics.  A principal aim of the study was to identify “what works, what fails, and why” when countries reform laws governing campaign and party finance.  To answers to these questions, researchers analyzed how and why governments regulate the financing of political campaigns and political parties, drawing on case studies of regulation in Brazil, Britain, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States.

Checkbook Elections‘ authors tout the results, asserting the volume provides “several core findings” which offer “important lessons for policy makers both domestically and internationally wishing to support countries in their reform trajectories.” Unfortunately for those looking for ideas on what kinds of campaign and party finance reforms might help control corruption, this is hype.  The text offers but a few lessons.  None are new or terribly important or generalizable.  The study, however, does contain an important conclusion, one which the authors are candid enough to report even if they don’t feature it. Continue reading →

Why Hasn’t the Indian Parliament Plugged the Gaping Hole in the Nation’s Anticorruption Law?

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India’s leaders have taken numerous steps in recent years to curb the pervasive corruption that grips the country.  Right to information, whistleblower protection, and other preventive measures have been enacted; an anticorruption agency was created in 2013, and this past April the Cabinet recommended the legislature amend the anticorruption laws to stiffen the penalties for bribery.  But despite the enormous attention the drive to combat corruption has garnered, a September 2015 Supreme Court opinion again pointed to a gaping a hole in the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, the nation’s basic anticorruption law, a hole that is easily repairable but that, until it is, makes convicting bribe-taking public servants far harder than it should be.

Why lawmakers have yet to seal the hole is a mystery. They have known about it since 2011, when the Supreme Court first exposed it.  It is an easy one to close, and until it is closed who knows how many civil servants will demand bribes with near impunity? Continue reading →

Sustainable Development Goal 16: Am I the Only One Who Thinks It Is a Major Setback in the Fight Against Corruption?

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Last week Matthew asked if he were the only one who wasn’t excited about Sustainable Development Goal 16.   At first glance it is hard to understand why he would ask such a question.  One of 17 goals approved September 25 by the United Nations General Assembly to end poverty by 2030, SDG 16 establishes an ambitious agenda for improving the way the nations of the world govern their citizens by, among other measures, requiring concerted global action to “substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.”  How could anyone, particularly one who works on corruption issues, not be ecstatic that the 193 member-states of the United Nations unanimously endorsed this objective? And indeed numerous anticorruption advocates have already celebrated its approval (click here for Transparency International’s enthusiastic endorsement).

Although the opening of Matthew’s post was low-key (am I the only one not excited?), readers quickly learned that he was in fact severely critical of SDG 16’s corruption and bribery target because of the way progress towards realizing it is to be measured: by changes in a nation’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.  Matthew nicely summarized why this is insane on technical grounds.  Here I explain why using the CPI to measure progress is not only insane but represents a major setback in the fight against corruption. Continue reading →

Will the Canadian Courts Wreck International Law Enforcement Cooperation on Corruption Cases?

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The answer to the question posed in the title depends upon how the Canadian Supreme Court rules in World Bank Group v. Kevin Wallace.  If the court rules that, despite laws providing it is not subject to the orders of domestic courts, the World Bank must obey a directive of the Ontario Superior Court, cooperation between the Bank and national law enforcement agencies is likely to end – or be severely weakened at the least.  The pleadings filed in the case, and just made available on the Supreme Court’s web site, describe how the court is poised to weaken transnational efforts to curb corruption. In summary . . . Continue reading →

Ridding the Courts of Corrupt Judges: Ghana Takes the First Step

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Last week Ghanaians awoke to depressing news.  A team of investigative reporters revealed they had 500 plus hours of video tapes showing High Court judges and lower court magistrates accepting payoffs to acquit defendants in cases ranging from robbery and murder to bribery itself.  (Click here, here, and here for news accounts.) For Ghana, this is bad news, very bad news: dangerous criminals remain at large; some innocent individuals may have been jailed because they didn’t pay off a judge; and whatever confidence citizens may have had in the courts has been shattered.

But the initial reports contain some very good news as well.  The government is taking forceful and responsible action to cleanse a critical state institution of corruption. In accordance with article 146 of the Ghanaian Constitution, Chief Justice Georgina Theodora Wood has established a committee to examine the allegations against each judge and advise Ghanaian President Mahama whether he should remove any of them from office per the constitutional test of “stated misbehavior.”  At the same time, the Attorney General has announced his intention to prosecute judges, magistrates, and their accomplices for bribery and related crimes.

The scandal is similar in many ways to the one that engulfed Chicago’s courts in the 1980s, recounted in a Foreign Policy article flagged here last week.  As in Ghana, the Chicago cases arose from secret tape recordings showing judges fixing cases for money.  Like the Chicago judges caught on tape, some of those implicated in the Ghanaian scandal claim the taping violated the sanctity of the judicial chambers and evidence from them should therefore not be heard in any legal proceeding.  And, as in Chicago, many in Ghana are urging that those who bribed their way out of a criminal case be re-tried before an honest judge.

As the Ghanaian scandal unfolds difference between it and the one in Chicago will emerge, but some issues will be the same, and it may help Ghanaian authorities and citizens to know about Chicago’s experience. Probably most useful is the reasoning American courts relied upon to overcome the defense of double jeopardy when prosecutors sought to retry those defendant who had paid a judge to acquit them. Continue reading →

Judges on the Take: How the FBI took on Chicago’s Crooked Courts

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FBI Special Agent Ken Misner was in Chicago on a critical mission: to get arrested for drunk driving. Yet each time the police pulled him over, he escaped with a warning – no matter how erratically he had driven, and no matter how well he had faked his drunkenness. It was 1980, and the Chicago police simply didn’t arrest middle-aged white guys for traffic offenses. When his act failed yet again, he finally decided it was time to resort to desperate measures. He jumped from his car, leaped onto the hood of the police cruiser, and started screaming obscenities. The officer promptly yanked him down and began writing a summons. At last, thought Misner, mission accomplished. But as he read what the cop had written, he saw he had caught another “break.” The charge was disorderly conduct, a minor offense that wouldn’t get him anywhere near traffic court. Misner never succeeded in becoming a traffic court defendant, but fellow FBI agent Woody Enderson did, realizing an important milestone in the federal undercover investigation into corruption in Chicago’s court system known as “Operation Greylord.”

Click here to read the rest of this article from Foreign Policy magazine.  It appears in the series, “Curbing Corruption: Ideas that Work,” DemLab Case Studies exploring successful approaches to fighting corruption.  Democracy Lab is Foreign Policy’s home for coverage of transitions to democracy, published in partnership with the Legatum Institute.

Reducing Court Delays: A Critical Element in the Fight Against Corruption

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One consistent finding from the research on anticorruption policy is that those tempted to commit an act of corruption can be deterred from doing so if they are afraid they will be caught and punished.  That is the good news.  Deterrence works. But as I noted in an earlier post, deterrence requires a court system that can resolve cases within a reasonable time.  If those contemplating whether to take or pay a bribe or participate in some other form of corruption know that, if caught, they can delay the case for years if not decades, the fear of punishment will be lessened if not eliminated altogether. An effective national anticorruption policy thus requires ensuring cases are resolved without inordinate delay.

Court delay is a long-standing problem in many nations, and courts in any number of jurisdictions have implemented programs to reduce delays. Few, however, have succeeded.  In a new policy brief for the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre I argue that one reason why so many delay reduction programs have failed is that they have ignored how the formal and informal rules governing case disposition shape the incentives of judges, lawyers, court staff, and litigants.  I urge that a successful delay reduction strategy must start with such a “political economy” analysis and that reforms be built around what that analysis reveals. Comments welcome.

How to Corrupt an Anticorruption Commission: The Case of Nepal

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Narayan Manandhar, an international consultant on anticorruption, contributes the following guest post:

Nepalese lawmakers recently promulgated a draft constitution that envisages new roles and responsibilities for its anticorruption agency, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority.  The proposed changes to the commission’s mandate shows how, if policymakers don’t have the guts to abolish an anticorruption agency, they can defang it by eroding its power and responsibilities.  This recent effort is the latest attempt by Nepal’s elite to ensure the commission cannot do what it is supposed to do: fight corruption.    Continue reading →

Announcement: Fixing the Fight Against Corruption, Panel Discussion September 17

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As part of its ‘Curbing Corruption’ series, the Legatum Institute, together with Democracy Lab, an on-line partnership between the Institute and Foreign Policy magazine, will host a panel September 17 at the Institute’s London office to discuss the major challenges facing the current global anti–corruption effort and what might be done—from a local perspective to wider international solutions.  Panelists are Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Professor of Democracy Studies, Hertie School of Governance; Nils Taxell, Senior Advisor, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre; and GAB Senior Contributor Richard Messick.  Christian Caryl, Managing Editor, Democracy Lab and Senior Fellow, Legatum Institute will moderate.

The panel will run from 18:00 to 19:15, London time, and will be live streamed.  The Legatum Institute is located at 11 Charles Street, London, W1J 5DW.  Details on attending in person or live streaming are here.