Monthly Archives: February 2024

ECOWAS Must Get Serious About Corruption—or the Coups Will Continue

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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 to foster economic cooperation within West Africa. Over time, ECOWAS’s mission has expanded to include the promotion of democracy and political stability. And for a while, it looked like the region was indeed making progress on this front: Between 2015 and 2020, all fifteen ECOWAS member countries were democratic states. But since 2020, West and Central Africa have been hit with a wave of eight military coups, the most recent ones occurring this past July (in Niger) and August (in Gabon). ECOWAS’s response to this democratic backsliding has been unimpressive. For example, ECOWAS looked on passively when, in 2020, both Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara and Guinea’s then-President Alpha Condé ignored or circumvented constitutional limits on their terms. Just this month, Senegal President Macky Sall unilaterally delayed presidential elections for the first time in the nation’s history. Recently, ECOWAS—under pressure from the US and EU—did impose sanctions against Niger in response to the coup, but these sanctions were insufficient to get the coup leaders to step down. In fact, these sanctions were so ineffective that they caused coup-hit Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from the bloc, citing “illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions” and failure to support their fight against “terrorism and insecurity.” All this has begun to jeopardize ECOWAS’s credibility even in the eyes of local populations.

Perhaps more seriously, ECOWAS has lost credibility not only for its response to the coups, but also for its failure to address the root causes of these coups, including not only economic woes, but also endemic corruption. As a coalition of West African civil society organizations recently asserted, ECOWAS operates as “a club of Head of States, whose sole preoccupation is regime protection of the various West African leaders, and their penchant for appropriating the benefits of office to themselves, while the ordinary citizens of countries in the sub-region wallow in extreme poverty, misery, and penury.”

ECOWAS could and should take concrete steps to bolster its waning authority. One of the most effective ways it could do so is by taking a strong stand against corruption. This would not be taking ECOWAS far outside the scope of its existing mandate. The ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption authorized ECOWAS to take action “whenever an act of corruption is committed or produces some effects in a State Party.” More generally, given the threat that corruption poses to both democracy and stability, ECOWAS is justified in more decisive action to address this scourge.

In particular, there are three things that ECOWAS ought to do:

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New Resource Guide on Corruption Risk Assessment of Legislation

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As a too-familiar cliché has it, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and this is a message many in the anticorruption community have taken to heart. But talking in general terms about the  importance of preventing corruption is one thing; figuring out how to design specific, practical anticorruption measures is a much greater challenge. Among the preventative tools in the anticorruption toolkit, one that has shown some promise in a number of countries, and that has attracted attention in many others, is the pre-enactment analysis of proposed laws to assess the corruption risks associated with those laws. This process is sometimes referred to as “corruption risk assessment” (CRA). (It is also—rather unfortunately—sometimes referred to as the “corruption-proofing” of proposed legislation, a label that vastly oversells what this sort of assessment is capable of doing.) We have had a couple of posts on this technique on the blog previously (see here and here).

Last month, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) published a useful resource guide on CRA intended primarily for parliaments (and other legislative bodies), authored by GAB’s own senior contributor Rick Messick. (Full disclosure: I provided some comments on a very early draft of the guide, and I also worked as a consultant, though in a comparatively minor role, on a related project with the NDI’s Bangkok office.) To quote from the introduction, this guide “suggests how a CRA procedure can be incorporated into the standing rules of parliament and provides a checklist of issues the CRA should consider…. While primarily written for stakeholders in parliament, the guide can be adapted for use by anti-corruption agencies, executive branch agencies, civil society organizations (CSO) and other groups to detect and highlight the corruption risks that exist in legislative processes.”

The link above goes to the NDI page with information about the guide and related documents. You can also go directly to a PDF of the guide itself here. I hope some of our readers find this to be a useful resource.

Brazil’s Anticorruption Backsliding

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In a recent post I discussed the positive legacy of Brazil’s Car Wash Operation and argued that this operation, for all its missteps, strengthened the country’s legal and institutional framework against corruption. The operation not only increased public awareness of corrupt practices but also inspired the development of effective tools for corruption prevention, investigations, and case resolution, significantly contributing to a more transparent, honest, and efficient business and political environment. Nevertheless, actions taken by Brazilian leaders in the past year have intensified concerns—already present under the previous Administration—about the government’s commitment to sustaining and expanding this legacy. Transparency International (TI) raised some of these concerns in its recent comment on Brazil’s worsening performance on TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Now, there are well-known reasons to be cautious about drawing strong conclusions from the CPI or other perception-based international indexes, but in Brazil’s case, there are good reasons to be alert. Senior leaders in both the political and judicial branches have made a series of worrisome decisions that seem likely—indeed, may be intended—to set back Brazil’s fight against high-level corruption. Among those setbacks, the following are the most serious and troubling: Continue reading →

Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Orders Investigation of Transparency International

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Six days after it reported in its annual survey of corruption perceptions that the fight against corruption in Brazil was losing steam, Transparency International was placed under investigation by Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli (here). The ostensible reason is that the internationally renowned corruption fighting organization, headquartered in Berlin with a Brazilian chapter, misused public funds.  According to the justice, the group is a “foreign” organization and thus funds received in Brazil for its anticorruption work should have been allocated to the national treasury.

TI immediately issued a statement denying all wrongdoing. In the statement it pointed not only to the close connection between release of the 2023 CPI and Justice Toffoli’s decision to open an investigation, but to the criticisms the international organization and its Brazilian chapter have levelled against Justice Toffoli’s continuing efforts to gut Lava Jato, the case where a cartel led by the Brazilian engineering and construction firm Odebrecht bribed some 415 politicians and 26 political parties in Brazil as well as dozens officials in ten Latin American and two African countries (here).

Last September the justice tore up 2017 cooperation agreement between prosecutors and Odebrecht, making it difficult if not impossible for prosecutors in other nations to pursue charges against the company and those it bribed in their countries (here). Last week, as the Financial Times reported in breaking the investigation story, Toffoli issued another ruling letting Odebrecht off the hook; this one suspends a multimillion-dollar fine the company had been ordered to pay.

Brazilian citizens, opposition parties, and Brazil’s friends in the international community have all begun to speak against this effort to undo one the largest — and for its faults (as rehearsed on this blog (latest post here)) — one of the most important steps forward in recent years in the fight against corruption. In Brazil, its neighbors, and indeed globally.  

Let’s hope Brazilian authorities hear them.

Should Officials’ Asset Declarations Be Public? Why I Changed My Mind About Sierra Leone

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Many countries have some form of asset declaration requirement for public officials, but there is substantial country-by-country variance as to the actual design of the process. There is especially wide variation with respect to the public accessibility of the disclosed information. In Sierra Leone, under current law, government officers’ asset declarations are kept confidential. Before I was appointed head of Sierra Leone’s Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), I was part of a civil society consortium that called for making all of these declarations public. A few months after my appointment, I was asked if I would support changing the law to make asset declarations public, in line with what I had advocated as a member of civil society. In reflecting on this question, I found that I had changed my mind.

Part of the reason I did not advocate changing the law to make asset declarations public was simply that there was no way our Parliament would pass such an amendment in the short-to-medium term. It did not seem sensible to waste political capital on such a controversial proposal—especially since doing so might provoke a backlash and jeopardize other important reforms. But the reasons for my change of view were not merely pragmatic political calculations. I have also come to believe that, at Sierra Leone’s current stage of development, making asset declarations public could do more harm than good. Continue reading →

Does Congress Really Want to Relax Corruption Controls on U.S. Arms Sales?

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Today’s Guest Post is by Colby Goodman, a Senior Researcher with Transparency International US and Defence and Security. His research focuses on corruption risks within the international arms trade and other forms of defense sector corruption. 

That corruption permeates the international arms trade is no surprise to readers of Transparency International reports (here), business executives (here), or investigative reporters (here, here, and here). What is a surprise is that the U.S. House of Representatives is considering weakening the measures the U.S. government has put in place over the past decades to prevent U.S. companies from becoming entangled in corrupt dealings.

This Tuesday, February 6, the House Foreign Affairs Committee will discuss a bill to significantly decrease the number of proposed U.S. arms sales that would require congressional review before proceeding. The bill would increase the dollar threshold that require  the Defense and State Departments to notify Congress of a planned sale. It follows a US defense industry lobbying campaign to speed up the process in delivering U.S. weapons and so make their purchase more commercially attractive. But at the cost of weakening key U.S. government efforts to curb corruption in U.S. arms sales.

To its credit, in early 2023 the Biden Administration  updated the government’s Conventional Arms Transfer policy to “ensure that arms transfers do not fuel corruption or undermine good governance, while incentivizing effective, transparent, and accountable security sector governance.”  This policy followed its Countering Corruption Strategy, where  the U.S. government pledged to start “reviewing and re-evaluating criteria for government-to-government [security] assistance, including around transparency and accountability.”  These actions recognized the significant harm to U.S. national security that comes from pervasive corruption in partner countries and the need to mitigate corruption risks within the U.S. defense industry.  

Detailed below are four key critical corruption checks that would be undermined by the proposed bill.

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