Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Orders Investigation of Transparency International

Six days after it reported in its annual survey of corruption perceptions that the fight against corruption in Brazil was losing steam, Transparency International was placed under investigation by Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli (here). The ostensible reason is that the internationally renowned corruption fighting organization, headquartered in Berlin with a Brazilian chapter, misused public funds.  According to the justice, the group is a “foreign” organization and thus funds received in Brazil for its anticorruption work should have been allocated to the national treasury.

TI immediately issued a statement denying all wrongdoing. In the statement it pointed not only to the close connection between release of the 2023 CPI and Justice Toffoli’s decision to open an investigation, but to the criticisms the international organization and its Brazilian chapter have levelled against Justice Toffoli’s continuing efforts to gut Lava Jato, the case where a cartel led by the Brazilian engineering and construction firm Odebrecht bribed some 415 politicians and 26 political parties in Brazil as well as dozens officials in ten Latin American and two African countries (here).

Last September the justice tore up 2017 cooperation agreement between prosecutors and Odebrecht, making it difficult if not impossible for prosecutors in other nations to pursue charges against the company and those it bribed in their countries (here). Last week, as the Financial Times reported in breaking the investigation story, Toffoli issued another ruling letting Odebrecht off the hook; this one suspends a multimillion-dollar fine the company had been ordered to pay.

Brazilian citizens, opposition parties, and Brazil’s friends in the international community have all begun to speak against this effort to undo one the largest — and for its faults (as rehearsed on this blog (latest post here)) — one of the most important steps forward in recent years in the fight against corruption. In Brazil, its neighbors, and indeed globally.  

Let’s hope Brazilian authorities hear them.

Guest Post: The Brazilian Supreme Court’s Erroneous Nullification of the Car Wash Evidence

Today’s guest post is from Eduardo Carvalho, a Brazilian prosecutor from the State of Rio de Janeiro.

There has been a great deal of commentary in the Brazilian and global anticorruption community – including on this blog (see here, here, and here) – on a recent decision by Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli concerning important evidence on which Brazilian prosecutors relied in securing numerous convictions in the so-called Lava Jato (Car Wash) Operation. The evidence in question—principally files stored on computer disks—was obtained from the Odebrecht company as part of settlement agreements with Brazilian, Swiss, and US authorities. Justice Toffoli, expanding on a previous ruling by Justice Lewandowski, found that this evidence was obtained in violation of Brazilian laws on international cooperation and evidence handling, and therefore could not be used in court. As a result, an enormous number of Car Wash convictions are likely to be nullified. From an anticorruption perspective, this is a disaster, undoing years of hard work and allowing scores, perhaps hundreds, of corrupt politicians to go free.

But according to Adonis Brozoza’s post last week on this blog, the responsibility for this lies with the prosecutors, not the Justices. Mr. Brozoza argues that the prosecutors, in their zeal to secure corruption convictions, ignored relevant laws and procedures on international cooperation and evidence handling. This sloppiness, he maintains, so compromised the reliability of this crucial evidence that the Justices were obligated, under the relevant Brazilian laws, to rule this evidence inadmissible.

Respectfully, this assertion is both legally questionable and factually incorrect. While I do not impugn the good faith of either the Justices or Mr.Brozoza, careful attention to the relevant laws, and to what the relevant authorities actually did, demonstrates that Justice Toffoli’s ruling ought to be overturned by the full Court. Continue reading

The Perils of Taking Shortcuts: How Brazilian Prosecutors Alleged Carelessness with Evidence May Undo Years of Hard Work 

Brazil’s so-called Lava Jato (Car Wash) Operation, launched in 2014, exposed one of the largest corruption schemes ever. The investigation resulted in over 361 convictions (for corruption, money-laundering, procurement fraud, and other crimes); among those convicted were numerous prominent members of the Brazilian business and political elite, including the current President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (known as Lula). In building its cases against these defendants, Brazilian federal prosecutors made extensive use of “leniency agreements,” offering some companies lighter penalties in exchange for evidence against other parties. One of the most important of these leniency agreements was the one Brazilian prosecutors, working in conjunction with U.S. and Swiss prosecutors, reached with the Odebrecht company, a major Brazilian infrastructure conglomerate at the center of the corruption scheme.

But over the last few years, the Car Wash operation has started to unravel, with several of its most important achievements reversed. In 2019 a Brazilian hacker publicized text messages allegedly exchanged between Sergio Moro, the presiding judge in many of the Car Wash cases (including Lula’s), and the Car Wash prosecutors, prompting allegations of bias. The specialized Car Wash prosecutorial task force was disbanded in February 2021, and the Brazilian Supreme Court annulled Lula’s conviction on procedural grounds in April 2021, paving the way for his re-election to a third presidential term in October 2022. The most recent setback to the Car Wash Operation, already discussed and debated on this blog (see herehere, and here), is a decision by the Supreme Court Justice Dias Toffoli this past September. In that decision, Justice Toffoli declared that, due to procedural errors, none of the evidence acquired in the leniency agreement with Odebrecht could be used in any judicial proceeding. This ruling puts numerous Car Wash convictions at risk: Defense attorneys may now seek to annul convictions in cases in which their clients were convicted primarily on the Odebrecht evidence.

Many in the anticorruption community, in Brazil and abroad, have denounced Justice Toffoli’s ruling, and have suggested that it may have been improperly influenced by political or personal considerations. But as a technical legal matter, Justice Toffoli’s decision was probably correct. While it is understandably frustrating to see so much hard work wiped away and the prospect of convicted corrupt actors going free, the responsibility here appears to lie more with the Car Wash prosecutors than with the Supreme Court. Indeed, the recent developments in the Car Wash saga should serve as a cautionary tale for investigators and prosecutors. In their understandable zeal to catch and convict bad actors, law enforcement authorities must be careful to scrupulously and rigorously observe all legal requirements. Continue reading

Guest Post: The Odebrecht Ruling and Prosecutorial Transparency in Brazil–A Rejoinder

Two weeks ago, we published a guest post is from Professor Gregory Michener and Breno Cerqueira, based on an op-ed they had originally published (in Portuguese) in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper, concerning an important decision last by Justice Toffoli of the Brazilian Supreme Court. That decision nullified the evidence that Brazilian prosecutors had acquired from the Odebrecht firm as part of the agreement to settle the corruption charges against that firm; Justice Toffoli’s decision thus called into question ever subsequent corruption conviction that had relied on this evidence. That guest post prompted a response, which we published last week, from a Brazilian lawyer who took issue with many of the assertions that Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira had made in their piece. (The author of that post asked to remain anonymous. While GAB does not usually publish anonymous pieces, after considering the reasons for the anonymity request, I decided to grant it in that case.) Today’s guest post is from Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira, who offer a rebuttal to last week’s criticisms of their piece.

I realize that some readers may find this a bit excessive, especially since the issues here involve some fine technical points of Brazilian law. But in my view the issues are so important—going to the heart of one of the largest and most important anticorruption investigations in the world over the last decade (the “Car Wash” Operation)—and the legal issues are sufficiently difficult even for attentive outsiders to understand, that a thorough debate about what the most recent decision does and does not mean, that this exchange serves a useful purpose. I am grateful to all the parties involved for being willing to engage in this important conversation..

Without further adieu, here is Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira’s rebuttal to the criticism of their post on Justice Toffoli’s ruling:

The Odebrecht case spanned twelve countries and involved nearly a billion dollars of elaborate payments made from Odebrecht’s in-house bribery department to corrupt governments on three continents. (Perhaps the best way to understand the case is through the documents posted with the US Department of Justice press release about the settlement of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act charges in the case.)

The primary objective of our editorial was to discuss the deficient transparency of corruption cases in Brazil, an understudied aspect of corruption that should be of concern to citizens everywhere. Transparency of corruption cases can assign responsibility and promote accountability, deter graft among businesses and public officials, identify institutional weaknesses that need to be fixed and, perhaps most importantly, provide an important historical archive to keep the record straight – not only of crimes committed but of retributive government efforts in favor of the public interest. In the case of Brazil, we argued, a lack of transparency worked in favor of corruption and impunity, which is currently on the upswing.

We find it ironic that the critic of our article, a Brazilian lawyer (“Anonymous”), would ask for anonymity if his or her critiques were squarely fair handed and factual. (As an aside, anonymity is illegal as per the Brazilian Constitution (Article 5 IV – “the expression of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden”). As a leading anticorruption specialist and friend commented on the Anonymous post a day after it appeared, it attempts to “muddy the waters.” Rather than “setting the record straight” it simply creates doubt where little should exist. The following explains why: Continue reading

Guest Post: The Recent Brazilian Ruling on Use of Evidence from the Odebrecht Case—Setting the Record Straight

Last week, this blog featured a guest post from Gregory Michener and Breno Cerqueira on the recent decision by Justsice Toffoli of the Brazilian Supreme Court, which concerned the settlement that Brazilian prosecutors had previously reached with the Odebrecht company—and the evidence against other defendants that Odebrecht had provided prosecutors as part of that settlement. A Brazilian lawyer with first-hand knowledge of the case submitted the following guest post, which takes issue with a number of the claims made in the previous post. Although it is not GAB’s usual practice to publish anonymous posts, in this case the sensitivity of the matter and the importance of raising these issues led me to exercise my editorial judgment to publish the post below without the author’s name.

The recent guest post on this blog regarding the recent judicial ruling on the settlement in the Odebrecht case is inaccurate in certain respects.

  • The first and most important inaccuracy is that, in contrast to what the post indicates, Justice Toffoli’s ruling did not annul the settlement in the Odebrecht case. Rather, the ruling held that the evidence included in certain important Odebrecht databases contained in hard drives, obtained by the Brazilian prosecutors from Swiss authorities, may not be lawfully used in criminal or civil investigations. The guest post properly states this aspect of the ruling—that it prohibited the use of this evidence —but the suggestion that the ruling annulled the settlement itself is not accurate.(A potentially important issue is whether the ruling would apply with the same force to the evidence turned over directly to the Brazilian prosecutors by Odebrecht, rather than obtained by the Brazilian prosecutors from the Swiss authorities. But the guest post fails to make that distinction.)
  • Second, the guest post seems to treat Justice Toffoli’s decision as a surprise, or at least unanticipated. But in fact, several prior decisions by other Brazilian Supreme Court Justices (particularly Justice Lewandowsky) had reached essentially the same conclusion, though with regard only to particular defendants. Justice Toffoli’s ruling extends and generalizes those prior decisions, ruling that the evidence in question cannot be used at all, thus obviating the need for individual defendants to obtain a similar ruling by the court in their individual cases.
  • Third, the post seems to imply that Justice Toffoli decided this case because he was appointed by President Lula, and previously served in senior positions in Lula’s first administration. But this is a gross simplification, especially when one remembers that Justice Toffoli handed down several decisions that went against against Lula’s interests (including rulings against prominent members of Lula’s party in the Mensalao case, and during Lula’s time in jail). Notably, Justice Toffoli apologized for some of those earlier decisions in the more recent decision currently being discussed. Therefore, rather than favoring Lula and his party consistently, a more plausible hypothesis, based on Justice Toffoli’s record, is that he seems inclined to decide cases in favor of the interests he sees as commanding the current political agenda. This may be at least as objectionable as guest post’s suggestion that he is decides cases systematically out of loyalty to Lula, but as a matter of empirical analysis of judicial trends, it is importantly different. (And Lula himself is, or should be, attentive to that.)
  • Fourth, another inaccuracy in the post, though admittedly a less important one, is the claim that prosecutors had not made public the Odebrecht agreement’s legal framework until last week. This is not true. The agreement has been publicly available for more than five years on the Ministry of Federal Prosecution’s website, which provides easy access to several of the resolutions that the federal prosecutors have concluded.
  • Finally, it is worth addressing the suggestion at the end of the post that transparency regarding the facts reported by Odebrecht under the settlement agreement might have reduced the chance of a decision such as Justice Toffoli’s. This cannot be characterized as a factual inaccuracy, as it is inherently a speculation about what might have happened under different conditions. Nevertheless, that assertion seems too rudimentary. There may be good reasons why prosecutors (and other control agencies, such as, in the case of Brazil, the Comptroller General and the Attorney General’s office) elect not to disclose all of the facts contained in the evidence turned over by the company right away. The most obvious reason for not publicly disclosing this evidence right away is that the evidence may be relevant to ongoing investigations. And it is not true that the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) would make public comparable factual material, if doing so would jeopardize ongoing investigations. (Some also claim that the DOJ decides on the degree of disclosure of facts in statements of facts attached to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act negotiated resolutions based more on, or at least with an eye to, strategic or geopolitical considerations than transparency concerns.) Again, though, the claim that more transparency about the settlement and the associated evidence would have helped seems reasonable, and is not strictly speaking inaccurate. There is certainly room for reasonable disagreement about the prosecutors’ approach to disclosure. But the issue is far more nuanced than the post suggests.

I want to emphasize that these comments are not meant to contradict the importance of making pointed critical assessments of judicial decisions in general and Justice Toffoli’s ruling in particular. Nor do I wish to offer any further opinion on these fraught, highly controversial legal and political issues. But given the intensity of the discussion in Brazil, and the unfortunate tendency for all sides in these debates to hurry over or oversimplify key facts, I thought it was important to advocate for subtlety and raise these problems about the recent guest post on this blog.

Guest Post: The Judicial Annulment of the Odebrecht Settlement Evidence in Brazil, and Its Implications

Today’s guest post is from Professor Gregory Michener, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV-EBAPE) and Breno Cerqueira, a Brazilian public official. The post is based on an op-ed originally published (in Portuguese) in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper.

Earlier this month, a single Justice on Brazil’s Supreme Court invalidated, on dubious procedural grounds, the plea bargain that prosecutors had reached seven years ago with the Odebrecht firm, which resolved serious corruption charges that the prosecutors had brought against the firm. The alleged impropriety concerned how the Brazilian prosecutors had interacted with their counterparts in the United States and Switzerland, which had also brought cases against Odebrecht, which ultimately pled guilty and paid penalties in all three jurisdictions. According to Justice Toffoli (who, incidentally, had been implicated in Odebrecht’s wrongdoing when he was Solicitor General, though he succeeded in suppressing reports about his alleged wrongdoing), the Brazilian prosecutors from the Lava Jato (“Car Wash”) Task Force had engaged in discussions of the case with their U.S. and Swiss counterparts without those foreign prosecutors having first filed a formal official request for international legal cooperation, and without including representatives from the Brazilian Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs in the discussions. Strikingly, Justice Toffoli ruled that none of the evidence obtained from Odebrecht in the plea deal—and which was used in hundreds of other cases—could lawfully be used. Tofolli’s decision thereby threatens to undo the vast majority of the convictions that the Car Wash prosecutors had secured before the task force was disbanded.

This decision is troubling for a number of reasons. For one thing, the decision put the private interests of defendants ahead of the public interest of deterring and prosecuting corruption. No one denies that due process is important. However, preserving indisputable evidence of corruption can be achieved without a wholesale dismissal of charges. The nullification of the Odebrecht case is a nullification of justice and of the public interest.

Perhaps even more troubling, the decision is unsettlingly aligned with President Lula’s promise of revenge against the Car Wash Operation—and the individual judges, prosecutors, and others involved in that operation. Lula himself was jailed for 18 months after he was convicted for taking a bribe (in the form of a luxury apartment)— a conviction that was ultimately overturned on technical grounds (principally that the case was brought in the wrong venue). Lula, his supporters, and many mainstream media outlets have characterized the conviction as a baseless and politically motivated prosecution. That Justice Toffoli, a Lula appointee, issued this sweeping ruling—and also issued a broad and highly political statement condemning the entire Car Wash operation—would certainly seem consistent with the notion that the ruling had more to do with political and personal motivations than the law. Worse still, the ruling not only invalidates the Odebrecht plea deal and all other convictions that relied on the evidence it produced, but the ruling also calls for the investigation of the Car Wash prosecutors and judges for (alleged) misconduct.

Now, it is worth noting that Justice Toffoli’s ruling is unlikely to have any effect on Odebrecht’s plea agreement with the U.S. authorities. U.S. evidentiary standards tend to be more permissive, at least in this context, about barring the use of illegally sourced evidence – especially in cases where the public interest has clearly been aggrieved. And Odebrecht is unlikely to try to use the Brazilian ruling to wriggle out of is plea deal with the U.S., especially since that deal provides that non-compliance can result in further prosecution.

One more observation may be pertinent here: The Brazilian prosecutors may have hurt their cause by not providing sufficient transparency in an official register of the crimes, including their investigation, prosecution, and ultimate plea bargain. In the U.S., the Department of Justice website provides open and transparent information about all Foreign Corrupt Practices Act plea agreements. In the case of Odebrecht, company representatives signed affidavits testifying to US$788 million in bribes to government officials in 12 countries, including US$349 million in Brazil. In all, ill-gotten gains netted Odebrecht US$3.336 billion of construction contracts, including US$1.9 billion in Brazil. By contrast, Brazilian authorities failed to provide the transparency required under Brazilian law. The Federal Public Prosecutor, which handles civil and criminal cases, disclosed nothing until, following last week’s decision, it posted the agreement’s legal framework. The Office of the Comptroller General, which handles administrative crimes, posts all plea bargains on its website but includes few to no specific details about crimes.

The issue of transparency raises a counterfactual question: to what extent would things have been different if the facts of the Odebrecht case had been made transparent, engraving outrageous corruption permanently on the public record from the very beginning? Just maybe Justice Toffoli’s decision might have been different. Transparency affects the legal and political environment in unmeasurable ways, and may have impacted subsequent judicial rulings.

The Brazilian Supreme Court’s Most Recent Ruling in the Lula Case Reveals the Court’s Own Bias

Back in 2017, a Brazilian court convicted former President Lula for corruption offenses in connection with a seaside apartment that Lula allegedly received as a bribe from a construction firm. In 2019, he was again found guilty of a corruption offense in a separate trial, this time for receiving bribes in the form of improvements to his country house. And he faced other corruption charges as well, including an indictment in which Odebrecht—a major construction firm and one of the most significant players in the Car Wash scandal— allegedly bribed Lula by agreeing to construct a headquarters for his foundation, the Lula Institute. The principal evidence for this latter accusation was acquired by prosecutors as part of a so-called “leniency agreement” with Odebrecht. In Brazil, leniency agreements are negotiated settlements, regulated by the Clean Company Act (CCA), in which companies voluntarily agree to confess unlawful conduct, pay penalties, and take other remedial action—including cooperating with prosecutors by providing evidence against other wrongdoers—and, in return, the companies have their sanctions and fines reduced (see, for example, here, here, and here). Such agreements have been critical to the success of the Car Wash Operation, and more generally to the effectiveness of Brazil’s fight against corruption.

But this past June, the Brazilian Supreme Court decided to nullify the evidence against Lula that had been collected under the Odebrecht leniency agreement (here). The Court’s ruling was not only legally flawed, but its reasoning, if accepted, threatens to undo dozens of prior corruption convictions and to create a cloud of uncertainty surrounding the validity of evidence obtained in leniency agreements. Such a ruling would needlessly undermine the ability of Brazilian prosecutors and courts to fight corruption in the future. Of course, the Court may not actually adhere to its legal reasoning in future cases—but that only underscores another problem: though the Brazilian Supreme Court has criticized lower court proceedings as biased against Lula, the Court’s own conduct, particularly in the most recent case, suggests an unacceptable bias in Lula’s favor.

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What the Odebrecht Case Teaches

The anticorruption community owes the American Economic Association and Nicolás Campos, Eduardo Engel, Ronald D. Fischer, and Alexander Galetovic a debt of gratitude. The AEA for publishing their article “The Ways of Corruption in Infrastructure: Lessons from the Odebrecht Case” and making it available free to non-members (here). The four Chilean scholars for showing how much can be learned when a command of the literature on corruption is coupled with a careful, painstaking study of a single case.

In 2016, the Brazilian engineering and construction company Odebrecht admitted in a settlement with American, Brazilian, and Swiss authorities (here) to bribing 600 officials in 12 states either to secure contracts to build roads, powerplants, and other large infrastructure projects or to agree to raise the contract price during construction of the project. Information the authors pieced together from the settlement documents show the company grossed $3.3 billion in profits from paying $788 million in bribes.  These numbers confirm the obvious: the returns from infrastructure corruption are enormous, and significant resources should be devoted to preventing it.

Digging deeper into the massive amount of paper the several prosecutions of Odebrecht and its executives have generated, the authors report other findings that are not so obvious.

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Peru’s Misguided Proposal for Countering Corruption in Arbitrarion

In Peru, as in far too many countries, the judicial system is corrupt and unreliable. For this reason, companies often find arbitration is an attractive alternative for resolving commercial disputes—not just because arbitration can be cheaper and faster than judicial dispute resolution in these cases, but because the arbitrators are (supposedly) less likely to be corrupt than judges. Alas, corruption has found its way into commercial arbitration in Peru as well, as illustrated most prominently by a recent case in which agents of the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht allegedly paid bribes to arbitrators to secure favorable decisions in pending cases between Odebrecht and the Peruvian government (see hereherehere and here). 

bill was introduced into the Peruvian Congress this past February that, according to its proponents, would address this problem. This bill would amend Peruvian arbitration law to add a requirement that all international arbitrators hearing domestic cases have their qualifications certified by the state education regulator (known by its Spanish acronym SUNEDU) within 30 days. On its face, this requirement doesn’t seem to have much to do with corruption. But the bill’s advocates have been quite explicit that this new rule should be understood as a way to prevent future corruption of arbitration proceedings in Peru. According to the bill’s supporters, corruption in arbitration arises because foreign arbitrators do not understand Peruvian anticorruption laws; therefore, the argument continues, requiring a state agency to validate the credentials of these foreign arbitrators would ensure that they understand the Peruvian system, including the prohibitions on corruption in the arbitral system and the regulation on corruption more generally (see here and here).

If that sounds silly, it’s because it is. This bill not only fails to address the actual sources of corruption in Peruvian arbitration, but might actually make things worse. Arbitral corruption is a genuine problem in Peru, but this is not the right way to address it.

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The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Should Ensure a Fair Distribution of Settlement Recoveries

In December 2016, the United States, Brazil, and Switzerland announced that they had concluded plea agreements with the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht and its affiliate Braskem, in which the companies admitted their culpability in extensive bribery schemes involving upwards of US$800 million in bribes paid in a dozen countries—mainly though not exclusively in Latin America—and agreed to pay approximately US$3.5 billion in penalties to the US, Brazilian, and Swiss authorities. But with the exception of Brazil, none of the countries where the bribes were actually paid were entitled to receive any compensation under these plea agreements.

In fairness, the plea agreement with Odebrecht did require the company to cooperate with foreign law enforcement and regulatory agencies in any future investigation into related misconduct by Odebrecht or any of its current or former officers, directors, employers, or affiliates. The plea agreement further required Odebrecht to truthfully disclose all non-privileged factual information, and to make available its officers, employees, and affiliates, to foreign law enforcement authorities. Additionally, under the terms of the plea deal Odebrecht consented to US federal authorities sharing with foreign governments all documents and records that the company had provided to the US authorities in the course of the investigation into Odebrecht’s violation of US law. 

These well-intentioned provisions seem to have been included specifically to ensure that enforcement agencies of other countries could pursue their own actions against Odebrecht and its officers. But the plea agreements did not create a formal mechanism that enables foreign enforcement agencies to ask the DOJ, Swiss authorities, or Brazil to impose sanctions for breach of these conditions. If Odebrecht fails to fully cooperate with foreign enforcement agencies, that foreign government’s only recourse would be to try to convince (presumably through informal channels) the US, Brazilian, or Swiss authorities to sanction Odebrecht for breaching the plea agreement. But it’s unlikely that those governments will have much appetite for assessing these claims of non-cooperation. Furthermore, even if other countries do bring their own cases, the penalties imposed by the US, Switzerland, and Brazil were so high that Odebrecht simply doesn’t have the money to pay sufficient fines to other countries, at least in the short run.

The Odebrecht case may be unusual in its size, but it is not unique. It is therefore useful to reflect on whether the international community should adopt new mechanisms governing how the fines or reparations recovered in settlements of cross-border bribery cases are distributed, in order to ensure proportionality and fairness, particularly to victim nations. The most promising way forward would be to amend the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.The Convention already requires (in Article 4) that Convention parties shall consult with each other to determine which is the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution, and also requires (in Article 9) that Convention parties provide, to the fullest extent possible, “prompt and effective legal assistance” to any other Convention party concerning investigations and proceedings within the scope of the Convention. But the Convention does not explicitly address other forms of cooperation, such as ensuring fairness in the distribution of monetary recoveries. The Convention should be amended to include additional language that covers this topic, as follows: Continue reading