Whistle While You Work: Protections for Internal Whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank

One of the many objectives of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was to encourage whistleblowers to report securities violations—including violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)—to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among other things, Dodd-Frank created new remedies for whistleblowers who suffer retaliation by their employers, including allowing whistleblowers to sue their (former) employers on more favorable terms than existing anti-retaliation laws. But what if an employee doesn’t report a possible violation to the SEC, but only told her boss? If that “internal whistleblower” is subsequently terminated, can she avail herself of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions?  Because of the way the law was drafted, this turns out to be a difficult legal question, one on which courts across the U.S. have divided.

Nevertheless, there are strong practical reasons—above and beyond the basic reasons that could be advanced in any context—why Dodd-Frank should cover internal whistleblowers. Unless the courts resolve their division in favor of internal whistleblowers soon (most likely through a Supreme Court decision), Congress should step in and rewrite the law to remove any doubt that internal whistleblowers are protected.

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To Catch Big Fish, the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency Should Pay for Tips

The World Bank’s Integrity Vice President (“INT”), responsible for investigating corruption and fraud in World Bank projects, recently released its Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Update. INT had a busy year, opening 323 preliminary investigations, of which 99 were selected for full investigation, and closing 81 investigations, with three-quarters finding evidence of sanctionable conduct. (A primer on how INT conducts external investigations is here.) Some of INT’s recent cases, such as those brought against Alstom SA and SNC-Lavalin, involve large companies. Yet despite these examples, the data in the Annual Report raises questions about whether INT is sufficiently effective in uncovering corruption and fraud by large companies. The evidence suggests not: The firms debarred in FY 2015 are mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises—minnows, not sharks. The longest debarment leveled was for thirteen years on N.C. Sanitors and Service Corporation, essentially for paying public officials in Liberia and falsely claiming it collected trash that it never picked up. The challenged contract was worth about $350,000—not exactly a break-the-bank amount, especially considering the largest contracts the World Bank awarded last year were worth $438 million, $98 million, and $53 million (excluding government-awarded contracts funded by World Bank loans).

Perhaps large corporations with World Bank contracts and governments officials administering large World Bank loans are not engaging in corruption—but I doubt it. It’s much more likely that INT does not have the information that it would need to investigate and seek to sanction large companies. According to people familiar with INT’s intake system, while INT gets thousands of tips a year through its phone and online tip lines, many of which prove valuable (either individually or when aggregated), relatively few tips relate to large contracts where the amount of money at stake enhances the harm from corruption and bribery. INT should therefore develop methods to get actionable information on fraud and corruption related to large projects. My suggestion: pay for information.

One reason why INT may receive few tips about large contracts is that INT currently only offers confidentiality to protect whistleblowers. When it comes to large contracts, the likelihood that a whistleblower will face repercussions if her tip is revealed increases, changing the cost-benefit analysis of reporting. Some potential whistleblowers with actionable information might need some sort of additional material incentive to offset the potential risks. A well-structured system using payments to induce reporting might therefore increase the amount of actionable information INT receives about large-contract corruption.

What would such a system look like? How should it be designed? While this is not the place to lay out the proposal in all its details, the essential elements might work as follows: Continue reading

Is Dodd-Frank Coming to Kenya?

Being a whistleblower in Kenya is a risky business. John Githongo and David Munyakei might be exhibits 1 and 1a in supporting that assertion. More recently, blogger David Mutai was arrested and had his blogs and Twitter account shutdown after exposing corruption at a public agency and in some county governments. More generally, according to Transparency International’s 2014 East Africa Bribery Index, Kenyans reported just 6% of the bribes they were aware of, and a common reason (noted by 10% of respondents) was fear of adverse consequences.

Against this backdrop, earlier this year Kenyan Attorney General Githu Muigai formed the Task Force on Review of Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for Fighting Corruption. It is not clear how much work the Task Force has done or is doing (you can read the opening address from the June 2015 “Technical Retreat for Development of a Draft Report” here), but it was reported over the summer that the Task Force plans to propose a whistleblower reward system similar to Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower incentive provisions (which have been discussed previously on this blog herehere, and here). Specifically, the reported Kenyan proposal would reward “a person who reports corruption [with] at least 10 per cent of the value of any property recovered after investigations and conclusion of the matter through judicial or other dispute-resolution mechanisms.”

If the Task Force is still looking for ideas (as far as I can tell it has not released any draft legislation or white papers, and the latest news story I could find that mentioned the Task Force is this one from August), I have a few for how to make sure its whistleblower reward program is effective. Continue reading

A U.S. Court Jeopardizes Corporate Transparency Rules, in the Name of Free Speech

Transparency is often seen as an important anticorruption tool, perhaps nowhere more than in extractive industries. Notably, an international movement has called on extractive industry firms to “Publish What You Pay” (PWYP). The idea is that if it were public knowledge what these firms had paid for the concessions they receive from governments, the citizens in those countries (as well as journalists, NGOs, and others) would be better able to hold governments accountable for what they did with the money (and would make it harder for governments, or individual government officials, to lie about how much money they received). Many advocates therefore believe that it would be good public policy to enact PWYP rules that would compel these sorts of disclosures. But would such disclosure requirements violate the constitutional principle of freedom of speech? Alas, some U.S. judges seem to think so.

If the whole idea that disclosure requirements of this sort might infringe free speech rights seems bizarre, I’m with you—in my earlier post on this topic, discussing an earlier case that seemed to take this position, I used words like “absurd” and “inane.” Yet last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a new ruling (a follow-up to the earlier decision I ranted about last year) that seemed to strongly endorse a very broad constitutional protection for corporations against “compelled commercial speech,” which bodes ill. Although the most recent opinion, like the one I posted about last year, does not directly address PWYP mandates, the larger themes of the D.C. Circuit opinion are troubling, and suggest that this court (or at least some judges) may be hostile to the whole idea of using mandatory disclosures as a way to advance important public policy goals, including the fight against corruption. Continue reading

Whistling in Chorus: The Potential Impact of the Rise of Parallel Prosecutions on Whistleblower Regimes

A few months ago, Chinese officials announced a number of new incentives for whistleblowers to come forward to disclose corporate wrongdoing: pledging to develop protection plans for whistleblowers when necessary to “prevent and end acts of retaliation” and increasing the rewards whistleblowers could potentially receive to approximately $33,000 for “actionable information” (with even greater sums available for “significant contributions of information”).  While these policies are fascinating in their own right, they also feed into a larger discussion that has been taking place both on this blog and in other forums, regarding what impact, if any, an increased commitment to anticorruption norms by demand-side countries may have upon the current anticorruption regime. A number of authors have already discussed this phenomenon both in broad strokes and specifically within the context of China’s increased enforcement of anticorruption laws (though some have suggested China’s recent, high-profile corruption prosecutions, including a $490 million fine of GlaxoSmithKline, may serve as a cover for protectionist policies).  One area that may warrant further consideration, however, is the likely impact that the rise of demand-side prosecutions and the resulting potential for parallel enforcement by demand-side and supply-side countries may have upon these states’ whistleblowing regimes.

While the ways in which the increased prevalence of demand-side corruption prosecutions will impact the interactions between supply- and demand-side countries’ anticorruption regimes remains unclear, this phenomenon seems likely to result in one of two possible outcomes with respect to states’ attitudes towards whistleblowers. First, countries may perceive some benefit to ensuring that they are the only–or, at the very least, the first–government to receive a whistleblower’s report.  Second, states may alter their whistleblowing policies to reflect the fact that whistleblowers can potentially report to, and be rewarded by, both demand- and supply-side countries.  While the impact of these different scenarios on the ways in which whistleblowing protections and incentives will develop over time may be quite different, both appear disadvantageous to states’ anticorruption efforts, to the whistleblowers themselves, or both.

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Bribery in the Boardroom: Implications for Internal Reporting Programs

Early last month, the OECD released its first Foreign Bribery Report. According to Angel Gurria, the organization’s Secretary-General, the report “endeavors to measure, and to describe, transnational corruption based on data from the 427 foreign bribery cases that have been concluded since the entry into force of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1999.” The report as a whole is quite interesting, but I would like to hone in on the OECD’s findings regarding who engages in bribery, and how this should change how we approach arguments on whistleblower internal reporting requirements.

The report found that, contrary to popular belief, in the majority of cases senior management were aware of or endorsed the payment of whatever bribe occurred (in 41% of the cases senior management was implicated, in 12% even the highest level executives were aware of the bribe being paid). As the report notes, this “debunk[s] the “rogue employee” myth,” and this, I would argue, calls into question internal reporting requirements as a means of combating foreign bribery. Continue reading

Whistling in the Dark: The Potential Benefits of Withdrawing Anti-Retaliation Protection from Foreign Whistleblowers

When the US Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, it provided the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with two powerful tools to encourage whistleblowers to report violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other federal securities laws. First, whistleblowers can potentially receive a “bounty” of 10-30% of the monetary damages assessed against a company. Second, whistleblowers are shielded from their employers’ ire via an “anti-retaliation” provision, which affords whistleblowers a private cause of action for wrongful termination, harassment, or other discrimination associated with their report.

While many observers initially believed that these measures applied equally to all whistleblowers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in Liu v. Siemens AG that the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti-retaliation provision does not have extraterritorial effect–it cannot be invoked by a foreign whistleblower against a foreign corporation (even though the corporation is listed on a US exchange), if none of the relevant conduct took place in the United States. The Second Circuit is the first Court of Appeals to adopt this position and, as some commentators have noted, this ruling creates an odd imbalance in the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions: in certain cases involving foreign whistleblowers and foreign companies, although whistleblowers might be eligible to receive significant monetary rewards under the Dodd-Frank Act’s bounty provision, they will nonetheless not be able to invoke the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions if their employer takes action against them.

Putting aside the question of whether the Second Circuit’s legal analysis was sound, as a matter of policy this may, at first glance, seem like a perverse result. Yet this seeming disconnect between the reach and scope of the Dodd-Frank Act’s bounty and anti-retaliation provisions may result, paradoxically, in an improvement in both the volume and content of whistleblower reports.  Continue reading

Rethinking Kiobel: Is there Room for Human Rights in FCPA Enforcement?

Today is the one-year anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In its decision, the Court narrowed the admissibility of Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims related to extraterritorial human rights abuses, ruling that such claims are not actionable unless the claim has a sufficient nexus to U.S. territory. What kind of nexus is enough for an ATS case arising from exterritorial conduct? For cases involving foreign multinational companies, such as the defendant Royal Dutch Petroleum in Kiobel, a “mere corporate presence” in the U.S. is not enough.

A striking feature of this holding is the clear contrast between how a “mere corporate presence” in the U.S. is not enough for an ATS claim based on extraterritorial conduct, but is sufficient for a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prosecution. Although Royal Dutch Petroleum’s “mere corporate presence” in the U.S. was not a sufficient basis for an ATS claim, if these human rights abuses were tied to corruption for the retention or solicitation of business in Nigeria (and involved U.S. interstate commerce — a requirement not difficult for the DOJ and SEC to overcome), Royal Dutch Petroleum could be liable for FCPA violations. As a foreign multinational company, Royal Dutch Shell Company lists its shares on the New York Stock Exchange and prepares filings for the SEC. Such activity is sufficient for establishing FCPA jurisdiction.

This suggests a possible strategy for human rights advocates dismayed by the Kiobel decision: Perhaps it might be possible to more aggressively utilize FCPA enforcement for circumstances in which corporate accountability for human rights abuses is tied to bribery. Continue reading