Tag Archives: Charles Duross

“Combating Grand Corruption: Is International Law the Answer”: The Debate Continues at Harvard Law School

Posted on by
10

As readers of this blog know, U.S. Federal District Judge Mark Wolf has been vigorously advocating for the creation of a new International Anticorruption Court (IACC), modeled on the International Criminal Court (ICC), that would have jurisdiction over grand corruption committed by senior national leaders and their associates. His proposal has attracted a great deal of attention, including a critique that I posted a little while back. The proposal also relates to more general questions about the appropriate role for international law and institutions in fighting grand corruption.

Last week, the Harvard Law and International Development Society (LIDS) organized a fantastic symposium on “Combating Grand Corruption: Is International Law the Answer” to tackle some of these issues. Judge Wolf and Luis Moreno Ocampo, who served as the first prosecutor at the ICC, gave opening and closing remarks.

Fortunately the conference was recorded; here are the links to Part One and Part Two. The whole thing is worth watching, but for those of you who are particularly interested in seeing Judge Wolf and I square off in person, his opening remarks in support of the IACC proposal can be found from 4:26-24:43 of Part One, my critique is at Part One, 1:32:20-1:45:52, and his closing remarks (which include but are not limited to a rebuttal of my critique) are at Part Two, 1:11:14-1:30:12.

Other highlights include:

  • Mr. Moreno Ocampo’s opening and closing remarks (Part One, 25:03-42:37 and Part Two, 1:06:18-1:11:06)
  • Akaash Maharaj, Executive Director of the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption, on the range of possible international legal responses to grand corruption (Part One, 1:17:00-1:32:07)
  • My Harvard Law School colleague Alex Whiting, former Prosecutions Coordinator at the ICC, on what we can learn from the ICC experience for the proposed IACC (Part One, 1:46:00-1:58-40)
  • Charles Duross, former head of the FCPA Unit at the U.S. Department of Justice, on how the FCPA helps combat grand corruption and what we could do to make it more effective in doing so (Part Two, 3:33-18:17)
  • GAB’s very own Rick Messick on more practical, achievable measures that could make a difference in reducing grand corruption (Part Two, 18:35-29:39)
  • Robert Leventhal, Director of Anticorruption Programs and Governance Initiatives at the U.S. State Department, on measures that the U.S. government is undertaking that make it harder than ever to be a kleptocrat (Part Two, 29:47-42:40)

Should FCPA Enforcers Focus on Corruption in the Poorest Countries?

Posted on by
Reply

A few months ago, the Wall Street Journal published an interview with Charles Duross, the current Morrison & Foerster partner who up until last February led the U.S. Justice Department’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit. Among the interview’s most interesting revelations was Duross’s description of how he set enforcement priorities. When asked about likely future priorities Duross provided this response:

To be clear we do prioritize cases, based on the significance of the case. For example how big are the bribes? Are we talking about $100 million or $100? But in terms of saying “I have decided what we’re going to do is look at X industry or everybody that’s going to be dealing with this country or this region, and we’re going to scrub those folks in particular,” I don’t think we do that.

Although Duross may well be correct that DOJ doesn’t target particular countries or regions, there is some evidence that FCPA enforcement does disproportionately involve particular kinds of countries–in particular, poorer countries and countries with poorer governance. A working paper by Stephen Choi and Kevin Davis (which Matthew also discussed in a recent post) found that “aggregate total monetary sanctions related to a particular violation country, controlling for the overall bribe level in that country, is greater for countries with a lower GNI [gross national income] per capita, as well as weaker government effectiveness and rule of law scores.” What to make of this? Is it true that companies are penalized more heavily (controlling for the size of the bribe) when they pay bribes in poorer countries with less effective legal systems? If so, is this desirable?

Continue reading →