Special 100th Episode of the KickBack Podcast

After a bit of a hiatus, a new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. This is the 100th episode of the series, and to mark that milestone, the podcast hosts asked a dozen leading anticorruption experts (and me) to address one or both of two questions (in under three minutes):
  1. What is one thing about corruption that you’ve changed your thinking on in the past 10 years?
  2. What is the most significant development — positive or negative — in relation to corruption and corruption studies over the past thirty years?’
In case you want to jump around, here is the list of people featured in the episode, and the time stamps indicating where you can hear their response to those questions, together with a direct hyperlink:
  • Michael Johnston: 2:34
  • Leena Koni Hoffmann: 7:52
  • Alina Mungiu-Pippidi: 10:24
  • Paul Heywood: 12:51
  • Florencia Guerzovich: 15:40
  • Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez: 18:16
  • Jorge Alatorre: 21:36
  • Delia Ferreira Rubio: 23:33
  • Matthew Stephenson: 26:55
  • Susan Rose-Ackerman: 29:43
  • John Githongo: 32:15
  • Jon Quah: 33:34
  • Laode Muhammad Syarif: 36:12
You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack was originally founded as a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). It is now hosted and managed by the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption. If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends!

U.S. Prosecutors Newest Addition to Their Anticorruption Toolkit

For more than three decades the U.S. Justice Department has sought ways to pressure American corporations to police their executives, employees, and consultants. To see that they take measures to see those they employ don’t pay bribes, rig prices, or commit other crimes. Shown above is pictorial representation of its latest tool.

It shows a crab gripping a stack of hundred dollar bills with its claw. That is precisely what the Justice Department expects a corporation to do if it discovers someone in its employ has paid a bribe, fixed a price, or committed another serious crime to advance the corporation’s interest. The company is to clawback monies paid the miscreant.

Continue reading

Corruption, Extremism, and the Crisis in Israel: Some Tentative Thoughts on Possible Connections

Since the terrorist organization Hamas’s mass murder and kidnapping of Israeli civilians ten days ago, I’ve been finding it difficult to think about anything other than the news from Israel/Palestine. Like many of you, I’ve been spending a lot of time (probably too much) doom-scrolling, worrying about my friends in the region, and anxious about about what will happen next. A lot of people, including university professors and those who have public platforms of some kind, have been weighing in on various aspects of this conflict. I have been hesitant to do so, because I have basically no professional expertise in the most important dimensions of the current crisis (such as the politics and history of the Middle East, military strategy, international humanitarian law and the law of war, etc.). What I write about on this platform is corruption, and the current crisis in Israel has little to do with corruption.

Little, but not nothing. At the risk of engaging in an all-too-common form of academic narcissism (“Look how this biggest important news event relates to the narrow topic I happen to study!”), I did want to offer some brief and tentative thoughts on how corruption, and the response to it, may have played a minor but notable role in precipitating the current crisis.

I’m not going to say much here about corruption on the Palestinian side. In an insightful post from back in June 2021, GAB contributor Magd Lhroob addressed aspects of this issue, noting both how Hamas’s initial electoral success back in 2006 may have had more to do with the perception that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was hopelessly corrupt, and also how the growing frustration of ordinary Gaza residents at Hamas’s corruption strengthens Hamas’s incentives to foment violence with Israel. Here I want to say a few words about corruption issues on the Israeli side, particularly the corruption charges against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Continue reading

The U.S. Approach to Corruption in Ukraine: Change or Continuity?

[A quick note: I drafted the post below last week, before the horrific events in Israel over the weekend. I have nothing useful to say about that tragedy–I have no expertise in military or security policy, Middle Eastern politics, terrorism, or anything along those lines. But I wanted to express my deepest sympathy to those who have been affected by Hamas’s horrific and inexcusable attack on innocent civilians. I will continue to write posts on assorted corruption-related issues, like the one below, because that’s what I know and that’s what I do. But this is one of those moments when other things seem so much more important. Am Yisrael Chai.]

Last week, a piece in Politico discussed the contents of a confidential (but not classified) U.S. State Department’s “integrated country strategy” for Ukraine; a shorter public version of that strategy document was released last August, but the version Politico obtained was longer and more detailed. The big headlines coming out of the Politco story (both literally and figuratively) concern corruption. The U.S. strategy document, Politico notes, “sees corruption as the real threat,” and “warns Western support may hinge on cutting corruption.” The Politco story made a bit of a splash among some of the people who follow these issues closely, but I don’t think it tells us much that we didn’t already know, and the new material from the confidential version of the report, so far as I can tell from Politico’s reporting, mainly concern political calculations that are basically common knowledge, though perhaps a bit sensitive for the U.S. government to declare formally in a public document.

Let me start out by noting one thing that I think the Politico piece gets exactly right, and that poses a general, and by now familiar, challenge to those who both support Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression and believe anticorruption reforms are vital for the country’s future success. As the Politico story puts it:

The [Biden] administration wants to press Ukraine to cut graft … [b]ut being too loud about the issue could embolden opponents of U.S. aid to Ukraine, many of them Republican lawmakers who are trying to block such assistance. Any perception of weakened American support for Kyiv also could cause more European countries to think twice about their role.

This is indeed a real issue, and a rhetorical and political challenge. Having said that, I think the Politico story, perhaps inadvertently, may simultaneously (1) understate the extent to which the U.S. government has already been willing to publicly raise the need for serious anticorruption reforms in Ukraine, and (2) overstate the extent to which the U.S. is relying on a coercive approach (mainly express or implied aid conditionality) to press for such reforms. A few thoughts on each: Continue reading

Guest Post: A Proposal for an Online Practical Politics Platform

Today’s guest post is from Peter Evans, who recently stepped down as Director of the U4 Anticorruption Resource Centre, and who previously led the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) program at the UK’s Department for International Development.

All too often, approaches to anticorruption reform—like mainstream approaches to growth, development and governance more generally—frame the issue as a technical problem. In development agencies, multilateral organizations, and civil society organizations working on corruption issues, it is not uncommon to hear people say, “We don’t do politics,” or to mention politics only in the context of blaming the failure of a project, or non-receptiveness to technically sound advice, on a “lack of political will.” But as Stefan Dercon emphasized in his influential recent book Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose, understanding and addressing development challenges requires engaging seriously with the political economy constraints and opportunities related to power and elites. While Dercon’s book is not about corruption specifically, it is chock-full of corruption examples. And, in fairness, an increasing number of anticorruption specialists have gotten the message that “technical only” approaches often fail, and that making real progress often requires us to understand, and be brave enough to talk about, politics—and in particular the way power is distributed and used in the relevant country or sector.

But while recognizing that politics matters—and that serious anticorruption work requires serious political economy analysis—is a necessary first step, actually putting this idea into practice turns out to be hard, even for people who want to do it—because political economy analysis is hard, and much of the available information is obscure, difficult to locate, or difficult for busy practitioners to digest. Some country- and sector-specific political economy research is published, though not all of it is written in an accessible way. And some research that is highly relevant to political economy analysis doesn’t include terms in the title or abstract that would make its relevance obvious to a busy professional trying to find useful information. Some agencies pay consultants to deliver bespoke political economy analysis, or build skills through training courses, but the utility of these efforts may be limited to that particular agency. SOAS ACE takes an explicit political economy framed approach to understanding and tackling corruption, and there have been a few efforts to provide more general information, such as the U4 Centre’s a workstream on the politics of anticorruption and the UK-based Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, but global coverage of relevant political economy research remains patchy.

To address this problem, I advocate the creation of a “Practical Politics Platform” where good quality, clearly explained political economy research is collected, curated, and presented in a form that is easy to search and freely available as a public good. It would be something like Our World in Data, but for practical political economy research. (To be clear, while corruption and anticorruption would be an important element of such a platform, the platform should more broadly integrate research on related issues, such as accountability, transparency, and public sector governance.) To increase user-friendliness, the platform could include clickable maps that allow users to focus on a country, and disaggregate the information, if desired, by sector and sub-unit. Continue reading

Inside the Corruption Hunters Network

Pursuing powerful officials for corruption is a lonely, often dangerous business. Presidents, ministers, and others at the apex of government don’t take nicely to being investigated, especially when they have come to believe that their office comes with a grant of impunity.  

Thanks to former French magistrate Eva Joly, whose pursuit of corruption among the French elite subjected her to ugly smear campaigns and threats to her safety, and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, a safe space has been opened for those on the trail of grand corruption. At Eva’s instance, Norad sponsors twice a year conferences where those on the hunt for high-level corruption meet to share stories, trade tips, and, most importantly, remind each other why what they are doing is worth the personal price they are paying.

Just how much the Corruption Hunters Network has contributed to the fight against corruption will never be known. But in a special edition on her podcast series, French lawyer and anticorruption activist Sophie Lemaître gives us a hint. In interviews, members explain how the Network has not only advanced work on individual cases but what being a part of a group with a common cause has meant to them both personally and professionally. (Other material on the Network here, here, and here.)

Guest Post: The Odebrecht Ruling and Prosecutorial Transparency in Brazil–A Rejoinder

Two weeks ago, we published a guest post is from Professor Gregory Michener and Breno Cerqueira, based on an op-ed they had originally published (in Portuguese) in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper, concerning an important decision last by Justice Toffoli of the Brazilian Supreme Court. That decision nullified the evidence that Brazilian prosecutors had acquired from the Odebrecht firm as part of the agreement to settle the corruption charges against that firm; Justice Toffoli’s decision thus called into question ever subsequent corruption conviction that had relied on this evidence. That guest post prompted a response, which we published last week, from a Brazilian lawyer who took issue with many of the assertions that Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira had made in their piece. (The author of that post asked to remain anonymous. While GAB does not usually publish anonymous pieces, after considering the reasons for the anonymity request, I decided to grant it in that case.) Today’s guest post is from Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira, who offer a rebuttal to last week’s criticisms of their piece.

I realize that some readers may find this a bit excessive, especially since the issues here involve some fine technical points of Brazilian law. But in my view the issues are so important—going to the heart of one of the largest and most important anticorruption investigations in the world over the last decade (the “Car Wash” Operation)—and the legal issues are sufficiently difficult even for attentive outsiders to understand, that a thorough debate about what the most recent decision does and does not mean, that this exchange serves a useful purpose. I am grateful to all the parties involved for being willing to engage in this important conversation..

Without further adieu, here is Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira’s rebuttal to the criticism of their post on Justice Toffoli’s ruling:

The Odebrecht case spanned twelve countries and involved nearly a billion dollars of elaborate payments made from Odebrecht’s in-house bribery department to corrupt governments on three continents. (Perhaps the best way to understand the case is through the documents posted with the US Department of Justice press release about the settlement of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act charges in the case.)

The primary objective of our editorial was to discuss the deficient transparency of corruption cases in Brazil, an understudied aspect of corruption that should be of concern to citizens everywhere. Transparency of corruption cases can assign responsibility and promote accountability, deter graft among businesses and public officials, identify institutional weaknesses that need to be fixed and, perhaps most importantly, provide an important historical archive to keep the record straight – not only of crimes committed but of retributive government efforts in favor of the public interest. In the case of Brazil, we argued, a lack of transparency worked in favor of corruption and impunity, which is currently on the upswing.

We find it ironic that the critic of our article, a Brazilian lawyer (“Anonymous”), would ask for anonymity if his or her critiques were squarely fair handed and factual. (As an aside, anonymity is illegal as per the Brazilian Constitution (Article 5 IV – “the expression of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden”). As a leading anticorruption specialist and friend commented on the Anonymous post a day after it appeared, it attempts to “muddy the waters.” Rather than “setting the record straight” it simply creates doubt where little should exist. The following explains why: Continue reading

Mozambique Government Announcement of Settlement of Hidden Debt Claims Against UBS

Mozambique’s citizens are the victim of likely the most egregious corruption scandal of the 21st century. As explained on GAB and numerous media accounts (here, here, here, and here), employees of Swiss banking giant Credit Suisse together with Mozambique government officials, and Middle East ship-building company Privinvest put the country’s government on the hook for $2.2 billion in loans for projects of little or no value. Citizens of one of the word’s poorest nations are now stuck repaying them.

Some of the only good news to come out of this enormous crime was the Mozambique’s government decision to bring suit against Credit Suisse, Privinvest, and some of the other perpetrators in London (complaint here). A favorable judgment could not only result in cancelling the debt but an award of damages. Damages because of the enormous hit the Mozambique economy took when the loans, hidden because they were taken out in violation of an IMF bailout loan, were finally revealed.

Earlier today the Mozambique government announced it had settled with UBS, which assumed Credit Suisse’s liability when it took the bank over. On its face, the settlement appears to be a very good deal for UBS. Whether it is a good one for the citizens of Mozambique remains to be seen.

Mozambique’s Prosecutor General disclosed some of the terms in a press conference earlier today in Maputo. According to an on-scene report,

Continue reading

When Do Partisans Turn on One of Their Own? Reflections on the New Menendez Case

The biggest corruption-related political news in the United States over the past couple of weeks is the decision by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to indict Senator Bob Menendez (Democrat of New Jersey) for allegedly taking bribes (including cash, gold bars, and a luxury car) from several businessmen, in exchange for using his influence to help these businessmen in various ways. If you’re having a sense of déjà vu, it’s because we’ve seen this movie (at least the beginning) before: Back in 2015, the DOJ indicted Senator Menendez for accepting lavish gifts from a wealthy friend and campaign donor, allegedly in exchange for using his influence to help advance that donor’s personal and business interests. That prosecution was unsuccessful: The DOJ pursued the case, but although the prosecutors prevailed on some important issues of law, the trial, which took place in 2017, ended in a hung jury—presumably because some of the jurors did not think that prosecutors had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the luxury trips and gifts bestowed on Senator Menendez were bribes, rather than personal hospitality offered by a close friend.

It remains to be seen whether the legal outcome will be different in this case (and of course, it should go without saying, Senator Menendez is entitled to the presumption of innocence in a court of law, though he is entitled to no such presumption in the court of public opinion). But there is already one notable difference between the current case and the 2015 case: the reaction of Senator Menendez’s colleagues in the Democratic party. As I write this (several days before the post will likely be published, so forgive me if this is a bit out of date), a number of prominent Democrats, including New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy, several Democratic Senators, and numerous Democratic House Members, including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, have called on Menendez to resign. To be sure, as a critics have noted, several leading Democrats—including President Joe Biden and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer—have not called on Senator Menendez to resign. But this is still a marked contrast from 2015, when to the best of my recollection (and readers should feel free to correct me if I’m wrong) no prominent Democrats called on Senator Menendez to resign. Why the difference? Continue reading

Guest Post: The Recent Brazilian Ruling on Use of Evidence from the Odebrecht Case—Setting the Record Straight

Last week, this blog featured a guest post from Gregory Michener and Breno Cerqueira on the recent decision by Justsice Toffoli of the Brazilian Supreme Court, which concerned the settlement that Brazilian prosecutors had previously reached with the Odebrecht company—and the evidence against other defendants that Odebrecht had provided prosecutors as part of that settlement. A Brazilian lawyer with first-hand knowledge of the case submitted the following guest post, which takes issue with a number of the claims made in the previous post. Although it is not GAB’s usual practice to publish anonymous posts, in this case the sensitivity of the matter and the importance of raising these issues led me to exercise my editorial judgment to publish the post below without the author’s name.

The recent guest post on this blog regarding the recent judicial ruling on the settlement in the Odebrecht case is inaccurate in certain respects.

  • The first and most important inaccuracy is that, in contrast to what the post indicates, Justice Toffoli’s ruling did not annul the settlement in the Odebrecht case. Rather, the ruling held that the evidence included in certain important Odebrecht databases contained in hard drives, obtained by the Brazilian prosecutors from Swiss authorities, may not be lawfully used in criminal or civil investigations. The guest post properly states this aspect of the ruling—that it prohibited the use of this evidence —but the suggestion that the ruling annulled the settlement itself is not accurate.(A potentially important issue is whether the ruling would apply with the same force to the evidence turned over directly to the Brazilian prosecutors by Odebrecht, rather than obtained by the Brazilian prosecutors from the Swiss authorities. But the guest post fails to make that distinction.)
  • Second, the guest post seems to treat Justice Toffoli’s decision as a surprise, or at least unanticipated. But in fact, several prior decisions by other Brazilian Supreme Court Justices (particularly Justice Lewandowsky) had reached essentially the same conclusion, though with regard only to particular defendants. Justice Toffoli’s ruling extends and generalizes those prior decisions, ruling that the evidence in question cannot be used at all, thus obviating the need for individual defendants to obtain a similar ruling by the court in their individual cases.
  • Third, the post seems to imply that Justice Toffoli decided this case because he was appointed by President Lula, and previously served in senior positions in Lula’s first administration. But this is a gross simplification, especially when one remembers that Justice Toffoli handed down several decisions that went against against Lula’s interests (including rulings against prominent members of Lula’s party in the Mensalao case, and during Lula’s time in jail). Notably, Justice Toffoli apologized for some of those earlier decisions in the more recent decision currently being discussed. Therefore, rather than favoring Lula and his party consistently, a more plausible hypothesis, based on Justice Toffoli’s record, is that he seems inclined to decide cases in favor of the interests he sees as commanding the current political agenda. This may be at least as objectionable as guest post’s suggestion that he is decides cases systematically out of loyalty to Lula, but as a matter of empirical analysis of judicial trends, it is importantly different. (And Lula himself is, or should be, attentive to that.)
  • Fourth, another inaccuracy in the post, though admittedly a less important one, is the claim that prosecutors had not made public the Odebrecht agreement’s legal framework until last week. This is not true. The agreement has been publicly available for more than five years on the Ministry of Federal Prosecution’s website, which provides easy access to several of the resolutions that the federal prosecutors have concluded.
  • Finally, it is worth addressing the suggestion at the end of the post that transparency regarding the facts reported by Odebrecht under the settlement agreement might have reduced the chance of a decision such as Justice Toffoli’s. This cannot be characterized as a factual inaccuracy, as it is inherently a speculation about what might have happened under different conditions. Nevertheless, that assertion seems too rudimentary. There may be good reasons why prosecutors (and other control agencies, such as, in the case of Brazil, the Comptroller General and the Attorney General’s office) elect not to disclose all of the facts contained in the evidence turned over by the company right away. The most obvious reason for not publicly disclosing this evidence right away is that the evidence may be relevant to ongoing investigations. And it is not true that the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) would make public comparable factual material, if doing so would jeopardize ongoing investigations. (Some also claim that the DOJ decides on the degree of disclosure of facts in statements of facts attached to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act negotiated resolutions based more on, or at least with an eye to, strategic or geopolitical considerations than transparency concerns.) Again, though, the claim that more transparency about the settlement and the associated evidence would have helped seems reasonable, and is not strictly speaking inaccurate. There is certainly room for reasonable disagreement about the prosecutors’ approach to disclosure. But the issue is far more nuanced than the post suggests.

I want to emphasize that these comments are not meant to contradict the importance of making pointed critical assessments of judicial decisions in general and Justice Toffoli’s ruling in particular. Nor do I wish to offer any further opinion on these fraught, highly controversial legal and political issues. But given the intensity of the discussion in Brazil, and the unfortunate tendency for all sides in these debates to hurry over or oversimplify key facts, I thought it was important to advocate for subtlety and raise these problems about the recent guest post on this blog.