An updated version of my anticorruption bibliography is available from my faculty webpage. A direct link to the pdf of the full bibliography is here, and a list of the new sources added in this update is here. As always, I welcome suggestions for other sources that are not yet included, including any papers GAB readers have written.
My complaint in last week’s post that Checkbook Elections, the recent study of campaign and party finance rules in 11 countries, failed to offer any guidance for reformers drew a sharp and quick retort from University of Sussex researcher Samuel Power. Power says I didn’t like the study because it didn’t produce a “one-size fits all” solution to the problem of controlling money in politics. That search for the holy grail of campaign and party finance is misguided, he says, for reforms are context specific. When a reformer, Power writes, asks a money-in-politics guru “. . . for ‘guidance on what works,’ the (sensible) answer is very likely to be ‘well it depends. . . .’”
But depends on what Mr. Power? Climate? Latitude? Ethnolinguistic fractionalization? Continue reading
Last week I published a post with some conjectures as to why the DOJ’s investigation into alleged Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations by Walmart – triggered by New York Times reports, published in 2012, of widespread bribes paid by Walmart’s Mexican subsidiary, Wal-Mex – might be taking a long time to resolve. I noted that there was as yet no evidence of an especially lengthy investigation, compared to the norm in big FCPA cases, but I nevertheless speculated that perhaps the case might take a long time because the seriousness of the misconduct, coupled with Walmart’s failure to disclose (or even to conduct a reasonable internal investigation), meant that the DOJ was going to insist on particularly severe penalties (which Walmart’s lawyers might be resisting). But I may have been completely wrong about that: According to a report in this past Sunday’s Wall Street Journal, the Walmart investigation is likely to be wrapped up soon, and the fine may be much smaller than expected, in part because (at least according to the sources for WSJ report) the bribery violations in Mexico were not as extensive as many (myself included) had thought.
It’s important to emphasize that the WSJ report has not been confirmed by the Justice Department, Walmart, or any other source. It may well turn out to be inaccurate. But let’s suppose for the moment that it’s (mostly) right. Suppose we see a Walmart settlement within the next few months in which the extent of (admitted) violations, and/or the severity of the penalties, are much lower than expected. What to make of this? A few thoughts: Continue reading
In May 2014, when Narendra Modi’s National Democratic Alliance (NDA) ran and won against the incumbent United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government on a platform of anticorruption and growth, very few were surprised. UPA’s second term was paralyzed by a string of mega-corruption scandals, including the 2G scam and Coal–Gate, pointing to entrenched crony capitalism and raising public fury. A country that had had enough with lackluster economic performance and widespread corruption kicked into survival mode and set aside its deep misgivings about a man with a troubling past. India was desperate for an efficient administrator and an uncorrupted leader—and Modi promised both.
After Modi became Prime Minister, many Indian businessmen grumbled that they had lost access to the Government—a fact hailed by the Indian media as evidence that he was finally cleaning house and cracking down on crony capitalism. However, more recent reports suggest that the Cronyism of Many has simply been replaced by the Cronyism of One. The Indian media is rife with reports hinting at a troublingly close relationship between the Prime Minister and a Gujarat-based industrialist who is one of the latest entrants to the Indian billionaire’s club (See reports here, here, here and here).
To be clear, such allegations do not necessarily imply that the PM himself is corrupt. Nonetheless, in this context even the appearance of corruption can be damaging. High officeholders in a country like India, where endemic corruption and crony capitalism have historically prevented the nation from achieving its full potential, ought to be held to much higher standards of probity.
The PM may be flirting within the permissible boundaries of business-government collaboration and may even get away with it using personal charisma, strong economic performance, and the lack of clarity in laws governing such relations. However, in the interest of keeping the high offices of the country beyond reproach, it is time to have a relook at the laws governing business-government relations in India. A good place to start will be the Conflict of Interest (COI) provisions for India’s Executive and Legislative branches. Unfortunately, the current COI regime for Indian public office holders is weak and ineffectual: Continue reading
Ben Cowdock of Transparency International UK (TI-UK) contributes the following guest post:
Earlier this year, UK Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech in Singapore in which he vowed to take a stand against corruption at home and abroad, and announced that London would host an International Anticorruption Summit in 2016. We at TI-UK are optimistic that this summit will provide an expanded opportunity for civil society to contribute, and indeed we are hopeful that we may be entering a period of unprecedented involvement of the wider anticorruption community in the formulation of national and global policy. This would signify an exciting new direction for policymakers—one which the anticorruption community has long advocated. A more open and inclusive process is beneficial for society as a whole; policy is increasingly built on consensus and shared learning, resulting in choosing the right path to tackling corruption.
More concretely, in response to the Prime Minister’s announcement and in preparation for this global summit, Transparency International UK (TI-UK) has been assembling a database of the current “big ideas” on anticorruption policy from the academic, activist, business and policy communities. The database, currently contains over 100 “game-changer” policy proposals (including a number of suggestions put forward and debated on this very blog (such as truth commissions and the potential benefits of expanding UNCAC article 35). To enhance academic, public, and policy awareness of the range of current policy proposals, the database will be published in the near future with full attribution to authors and researchers. We hope this will lead to further debate on which ideas have the potential to significantly improve anti-corruption efforts and deter corruption. We also hope that the summit will provide an opportunity to showcase the growth of “anticorruption hacking”, a collective action phenomenon in which civil society generates pioneering technological approaches to fighting corruption.
The London summit represents a chance for new ideas to come to the fore and be at the heart of UK and global effort against corruption. Civil society has already made a huge contribution in the overwhelming response to TI-UK’s call for big idea policies, which we hope will be influential in shaping the agenda of the summit and demonstrating an international commitment to making a change for the better. If you have any big “game-changing” ideas that you believe would further UK or international anti-corruption efforts, we encourage you to leave an overview in the comment!
The research consortium Money, Politics, and Transparency recently released Checkbook Elections, a summary of a two year, multi-million dollar project to examine the role of money in politics. A principal aim of the study was to identify “what works, what fails, and why” when countries reform laws governing campaign and party finance. To answers to these questions, researchers analyzed how and why governments regulate the financing of political campaigns and political parties, drawing on case studies of regulation in Brazil, Britain, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States.
Checkbook Elections‘ authors tout the results, asserting the volume provides “several core findings” which offer “important lessons for policy makers both domestically and internationally wishing to support countries in their reform trajectories.” Unfortunately for those looking for ideas on what kinds of campaign and party finance reforms might help control corruption, this is hype. The text offers but a few lessons. None are new or terribly important or generalizable. The study, however, does contain an important conclusion, one which the authors are candid enough to report even if they don’t feature it. Continue reading
So this might not be the most important question in the world, but I’ve been wondering why the U.S. Government’s investigation into Walmart’s alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (or, more accurately, FCPA violations committed by Wal-Mart’s Mexican subsidiary, Walmex) has yet to produce a final settlement.
A quick and somewhat simplified recap (for those among our readers who don’t obsessively follow every FCPA case in the pipeline): In April 2012, two New York Times reporters broke a blockbuster story about how Wal-Mex had been systematically paying bribes to scores of Mexican officials to get permits for new stores (often circumventing local environmental protection and historical preservation regulations in the process), and—perhaps even more damningly—about how Walmart’s senior leadership, upon learning of the bribery allegations from an internal whistleblower and preliminary internal investigation, had decided to cover up the problem and reject its own compliance department’s calls for a thorough investigation. (Walmart tried to get out in front of the story by including a disclosure of possible FCPA problems in its December 2011 FCPA filing, though that disclosure downplayed the seriousness of the issue.) The original New York Times story, along with a follow-up story published in April 2012, netted the two reporters a Pulitzer Prize. Those reports, along with Walmart’s December 2011 disclosure, prompted the Department of Justice Securities & Exchange Commission to begin investigating Walmart for FCPA violations.
That was back in April 2012. It’s now three and a half years later, and there’s still no resolution of the case; the investigation is still ongoing—something that has prompted grumbling in some quarters about both the length and cost of the investigation (see here and here). Why is this taking so long?
This is a question I’ve heard several people raise at various conferences and meetings. I don’t have any good answers, but I thought I’d throw out a few hypotheses: Continue reading
Last month, the International Bar Association (IBA) Human Rights Institute issued a report entitled Justice versus Corruption: Challenges to the Independence of the Judiciary in Cambodia which paints a dark picture of the extent of political and financial corruption in the Cambodian judicial system. This report was prompted by the enactment of three controversial laws that enabled the Cambodian government to undermine the independence of the courts, but the IBA’s investigation went beyond these three laws to examine the judicial system as a whole, only to discover that, in addition to persistent problems of government interference with judicial independence, the entire Cambodian judicial system was riddled with both bribery and political corruption.
There are credible allegations that cases are often decided in favor of the party offering the larger bribe; Cambodian lawyers interviewed by the IBA researchers estimated that 90% of the cases heard by the courts involve bribes to judges or clerks, and that when no bribe is offered, judges often give no attention to the case, and court staff will refuse to release basic information, or give lawyers access to the case files. In addition, the report found that trainee judges are asked for large bribes to access to their professional trainings — meaning that what the report calls the “the culture of bribe giving and receiving” is taught to judges from the very beginning of their career. In addition to this widespread bribery, political corruption of the judiciary is also pervasive. The report notes suspicions of judges and clerks sometimes being given specific instructions from powerful politicians how to decide cases in which these politicians have a financial interest.
To address this widespread, systemic corruption, the IBA offers a series of recommendations. A few of the report’s recommendations are concrete and implementable. For example, report recommends that the IBA exercise influence on the Cambodian Bar Association (the BAKC) to reform itself if it wishes to remain a member of the IBA; such pressure may be help to end corrupt practices in the BAKC itself, and encourage the independence and protection of lawyers in Cambodia. Unfortunately, however, most of the report’s recommendations, while appealing in theory, are not terribly practical, at least in the context of Cambodia today. In emphasizing idealistic, aspirational recommendations, the report perhaps missed an opportunity to recommend some more concrete, practical goals that, while not fully addressing the problem, might at least have some chance of being adopted. Continue reading
Being a whistleblower in Kenya is a risky business. John Githongo and David Munyakei might be exhibits 1 and 1a in supporting that assertion. More recently, blogger David Mutai was arrested and had his blogs and Twitter account shutdown after exposing corruption at a public agency and in some county governments. More generally, according to Transparency International’s 2014 East Africa Bribery Index, Kenyans reported just 6% of the bribes they were aware of, and a common reason (noted by 10% of respondents) was fear of adverse consequences.
Against this backdrop, earlier this year Kenyan Attorney General Githu Muigai formed the Task Force on Review of Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for Fighting Corruption. It is not clear how much work the Task Force has done or is doing (you can read the opening address from the June 2015 “Technical Retreat for Development of a Draft Report” here), but it was reported over the summer that the Task Force plans to propose a whistleblower reward system similar to Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower incentive provisions (which have been discussed previously on this blog here, here, and here). Specifically, the reported Kenyan proposal would reward “a person who reports corruption [with] at least 10 per cent of the value of any property recovered after investigations and conclusion of the matter through judicial or other dispute-resolution mechanisms.”
If the Task Force is still looking for ideas (as far as I can tell it has not released any draft legislation or white papers, and the latest news story I could find that mentioned the Task Force is this one from August), I have a few for how to make sure its whistleblower reward program is effective. Continue reading
GAB is delighted to welcome back Dieter Zinnbauer, Programme Manager at Transparency International, who contributes the following guest post:
Corrupt transactions do not merely “take place” – they take place in a place, a specific place at a specific time: at customs authorities and land registrars, at hospital wards, police road-stops, school headmaster offices, or the offices of social benefits agencies. The fact that most form of corruption occur in physical locations may seem both obvious and unimportant, but in fact there may be some promising ways to modify the physical settings for government-citizen interactions that would make various kinds of corruption less likely to occur (or easier to detect and remedy). This possibility builds on the observation that many corrupt transactions are fragile forms of social exchange, often involving power asymmetries, established social roles, norms, and expectations. These social dynamics are critical to enabling the parties to engage in an illegal transaction that could get both of them into a lot of trouble. These complex social dynamics and expectations are affected by the physical environment; modifications to that environment can therefore disrupt or alter the social dynamics of a specific situation—creating feelings of empowerment for potential targets of extortion and feelings of uncertainty and anxiety for those who would propose corrupt exchanges.
We should therefore think about ways to use architecture and design to empower citizens to become more aware of their rights and entitlements, to better understand and assess the services they receive, and to register complaints and seek remedies more effectively. I call this concept “ambient accountability.” I have developed this idea more fully in two recent papers (here and here), but here are some concrete examples of how this sort of intervention might work in other contexts: Continue reading
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