Countering Procurement Corruption with Integrity Pacts: The Indian Experience

Corruption in government procurement is a massive problem worldwide, especially in developing countries. In an ideal world, measures to combat procurement corruption would include structural changes that would open up monopolies, break cartels, and enact rational, uniform, and effective procurement laws. Sadly, the potential effectiveness of these measures is matched only by the near impossibility of their implementation any time soon. We should continue to push for comprehensive structural solutions to the procurement mess, of course. But in the meantime, are there other measures that can be implemented in countries struggling with widespread procurement corruption, which can at least help alleviate the problem?

One possible solution, heavily promoted by Transparency International (TI), is the use of so-called “Integrity Pacts” (IPs). An integrity pact is a voluntary agreement between a government agency and the bidders entering into a procurement contract, where both sides agree to refrain from corrupt practices. Bidders violating the pact could be blacklisted, placed under investigation, or have their contracts cancelled. Civil society actors monitor and arbitrate disputes in enforcement of IPs. The first IP was implemented in Ecuador for a refinery project in 1994; since then, TI has collaborated with government agencies to implement IPs in public contracts of more than 30 countries including Germany, Hungary, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Argentina, Pakistan, China and India.

No one expects IPs to be a panacea—deeper structural reforms are still essential. But do IPs at least help? Or are they a distraction from more meaningful reforms? While a general answer may not be possible, we can learn from the past three decades of experience with IPs in different countries. One useful test case for the effectiveness of IPs is India. And the evidence is, on the whole, encouraging. Continue reading

The 2015 CPI and Year-to-Year Changes: A Definite Improvement, But Problems Remain

As most people who follow this blog are likely aware, Transparency International released the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) last week. There is, of course, a lot to talk about here, and I’m sure many commentators and scholars will spend a lot of time poring over the new data and debating its significance. Given my previous criticisms of the CPI’s suggestion that scores for the same country can be compared across time (see here, here, here, and here), that was naturally the first thing I focused on. I was hoping that TI might take up some version of my suggestion to report statistical confidence intervals in an easy-to-see place in the main data table, or, even better, test for statistically significant changes in scores across years. Alas, TI didn’t do either of those things. (The confidence intervals are still available, but you have to download the data to find them.) TI did, however, report that since 2012, some countries had improved, while others had deteriorated. In particular, TI noted three countries (Greece, Senegal, and the UK) had improved their CPI scores since 2012, while five countries (Australia, Brazil, Libya, Spain, and Turkey) had seen a notable worsening.

Because of last year’s fiasco with China (where TI emphasized a decline in China’s CPI score that turned out to be bogus), I was initially skeptical. So, I went ahead and implemented the procedure that I outlined in my post from a few months ago to see whether, for these eight countries, there really was a genuine, statistically meaningful change in the CPI score. I was pleasantly surprised to discover that in all eight of the countries that TI identified, the change in the CPI score between 2012 and 2015 was indeed statistically significant at conventional levels, and do not seem to have been driven by the addition or subtraction of sources in the later year, or by a large anomalous jump in a single source. (Though it’s perhaps worth noting that in the case of Brazil – which TI particularly emphasizes in its press release – the change is just barely significant at conventional levels, and of the seven sources used to construct the score, although four indicate moderate to large declines, two show no change and one actually rates Brazil as improving slightly from 2012 to 2015.) So, while I still have a number of criticisms (about which more below), I’ll gladly give credit where credit is due: In this year’s publicity materials, TI has indeed identified countries where there is statistically significant change in CPI scores, generally driven by changes in several of the underlying data sources. I hope that in future years, TI will go further (and save me some time) by simply including in the main data table not only the confidence interval for the current year, but also a simple three-category indicator (up, down, null) for whether there has been a statistically significant change in the CPI in the past three years. (This is important because of the way the CPI is covered by mainstream journalists: Though researchers might dig into the data tables, most journalists or casual readers just look for year-to-year changes.)

Now, I did say I still had some concerns, so in the interest of continued constructive engagement, let me lay out why I still don’t think we should treat within-country year-to-year changes in CPI scores as terribly meaningful: Continue reading

More Phony Numbers–This Time on the Anticorruption Impact of Open Data

OK, I know I’m beating a dead horse. Within the last month I’ve already posted several times (see here, here, and here) about bogus anticorruption statistics, as has Rick. And I promise that after this post, I’ll move on to other topics. But I can’t help commenting on this latest release from Transparency International, criticizing the recent World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting for not explicitly addressing corruption. As its lead example, TI faults the WEF for not addressing issues like open data (and openness more generally). I’m sympathetic to TI’s policy position, but in making the case, TI asserts, “One study suggests that open data could reduce the costs of corruption by about 10 percent.”

I was curious (and, admittedly, skeptical) about yet another seemingly precise estimate of something that’s inherently hard to measure. So I clicked on the link to the “one study” that “suggests” that open data technologies would reduce the costs of corruption by 10%. This “study” is actually a report (really, an advocacy document) from an Australian consulting firm (Lateral Economics), commissioned by a philanthropic fund (the Omidyar Network) that invests in open data initiatives. How does this “study” reach its conclusion that open data could reduce the costs of corruption by 10%? I will now quote in full the entirety of the evidence and analysis supporting that conclusion: Continue reading

A Trade-Anticorruption Breakthrough?: The Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Transparency and Anticorruption Chapter

The full text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), released earlier this month, is already generating plenty of discussion. One of the proposed agreement’s most striking features is the full chapter on transparency and anticorruption, Chapter 26. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) had earlier stated that its objectives in negotiating the TPP included addressing transparency, accountability, and corruption; at the time I thought this was simply a negotiating ploy or marketing strategy, but it looks like I was wrong. As USTR’s summary of the “good governance” steps of Chapter 26 correctly notes, the TPP “includes the strongest anti-corruption and transparency standards of any trade agreement.” Indeed, Chapter 26–which appears to modeled in part on draft language that Transparency International had proposed for inclusion in a different trade deal, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership–could mark an important and unprecedented step towards using trade agreements to promoting and harmonize international anticorruption efforts.

Here are a few points that are or could be particularly important features of Chapter 26:

Continue reading

Political Finance Regulation and Perceived Corruption: Some Preliminary Exploration

Corruption is closely linked to problems associated with money in politics. Indeed, some have argued that an excessive/inappropriate influence of money on elections is corruption (even if it’s not necessarily illegal or currently viewed as unethical). Even for those who (like me) prefer a more restrictive definition of “corruption,” it is widely believed that these issues are related. Many hypothesize that countries with weak or ineffective systems of political finance regulation may experience higher levels of corruption—though at the same time excessively onerous, unrealistic regulations on political spending may also induce corruption in order to circumvent the official rules. Perhaps surprisingly, though, we do not have (or at least I have not yet seen) very much quantitative, comparative research on the relationship between the quality of countries’ laws on the regulation of political finance, on the one hand, and the extent of their corruption problems, on the other.

This may be starting to change, thanks in part to initiatives like the Money, Politics and Transparency (MPT) forum (a collaborative venture of the Sunlight Foundation, Global Integrity, and the Electoral Integrity Project). A few weeks back Rick posted a highly critical assessment of MPT’s volume Checkbook Elections, a collection of qualitative case studies. I haven’t yet read that report, but here I wanted to focus on another aspect of MPT’s work: a quantitative index that purports to measure how well 54 different democratic countries regulate political finance, based on responses to 50 survey questions in five different categories (public funding of elections, contribution and expenditure restrictions, reporting and disclosure, regulation of third-party actors, and monitoring/enforcement). The surveys include questions about both law and practice in all five categories; moreover, in addition to a composite index score, MPT also provides separate scores for the quality of electoral regulation both “in law” and “in practice.” (A detailed description of the methodology is available here.) All the usual caveats and concerns regarding these sorts of composite indexes of course apply here, but at first pass this seems like a useful resource, and potentially helpful in teasing out the relationships between political finance regulation and corruption more generally.

Real progress on this will front require careful research design, more extensive data, and the application of rigorous empirical methods—an enterprise for which I lack both the time and the talent. But just for fun, I played around a bit to see how the MPT index (and each sub-index) correlates with the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Are countries with better regulation of political finance (in law, in practice, or overall) perceived as more corrupt? Less corrupt? I’ll tell you what I found after the break, but just for fun take a guess now, before you know the answer!

OK, here’s what I found: Continue reading

A Quick (Partial) Fix for the CPI

A regular readers of this blog know, I’ve been quite critical of the idea that one can measure changes in corruption (or even the perception of corruption) using within-country year-to-year variation in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). To be clear, I’m not one of those people who like to trash the CPI across the board – I actually think it can be quite useful. But given the way the index is calculated, there are big problems with looking at an individual country’s CPI score this year, comparing it to previous years, and drawing conclusions as to whether (perceived) corruption is getting worse or better. Among the many problems with making these sort of year-to-year comparisons is the fact the sources used to calculate any individual country’s CPI score may change from year to year, and the fact that a big, idiosyncratic movement in an individual source can have an outsized influence on the change in the composite score. (For more discussion of these points, see here, here, and here.) Also, while TI does provide 90% confidence intervals for its yearly estimates, the fact that confidence intervals overlap does not necessarily mean that there’s no statistically significant difference between the scores (an important point I’ll confess to sometimes neglecting in my own prior discussions of these issues).

Although there are lots of other problems with the CPI, and in particular with making over-time CPI comparisons, I think there’s a fairly simple procedure that TI (or anybody working with the TI data) could implement to address the problems just discussed. Since TI will be releasing the 2015 CPI within the next month, I thought this might be a good time to lay out what I think one ought to do to evaluate whether there have been statistically significant within-country changes in the CPI from one year to another. (I should say up front that I’m not an expert in statistical analysis, so it’s entirely possible I’ve screwed this up in some way. But I think I’ve got the important parts basically right.) Here goes: Continue reading

Sustainable Development Goal 16: Am I the Only One Who Thinks It Is a Major Setback in the Fight Against Corruption?

Last week Matthew asked if he were the only one who wasn’t excited about Sustainable Development Goal 16.   At first glance it is hard to understand why he would ask such a question.  One of 17 goals approved September 25 by the United Nations General Assembly to end poverty by 2030, SDG 16 establishes an ambitious agenda for improving the way the nations of the world govern their citizens by, among other measures, requiring concerted global action to “substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.”  How could anyone, particularly one who works on corruption issues, not be ecstatic that the 193 member-states of the United Nations unanimously endorsed this objective? And indeed numerous anticorruption advocates have already celebrated its approval (click here for Transparency International’s enthusiastic endorsement).

Although the opening of Matthew’s post was low-key (am I the only one not excited?), readers quickly learned that he was in fact severely critical of SDG 16’s corruption and bribery target because of the way progress towards realizing it is to be measured: by changes in a nation’s score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.  Matthew nicely summarized why this is insane on technical grounds.  Here I explain why using the CPI to measure progress is not only insane but represents a major setback in the fight against corruption. Continue reading

Guest Post: Pro-Transparency Organizations Fail To Practice What They Preach

Till Bruckner, freelance journalist and Advocacy Manager for Transparify (an initiative that rates the financial transparency of think tanks and advocacy groups), contributes the following guest post in a private capacity:

“Transparency” is the watchword of the international anticorruption movement, a fact perhaps best illustrated by Transparency International’s choice of name. And partly due to the efforts of TI and many other groups, the world has changed for the better: transparency has become the new norm. Yet many of the anticorruption groups themselves need to wake up to this reality, and become more transparent themselves. Indeed, those of us in the anticorruption community would do a lot better if we started to walk our transparency talk.

This fact was driven home to me in a recent exchange I had with Professor Peter Eigen, the living legend who helped found Transparency International, about his newest venture, the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI). FiTI aims to curb corruption in international fisheries, and if it works as planned, it could have a positive impact on many issues, including overfishing, food security, and public revenue in developing countries. Somewhat unconventionally, FiTI is financed by the government of Mauritania, whose controversial president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, first announced the initiative. (see my recent article in Foreign Policy for more background.) I asked Professor Eigen about Mauritania’s financial support for the FiTI; he explained that Mauritania was only sponsoring the initial conceptual phase of FiTI, and he persuasively argued that its government would have no undue influence, let alone control, over outcomes. I then asked Professor Eigen how much Mauritania was paying his organization (the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform) in connection with its work on the FiTI project, but he told me he didn’t want to disclose the figure. He explained:

“This is a normal consulting arrangement of our not-for-profit organization with the [Mauritanian] government. We do not feel it would be proper for us to disclose details of contracts. If media or taxpayers want to find out how [the] Government spends its budget, they can ask the Government. This is for FiTI an unimportant side issue.”

Professor Eigen added two more points. First, his organization would at some later point account for the money on its website. Second, he himself would be working “pro bono.”

Summary: There’s no influence peddling; the use of taxpayer funds is a domestic issue; all money will be accounted for; and nobody is lining their pockets. So, everything is okay, right?

No, it’s not okay at all. Here’s why: Continue reading

Do We Need an “ASEAN Integrity Community”?

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is taking a major step toward greater regional economic integration at the end of this year, with the long-awaited launch of the “ASEAN Economic Community”, a region-wide agreement designed (among other things) to promote the freer movement of goods, capital, and labor throughout the region. Yet many worry that this greater economic integration might exacerbate the region’s already serious struggles with corruption, especially cross-border corruption. Largely in response to that concern, last April Transparency International published a report calling for the creation of an “ASEAN Integrity Community” (AIC) that would, in the words of the report, “create a coherent regional anti-corruption strategy” and “provide space for civil society and the business sector to be able to have input into and shape this regional anti-corruption agenda.”

It’s an intriguing idea, and the report is worth reading. (Full disclosure: I wrote a background paper for one of the meetings TI organized last September to discuss corruption challenges in ASEAN. Indeed, substantial chunks of the background paper that I wrote appear – uncredited – in the TI Report on the AIC.) Certainly, there’s a good case to be made for greater regional cooperation on anticorruption challenges within ASEAN. That said, I found the TI report on the proposed AIC frustrating in several respects, most significantly the vagueness regarding how, exactly, the AIC would operate, and how it would add value above and beyond the existing regional forms and groupings that address corruption issues. I realize that this is an early-stage proposal, designed to generate political momentum for greater action and political buy-in (particularly in advance of the International Anti-Corruption Conference in Malaysia next week), so it may not really fair to criticize the report for being a bit light on specifics. Still, it’s worth reflecting a bit more on what we might hope to get out of something like an AIC, and whether this is the right way to go about tackling what most experts would agree is a genuine and serious set of problems and challenges. Continue reading

TI Report on Anti-Bribery Compliance Programs in the Defense Industry: Some Quick Reactions

Last April Transparency International UK released a very interesting report on the quality of corporate anti-bribery compliance programs in the defense industry. (This was the second such report; the first was issued in 2015). The report evaluated the ethics and anti-bribery compliance programs of 163 defense companies along five dimensions (leadership & governance, risk management, policies & codes, training, personnel & helplines) using publicly available information, supplemented with additional internal information from 63 cooperating firms, and assigned each firm a letter grade (A-F). The most eye-catching result, and the one that has gotten the most attention in the press releases and reporting on the report, is how badly the defense industry seems to be doing overall on this issue: Of the 163 firms included in the review, there were 4 As, 23 Bs, 29 Cs, 31 Ds, 19 Es, and 57 Fs. Thus, fewer than 17% of the defense firms examined scored in the A or B range, while close to half (47%) received a failing grade of E or F.

That’s certainly a notable and important (and depressing) finding, but digging a bit deeper, there are a few other interesting features of the report that have gotten a bit less attention, and are worth highlighting. Continue reading