Tag Archives: transparency

Guest Post: Public Debt Confidentiality — Separating Fact from Fiction

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In this guest post, Erin Houlihan, Senior Program Director with the National Democratic Institute, reviews the relationship between confidentiality clauses and hidden debt, and highlights insights and recommendations from the publication. It is drawn from a new brief,developed by Richard Christeland co-published by NDI, OGP and TI, examining the problem of secrecy clauses in sovereign debt agreements and debunking the most common fictions used by lenders and borrowers to justify their use.

The UNCTAD Secretariat calls the current global debt crisis “one the biggest threats to global peace and security and financial stability” facing the world today. By 2030, global public debt is predicted to reach 100 percent of GDP. Unfortunately, the situation is probably worse than the data indicate. 

The problem of hidden debt – meaning debt hidden from both a nation’s citizens and its creditors – is a consistent and “remarkably pervasive” feature of the world’s sovereign debt crisis and one invariably the result of corruption. It is the citizens of borrowing states – mainly Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) – who pay the price when the debt is discovered: increased taxes and fewer public services as governments slash social spending on health, education and other public goods to cover borrowing costs. 

In Mozambique, for instance, the revelation of over USD 2bn in hidden debt prompted the IMF to withdraw aid in 2016, triggering a financial crisis, sovereign debt default, and currency collapse. More recently, a 2024 audit in Senegal revealed billions of dollars in hidden debt from the previous government, throwing the country’s governance credibility and financial future into disarray. 

Why is hidden debt so pervasive and what contributes to non-disclosure?

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Guest Post: The Odebrecht Ruling and Prosecutorial Transparency in Brazil–A Rejoinder

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Two weeks ago, we published a guest post is from Professor Gregory Michener and Breno Cerqueira, based on an op-ed they had originally published (in Portuguese) in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper, concerning an important decision last by Justice Toffoli of the Brazilian Supreme Court. That decision nullified the evidence that Brazilian prosecutors had acquired from the Odebrecht firm as part of the agreement to settle the corruption charges against that firm; Justice Toffoli’s decision thus called into question ever subsequent corruption conviction that had relied on this evidence. That guest post prompted a response, which we published last week, from a Brazilian lawyer who took issue with many of the assertions that Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira had made in their piece. (The author of that post asked to remain anonymous. While GAB does not usually publish anonymous pieces, after considering the reasons for the anonymity request, I decided to grant it in that case.) Today’s guest post is from Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira, who offer a rebuttal to last week’s criticisms of their piece.

I realize that some readers may find this a bit excessive, especially since the issues here involve some fine technical points of Brazilian law. But in my view the issues are so important—going to the heart of one of the largest and most important anticorruption investigations in the world over the last decade (the “Car Wash” Operation)—and the legal issues are sufficiently difficult even for attentive outsiders to understand, that a thorough debate about what the most recent decision does and does not mean, that this exchange serves a useful purpose. I am grateful to all the parties involved for being willing to engage in this important conversation..

Without further adieu, here is Professor Michener and Mr. Cerqueira’s rebuttal to the criticism of their post on Justice Toffoli’s ruling:

The Odebrecht case spanned twelve countries and involved nearly a billion dollars of elaborate payments made from Odebrecht’s in-house bribery department to corrupt governments on three continents. (Perhaps the best way to understand the case is through the documents posted with the US Department of Justice press release about the settlement of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act charges in the case.)

The primary objective of our editorial was to discuss the deficient transparency of corruption cases in Brazil, an understudied aspect of corruption that should be of concern to citizens everywhere. Transparency of corruption cases can assign responsibility and promote accountability, deter graft among businesses and public officials, identify institutional weaknesses that need to be fixed and, perhaps most importantly, provide an important historical archive to keep the record straight – not only of crimes committed but of retributive government efforts in favor of the public interest. In the case of Brazil, we argued, a lack of transparency worked in favor of corruption and impunity, which is currently on the upswing.

We find it ironic that the critic of our article, a Brazilian lawyer (“Anonymous”), would ask for anonymity if his or her critiques were squarely fair handed and factual. (As an aside, anonymity is illegal as per the Brazilian Constitution (Article 5 IV – “the expression of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden”). As a leading anticorruption specialist and friend commented on the Anonymous post a day after it appeared, it attempts to “muddy the waters.” Rather than “setting the record straight” it simply creates doubt where little should exist. The following explains why: Continue reading →

How to Reform Brazil’s Freedom of Information Regime

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Ten years ago, Brazil enacted its Access to Information Law, which implements the constitutional guarantee of the right to information. Under the law, certain government data must be proactively disclosed, and other information must be provided upon the request of a member of the public, without the requester needing to show any special reason or justification. This law was supplemented with the enactment, last March, of the Digital Government Law, which streamlines the procedures for information requests, clarifies the government’s obligations to provide information in an open format that fulfills completeness, quality, and integrity requirements, and includes a non-exhaustive list of data that must be disclosed.

These laws, like other freedom of information laws, are intended to make government more responsive and accountable and to help fight corruption by making it easier for citizens, journalists, advocacy groups, and prosecutors to scrutinize and analyze government information for evidence of suspicious activity. But while the laws are very detailed about the rules for disclosing information upon request, the law’s provisions on proactive disclosure are not sufficiently specific or effective. And proactive disclosure is quite important. After all, while the right to request information is helpful to those who want to investigate a specific event, the proactive disclosure of data—for example, with respect to public expenditure, public procurement processes, and public contracts—may raise “red flags” that can spur more in-depth investigations.

There are three deficiencies in particular that should be remedied, so that Brazil’s freedom of information laws can be effective in ensuring the sorts of proactive information disclosure that can foster transparency and detect or deter corruption:

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Guest Post: Highlights from the UNGASS Anticorruption Session Side Events

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Last month, the UN General Assembly held its first-ever Special Session focused specifically on the fight against corruption. In addition to the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) itself, various governments and civil society organizations arranged various side events, held in parallel with the main UNGASS meeting, to allow activists, policymakers, and researchers to share their expertise. Today’s guest post, contributed by Michaella Baker, a JD-MBA student at Northwestern University (working in collaboration with Northwestern Law Professor Juliet Sorensen), summarizes the themes and principal contributions of three of these side events.

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Corruption at the Heart of India’s Coronavirus Crisis? Prime Minister Modi Must Answer for the PM Cares Fund

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India’s unfathomable Covid tragedy has left the country gasping for breath, and no oxygen can be found. Hospitals are overrun, and are often unable to help even those lucky enough to be admitted. Desperate relatives are turning to social media and the black market for help, as beleaguered crematoriums shift from unprecedented 24/7 hours to the horrors of mass cremation to keep up with demand. In the midst of this appalling tragedy looms the question: Why was the government so unprepared? And, more specifically, whatever happened to the billions of dollars raised last year through the Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations (known as the “PM Cares Fund”)? 

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Guest Post: Lessons from Moldova’s Covid-19 Vaccine Distribution Scandal

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Today’s guest post is from Valeria Ciolac, a member of the National Political Council of Moldova’s Party of Action and Solidarity, and a Youth Delegate of the Republic of Moldova to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe.

Since the prospect of effective Covid-19 vaccines emerged last fall, experts have warned about the risks of corruption in the vaccine procurement and distribution process. Alas, in many countries these warnings proved prescient. My home country, the Republic of Moldova, is reeling from reports that politicians and local officials arranged for certain doses of the Covid-19 vaccine to be provided, in secret, to themselves, their family members, and their associates. Evidence of such corrupt misallocation first emerged last March, in the city of Edinet. But this was not an isolated incident. Over the last several weeks, it has become clear that even though the vaccine supply—which was procured only through donations and considerable effort—is supposed to be allocated first to high-priority groups, a group of seven hundred politicians, bank directors, restaurant owners, and others from around the country jumped in front of the line, leaving seven hundred medical workers behind.

When confronted with this evidence, the officials involved tried to explain away the diversion of the vaccines as legitimate use of excess supply. The Mayor of Edinet, for example, claimed that some medical workers chose not to get their vaccines right away, and the vaccines provided to politicians and their friends were surplus doses that would otherwise have been thrown away. But given the long history of public corruption in Moldova, and the resulting lack of trust in the state authorities, most Moldovan citizens doubt this explanation. It seems far more likely that in this case, as in so many other cases, politicians and well-connected individuals used their influence to secure vaccines that should have gone to those with greater need.

While it is tempting to conclude that such corruption is inevitable in a country like Moldova—the poorest country in Europe, and one that has long been immersed in corruption and negligence by the of public authorities—it is more useful to look closely at the Moldovan vaccine distribution system and ask whether things could have been done differently. And indeed, while there’s probably no way to prevent some degree of corruption in vaccine distribution, there are several measures that Moldova, and other countries in a similar situation, could have adopted, and should still embrace now, to minimize the risk of this sort of corruption. Continue reading →

Sunshine or Sunset? The Latest Threat to Freedom of Information in Mexico

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In a country beset by extreme and seemingly intractable corruption, Mexico’s National Institute for Access to Information (INAI)—which runs Mexico’s freedom of information system—has stood out as an unusually effective mechanism for promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity. The INAI’s effectiveness stems from its binding legal authority and independence, as provided by constitutional provisions passed in 2013. The Institute can and has compelled other government agencies to improve their information disclosure policies, and, perhaps most significantly, the INAI can override other government agencies’ denial of information access requests. The INAI has substantial leverage to ensure greater government compliance by way of meaningful fines and effective injunctions for noncompliance. The INAI also moves lightning fast; the INAI regularly satisfies its statutory obligations to respond to requests within twenty business days and to deliver documents within thirty. The INAI does not charge search fees, and all uncovered information is available to the wider public. Citizens can challenge decisions to withhold information, and they routinely prevail.

The INAI’s broad freedom of information mandate makes the agency a powerful actor in exposing corruption (see, for example, here, here, and here). Perhaps most notably, the Institute enabled discovery of former President Pena Nieto’s secret mansion (“the White House Scandal”), the diversion of over $400 million allotted to public services, and embezzlement in public-private ventures in Mexico’s vast energy sector. More broadly, despite all the well-known deficiencies of Mexico’s anticorruption institutions, the INAI has been globally lauded for its role in government transparency.

Given this, why is Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to by his initials “AMLO”), who ran and won on an anticorruption platform, so keen on eradicating the agency? In a press conference earlier this year, AMLO proposed decommissioning all of Mexico’s independent agencies, singling out the INAI as an especially egregious example of bloated bureaucracy. His rationale boils down to three main arguments: (1) the INAI hasn’t ended corruption, (2) the INAI costs too much, and (3) the INAI’s functions can be provided by the Secretariat of Public Functions (SFP), a non-independent body that performs federal government audits and reports directly to the president. These arguments are unconvincing, to say the least.

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Let’s Talk About Monaco

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Monaco, the sovereign city-state on France’s Mediterranean coast, is many things. It is the second smallest country in the world, following only Vatican City. It boasts the highest GDP per capita of any country. It is a constitutional monarchy, ruled by the same family for over 700 years. It is known for its opulent casino, expensive real estate, and swaggering F1 drivers.

It is also willfully resistant to the Council of Europe’s anticorruption transparency recommendations – or any transparency measures at all, for that matter.

Perhaps due to its small size, Monaco has flown somewhat under the radar in international corruption monitoring. The city-state doesn’t feature in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, and TI’s web page for Monaco is quite blank. Despite being an international tax haven and banking center, Monaco is conspicuously missing from both the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings and the Heritage Foundation’s index of economic freedom. It’s not that Monaco is a corruption-free paradise. In the few lists in which it does appear, Monaco does not score particularly well: In the RAND Corporation’s Business Bribery Risk Assessment, for instance, Monaco ranked 72nd out of 192 jurisdictions. And a number of recent corruption scandals have involved Monaco, either directly or indirectly. Last year, for example, two brothers who ran a Monaco-based consultancy called Unaoil pleaded guilty in the United States to charges involving millions of dollars in bribes paid between 1999 and 2016. Corruption alarms were also raised in July 2019, when Monaco’s justice minister abruptly blocked term renewal for a judge leading a corruption inquiry that involved a Russian billionaire, a former Monaco justice minister, senior Monaco police officials, and others. More recently, in late November 2020, former French president Nicholas Sarkozy went on trial for attempting to bribe a French magistrate with a prestigious job in Monaco.

These incidents have largely come to light because of involvement outside of Monaco: international companies, legal battles that cross borders, and foreign politicians. Monaco itself remains something of a black box. As a 2017 report from the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) noted, there are no records whatsoever of criminal or disciplinary proceedings related to corruption in Monaco’s parliament. This lack of reported cases, GRECO concluded, is likely due not to an absence of corruption, but to a lack of oversight. As the report noted, Monaco has “few mechanisms to ensure satisfactory transparency of parliamentary work and consultations,” and lacks a “code of conduct that would govern, among other things, the acceptance of gifts and other benefits, the management of conflicts of interest, or relations with lobbies and other third parties seeking to influence parliamentary processes and decisions.” The GRECO report further observed that although judicial proceedings are typically public, there is a carve-out for holding court behind closed doors where public proceedings “might cause a scandal or serious inconvenience.” Cases “concerning the internal operation of courts” are also not public. In practice, there is even less transparency than the official policies would indicate, as most criminal cases are in fact dealt with in France, behind closed doors.

Without a code of conduct against corruption-related activities, with no mechanisms to provide oversight, with any corruption scandals that do occur likely to be tried in secret, and with little international attention on the issue beyond infrequent GRECO reports, Monaco can keep its corruption well hidden. Although occasional scandals might pop up around Monaco, the country makes it difficult to know the nature and extent of its corruption.

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Nigeria’s Government Assistance Programs for Small Businesses: A Gateway for Corruption

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Nigeria’s Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of the country’s economy, accounting for 96% of Nigeria’s businesses, 84% of its labor force, and 48% of its GDP. SMEs also provide Nigeria’s oil-dependent economy with some important economic diversification. Nevertheless, difficulties in securing startup or operational funds, among other problems, makes starting and operating a small business in Nigeria remarkably challenging. To mitigate these difficulties, the Nigerian federal government has created an assortment of agencies to support SMEs. In addition, at least 26 of Nigeria’s 36 state governments have established at least one SME development agency or office.

Unfortunately, government funds meant to help small businesses often fail to reach their intended recipients. Instead, the government’s SME programs often function as gateways for corruption, either in the form of misallocation of resources for political patronage, or as outright embezzlement of funds. This corruption problem is well illustrated by two of the most important national-level government programs meant to support Nigerian SMEs:

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A Covid-19 Checkup: How the IMF’s Transparency Measures Have Fared So Far

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With a trillion dollars in lending capability, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the best-equipped institutions to deal with the Covid-19 public health and financial crisis. Since March, the IMF has met an “unprecedented number of calls for emergency financing” with “unprecedented speed and magnitude,” through renegotiations of rapid credit facilities, refinancing initiatives, and debt relief assistance for more than 100 countries, totaling over $100 billion in disbursements so far. In the early days of the pandemic, there was a great deal of concern among anticorruption advocates over the way these emergency funds would be monitored (see collections of pieces here and here). The IMF’s initial approach generally did not impose formal transparency or governance requirements as a condition for receiving emergency Covid relief funds. Rather, the IMF chose to rely more on after-the-fact safeguards: recipient countries were told to spend as needed but to “keep the receipts.”

The IMF’s approach is understandable. As Jason Keene argued on this blog, the IMF at that early stage faced a trade-off between speed and transparency, and may have reasonably concluded that it would not be advisable to bargain over transparency measures if doing so would slow the deployment of much-needed funds. This conclusion, as a May 2020 IMF publication revealed, was influenced by the IMF’s experience with the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa: Many, including a prominent public health journal, blamed the IMF for the lethality of the Ebola epidemic, provoking a backlash against what was seen as unduly burdensome loans, a focus on austerity, and the underfunding of medical systems in vulnerable countries (see here, here, and here). Given this background, it’s understandable that the IMF might, on balance, favor speed over transparency, providing loans for Covid-related public health and budgetary shortfalls without much conditionality.

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