Occasionally one hears—particularly though not exclusively from the U.S. business community and corporate defense bar—the assertion that aggressive U.S. enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is the result, at least in part, of the desire to raise revenue for the U.S. government. (See here, here, here, and here.) This claim that the FCPA is a government “cash cow” is sometimes offered as a knowing (or cynical) explanation for why the government is allegedly “over-enforcing” the statute. Even among some scholars with less of a personal or professional stake in criticizing the U.S. government’s motives, the idea that FCPA enforcement advances the U.S. national interest by increasing U.S. government revenues seems to be occasionally finding its way into the discourse.

There are, to be sure, lots of legitimate questions about the motives and wisdom of the U.S. government’s current approach to enforcing the FCPA. But the notion that FCPA enforcement is driven by the desire to raise revenue (from beleaguered, helpless multinational corporations) is just implausible. Indeed, I’m surprised so many extremely intelligent people seem to entertain this argument rather than dismissing it outright.

Why do I think it’s so implausible? Two main reasons: Continue reading →