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Tag Archives: political parties
When Do Partisans Turn on One of Their Own? Reflections on the New Menendez Case
The biggest corruption-related political news in the United States over the past couple of weeks is the decision by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to indict Senator Bob Menendez (Democrat of New Jersey) for allegedly taking bribes (including cash, gold bars, and a luxury car) from several businessmen, in exchange for using his influence to help these businessmen in various ways. If you’re having a sense of déjà vu, it’s because we’ve seen this movie (at least the beginning) before: Back in 2015, the DOJ indicted Senator Menendez for accepting lavish gifts from a wealthy friend and campaign donor, allegedly in exchange for using his influence to help advance that donor’s personal and business interests. That prosecution was unsuccessful: The DOJ pursued the case, but although the prosecutors prevailed on some important issues of law, the trial, which took place in 2017, ended in a hung jury—presumably because some of the jurors did not think that prosecutors had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the luxury trips and gifts bestowed on Senator Menendez were bribes, rather than personal hospitality offered by a close friend.
It remains to be seen whether the legal outcome will be different in this case (and of course, it should go without saying, Senator Menendez is entitled to the presumption of innocence in a court of law, though he is entitled to no such presumption in the court of public opinion). But there is already one notable difference between the current case and the 2015 case: the reaction of Senator Menendez’s colleagues in the Democratic party. As I write this (several days before the post will likely be published, so forgive me if this is a bit out of date), a number of prominent Democrats, including New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy, several Democratic Senators, and numerous Democratic House Members, including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, have called on Menendez to resign. To be sure, as a critics have noted, several leading Democrats—including President Joe Biden and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer—have not called on Senator Menendez to resign. But this is still a marked contrast from 2015, when to the best of my recollection (and readers should feel free to correct me if I’m wrong) no prominent Democrats called on Senator Menendez to resign. Why the difference? Continue reading
Public Funding of Political Parties Is Unlikely To Reduce Corruption
Today’s guest post is from Dr. Sergiu Lipcean of the University of Bergen and Professor Iain McMenamin of Dublin City University.
Does public funding of political parties reduce corruption? Intuitively, there are good reasons to believe that it does. After all, when parties receive a substantial portion of their funding from public sources, they are less dependent on private contributions—both legal and illegal. That straightforward logic has led many scholars and prestigious organizations to recommend higher levels of public funding for parties and candidates. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, for example, recommends public funding of political parties and electoral candidates as an anticorruption measure, and the OECD, while not explicitly using the language of corruption, recommends public funding as part of a holistic system of political finance regulation to limit policy capture.
But the empirical evidence on the anticorruption impact of public funding for parties is surprisingly thin, and results that initially seem to show the sort of effect described above often turn out to be quite fragile and unreliable. We recently published our own study, which examines how the level of public funding for political parties affects enterprise managers’ perceptions of the impact of payments to government officials, using World Bank survey data from 27 post-communist countries. Although we find an association between higher public funding and lower corruption, this result is extremely sensitive to minor changes in method, and the results are too uncertain to recommend public funding as a policy intervention to reduce corruption.
We suspect that one of the reasons that empirical research has failed to find robust anticorruption effects of public funding is that many of the unlawful payments to politicians are used for their personal consumption, rather than for political purposes. As noted above, the economic logic of the view that public funding reduces corruption is that if parties can rely more on public funding for election campaigns and other legitimate political expenses, they will be less tempted to accept bribes, because they will have less need to fill their campaign coffers with dirty money. But if much of the illegal money given to politicians is used for their personal gratification, rather than for political purposes, than public funding of campaigns will not have much of an effect.
This is not to say that countries should not significantly increase public funding of political parties. Corruption is enormously damaging, and even very high levels of public funding for parties are unlikely to have much impact on most national budgets, so even the possibility that significant public funding might reduce corruption, at least in some contexts, may make this investment of resources worthwhile, even if we lack strong direct evidence of effectiveness. And of course there are many other reasons, besides anticorruption, to favor public funding of political campaigns. That said, an honest appraisal of the existing research compels the conclusion that, to date, the evidence that public funding will substantially reduce corruption is weak and speculative, and we should therefore not get too excited about its potential as a general anticorruption measure.
New Podcast Episode, Featuring Magnus Öhman
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Anticorruption Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Why Do They Fail, and How Can They Succeed?
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has seen both highly unstable party systems and high rates of corruption. As a result, lots of new parties keep popping up, and an anticorruption focus has proven to be a great way for them to get noticed. In fact, studies have found that new parties are more successful when they center their message on fighting political misconduct.
Among those that actually win, some of these anticorruption parties have been modestly successful in passing reforms. But many other anticorruption parties have floundered when in office. Part of the problem is that these parties often make lofty promises but fail to put forward actual, workable plans. Enough voters will still vote for the “anticorruption” party as a way of expressing disapproval for the incumbent government, without necessarily paying close attention to whether the anticorruption party and its leaders are willing or able to follow through on their promises. As a result, numerous CEE countries have had bad experiences with anticorruption parties that, when in office, appear to have little idea how to govern differently from their predecessors—and sometimes little apparent interest in doing so. Consider a few examples:
The Corruption of Italian Democracy: Russian Influence Over Italy’s League
Italy’s largest far-right policy, La Lega (“the League”), has long had close ties with Putin’s regime in Russia. The League’s leader, Matteo Salvini, has been a vocal supporter of Putin for years (see also here, here, and here), and in 2017 the League signed a formal cooperation agreement with Putin’s United Russia party. Even before then, the League (then known as Lega Nord, the “Northern League”) often advocated within Italy and the EU for Russian interests. Notably, while the EU imposed sanctions on Russia after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the League opposed sanctions and tried (unsuccessfully) to upend the solidarity necessary to keep EU sanction in place. That opposition to sanctions only intensified after the 2017 cooperation agreement: At a 2018 conference in Moscow, Salvini—then Italy’s Interior Minister–insisted that Italy would work “day and night” to repeal the 2014 sanctions. Salvini’s efforts proved unsuccessful, as he was unable to convince his coalition partners to change Italy’s stance. But the Kremlin still benefitted from the League’s vocal opposition to sanctions, as it showed that Russia wasn’t isolated diplomatically and that the West is internally divided.
The League’s long history of cooperation with Moscow could be chalked up to shared ideology and policy goals. But it appears that corruption, not policy, might explain why the party is so close with Putin.
Making Political Parties Liable for Corruption
When corrupt politicians are caught and convicted, they may suffer a variety of penalties, including fines and incarceration, and the government might also seize assets that were the proceeds of the wrongdoing. But punishing the individual politicians is not enough to deter wrongdoing or to compensate for the harm that the corruption causes. Moreover, even when an individual politician was the only actor who deliberately and intentionally engaged in corrupt criminal activity, that individual politician is not the only one at fault. Politicians’ decisions are affected by norms within a political party— for example, by expectations (sometimes unstated) that politicians will bring in a certain amount of money for campaign funds through graft.
For these reasons, political parties— in addition to the individual politicians— should be held liable for corrupt acts committed by their members in the course of their political activities or official duties. And such liability should attach even if the political parties’ leaders did not specifically know about or overtly endorse the corrupt acts in question.
This may seem like a radical suggestion, but in fact there are many contexts in which the law imposes so-called “vicarious liability” on organizations for acts committed by the organization’s members or agents. For example, the legal doctrine of respondeat superior (Latin for “let the master answer”) says that an employer (or other principal) can be held accountable for the wrongful actions of an employee (or agent), if the wrongful actions were within the normal “scope of employment.” Common examples include suing a hospital for the malpractice of one of its physicians or holding the government financially liable for wrongful conduct by law enforcement officers. (Although respondeat superior derives from English common law, other legal systems, such as those of Brazil and France have broadly similar concepts of vicarious liability.) Similarly, under the law of many jurisdictions, a corporation may be held liable (not only civilly, but also criminally) for acts committed by corporate employees—even if corporate management did not condone or even know about the criminal acts. These vicarious liability doctrines are important because a single employee frequently does not have the resources to redress the wrongs committed, and also because the employer often bears some responsibility for whatever the employee did, due to company culture, training, and incentive schemes. Because of this, economists point out that vicarious liability can be more socially efficient: The organization may be in a better position to detect and prevent wrongful conduct, so placing the liability on the organization can give it the appropriate incentives to take cost-justified measures to prevent the wrongful activity from occurring in the first place.
Although vicarious liability is a well-established legal principle, often used to hold employers responsible for the conduct of their employees, that concept has not yet been extended to hold political parties, as organizations, legally responsible for the corrupt acts of their members. Such an extension may seem radical, and in a sense it is, but it would be justified.
To make this case, I’ll apply the three-pronged standard that Black’s Law Dictionary lays out for respondeat superior liability to be appropriate in the employment context: (1) The individual was an employee when the occurred; (2) The employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment; and (3) The activities of the employee were a benefit to the employer. Continue reading
The Australian Government Shows Us How Not To Create an Anticorruption Agency
Two recent polls of the Australian public make two things quite clear: the Australian people have little trust in their federal politicians, and they want a federal anticorruption agency to investigate misuse of public office. This is perhaps not surprising given the string of scandals that have come to light in the past few years (see, for example, here, here, and here). And ordinary citizens are not alone: a survey of government workers found that thousands believed they had witnessed acts of corrupt behavior, particularly cronyism and nepotism. And a group of 34 former Australian Judges, including a former Chief Justice of the High Court, have published an open letter to Prime Minister Scott Morrison stating that Australian trust in federal politics is at an all-time low due to perceptions of corruption, and that a federal anticorruption agency is the necessary response.
It is therefore unsurprising that the proposed creation of a federal anticorruption agency has emerged as a salient issue in the upcoming federal elections, to be held on May 18 (one week from tomorrow). The Morrison government initially dismissed the idea, but in December 2018 changed its tune and announced that, if the Liberal Party (Morrison’s party) wins the election, the government would create a Commonwealth Integrity Commission with two separate divisions: a law enforcement integrity division and a public sector integrity division. The former would have the power to investigate police officers and other law enforcement personnel, while the latter would have the power to investigate politicians.
Unfortunately, while a federal anticorruption agency is an idea whose time has come, the Morrison government’s proposal suffers from four key shortcomings: Continue reading
Presidential Power Grab: Corruption and Democratic Backsliding in Mongolia
Mongolian democracy is in trouble. On March 26, President Khaltmaa Battulga proposed emergency legislation that would grant the presidency unprecedented powers to dismiss members of the judiciary, the prosecutor general, and the head of the state anticorruption agency (the Independent Authority Against Corruption, or IAAC). One day later, parliament approved this legislation by a vote of 34-6 (with 36 members of parliament either absent or abstaining), despite the fact that President Battulga hails from the Democratic Party (DP) while the rival Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) controls parliament. Technically the law doesn’t grant the dismissal powers directly to the president, but rather to a three-member National Security Council (NSC) composed of the president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament, and an oversight body called the Judicial General Council. But President Battulga dominates the NSC and personally appoints the members of the Judicial General Council, giving him effective authority to remove Mongolia’s judges and chief law enforcement officials at will. Sure enough, promptly after the law was passed, Battulga dismissed the head of the IAAC, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general.
This new legislation, a crippling blow to Mongolian democracy, has its origins in corruption, and corruption is likely to be its effect. President Battulga induced parliament to grant him such extraordinary powers by claiming that he alone can really take on Mongolia’s severe corruption problem. In his statement to parliament introducing the new legislation, Battulga alleged that the country’s law enforcement leaders were “part of a conspiracy system” that “fabricat[ed] criminal cases with a political agenda” while covering up others. The president pointed to Mongolia’s numerous unresolved corruption scandals to argue that the institutions of justice were “serving the officials who nominated and appointed them” rather than the public, and he argued that reducing the independence of the judiciary, the prosecutorial apparatus, and the IAAC would make those institutions more responsive to the popular will to fight corruption.
President Battulga is correct when he asserts that Mongolia has a corruption problem of serious, perhaps epidemic, proportions. Mongolians regularly list corruption as one of the country’s biggest issues (second only to unemployment in a 2018 survey) and political institutions such as parliament and political parties as among the most corrupt entities. The past few years have been especially scandal-plagued. During the 2017 presidential campaign, all three candidates faced accusations of corruption; most egregiously, the MPP candidate—who, until January 2019, served as speaker of the Mongolian parliament—was caught on video discussing a plan to sell government offices in a $25 million bribery scheme. Further, late in 2018, journalists discovered that numerous politically-connected Mongolians, including somewhere from 23 to 49 of the 75 sitting members of parliament, had been treating a government program designed to provide funding for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as a personal piggy bank, taking out over a million dollars in low-cost loans. Beyond these scandals, Mongolia’s poor enforcement record compounds its corruption problem. For example, in 2015, only 7% of cases investigated by the IAAC resulted in convictions, and in 2018 public approval of the IAAC reached an all-time low.
But is there any reason to believe that President Battulga is right that giving him greater personal control over law enforcement and the judiciary will lead to less corruption? All the evidence points to no:
India’s Political Party Finance Reform Falls Short of Ensuring Complete Transparency—But Is Still a Step in the Right Direction
On March 1, 2018, India began its latest effort to clean up the financing of political parties and elections. This efforts involves the sale of so-called “electoral bonds” at select state banks across the country. The term “electoral bonds” is a misnomer, for these “bonds” are not linked to elections, nor do they involve paying back a loan or yielding interest. Rather, these instruments are simply a new means to facilitate financial donations to political parties, and are intended to displace the undocumented cash transfers that form the lifeblood of Indian politics. As India’s Finance Minister argued, this cash-based system causes two problems: First, “unclean money from unidentifiable sources” facilitates corruption and money laundering. Second, the reliance on cash allows parties to underreport both their budgets and spending. These concerns led the government last year to reduce the limit on anonymous cash donations from $300 to $30. Electoral bonds intend to further disrupt the system and achieve at least some increases in transparency of political spending.
Announcement of the new system has generated significant commentary, with the few admirers crowded out by the numerous detractors (see, for example, here, here, and here). The main focus of criticism is the new scheme’s guarantee of donor anonymity: Electoral bonds will carry no name and nobody, other than the bank and donor, can know who made the donation unless the donor willingly discloses her identity. The government has defended the anonymity guarantee as a way to prevent reprisals against donors, but critics understandably argue that the lack of transparency means that much political financing will continue to come from “unidentifiable sources,” allowing big business to keep lobbing money in exchange for policy favors while the public remains in the dark. (Moreover, the government’s emphasis on fear of reprisals as the rationale for anonymity suggests the government is unduly concerned with protecting the only class of donors for whom this would be a significant concern, namely large capitalists.) The electoral bond scheme has thus been painted as a move that potentially strengthens the crony capitalism responsible for India’s dire economic situation.
This strong negative reaction to the electoral bond scheme is, in my view, overwrought. True, the new policy does not solve the deep and serious problems with political finance in India. But it does have some notable advantages over status quo. Additionally, critics of the electoral bond system sometimes seem to treat donor transparency as an unalloyed good, when in fact donor transparency may have some drawbacks as well (even if one doesn’t take too seriously the government’s official line on political reprisals). Let me elaborate on each of these points: Continue reading