GAB is pleased to cross-post Tilman Hoppe’s April 22 post on judicial vetting policy from Verfassungsblog, a leading source of analysis and informed commentary on public law issues.

In 2022, Moldova launched an ambitious judicial vetting process to fight corruption in the justice system. To that end, it created special commissions tasked with reviewing the integrity of members of judicial self-governing bodies, as well as senior judges and prosecutors. Because such bodies exercise far-reaching powers over judicial careers and discipline, their own independence is crucial.

In Moldova, this independence is now at stake: the ruling majority of Parliament lowered the threshold for appointing members to a simple majority. What may appear to be a technical adjustment points to something more fundamental. Read in light of the ECtHR’s case law on Poland’s contested justice reforms, the new Moldovan threshold risks undermining the Commission’s independence under Article 6 ECHR and, unfortunately with it, the legitimacy of the vetting process itself.

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