Guest Post: Despite Serious Flaws, U.S. Safeguards Against Political Corruption Can Serve as Model for the World

Today’s guest post is from Scott Greytak, the Director of Advocacy at Transparency International US.

As much of the world converges on Atlanta for the 10th Session of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Conference of the States Parties (CoSP), the urgent need for a renewed, reinforced, and relevant global anticorruption framework takes center stage. Among the most important issues to address concerns political finance transparency, an issue that the current version of the UNCAC does not directly cover. The United States is well-positioned to provide leadership on this issue. While U.S. laws on money in politics have failed to keep pace with America’s evolving political dynamics, aspects of these laws nevertheless can and should serve as inspirations for much of the world as it struggles with political corruption. The CoSP presents a chance for the U.S. to share its experiences and lessons learned with other countries, and to support resolutions and amendments to include commitments on political finance transparency in the UNCAC itself.

Suggesting that the U.S. can be a leader or a model on the issue of regulating money in politics may sound surprising. My colleagues and I at Transparency International US are all too aware of the many failings of American democracy, including the American approach to political finance regulation. More than in any other major developed country in the world, for example, people in the United States believe that rich people buy elections, and U.S. political finance laws are in urgent need of updating, to address persistent problems like the influence of “dark money” in elections, and the need for adequately funded public financing programs for political campaigns. But comparatively speaking, some pieces of the U.S. legal framework can serve as a useful benchmark. For instance, a survey by the Global Data Barometer Political Integrity Module and the International IDEA’s Political Finance Database revealed that of 181 countries surveyed, 100 do not have any limits whatsoever on how much money can be given to a candidate for office. In contrast, the United States has comprehensive contribution limits for candidates, political parties, and traditional political action committees (even though such limits are infamously absent when it comes to “independent” expenditure committees, or Super PACs). Emphasizing this best practice, among others, on the global stage in Atlanta could help jumpstart a much-needed exchange and collaborative approach that could raise the bar for all democratic and emerging-democratic countries.

To this end, the United States should support resolutions and amendments that require countries to enact and enforce laws that disclose campaign contributions to candidates and political parties, as well as expenditures made by those candidates and parties, in a timely and publicly accessible fashion. The U.S. can also support requirements that countries to establish and appropriately fund independent oversight bodies that monitor political spending and enforce political finance laws. The U.S. delegation can support protections for whistleblowers who call out political finance violations and can urge countries to expressly commit to sharing information, best practices, and resources in fulfillment of these commitments, and to engage with civil society closely and consistently when developing and implementing these measures.

Amidst yet another year of increasing global political unrest and accompanying anxieties, successful examples of U.S. laws can and must serve as inspirations to others. In an era of seemingly limitless challenges to democracy in all regions of the world, it is this collaboration and commitment that can fortify its foundations. A first step can and must be taken by the U.S. in Atlanta.

Any Change is Progress? African Citizens Hope the Coups will Leave the Fight against Corruption in Better Hands

Africa has seen a recent spate of military coups—from Mali to Guinea to Burkina Faso to Niger to Gabon. Most Western powers have condemned these coups. But many Africans have rejoiced, or at least have been far less concerned. For example, a survey conducted shortly after the coup in Niger suggests that most people in four other West African countries (Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast) believed that the Niger coup was justified. Why the dissonance between Western and African reactions to these coups?

The answer has to do with the dysfunction and corruption of many nominally “democratic” African governments. Endemic corruption has destroyed public trust in African democracy, and coup leaders have made it clear that corruption is one of the core justifications for their takeovers. Whether this is sincere, a pretext, or a combination, it is clear that the coup leaders are tapping into a sense of genuine public grievance, and that many citizens in these countries have become so frustrated with their elected governments that they would willingly trade electoral democracy for a government with the political will to fight corruption and improve living conditions.

For this reason, it would be an error to see African citizens’ support for these coups as evidence of a turn against genuine democracy. But there is an enormous gap between genuine democracy and the reality of electoral democracy as it exists in many African countries. Westerners who are surprised by African citizens’ support for the recent coups have underestimated just how poorly the corruption of the previous regimes had devastated public trust.

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Institutionalizing People Power: How Switzerland Overcame Systemic Corruption

How do states escape pervasive corruption? Expanding the small set of success stories, a burgeoning line of research (see herehereherehere, or here) seeks answers to this question through the study of polities that have achieved control of corruption before Second World War. This group of so-called “early achievers” mostly consist of Western and Northern European countries as well as territories that seceded from them. One lesson that has been drawn from the study of early achievers is that the gradual depoliticization of governance is an essential step on a society’s path to becoming free from endemic corruption. Indeed, some have suggested that transitioning to a robust democracy before building a sufficiently effective and clean state is a recipe for corruption and state capture, as political parties will organize on clientalist lines and focus mainly on capturing rents. The key to combating systemic corruption, on this account, is building a strong and professional class of civil servants and judges who are insulated from politics.

The case of Switzerland, which has received little attention so far, presents a puzzle in this regard. Now a textbook example of effective (domestic) corruption control, early nineteenth century Switzerland shared many of the klepocratic governance patterns we find in low- and middle-income countries today. Long dominated by a handful of wealthy families, from the 1830s onwards Swiss state institutions fell under the sway of a group of entrepreneurs involved in the financing and organization of railway construction. These “Railway Barons” dominated Swiss politics through a web of patronage networks and used the captured institutions of the state to assert their individual interests. But by the beginning of the twentieth century, Switzerland was free from such systemic corruption. Remarkably, and contrary to conventional thinking about early achievers, Switzerland accomplished this not by limiting democracy, but by doubling down on it. Continue reading

When Do Partisans Turn on One of Their Own? Reflections on the New Menendez Case

The biggest corruption-related political news in the United States over the past couple of weeks is the decision by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to indict Senator Bob Menendez (Democrat of New Jersey) for allegedly taking bribes (including cash, gold bars, and a luxury car) from several businessmen, in exchange for using his influence to help these businessmen in various ways. If you’re having a sense of déjà vu, it’s because we’ve seen this movie (at least the beginning) before: Back in 2015, the DOJ indicted Senator Menendez for accepting lavish gifts from a wealthy friend and campaign donor, allegedly in exchange for using his influence to help advance that donor’s personal and business interests. That prosecution was unsuccessful: The DOJ pursued the case, but although the prosecutors prevailed on some important issues of law, the trial, which took place in 2017, ended in a hung jury—presumably because some of the jurors did not think that prosecutors had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the luxury trips and gifts bestowed on Senator Menendez were bribes, rather than personal hospitality offered by a close friend.

It remains to be seen whether the legal outcome will be different in this case (and of course, it should go without saying, Senator Menendez is entitled to the presumption of innocence in a court of law, though he is entitled to no such presumption in the court of public opinion). But there is already one notable difference between the current case and the 2015 case: the reaction of Senator Menendez’s colleagues in the Democratic party. As I write this (several days before the post will likely be published, so forgive me if this is a bit out of date), a number of prominent Democrats, including New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy, several Democratic Senators, and numerous Democratic House Members, including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, have called on Menendez to resign. To be sure, as a critics have noted, several leading Democrats—including President Joe Biden and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer—have not called on Senator Menendez to resign. But this is still a marked contrast from 2015, when to the best of my recollection (and readers should feel free to correct me if I’m wrong) no prominent Democrats called on Senator Menendez to resign. Why the difference? Continue reading

The Role of Anticorruption Communications in Sustaining Integrity Reforms

Today’s Guest Post is by Corina Rebegea, governance and anti-corruption advisor with the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Corina oversees programming on transparency, anticorruption and countering kleptocracy and has previously worked on rule of law and justice reform, democratic governance and foreign policy issues, and foreign malign influence.

Moments of democratic opening can be a critical time for anticorruption reforms. In many instances, corruption triggered regime change. In a just released paper for the National Democratic Institute, I examine how to shape a reform message when a sudden shift to democracy opens a window of opportunity.

The paper confirms the important and obvious but often overlooked point that how we talk about corruption plays an important role in democratic transitions. An anticorruption communication campaign can thus inform policy priorities, help mobilize and sustain public opinion, and manage expectations. All are crucial for creating the conditions that make systemic change possible – and durable.

During times of political change, dedicating time to communications, as well as having the right expertise and tools, can be a daunting task. Especially as competing priorities must be addressed in a short period of time. Campaigns can also backfire, as the research summarized in the paper. The campaign can focus too much on the problem, leading to resignation, apathy or even nudging citizens to engage in corruption. Understanding how to effectively communicate anticorruption priorities, reforms and timelines is essential, particularly as there is a risk that forces opposing the democratic opening will retain enough power to derail integrity reforms and cause the window to close.

While more experimentation, research and analysis are needed, the lessons the paper offers are meant to inform the design of campaigns to build public support for integrity reforms, trust, and durable anticorruption outcomes. 

Money for Something: Do Remittances Have an Anticorruption Effect?

Remittances—the money or goods that migrants send home to support their families and friends—have become increasingly important in developing countries. In nations like Haiti, Honduras, and Tajikistan, remittances account for more than 20% of their respective GDPs. Interestingly, many of these top recipient countries also rank among the most corrupt in the world, at least according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. While that correlation does not by itself establish causation, it does invite the question of whether large flows of remittances have any meaningful impact on corruption within the recipient country.

Surprisingly, this question has been “virtually ignored” in academic literature. Only a few studies investigate the connection between remittances and corruption, and the handful of papers on this topic come to quite different conclusions.

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New Podcast Episode, Featuring Oksana Huss and Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez

A new episode of KickBack: The Global Anticorruption Podcast is now available. During the ongoing emergency in Ukraine, as Russia’s unprovoked military aggression throws the region and the world into crisis, my colleagues at the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN) and I are going to try as best as we can to feature on our podcast experts who can shed greater light on how issues related to corruption relate to the war, the larger political context, and the international response. In this episode, I had the opportunity to speak to two ICRN members: Oksana Huss, a research fellow at the University of Bologna, and Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez, Associate Professor at Osaka University. Our conversation begins with Oksana explaining Ukraine’s transformation since the Maidan Revolution in 2014, particularly democratic and anticorruption reforms under President Zelensky’s administration, and the cultural, political, and economic threat that developments in Ukraine posed to Russian elites and the Putin regime. Joseph then discusses Russia’s use of so-called “strategic corruption” to extend Russian influence in the West. Then, after recognizing the heroism of the Ukrainian army in slowing the Russian advance, our conversation turns to the impact of sanctions on Russia and Russia’s political and economic elites, and the extent to which cracking down on the dirty money may help counter Russian aggression. You can also find both this episode and an archive of prior episodes at the following locations: KickBack is a collaborative effort between GAB and the Interdisciplinary Corruption Research Network (ICRN). If you like it, please subscribe/follow, and tell all your friends! And if you have suggestions for voices you’d like to hear on the podcast, just send me a message and let me know.

The U.S. State Department’s New International Anticorruption Champions Awards Are a Winning Strategy in the Fight Against Corruption

This past February, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken launched one of the first foreign policy initiatives of the new Biden administration: the inaugural International Anticorruption Champions Awards. After receiving nominations from U.S. embassies around the world, the State Department honored a dozen individuals who made significant contributions to combatting corruption in their home countries. The recipients of the International Anticorruption Champions Awards were diverse in every sense of the word. They spanned six continents, represented national and local governments, state-owned companies, and non-governmental organizations. The awardees came from countries big and small, were young and old, and a third were women.

These awards added to a growing movement to provide formal international recognition to those who are leading the fight against corruption in their home countries. Transparency International has recognized such individuals and organizations through their Anti-Corruption Awards semi-annually since 2013, and the United Nations’ Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Center established the annual International Anti-Corruption Excellence Award in 2016. But, importantly, the International Anticorruption Champions Awards mark the first time that one sovereign country—and a major global power at that—officially recognized and honored anticorruption advocacy in other countries.

While it might be tempting to dismiss these awards as empty symbolism (or worse), this would be a mistake. That the U.S. government has created these awards, and apparently intends to continue to issue them annually, is a significant positive contribution to the global fight against corruption, for several reasons.

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Guest Post: Do More Candidate-Centric Electoral Systems Help Reduce Corruption?

Today’s guest post is from Rumilda Cañete-Straub, Josepa Miquel-Florensa, Stéphane Straub, and Karine Van der Straeten.

Although many people hope and expect that regular elections will help reduce corruption, this is not always the case: In many democracies, voters elect and reelect corrupt politicians. Why is this? Scholars have suggested that the efficacy of electoral democracy in reducing corruption depends on specific features of the electoral system, and the information available to voters. With respect to the electoral system, a common view is that electoral rules that give voters more formal control over individual candidates—such as primaries in majoritarian systems or open lists rather than closed lists in proportional representation (PR) systems—are more effective in reducing corruption. With respect to information, the conventional wisdom holds that providing voters with more information should help them identify corrupt politicians, thus increasing the chances that those politicians will be punished at the ballot box.

In our recent article, we present findings that challenge both aspects of this conventional wisdom. We focus on the comparison between closed-list PR system (in which voters vote only for a party, with the individual candidates elected depending on their position on the party’s list) and an open-list PR system in which voters can vote for any number of candidates on the list, without any constraint. Continue reading

A Lesson in Democracy? The Bitter Irony of Malaysia’s Failed Anticorruption Coalition

The tools of democracy may combat tyranny, but they do not always combat corruption. That’s not to suggest that democratic values run counter to anticorruption efforts. Indeed, a free press and a competitive multi-party system remain powerful tools in ensuring corruption does not take root. However, once corruption has snaked its way throughout a government, democratic values and institutions may be too easily manipulated to fight corruption effectively. Perhaps no world leader illustrates this seeming paradox better than Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, who served as Prime Minister twice. His long first tenure, from 1981 to 2003, earned him notoriety as a near-dictator whose autocratic regime contributed to a deeply-rooted culture of corruption and cronyism. During his short-lived second tenure from 2018 to 2020, Mahathir was heralded as a champion of democracy—but the liberal democratic pillars that he had suppressed during his first tenure, most notably genuine political competition and a free press, contributed to the failure of his anticorruption efforts and ultimately to the fall of his government. The bitter irony is that the suppression of both political competition and press freedom helped to create Malaysia’s entrenched corruption during Mahathir’s first tenure, while the flourishing of political competition and the free press contributed to the failure of Malaysia’s attempts to root out this entrenched corruption during his second tenure.

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