Policing Private Parties: How to Get Kleptocrats’ Seized Assets to their Citizens

As Rick has pointed out, it is exciting to see the successful forfeiture of U.S.-based assets owned by sitting Vice President of Equatorial Guinea, kleptocrat and international playboy Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (“Obiang”). The Department of Justice estimates that the assets are worth an estimated $30 million. Also encouraging is the fact that the bulk of the settlement funds will be returned to the people of Equatorial Guinea. This is the first case in which the assets of a current leader’s cronies will be seized and repatriated to the country of origin by the U.S. Disbursing millions of dollars transparently in country that ranks 163/177 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index will be challenging.

In stolen asset repatriation cases, the debate over disbursement typically boils down to whether to channel reclaimed cash through the government or through private actors. In Equatorial Guinea, returning the money directly to the government is a non-starter: the Obiang family has an extensive record of human rights and corruption abuses and a tight grip on power. The DOJ settlement accordingly cuts the government and its henchmen out of the forfeiture proceeds and channels repatriated funds through a private charity. But simply relying on private actors will not eliminate corruption challenges; there are pitfalls in channeling aid through private NGOs as well.

The DOJ should keep the following risks in mind as works out a disbursement plan for the Obiang settlement funds: Continue reading

Transparency International Makes Its Data Less Transparent: Why TI Should Be Ashamed of Its 2014 CPI Report

For all its flaws, I’ve long been of the view that Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has, on balance, made a positive contribution to our understanding of corruption, and the fight against it. (A couple of my sympathetic treatments can be found here and here.) Although some in the media (and, depressingly, some in academic and policy circles) misuse the index, TI has generally been quite clear about what the CPI numbers do and do not tell us.  And to its great credit, TI has proven remarkably receptive to criticism: each year TI’s annual CPI report has become better, clearer, more nuanced, and more transparent in its limitations.

Until this year. The 2014 CPI came out yesterday, and I’m disappointed at how TI has taken a big step backward, making the meaning of its scores less transparent, and choosing to play for catchy headlines rather than to deepen understanding. Continue reading

More on CPI Changes Over Time (or Not)

OK, in my post from a few weeks back, I asserted that year-to-year changes in a country’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score are not meaningful, even after the thoughtful and welcome changes that Transparency International made to its methodology in 2012. My concern was — and remains — that the underlying data sources that TI uses to create the index are themselves not likely to be comparable across years, which means that the CPI inherits the problem. But for purposes of this post, I’m going to completely disregard my own warning in that earlier post, and take a look at whether there have been fact been any notable changes in individual countries’ perceived corruption between 2012 and 2013.  Based on a very quick scan of the data, the answer appears to be (mostly) no.

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Post-2012 CPI Scores Can’t Be Compared Across Time, Either

In post last week, I emphasized what lots of others have already tried (without much apparent success) to point out: Prior to 2012, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores are not comparable over time.  The fact that a country’s score from one year to the next goes up or down might reflect an actual change in perceived corruption, but might be due to a whole host of other factors (changing aggregation methodology, changing scope of country coverage, change in perceived corruption of other countries, etc.), such that simple year-to-year comparisons are unreliable.  In making this point, I was not criticizing TI itself, which has been quite clear that the pre-2012 CPI scores cannot be compared across years.

But what about 2012 and after?  In 2012, TI announced, with much fanfare, that starting with the 2012 CPI and henceforth, scores across years would be comparable, due to changes in methodology (described here).

Is this right?  If it were, it would be a huge benefit both to scholars and policy reformers who want to evaluate changes over time–and the impact of various interventions.  Alas, after reading through TI’s discussion of the revised methodology, I regret to say the answer is probably no.

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Pre-2012 CPI Scores CANNOT Be Compared Across Time–So Please Stop Doing It!

OK, I know (as Rick pointed out in a recent post) that a lot — maybe too much — of the content on this blog has focused on measurement issues, so I apologize for yet another post on that topic, but this has really been bugging me:

Transparency International has been publishing its well-known and widely-used Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) since 1995.  The index has its pros and cons, several of which have been discussed on this blog (see here, here, here, here, and here).  But putting other debates about the CPI’s validity and utility to the side, one thing should be perfectly clear: At least prior to 2012 (when TI changed its method and scoring system for the CPI), a country’s CPI scores CANNOT be compared across years.  The fact that Country X scores, say, a 4.4 in 2002, and scores a 4.9 in 2005, does NOT mean that (perceived) corruption has declined in country X.  Maybe it did, but it might have stayed the same, or gotten worse.  At most, the pre-2012 CPI provides information about country’s ranking relative to other countries, within a single year, with respect to corruption perceptions.

TI itself could not be more explicit about this, stating bluntly “CPI scores before 2012 are not comparable over time.”  Yet I keep coming across sources — news articles, presentations by leading international organizations, academic papers — that use year-to-year CPI comparisons to make claims about how corruption in a particular country or region is improving or worsening, or about whether a particular policy intervention is working or not.  YOU CAN’T DO THIS!  PLEASE STOP!!

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Multiple Errors in Quantitative Data Analysis, from Site Specializing in Quantitative Data Analysis

Like many people out there, I’m both a huge fan of Nate Silver–and the rigorous quantitative approach to election forecasting that he popularized–and at the same time quite disappointed in his FiveThirtyEight website, where the posts (especially those not by Silver himself) often seem to be slapdash efforts by people who have a smattering of statistical knowledge but don’t really know much about the topics they’re writing about. A depressing recent example, germane to this blog, is a post from last week entitled “It Only Seems Like Politics Is More Corrupt.” I normally wouldn’t bother to comment on something so slight here (especially because the post appears to have been written by an intern, and I generally try to avoid beating up on people who are just starting out), but many of the errors in analysis are both sufficiently elementary, and sufficiently common in discussions of corruption trends in other contexts (and by people with much more experience and therefore less of an excuse), that it’s worth taking a moment to explain what’s wrong.

A quick summary: The author cites recent U.S. Gallup poll data showing that the percentage of Americans who believe that “corruption is widespread” throughout the government in the United States has increased from about 60% in 2006 to a little over 75% in 2013. However, the author argues, the data doesn’t support the idea that corruption in the U.S. has actually worsened. To support that claim, she points to two other data sources:

  1. U.S. Department of Justice statistics from 1992-2012 show that the number of cases prosecuted by the DOJ’s Public Integrity Section (as well as the number of convictions and number of cases awaiting trial) appears to have declined, or at least hasn’t increased.
  2. The U.S. score on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) hasn’t changed very much between 1995 and 2013 (although there’s concededly a slight downward trend).

Do these two data sources disprove the idea that corruption in the U.S. has worsened over the last eight years, or more generally that the U.S. public’s perception of corruption is inaccurate?  In a word, no. There are so many elementary conceptual and statistical errors in this analysis, it’s difficult to know where to begin, but let me take a shot at cataloguing the most egregious problems: Continue reading

Are Less Corrupt Countries More Faithful Enforcers of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention?

The failure of many signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to enforce their new laws against the bribery of foreign public officials has been widely noted, including on this blog. There is no single factor that explains this lack of enforcement across the 30 or so countries (out of 41 total signatories) that have not yet seriously begun enforcing their anti-bribery laws. However, there is a fair amount of descriptive evidence about the extent to which signatories actually do so: Transparency International (TI) has, for the last nine years, released annual reports on progress, which provide a good deal of information on this level.

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Corruption Risk Assessments: Some Observations on Private Sector Analyses

As the pressure to curb corruption has grown, so too has the demand for “corruption risk assessments,” efforts to predict what form corruption in a public agency or private firm is likely to take and what can be done to reduce if not to eliminate it.  In the private sector risk assessments have been fueled by national laws that reduce penalties for corruption violations if a firm has a risk management program in place.  In the public sector risk assessments help assure citizens that their money is not being stolen and provide an agency leader unlucky enough to be at the helm when a corruption scandal breaks at least a partial defense to charges of incompetence or venality.

Public sector assessments come in several varieties: those which examine the risks faced by a single organization, say the Albanian tax agency, others which assess risks in a publicly-funded program, for example a de-forestation project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and still others which consider overall risk in a sector with a large public presence such as water or education.  While public sector assessments are almost always readily available, private sector assessments are not, presumably for proprietary or competitive reasons.  What is available on private sector risk assessment are hundreds (thousands?) of tomes advising firms on how to conduct a risk assessment — often written by those looking to assess the corruption risks a corporation faces for a fee.

A Google search for “corruption risk assessment” produced 300,000 hits, one for “assessing corruption risks” 48 million!  I won’t pretend to have read even a representative sample of the reports or “how to” manuals, but the many I have read so far have been a disappointment. Continue reading

Corruption Measurement: A Primer

In an early post Matthew predicted that the measurement of corruption was likely to be a major topic of discussion on this blog.  So far his prediction has proved correct.  Ten of the sixty plus posts that have appeared since this blog was launched in mid-February have been devoted in whole or part to measurement issues:  Are perception measures accurate?  Useful whether accurate or not?  What’s the source of the $1 trillion bribe estimate?  Shouldn’t someone develop sub-national corruption perception measures?   And so forth.

This eleventh post steps back from the policy issues examined in earlier ones to address a much more straightforward question:  What are the different ways corruption can be measured? Continue reading

Let’s Create Sub-National Corruption Perception Indexes for the BRICS

For all their flaws, the major cross-country corruption indexes—Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and the like—have been quite useful, both for research (at least when used appropriately) and for advocacy.  But one important limitation of these datasets is that by focusing on corruption (or perceived corruption) at the country level, they may obscure the fact that there can be substantial within-country variation in the level of (perceived) corruption.  This variation may occur across government institutions—the same country may have quite different degrees of corruption in the health sector, the police force, the judiciary, customs, etc.  More pertinent here, there may also be significant heterogeneity across regions, particularly in large countries with substantial political decentralization.  Indeed, numerous studies have exploited within-country regional variation in corruption levels to test various hypotheses about corruption’s causes and consequences; such studies include research on Italy, Russia, China, the Philippines, and the United States, among others.  But these studies typically make use of particular data sets that are not reproduced year-to-year.

As we’re starting to see rapidly diminishing returns from the major cross-country corruption datasets, it is high time for those organizations with the resources and capacity to compile information on corruption perceptions on an ongoing basis to turn their focus to within-country regional variation in corruption.  I propose the creation of a sub-national corruption perceptions index (snCPI), starting with the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which would gather and compile data (primarily perception-based data, perhaps supplemented with more objective data when available) on perceived corruption levels within the major sub-national units (states/provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities) within each of those countries.

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