Happy International Anti-Corruption Day!

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As some readers of this blog already know, today (December 9th) is International Anti-Corruption Day. Other readers may be wondering, “Huh? International Anti-Corruption Day? What’s that?”

I’m glad you asked. When the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was opened for signature in 2003, the General Assembly’s resolution included a specific plank “decid[ing] that, in order to raise awareness of corruption and of the role of [UNCAC] in combating and preventing it, 9 December should be designated International Anti-Corruption Day.” (And you thought the UN General Assembly never decided anything important. Shame on you.)

So what should you do to celebrate International Anti-Corruption Day? It’s easy to make fun of things like this — and as should be clear, that’s a temptation I can’t entirely resist. But at the same time, I do think that raising awareness of the issue is important. And though I can’t find much about attention-raising activities in conjunction with this year’s International Anti-Corruption Day, apparently last year the UN tried to take the opportunity to launch a campaign — with slogans, Tweets, etc. — to get more attention to the issue. You can check out their website on how to “celebrate” International Anti-Corruption Day here.

One last Anti-Corruption Day thought: As I said, I’m all for raising more awareness. But at the risk of sounding like a Grinch, I think it’s fair to raise the question whether publicity gambits like this are starting to outlive their usefulness. Many in the anticorruption community–particularly those who started working on these topics in the 1990s or earlier, when it was definitely treated as marginal in many quarters–have spent a lot of time and energy trying to raise awareness about the issue. And the thing is, they’ve succeeded. The international community is aware of the problem, and takes it seriously (at least in the sense of acknowledging corruption as a legitimate concern). As I see it, the anticorruption movement is now in a tricky transitional phase: The first generation won an important battle, by getting corruption on the international agenda. The new generation needs to make more progress on figuring out what exactly to do about it. So by all means, use the International Anti-Corruption Day gimmick as a way to raise awareness. But at the same time, let’s recognize that we’re reaching the point where raising awareness isn’t really a central issue anymore.

Sunlight and Secrecy: Whistleblowing, Corruption, and the NSA

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While press coverage of the US National Security Agency (NSA) has been dominated by revelations, and concerns, regarding the scope of the NSA’s surveillance programs, recently this organization has been in the news for an altogether different reason. A number of recent articles have highlighted the remarkably porous nature of the relationship between the NSA and the private sector as well as potentially improper conduct on the part of a number of NSA officials. In October alone, several stories emerged regarding the fact that: (1) the husband of a high-ranking NSA official was registered as the resident agent of a private signals intelligence consulting firm located at the pair’s residence while the official herself served as the resident agent for an office and electronics business, also headquartered at her home; (2) the NSA’s Chief Technical Officer had been permitted to work for up to 20 hours a week for a private cybersecurity firm while still holding his post; and (3) the former head of the NSA had founded a private consulting company shortly after his retirement in spite of the fact that many commentators have questioned the degree to which he will be able to set aside confidential information he learned during the course of his time as the head of this organization.

To be clear, while a few commentators have thrown around the term “corruption” when discussing the apparent impropriety of some of these arrangements, there have been no allegations that the officials involved broke any laws or otherwise acted in a manner that can be deemed “corrupt” in any formal sense. Nonetheless, this cluster of incidents provides an opportunity to pause and reflect upon the inherent difficulties of identifying and addressing instances of corruption within the context of an organization which is extremely insular and unavoidably secretive. More specifically, the crucial part that whistleblowers and the media have played in bringing these incidents to light raises the question of what role, if any, we believe that greater transparency may play in exposing instances of corruption within the NSA. Sunlight may be the best disinfectant, as Justice Brandeis famously noted, but can or should it play a role when the organization in question is, by necessity, shrouded in secrecy?

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Policing Private Parties: How to Get Kleptocrats’ Seized Assets to their Citizens

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As Rick has pointed out, it is exciting to see the successful forfeiture of U.S.-based assets owned by sitting Vice President of Equatorial Guinea, kleptocrat and international playboy Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (“Obiang”). The Department of Justice estimates that the assets are worth an estimated $30 million. Also encouraging is the fact that the bulk of the settlement funds will be returned to the people of Equatorial Guinea. This is the first case in which the assets of a current leader’s cronies will be seized and repatriated to the country of origin by the U.S. Disbursing millions of dollars transparently in country that ranks 163/177 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index will be challenging.

In stolen asset repatriation cases, the debate over disbursement typically boils down to whether to channel reclaimed cash through the government or through private actors. In Equatorial Guinea, returning the money directly to the government is a non-starter: the Obiang family has an extensive record of human rights and corruption abuses and a tight grip on power. The DOJ settlement accordingly cuts the government and its henchmen out of the forfeiture proceeds and channels repatriated funds through a private charity. But simply relying on private actors will not eliminate corruption challenges; there are pitfalls in channeling aid through private NGOs as well.

The DOJ should keep the following risks in mind as works out a disbursement plan for the Obiang settlement funds: Continue reading →

Transparency International Makes Its Data Less Transparent: Why TI Should Be Ashamed of Its 2014 CPI Report

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For all its flaws, I’ve long been of the view that Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has, on balance, made a positive contribution to our understanding of corruption, and the fight against it. (A couple of my sympathetic treatments can be found here and here.) Although some in the media (and, depressingly, some in academic and policy circles) misuse the index, TI has generally been quite clear about what the CPI numbers do and do not tell us.  And to its great credit, TI has proven remarkably receptive to criticism: each year TI’s annual CPI report has become better, clearer, more nuanced, and more transparent in its limitations.

Until this year. The 2014 CPI came out yesterday, and I’m disappointed at how TI has taken a big step backward, making the meaning of its scores less transparent, and choosing to play for catchy headlines rather than to deepen understanding. Continue reading →

Just How Relevant for Developing Nations is Singapore’s Experience Combating Corruption?

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Policymakers in developing countries hunting for relevant examples of successful efforts to combat corruption are often urged to look to Singapore. (Click here, here, and here for representative publications.) Not only does it regularly score at or near the top of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (in seventh place in the just released 2014 index) but its history is similar to that of developing nations.  For much of the modern era it was under colonial rule, becoming fully independent only in 1965, and independence followed a turbulent decade marked by insurgency and social upheaval.  Again like many of today’s developing nations, at independence it had a backward economy and poorly educated citizenry.  Its success in lifting its citizens out of poverty and creating a modern economy, often attributed at least in part to how well it has done in curbing corruption, makes it an all the more attractive model for developing states.

But Singapore differs in so many critical ways from these nations that its relevance for their development is questionable at best. Continue reading →

Guest Post: The OECD Phase 3 Report on Turkey

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GAB is pleased to welcome back Gönenç Gürkaynak, the managing partner and head of the Regulatory and Compliance Department at ELIG, Attorneys-at-Law (Istanbul), who contributes the following guest post:

The OECD Working Group on Bribery (“WGB”) has published its Phase 3 Report on Turkey, following the Phase 2 and Phase 2Bis Recommendations (“Follow-Up Report”) of March 2010, to assess Turkey’s efforts in implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The Phase 3 Report is dominated by criticism of Turkey’s low level of enforcement and its inaction with respect to detecting, investigating, and prosecuting acts of foreign bribery. This result is consistent with the assessment provided by Transparency International in its 2014 Exporting Corruption report, which found that Turkey had “little or no enforcement” of its foreign anti-bribery laws. Indeed, despite the fact that Turkey is the 17th largest economy in the world, and has trade relations with many countries presenting potentially high risks of foreign bribery, Turkey has had only six foreign bribery investigations (only one of which was a result of pro-active detection by Turkish authorities) and no foreign bribery convictions in the 14 years since the Convention entered into force in Turkey. Thus the Phase 3 Report is yet another reminder that Turkish law enforcement regarding foreign as well as domestic bribery has still a long way to go.

As one might imagine given the disheartening enforcement statistics just noted, many of the WGB Phase 3 recommendations emphasize the need for improvements in Turkey’s mechanisms for gathering information to ensure effective detection of foreign bribery allegations and to enhance investigations by engaging with other investigative authorities. But there are three other important features of the Phase 3 report that are at least as important, and deserve more attention: First, the ambiguity of Turkey’s corporate liability laws; second, the inadequacy of Turkey’s whistleblower protections; and third, the significance of Turkey’s recent controversies over domestic anticorruption enforcement issues. Continue reading →

The Philippines Must Break the Power of Political Dynasties

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Democratic systems are no strangers to political dynasties. In the United States, some well-known families have been in politics for generations—the Kennedys held an impressive 64-year streak in Congress until 2011 (and staged a comeback only two years later), and earlier this month George P. Bush won the race for Texas Land Commissioner, carrying on the political legacy of his father Jeb Bush, his uncle George W. Bush, and his grandfather George H.W. Bush. Although the idea of political royalty inheriting power seems to cut against equal opportunity, members of such families have been revered throughout history. But political dynasties present a much greater threat to democracy when they control a majority of power in the country. In the Philippines, one study estimated that political dynasties comprised up to 70% of the last Philippine Congress (compared to 6% of the last U.S. Congress). During the last election, one notorious political clan had 80 members running for office. Indeed, Philippine political clans have evolved into the most efficient (and at times, deadly) means of monopolizing power. Various members of the same family often cycle through the same congressional, gubernatorial, and mayoral seats in their home province, and it’s not unusual to see an electoral race pitting two members of the same family against each other. In many ways, the dynastic culture of politics has removed meaningful choice from the voters, and exacerbated the pervasiveness of corruption in government.

A possible solution is before the Philippine Congress right now—the Anti-Political Dynasty Bill. This bill would prohibit any spouse or first-degree relation (including parents, siblings, and children) of an incumbent elected official from seeking elected office. Although individuals may run once their relative’s term is up, they may not immediately succeed that relative in the same elected office. (The bill would have a enormous effect on the upcoming 2016 elections—Vice President Jejomar Binay, who has already announced his candidacy, and whose daughter’s term in the Senate runs until 2019, would be precluded from running for President.) At first blush, the bill may seem antidemocratic, as it (temporarily) suspends the rights of many individuals to seek elected office. Still, in the Philippines, where the concentration of political power has bred such a strong culture of corruption, certain rights may need to be sacrificed. It is a drastic problem in need of a drastic solution.

There are several reasons why Congress should pass this bill and limit the influence of political families: Continue reading →

A First Draft of a Training Course for Anticorruption Investigators: Comments Please!

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Last week I complained about the poor quality of the training provided to investigators in developing country anticorruption agencies.   Here I offer a (very) rough draft of the topics I think a quality course should cover.  Comments, additional sources, and (gentle) critiques requested. Continue reading →

The Hidden Dangers of Anticorruption Education Initiatives

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A little while ago, in a post reflecting on the role of academics in the anticorruption movement, I noted the distinction between anticorruption classes that focus on “teaching of skills” (helping students become effective lawyers, policy analysts, critical thinkers, etc.) and “teaching of values” (using education to inculcate anticorruption norms and reduce cultural tolerance for corrupt activities). In this post I want to pick up on that latter theme, which has become increasingly important to anticorruption activists and policymakers. Fighting the “culture of corruption,” many have persuasively argued, requires not just changing incentives and formal institutions, but also changing norms and values. And one way to change values may be through education–not only formal classroom education at all levels, but other forms of educational campaigns. For example, many attribute the success of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption not only to its law enforcement efforts, but to its broad-based educational campaigns to change the attitude of the Hong Kong population. Many countries have tried to emulate some version of this broad-based “anticorruption advertisement” campaign, and there are at least anecdotal examples of such programs making a difference (though not, to my knowledge, and rigorous assessment through something like a randomized controlled trial).

But these sorts of education efforts, if not carefully designed, can prove not only ineffective, but counterproductive. I recently came across a very nice analysis by the political scientist Frederic Charles Schaffer making this point, drawing on a detailed case study of anti-vote-buying campaigns in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent in Thailand. (I haven’t yet had a chance to read Professor Schaffer’s 2008 book, The Hidden Costs of Clean Election Reform, but I gather it goes into much more depth and discusses a range of other issues and countries as well.)  The paper is from 2005, so it’s possible some of the specific examples and criticisms might no longer be apt, but my sense is that the larger points are still highly relevant, and quite important to anticorruption reformers who want to use mass education/advertisement campaigns to change citizen attitudes and behaviors toward corrupt practices. I won’t try to summarize all of Professor Schaffer’s nuanced account, but here’s what I take to be the essential argument: Continue reading →

Spy Tapes, Scorpions, and Bribe Solicitation: Prosecutorial Decisions in South Africa

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South African President Jacob Zuma is currently embroiled in a corruption investigation associated with the so-called Nkandla scandal. This is hardly the first time President Zuma has had to contend with corruption accusations, but he as so far managed to escape unscathed. One of those earlier incidents involved allegations that President Zuma received bribes from a defense contractor, but the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) dropped its investigation of those allegations in 2009. In explaining his decision to drop the investigation, Mokotedi Mpshe, the acting head of the NPA, cited “collusion between the former heads of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) and NPA to manipulate the prosecutorial process.” The evidence of this ostensible collusion? Wiretapped recordings of conversations between a former NPA head and then-DSO head Leonard McCarthy, who was responsible for directing some of the investigation into President Zuma. Mpshe claimed that the recordings, which have since become known as the “spy tapes,” showed an “abuse of process” via interference in the timing of the prosecution, forcing him to end the investigation.

This 2009 case has been in the news again, both because of the current corruption allegations against President Zuma, and also because the South African Supreme Court of Appeals recently ordered the NPA to hand over the spy tapes and associated documents to the opposition Democratic Alliance. Although the audio recordings themselves have not been made public, excerpts from their transcripts can be read online. From these excerpts (which are more extensive than those previously released in 2009), it appears the NPA’s decision to drop the case against Zuma was wrong-headed.

Continue reading →