Why Did the U.S. Fail to Fight Corruption in Afghanistan Effectively?

The war in Afghanistan is already the longest conflict in United States history. Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. government has poured over $100 billion into the reconstruction effort—more than the Marshall Plan. In spite of this massive public investment, Afghanistan’s government is weak, its economy is moribund, and the Taliban remains an active threat in the region. Contributing to all of those problems is persistent, systemic corruption. This problem was highlighted recently by a report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which  served as a harsh reminder not only that corruption in Afghanistan remains is daunting problem despite years of the reconstruction effort, but also that the U.S. has failed to address the problem, and has sometimes made it even worse. According to the SIGAR report, the U.S. failed to grasp the importance of combating corruption as part of a broader effort to improve security and stability, with policymakers and military leaders instead viewing anticorruption as a competing goal that had to be traded off against the seemingly more pressing security goals.

The SIGAR report is valuable in many ways, and its emphasis on viewing anticorruption and security as complementary rather than competing goals is welcome. (This corruption-insecurity link, and its relative neglect, have been emphasized by many other outside critics as well, most recently and prominently Sarah Chayes, who has argued that when government breaks down under the weight of corruption, people in those countries are pushed towards radicalization.) But the SIGAR report’s suggestion that the U.S. failed to adequately confront corruption in Afghanistan because leaders failed (until recently) to grasp this complementarity is not quite right.  Continue reading

Guest Post: Please, Criticize Me! (Why Anticorruption Practitioners Should Scrutinize and Challenge Research Methodology)

GAB is pleased to welcome back Roger Henke, Chairman of the Board of the Southeast Asia Development Program (SADP), who contributes the following guest post:

In a previous post, I described a survey used to estimate the incidence of fraud and associated problems within the Cambodian NGO sector. The response to the results of that survey have so far been somewhat disheartening—not so much because the research has had little influence on action (the fate of most such research), but rather because those who have been told about the study’s results have all taken the results for granted, questioning neither their meaningfulness nor how they were generated. Such at-face-value uptake is, paradoxically, a huge risk to the longer-term public acceptance of the evidence produced by social-scientific research.  I am relieved that methodological considerations (issues of publication bias, replicability, p-hacking, and others) are finally getting some traction within the social science community, but it is evident that the decades-long neglect of these problems dovetails with a public opinion climate that doubts and disparages social science expertise.

Lack of attention to the methodological underpinnings of “interesting” conclusions is hardly a remarkable fate for corruption research results, nor is it specific to corruption research.  But the anticorruption community has a lot to lose by distrust in research, and thus a lot to win by ensuring that the findings it uses to build its cases upon pass basic quality checks. For the remainder of this post I’ll examine some basic questions that the Cambodia NGO corruption survey’s results should have triggered before being accepted as credible and meaningful: Continue reading

Another Essential Web Site for Anticorruption Professionals

Last month I urged those whose investigate or prosecute corruption cases for a living to peruse and bookmark Guide to Combating Corruption & Fraud in Development Projects, an invaluable web page developed by the International Anticorruption Resource Center.  Today I recommend anticorruption professionals do the same for CAMPUS, an e-learning site developed by the Basel Institute’s International Centre for Asset Recovery.

CAMPUS currently contains four courses with more promised.  The four now available teach the user to: 1) use Excel to analyze financial records, 2) devise graphics to visualize cases and money flows, 3) show an individual is living beyond his or her means, and 4) analyze suspicious transaction reports.  Even those who are computer-challenged will find the courses easy to navigate. I have completed two and am working my way through the other two and have never had a better experience with an online course.  The substance of each is first-rate, and as with the Anticorruption Resource Center’s Guide, even veteran investigators and prosecutors will benefit from taking the courses.  Perhaps best of all, unlike many online courses computerization enhances rather than detracts from the learning experience. Take the course on using Excel to analyze financial records. Continue reading

TI’s “Declaration Against Corruption” — A Plug and a Question

Last week, I got an email alert from Transparency International asking me to sign (and publicize) TI’s new “Declaration Against Corruption.” The declaration is short and sweet:

I will not pay bribes
I will not seek bribes
I will work with others to campaign against corruption
I will speak out against corruption and report on abuse
I will only support candidates for public office who say no to corruption and demonstrate transparency, integrity and accountability

On reading the declaration, I had two thoughts. The first thought was, “Yes, of course I agree with all that, I’m happy to add my name to the list” (which I did). I’m also happy to use this blog post in part to help publicize the declaration in case some of you out there haven’t already heard about this and would like to sign on as well.

My second thought, though, was along the lines of “What’s the point?”

I ask that question with all due respect to TI. I want to pose this as a substantive, serious question about anticorruption campaign strategy: What is a “Declaration Against Corruption” like this supposed to accomplish? It certainly doesn’t do any harm, but what good do TI and other anticorruption campaigners think will come of this?

I have a few hypotheses about why one might think that calling on as many people as possible to sign onto a Declaration Against Corruption might be a useful and meaningful (as opposed to symbolic but ultimately trivial) element of an anticorruption campaign: Continue reading

Guest Post: What the McDonnell Opinion Portends for U.S. Anticorruption Law, and U.S. Politics

Jacob Eisler, Lecturer at Cambridge University, contributes the following guest post:

As Matthew observed in his blog post earlier this summer on the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision to vacate the conviction of former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell, there are two different ways one might interpret this decision. One could read McDonnell narrowly as a case that focuses on overly expansive jury instructions on the meaning of “official act” in the statutory definition of bribery. Alternatively, a more expansive reading would focus on language in the opinion that suggests the Court has a lenient attitude towards self-serving behavior by (high-ranking) public officials. As I argue at length in a forthcoming article, the broader—and for anticorruption activists more troubling—reading of the case is the right one, and the decision therefore has potentially extensive implications for American politics. Continue reading

Why Not Citizen Suits for Corrupt Procurements?

Beginning from the simple and indisputable premise that those harmed by corruption should be able to do something about it, Professor Abiola Makinwa of the Hague University of Applied Sciences develops a novel approach to attacking the ubiquitous problem of corruption in public procurement.  To appreciate it, take an example.  Suppose government awards a contract to a company to build a road so farmers in the region can more easily and cheaply bring their products to market.  Suppose further that thanks to corruption the road is either never built or it quickly becomes impassable.  Who suffers most from the construction company’s failure to perform the road building contract?  Who has the greatest stake in remedying the wrong? Continue reading

Are Aggregate Corruption Indicators Coherent and/or Useful?: Further Reflections

Last week, I used Professor Michael Johnston’s recent post on the methodological and conceptual problems with national-level perceived corruption indicators as an opportunity to respond to some common criticisms of research that relies on these indicators. In particular, I have frequently heard (and interpreted Professor Johnston as advancing) two related criticisms: (1) composite indicators of “corruption” are inherently flawed because “corruption” is a multifaceted phenomenon, comprised of a range of diverse activities that cannot be compared on the same scale, let alone aggregated into a single metric; and (2) corruption is sufficiently diverse within a single country that it is inappropriate to offer a national-level summary statistic for corruption. (These points are related but separate: One could believe that corruption is a sufficiently coherent concept that one can sensibly talk about the level of “corruption,” but still object to attempting to represent an entire country’s corruption level with a single number; one could also endorse the idea that national-level summary statistics can be useful and appropriate, even when there’s a lot of intra-country variation, but still object to the idea that “corruption” is a sufficiently coherent phenomenon that one can capture different sorts of corruption on the same scale.) For the reasons I laid out in my original post, while I share some of the concerns about over-reliance on national-level perceived corruption indicators, I think these critiques—if understood as fundamental conceptual objections—are misguided. Most of the measures and proxies we use in studying social phenomena aggregate distinct phenomena, and in this regard (perceived) corruption is no different from war, wealth, cancer, or any number of other objects of study.

Professor Johnston has written a nuanced, thoughtful reply (with a terrific title, “1.39 Cheers for Quantitative Analysis”). It is clear that he and I basically agree on many of the most fundamental points. Still, I think there are still a few places where I might respectfully disagree with his position. I realize that this back-and-forth might start to seem a little arcane, but since so much corruption research uses aggregate measures like the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and since criticisms of these measures are likewise so common, I thought that perhaps one more round on this might not be a bad idea.

Let me address the two main lines of criticism noted above, and then make some more general observations. Continue reading

Guest Post: The Long, Long Road from Talking Transparency to Curbing Corruption in Mauritania

GAB is delighted to welcome back Till Bruckner, an international development expert who recently spent six months living Mauritania, and contributes the following guest post based on his experience there:

What do fish and iron have in common? Answer: Mauritania, a largely desert country of less than four million people in north-western Africa, is immensely rich in both. At the same time, most Mauritanians are poor. And one of the biggest reasons is corruption and misgovernance.

Consider first fishing. Although Mauritania has some of the world’s richest fishing grounds, its marine wealth is carried away by foreign ships whose owners often bribe senior government figures to obtain fishing permits and take their catch straight to Europe or Asia. As a result, the country has failed to develop a significant fishing industry, or domestic fish processing industry, of its own, and a fishing industry that boasts an annual catch of half a million tons generates a mere 40,000 jobs inside Mauritania. Yet to the south, Senegal translates a catch of similar size into at least 130,000 jobs, while to the north, Morocco has turned its million-ton-a-year catch into a massive export industry whose turnover is projected to reach two billion dollars by the end of this decade.

Inland, deep in the Sahara, some mountains contain more metal than rock, consisting of up to 75% iron, one of the highest concentrations in the world. Mauritania nationalized its iron mines in 1974, creating the state-owned monopoly company SNIM. Its workers blast the slopes to rubble, and conveyor belts transport the rubble into waiting railway waggons. The longest train in the world then chugs its way across 700 kilometres of desert, loads its cargo onto giant foreign freighters—and neither the ore nor most of the money paid for it are ever seen again. The looting dynamics in Mauritania’s mining sector are illustrated by the stark contrast between Zouerate, the town in the Sahara where the iron is mined—which looks like a dystopian hellhole straight out of a Mad Max film—and the rich suburbs of the capital city of Nouakchott (which produces virtually nothing), where giant villas rise out of the sand, and oversized SUVs cruise the streets. And in Nouakchott itself, in the poor suburbs, families living five to a windowless room have to pay for their drinking water by the barrel.

The preferred prescription in a situation like this (from the usual suspects: development professionals, anticorruption activists, etc.) is a combination of transparency, accountability, and civil society monitoring. But Mauritania is actually doing well on those dimensions. Continue reading

A Global Stocktaking on This First International Right to Know Day

GAB is pleased to welcome this guest post by the Centre for Law and Democracy:

Today marks the first of what will be an annual recognition and celebration of citizens’ right to access information held by their governments.  Making September 28 International Day for Universal Access to Information will, as the UNESCO resolution establishing it explains, help make governments and citizens alike aware that an “open and transparent government is a fundamental component of a democratic and developed state,” that all natural and legal persons have a “right to seek, access and receive information from public bodies and private bodies performing a public function,” and that it is “the duty of the state to prove such information.”

For the past five years the Centre for Law and Democracy and Access Info Europe have been tracking nations’ efforts in fulfilling this duty, and we are pleased to note that substantial progress has been made.  There are now 112 countries with some form of right to information or freedom of information legislation on the books with six nations enacting a new law this year alone.  Not all RTI laws meet the minimum criteria for granting citizens the right to information, and even those laws that do are not always enforced effectively.  To keep watch over developments, our two organizations annually produce an RTI Rating reporting legal changes and assessing their compliance with international norms.  This year’s report has a number of surprising findings.    Continue reading

The Level-of-Aggregation Question in Corruption Measurement

Recently I learned that CDA Collaborative (a nonprofit organization that works on a variety of development and conflict-resolution projects) has launched a new blog on corruption. Though it’s a new platform, they already have a few of interesting posts up, and it’s worth a look.

While I’m always happy to advertise new platforms in the anticorruption blogosphere, in this post I mostly want to focus on the first entry in the CDA’s new blog, a post by Professor Michael Johnston entitled “Breaking Out of the Methodological Cage.” It’s basically a critique of the anticorruption research literature’s alleged (over-)reliance on quantitative methods, in particular cross-national regression analyses using country-level corruption indices (such at the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) or Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) graft index). There are some things in Professor Johnston’s post that I agree with, and much that I disagree with. I want to focus on one issue in particular: the question of the right unit of analysis, or level of aggregation, to use when attempting to measure corruption.

Professor Johnston has two related complaints (or maybe two variants on the same underlying complaint) regarding these national-level perceived corruption measures. First, he complains these “[o]ne dimensional indices tell us … that corruption is the same thing everywhere, varying only in amount[.]”  In other words, corruption indices lump a whole bunch of disparate phenomena together under the same umbrella term “corruption,” ignoring the internal diversity of that category. Second, he contends that “relying … on country-level data is to assume that corruption is a national attribute, like GDP per capita” when in fact “corruption arises in highly specific processes, structural niches, and relationships.” Corruption, he explains, is not an attribute of countries, but of more specific contexts, involving “real people … in complex situations[.]”

Respectfully, I think that these points are either wrong or irrelevant, depending on how they are framed. Continue reading