Category Archives: Guest Commentary

Guest Post: The Iron Square of Political Financing in Ghana

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Today’s guest post is from Joseph Luna, an economist and consultant on international development projects.

Many reformers hope that democratization in poor countries will foster improved economic and social development. But participating in democratic processes can be expensive. Where do candidates for office in developing countries get the money to pay for campaigns and other political activities? Over the course of 2013-14, I was embedded in 11 local governments across Ghana, observing their operations and interviewing nearly 200 public servants, politicians, construction contractors, traditional chiefs, and party officials. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many politicians told me that they faced numerous demands for money, not just for elections, but also to meet their constituents’ personal needs. As one District Chief Executive (essentially the equivalent of a mayor) from the Ashanti Region put it to me: “It is about the MONEY! The people keep coming to you. ‘I am bereaved, I have to pay school fees, my wife is admitted to hospital.’ And so forth. They expect money from you. It is especially bad with party people! They think that because you are District Chief Executive that you can just open up the district budget to them.” This story repeated itself all across Ghana. Where did local politicians get the money to meet these demands? Much of this political money was extracted from kickbacks paid by firms for public procurement contracts. Indeed, in my research, which I discuss at greater length in my new book, Political Financing in Developing Countries: A Case from Ghana, I found a complex system of collusion among politicians, party chairs, contractors, and bureaucrats—what I call the Iron Square of Political Financing. Continue reading →

Guest Post: A Defense of Anticorruption Orthodoxy

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Robert Barrington, Professor of Anti-Corruption Practice at the University of Sussex’s Centre for the Study of Corruption, contributes today’s guest post.

The international anticorruption movement, which has been so successful over the last 25 years in putting this once-taboo issue squarely at the forefront of the international agenda, is suffering a crisis of confidence. The aspiration to eliminate corruption now seems to many like a fantasy from the dreamy era of the fall of the Berlin Wall. And what had appeared to be an emerging consensus about how to diagnose corruption, and how to respond, is fracturing. There has long been a lively debate within the anticorruption community about the best ways to understand and respond to corruption; and likewise, a growing challenge from several different quarters (including governments, businesses, journalists, and academics) on areas such as measurement, what has been successful, and whether the evidence matches the theory for fundamental approaches such as transparency. The debate and challenge have been broadly healthy, and have led to sharper thinking and improved approaches. But some criticism has veered towards attacking simplistic caricatures of the perceived orthodoxy, or launching broad-brush critiques that, intentionally or not, serve to undermine the anticorruption movement and provide nourishment for those that would prefer to see the anticorruption movement diminished or fail.

Take, for example, two common lines of attack against the “orthodox” approach to tackling corruption, one concerning the diagnosis of the problem and the other concerning appropriate responses: Continue reading →

Guest Post: The Infeasibility of Evidence-Based Evaluation of Transnational Anti-Bribery Laws

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Kevin Davis, the Beller Family Professor of Business Law at New York University School of Law, contributes today’s guest post, based on his recent working paper.

Academics and policymakers enthusiastically endorse “evidence-based” policymaking, for obvious reasons. (After all, what is the alternative? Faith? Popularity contests?) But while evidence—including quantitative evidence—is often helpful, we must be mindful of the limits on what empirical analysis can tell us about important topics. Take the regulation of transnational bribery. Scholars and policymakers would like to know if the current regime—laws like the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and U.K. Bribery Act, and international instruments like the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention—has “worked.” That is, have these instruments reduced bribery by the firms that they cover? And did those laws have additional, possibly undesirable collateral consequences, for example reducing investment in countries perceived to be corrupt?

The most sophisticated efforts to answer these questions (see, for example, here and here and here) essentially rely on what social scientists call “natural experiments.” First, the intervention (the law or policy change) of interest, which (in a borrowing from medical terminology) researchers call the “treatment.” Next, one must identify the population of interest—say, firms or countries—and an outcome of interest (such as the frequency of bribery or the level of investment). Then, the researcher identifies the subset of those entities that are affected by the intervention (for example, the firms that fall under the jurisdiction of the new anti-bribery law); this is the “treatment group.” The researcher also identifies another subset of entities—the “control group”—that appears otherwise similar to the treatment group, but did not receive the treatment (for example, a group of firms that are outside the jurisdiction of the new law). The big difference between a “controlled experiment” and a “natural experiment” is that in a controlled experiment the researcher can randomly choose which members of the population receive the treatment (for example by randomly selecting some patients to get a new drug and giving the other patients a placebo), but in a natural experiment, the assignment of the treatment is done not by the researcher, but by some “natural” process in the world. In trying to figure out the effect of an anti-corruption law, it generally is not feasible to conduct a controlled experiment: researchers can’t decide that these firms but not those firms, selected at random, will fall under the jurisdiction of an anti-bribery law. So the best that researchers can do is to rely on natural experiments and try to account as best they can for possible differences between the control group and the treatment group by including additional control variables in a multivariate regression.

Unfortunately, when it comes to studying the effects of transnational anti-bribery laws, these sorts of studies face several fundamental challenges, which are all too often overlooked or understated. Continue reading →

Guest Post: Why the U.S. Congress Should Pass the CROOK Act

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Today’s guest post is from Abigail Bellows, a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an independent governance consultant. Ms. Bellows previously served in the U.S. Department of State, where she created and led the anticorruption portfolio in the Office of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.

In countries long plagued by pervasive corruption, a wave of global protests is disrupting the political order. These protests, typically triggered by a corruption scandal, produce a brief upswing in political will and may result in the ouster of the current government. In fact, 10% of countries of countries around the world have experienced corruption-fueled political change over the last five years. These settings present historic opportunities to produce genuine, lasting reform. But to succeed, reformers must take advantage of political momentum before public interest dissipates or opponents regroup. During these windows of opportunity, U.S. support can play a valuable role, both because of the symbolic power of U.S. support and because of the scale and rigor of the technical assistance that the U.S. can provide. Yet all too often, the U.S. government is unable to respond sufficiently and quickly to support reformist governments during these crucial windows of opportunity. One of the main reasons is that the current U.S. anticorruption budget is too small ($115 million annually), too geographically rigid, and insufficiently flexible (given that programming is typically planned and budgeted two years in advance).

New legislation pending in the U.S. Congress—Countering Russian and Other Overseas Kleptocracy (CROOK) Act—would help address these problems. The House version of the CROOK Act, which was introduced on July 18, 2019 by Representative Bill Keating (D-MA) and Representative Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA), with support from the U.S. Helsinki Commission, passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 18. The companion Senate bill was introduced on December 11 by Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) and is awaiting review by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While the CROOK Act contains many measures that would strengthen U.S. anticorruption efforts, its centerpiece is the creation of an “Anti-Corruption Action Fund.” Continue reading →

Guest Post: Fighting Police Corruption in London, and Beyond

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Today’s guest post is from Matt Gardner, who previously served as the Head of Anti-Corruption at New Scotland Yard, Metropolitan Police, and who is currently covers police-related issues or CurbingCorruption.Com (whose launch in October 2018 GAB covered here).

The Metropolitan Police in London (the “Met’) is a large city force, with 30,000+ officers policing a city of over 10 million on any working day. Even in a well-trained professional force like this one, keeping police corruption down to low levels is a constant challenge. The ordinary difficulties of tackling corruption are compounded by the authority that the police are entrusted with: If you are a thief, a sexual predator, a bully, or lean towards corruption and criminality, joining the police service in any country is an excellent career choice. You can hide behind your warrant card, police ID, or uniform.

So what can police departments do to keep corruption within their own ranks in check? In this post, I want to highlight the four most important tools for keeping police corruption at low levels, using the Met’s experience to illustrate each of these elements: Continue reading →

Guest Post: Indonesian Anticorruption Institutions at Risk, Part 2: Legislative Amendments Spell Disaster for the KPK

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GAB is pleased to welcome Simon Butt, Professor of Indonesian Law and Director of the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law, the University of Sydney, to contribute a two-part series on recent developments in Indonesia. Today’s post, the second of the two, is a revised and expanded version of an article that Professor Butt originally published on Indonesia at Melbourne.

As I discussed in yesterday’s post, Indonesia’s anticorruption commission (the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) has found itself under serious attack since it began to pursue powerful political figures. Members of the national parliament, many of whom have found themselves in the KPK’s sights, have long threatened to use their legislative power to weaken the KPK and undermine its independence. For many years the KPK has managed to stave off such threats, thanks mainly to strong leadership and public support. But the KPK has found itself in a weakened state in recent months. It lost its first case in its 17-year history, and more significantly, the KPK’s leadership team has been replaced with a new group of problematic commissioners, whose terms commence next year. And last month, on September 17th, the parliament took advantage of this vulnerability and finally made good on its threat to amend the 2002 statute that established the KPK. These amendments, which attack the very institutional features and powers the KPK has used to build its impressive track record, are disastrous for the KPK and Indonesia’s fight against corruption. Continue reading →

Guest Post: Indonesian Anticorruption Institutions at Risk, Part 1: The Significance of the KPK’s First Acquittal

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GAB is pleased to welcome Simon Butt, Professor of Indonesian Law and Director of the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law, the University of Sydney, to contribute a two-part series on recent developments in Indonesia. Today’s post, the first of the two, is a revised and expanded version of an article that Professor Butt originally published on the East Asia Forum.)

Over the past decade or so, Indonesia’s anticorruption commission (the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) had managed to deflect numerous efforts of powerful politicians and senior law enforcement figures to reduce its independence and effectiveness. However, last month Indonesia’s national parliament appears to have successfully hobbled the Commission, with the support of President Joko Widodo. The effort to weaken the Commission began with the appointment of a new batch of commissioners, widely condemned as being sympathetic to the regime or likely to be ineffective. This was followed by amendments to the Commission’s founding statute that are clearly designed to render the Commission ineffective in investigating and prosecuting corruption.

An important precursor to these events was the KPK’s first loss in court. Until this past July, the KPK had not, since its establishment in 2003, lost any of the hundreds of cases it had brought to full trial. This was a remarkable achievement in a country renowned for deeply entrenched and widespread corruption at the highest levels, particularly in government institutions and the courts.

But on July 11, 2019, the KPK’s perfect record was broken when a divided three-judge Supreme Court panel voted to acquit Syafruddin Arsyad Temenggung, the former chair of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency. Temenggung had been convicted at trial (in one of Indonesia’s specialized anticorruption courts) for a scheme in which a businessman, Sjamsul Nursalim, overstated the value of assets used to repay government assistance funds he had received after the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis. According to the prosecution, by improperly approving the discharge of Nursalim’s debt, Temenggung caused the Indonesian state to lose 4.5 trillion rupiah (well over USD 300 million). Temenggung’s lawyers argued, among other things, that there was no proof that their client had obtained any benefit from Nursalim in exchange for discharging the debt, and that their client was simply doing his job and had not committed any crime. The trial court rejected these defences, convicted Temenggung, and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment. On the first appeal, the Jakarta High Provincial Court affirmed the conviction and increased the prison sentence to 15 years. But Temenggung then appealed to the Supreme Court, and there he prevailed. At time of writing, the Supreme Court judgment acquitting Temenggung has not yet been made publicly available. Nevertheless, according to media reports, two of the three judges on the panel voted to acquit Temenggung, though for somewhat different reasons, while the third judge would have affirmed the conviction.

Given that the KPK probably lacks a legal basis for asking the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision, the KPK appears to have now suffered its first defeat in its 15-year history. The loss of this case is a major blow on its own terms, because it was the KPK’s largest-ever case in monetary terms, involving over twice the alleged state loss than its previous largest case. But the significance of this acquittal may be much broader, and raises a number of questions about the future of corruption eradication efforts in Indonesia. Continue reading →

Guest Post: Toward a Meaningful “Common African Position on Asset Recovery”

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GAB is delighted to welcome back Mat Tromme, Director of the Sustainable Development & Rule of Law Programme at the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, who contributes the following guest post:

It’s no secret that kleptocratic rulers in Africa have robbed their countries of substantial assets that could have  otherwise been used to promote development and social welfare. Indeed, the amounts are often staggering: $16 billion reportedly stolen by former Libyan President Gaddafi; $1 billion by Gambia’s ex-President Jammeh; billions by former Congolese President Kabila; and the list goes on. Recently, Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crime Commission suggested that up to $50 billion has been looted from Africa, and whether or not particular estimate is accurate, there’s little doubt the problem is serious. More troubling is the fact that only a small proportion of these stolen assets have been recovered and repatriated to the country of origin.

As part of the effort to address the challenges of asset recovery—and to give African states more clout in negotiating the terms and conditions of asset return with the states that initially seize the stolen loot—African countries are currently undertaking an effort to develop a “Common African Position on Asset Recovery” (CAPAR). Incidentally, a common african position was the chosen theme of this year’s African Union Anti-corruption day. At this early stage, it seems likely that this effort will result only in a political proclamation (perhaps within the framework of this month’s UN General Assembly), one that will re-emphasize the importance of the speedy and unconditional return of assets, and call for better collaboration across countries. That’s a good start, but not enough! Developing a pan-African position on asset recovery—perhaps similar to the multilateral framework adopted by the Mercosur countries and by the EU—is a worthwhile endeavor, one that will likely produce tangible benefits only if it goes beyond mere statements of intent or general principles, and lays out some concrete steps to translate the vision into reality.

Ideally, CAPAR should seek to streamline policies and resources devoted to recovering assets and developing better investigative and prosecutorial capacity across African states, for example by implementing cross-border investigations and fostering collaboration, experience and information-sharing between countries. There are various ways to achieve this broad objective: Continue reading →

Lula’s Lawyers Respond to the Lava Jato Prosecutors’ Letter

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Last week, GAB published two letters presenting alternative perspectives on the so-called “Car Wash” (Lava Jato) anticorruption operation in Brazil, in particular the prosecution and conviction of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). The first letter was a re-publication of an open letter sent by a group of international jurists and scholars, who asserted that Lula did not receive a fair trial and that the prosecutors were politically biased. The second letter was a reply from the prosecutors, who defended their conduct, argued that the conviction of Lula was legitimate and not politically motivated, and contended that a number of factual and legal assertions in the international jurists’ letter were incorrect.

After publication of that post, I received a message from Lula’s lawyers (the law firm of Teixeira, Martins & Advogados), who asked me to publish their letter in response to the prosecutors. In the interest of furthering this important substantive debate, I am presenting their letter below: Continue reading →

Guest Post: U.S. State Ethics Agencies Must Improve Both Enforcement and Transparency

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Today’s guest post is from Shruti Shah, President and CEO of the Coalition for Integrity (C4I), and Alex Amico, a C4I legal fellow.

Recently, the Coalition for Integrity released a report on Enforcement of Ethics Rules by State Agencies (along with an associated index and map) which examined the performance of state-level ethics agencies across the United States. In addition to providing basic enforcement statistics, the report emphasized two aspects of these agencies’ performance. First, the report looked at how these agencies enforced the ethics laws they were charged with enforcing, to see how aggressively agencies stand up for ethical government within their legal authority. Second, the report examined how transparent the agencies were in that enforcement, and hence how accountable these agencies make themselves to the public. (The report also ranked each state and agency based on their transparency of enforcement). Both of these aspects of agency performance are crucial to creating a culture of honest government and a robust ethics enforcement regime. Some our headline findings with respect to each of these dimensions of performance were as follows: Continue reading →