Kleptocracy Strikes Mongolia? The Batbold Case Part II — UPDATE

There is little doubt GAB’s Mongolian readers feel strongly about their former Prime Minister and possible 2021 presidential candidate Batbold Sukhbaatar. A December 8 post summarizing Offshore Alert’s December 7 revelations of charges he masterminded a massive corruption scheme sparked an avalanche of comments.  By contrast an earlier post recounting charges his likely rival, the current president, was corruption and had abused of power to control judicial appointments drew nary a word.

Comments on the Batbold case split roughly 50-50.  Half claimed the charges were fabricated with several seeing unnamed “foreign interests” behind them, and half believed every word of the government’s case and hoped Batbold would soon be brought to justice. Unfortunately for GAB readers neither from Mongolia nor schooled in developments there, none of the commentary offered any facts in support of their passionately asserted views.  Indeed, the only fact about the case that has appeared since the Offshore Alert article, at least in the English language press, is a story in today’s Times of London.

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Is the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Program Working?

The 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (GMA), inspired by the imprisonment and death of Sergei Magnitsky in Russia after his discovery of $230 million in tax fraud orchestrated by the Russian government, stands as the boldest authorization of U.S. economic sanctions in the fight against corruption. Executive Order 13818, issued in December 2017, designated the first sanctioned parties under GMA, enabling asset freezes and travel bans.

Since then, approximately 150 individuals and entities worldwide have been sanctioned for corruption under the GMA. (The GMA also allows for sanctions against human rights violators, and such authority was exercised to target 75 more individuals and entities.) The list includes current and former government officials—or those acting on their behalf—in Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Iraq, Latvia, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Serbia, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, and Uzbekistan, among others. The designations include familiar names in the anticorruption community such as Gulnara Karimova, former Uzbek first daughter convicted of embezzlement and other corruption totaling more than $1.3 billion, Dan Gertler, the Israeli billionaire who earned millions of dollars through underpriced mining contracts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angel Rondon Rijo, a Dominican lobbyist central to Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht’s $4.5 billion Latin America-wide bribery-for-contracts scheme. Other sanctioned parties include the former Gambian president and first lady for misappropriating $50 million in state funds, a former Mexican judge and a former Mexican governor who took bribes from drug cartels, and a Sudanese businessman who, along with senior South Sudanese government officials, embezzled millions of dollars from a government food program.

The GMA represents a new era of so-called “smart sanctions.” Instead of limiting transactions with an entire country—as in the case of U.S. sanctions programs targeting Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria—these individualized sanctions are designed to maximize harm and minimize collateral economic damage by restricting only bad actors’ access to global commerce, not that of entire populations. This approach is catching on outside the United States, with Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union recently announcing their own GMA-esque sanctions, while other countries, like Australia and Japan, are actively considering adopting similar programs.

Yet, a fundamental question remains: is the GMA working?

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A Covid-19 Checkup: How the IMF’s Transparency Measures Have Fared So Far

With a trillion dollars in lending capability, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the best-equipped institutions to deal with the Covid-19 public health and financial crisis. Since March, the IMF has met an “unprecedented number of calls for emergency financing” with “unprecedented speed and magnitude,” through renegotiations of rapid credit facilities, refinancing initiatives, and debt relief assistance for more than 100 countries, totaling over $100 billion in disbursements so far. In the early days of the pandemic, there was a great deal of concern among anticorruption advocates over the way these emergency funds would be monitored (see collections of pieces here and here). The IMF’s initial approach generally did not impose formal transparency or governance requirements as a condition for receiving emergency Covid relief funds. Rather, the IMF chose to rely more on after-the-fact safeguards: recipient countries were told to spend as needed but to “keep the receipts.”

The IMF’s approach is understandable. As Jason Keene argued on this blog, the IMF at that early stage faced a trade-off between speed and transparency, and may have reasonably concluded that it would not be advisable to bargain over transparency measures if doing so would slow the deployment of much-needed funds. This conclusion, as a May 2020 IMF publication revealed, was influenced by the IMF’s experience with the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa: Many, including a prominent public health journal, blamed the IMF for the lethality of the Ebola epidemic, provoking a backlash against what was seen as unduly burdensome loans, a focus on austerity, and the underfunding of medical systems in vulnerable countries (see here, here, and here). Given this background, it’s understandable that the IMF might, on balance, favor speed over transparency, providing loans for Covid-related public health and budgetary shortfalls without much conditionality.

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A Breaththrough in Recognizing Who is a Corruption Victim

A decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruling shareholders of a company damaged by bribery are “corruption victims,” and its order affirming $135 million in damages establish an important precedent. The decision and order were handed down in a case arising from the prosecution of OZ Africa Management for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. OZ, a subsidiary of a U.S. hedge fund, had pled guilty to participating in a bribery scheme Israeli billionaire Dan Gertler engineered to gain control of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s mineral resources.  As the case was about to close, shareholders in Africo, a Canadian company whose mining rights had lost value thanks to the bribery, filed a claim for damages under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, a statute requiring criminal defendants to compensate victims of their crimes.    

OZ and the prosecutors in the case both opposed the shareholders’ claim. Under the act, those claiming they were injured by a criminal offense must show they were “directly and proximately harmed” by it. Several events occurred between OZ’s bribes and the injury Africo’s shareholders sustained that blurred the causal link between the two. Both the government and OZ asserted that these intervening events made the shareholders at best indirect victims of corruption. And in any event the injuries were so far removed from the bribery that it could not be said the bribery proximately caused them.  Finally, OZ argued the damage the shareholders suffered, loss of the chance to develop the mine, could not be readily quantified, making any award “speculative” and “hypothetical.”

The difficulty in showing the harm from corruption is “direct” and “proximately” caused, and the challenge of precisely calculating the damage are not just hurdles to those seeking compensation for corruption under American law. They are commonly cited as reasons why, though virtually all nations permit corruption victims to sue for damages in accordance with article 35 of the UN Convention Against Corruption (here), virtually no one has (here, here [21ff], and here). While the court in OZ Africa Management was only construing a U.S. law, its reasoning offers courts in other jurisdictions precedent for awarding damages when their citizens are injured by corruption.  

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What Made Alexei Navalny an Anticorruption Icon?

On August 20, 2020, former Russian presidential candidate Alexei Navalny fell ill while on a flight from Tomsk to Moscow. He slipped into a coma and was immediately evacuated to Berlin, where doctors discovered that Navalny had been poisoned by a Soviet-era nerve agent. While the Kremlin has denied any involvement, the chemical nerve agent used on Navalny was similar to the one that Russia was accused of using to poison former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in 2018.

A Kremlin-orchestrated attempt on Navalny’s life was hardly surprising. For the past decade, Navalny has been making a name for himself as one of the leading figures opposing Russian President Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party. Navalny has denounced United Russia as a “party of crooks and thieves” and has organized campaigns to unseat Putin-affiliated politicians across the country. Furthermore, Navalny’s investigative journalism has uncovered government corruption, and he has used these exposés to advocate for political reform and to bolster his own popularity, especially among the younger generation. Navalny’s success in exposing corruption highlights several interesting and unique tactics and personal attributes that allowed him to be an effective advocate in a country that routinely punishes government opposition.

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Fast-Tracking Justice: India’s New(ish) Strategy to Curb Corruption

How do you deal with the problem of more than 6,000 corruption cases and nearly 5,000 criminal cases pending against politicians, some dating back almost 40 years? The answer, according to India’s Supreme Court: put a one-year time limit on cases involving politicians.

This decision, which was issued this past September in a “public interest litigation” case, seeks to increase public confidence in the judicial process and to make the legal system more effective in addressing India’s pervasive political corruption. Corrupt politicians in India are typically able to slow down legitimate prosecutions, for example by exploiting India’s complex court filing procedures, leading the cases to drag on for years or even decades. This delay increases the chances that key evidence will be lost or obscured—a process that corrupt defendants can and do help along by bribing, threatening, or even killing witnesses. By preventing cases from ending in conviction, corrupt politicians have created a de facto culture of impunity. The problem is particularly acute in the current parliament, where 43% of new members elected in 2019 had pending criminal charges. The Supreme Court’s order seeks to address this and other problems.

This isn’t the first time that the Supreme Court has ordered fast-tracking. The Supreme Court previously called for time-bound trials against politicians back in 2011, during the tenure of the corruption-riddled Congress Party, yet the case backlog remained. There is reason to believe, though, that this time is different. The current ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) swept into power in part by making anticorruption efforts a priority, and there are signs that the BJP’s general commitment to anticorruption may be having a meaningful impact in the context of the one-year order. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, the highest courts in (most) states submitted action plans for dispatching cases, and India’s Solicitor General said that he is “100% serious” about completing trials within a year. Despite certain serious challenges to effective implementation of this new fast-tracking program, India’s renewed commitment to moving the wheels of justice more quickly could prove powerful in holding corrupt politicians accountable and restoring public confidence in the judiciary.

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Kleptocracy Strikes Mongolia? The Batbold Case

Offshore Alert yesterday revealed the Mongolian government has charged former Prime Minister Batbold Sukhbaatar with receiving hundreds of millions of dollars from kickbacks and fraudulent and illegal transactions in deals involving the nation’s two largest mines. The case against the former prime minister, senior member of the ruling Mongolian People’s Party, and the party’s likely 2021 presidential candidate, is spelled out in a November 23 filing in a New York court.  The New York case together with similar ones in Hong Kong and London seeks a freeze on assets Batbold holds until the main case, brought in Mongolia, is decided.  There plaintiffs — the agency responsible for overseeing Mongolia’s natural resources and the state-owned companies that operate the two mines – ask that agreements between the two operating companies and shell companies they say Batbold secretly owns be invalidated and Batbold and accomplices disgorge all profits made on secret deals and as well as pay damages. The total could run into the hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars.  

Documents submitted in the New York case paint a picture familiar to students of kleptocracy.  With assistance from lawyers, accountants, and other enablers, Batbold allegedly established some 100 shell companies in at least ten countries to conceal his actions and hide his wealth.  Two things make the case worthy of careful study by all seeking to end the massive theft of a nation’s assets by its rulers:

i) the political will the governing party has shown in pursuing one of its own, and

ii) the quantum of information on an alleged kleptocrat’s wrongdoing that can be gleaned from a painstaking search of the public record.

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Fighting Police Corruption in Nigeria: Learning from SARS’ Alleged Dissolution

In 1992, the Nigerian police force created the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) to combat violent crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping, murder, and hired assassination. In each state, SARS operates under the criminal investigations department of the state’s police command. Alas, SARS developed a reputation for corruptly extorting money from the targets of its investigations. To offer one example, a local software engineer alleged that heavily-armed SARS officers stopped him and ordered that he withdraw one million Naira (approx. $2,607.56 USD) for his release. Such allegations are not unusual, as demonstrated by an online Twitter campaign, labeled #EndSARS, in which numerous Nigerians recounted their personal experiences with SARS. These allegations were serious enough that the Inspector General of Police (IGP) recently released an order to dissolve SARS altogether.

One might reasonably suppose that this dissolution order will result in the elimination of SARS and the corrupt practices that pervaded its department. However, such conclusion would be incorrect, or at least premature, for a couple of reasons. First, the dissolution may turn out to be little more than a publicity gambit that does not have lasting effect. This most recent order is actually the fourth IGP order in four years that has sought to restrict, reorganize, or ban SARS’ operations. In the previous three directives the restrictions were not implemented, and the current order may not be either. Second, even if SARS is dissolved, the root causes of the corruption that pervaded its units are not unique to SARS. If left unaddressed, those same underlying causes can be expected to give rise to similar sorts of extortive corruption in other police units.

So, what factors contributed to the widespread corrupt practices within SARS? Part of the problem may be general systematic inadequacies—factors that contribute to corruption throughout the Nigerian government—but we can also identify three specific factors that made SARS particularly prone to extortive corruption. Continue reading

Combating Money Laundering in Africa: John Hatchard’s Latest Guide for African Corruption Fighters

The war on corruption is being fought on many fronts. One where victory is especially critical is the battle to prevent leaders of poor countries from robbing their citizens blind, and nowhere will a victory be more welcome or more hard-fought than in Africa.   Seventy percent of the world’s poor live on the continent while, thanks first to colonialism and then to Cold War machinations, Africans are saddled with governments ill-equipped to keep greedy leaders in check.  Courts, legislatures, and other accountability institutions are weak; the media and civil society hobbled by repressive, non-democratic measures.

Not that in recent years there have not been promising developments. South Africa’s once powerful leader Jacob Zuma was forced to resign the presidency over corruption allegations for which he is now on trial.  Former Guinea Minister of Mines Mahmoud Thiam forfeited $8.5 million and was sentenced to seven years in prison for corruptly granting virtually the whole of his nation’s mineral sector to a Chinese conglomerate.  The son of former Mozambique President Armando Guebuza is one of over a dozen members of the country’s ruling circle facing trial for his role in the “hidden debt” scandal.

What will be required to continue this progress is the theme of John Hatchard’s latest book,  Combating Money Laundering in Africa: Dealing with the Problem of PEPs. Like his earlier ones on African anticorruption laws and institutions (here, here, and here), it’s a must have for African corruption fighters.

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When Anticorruption Begets Corruption: A History Lesson from the Roman Republic

Most readers of this blog are likely to support rigorous anticorruption laws. But a modicum of caution is necessary: If poorly designed, even anticorruption laws adopted with the best of intentions can be weaponized by bad-faith actors. This is not only a modern problem. Indeed, a troubling illustration of how overly ambitious anticorruption laws can spectacularly betray their core purposes can be found some two thousand years ago, in the dying days of the Roman Republic.

The Roman Republic had a comprehensive and complex legal code, with multiple statutes (lex) prohibiting the general crime of ambitus. It is frustratingly unclear what precisely constituted ambitus, but at its core, ambitus (which shares the same linguistic root as modern-day “ambition”) covered electoral bribery and other forms of electoral fraud and corruption. That said, the line between legal electioneering and illegal ambitus was often blurry, and ambitus was sometimes used as a general pejorative accusation for when a candidate’s ambition “went too far.” (In that sense, Roman debates over the definition of ambitus may parallel modern debates over the definition of “corruption.”)

A handful of ambitus laws were passed during the Middle Republic. For example, an ambitus law from 358 BC prohibited political candidates from canvassing on market days, and a 314 BC law created a commission to investigate election rigging. Yet such laws were relatively rare, and ambitus does not seem to have been a prominent concern during this period. During the Late Republic, however, the problem of rampant electoral bribery prompted the Senate to enact a flurry of new ambitus legislation. Many of these laws were direct responses to specific incidents of ambitus, and exhibited a pattern of increasingly harsh punishments and prosecution-friendly procedural changes. Despite addressing a very real problem, these reforms to the ambitus laws of the Late Republic ended up being not only ineffective, but actively exacerbated the decline of the Republic.

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