Though the war in Ukraine continues to rage, scholars and policymakers around the world have already begun to look ahead to what it will take to help rebuild the country—a project that the Ukrainian government estimates will cost upwards of $750 billion, and which will likely entail substantial international assistance from a broad coalition of countries. Any project of this magnitude—one that involves large government contracts for construction, supplies, and other services—raises concerns about corruption. Indeed, concerns about the potential for widespread corruption in the reconstruction of Ukraine have already been voiced on this blog and elsewhere (see, for example, here, and here). But while this concern should be taken seriously, it should not be exaggerated. There are at least three reasons why the potential for corruption in the Ukrainian reconstruction process, while real, may not be nearly as severe as some of the current pessimistic commentary suggests:
Category Archives: Commentary
Islamic States Agree to Anticorruption Convention
On 28 Jumada Al-Awwal, 1444h (December 22, 2022), Anticorruption Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation agreed to assist one another in preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting corruption crimes.
The Makkah Al-Mukarramah Convention commits OIC’s 57 member states to exchange information and share expertise on bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, and the other corruption offenses listed in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Member states foreign ministers are expected to ratify the Convention by March of this year.
The Convention is an important step forward. For two reasons. One, as a practical matter requests from one OIC member to another for assistance in locating fugitives, securing evidence, or recovering stolen assets often run up against obstacles ranging from outmoded procedures to a lack of trust between law enforcement agencies.
This makes it easy for embezzlers, bribe takers and payers, and other scam artists to escape prosecution. Not only does the Convention require states to eliminate these barriers, but its creation of a General Secretariat and a Conference of State Parties should help smooth working relations among law enforcement personnel as well as provide a forum for resolving disputes.
The greater impact is surely the Convention’s demonstrative effect. Beyond an immediate effect on behavior, law serves an expressive function, creating and validating social norms. The OIC is in its own words “the collective voice of the Muslim world.” For the representative of the believers in one of the world’s great religions to join the fight against corruption validates and reaffirms the importance of the fight. That the English for “Makkah Al-Mukarramah” is “Holy City of Mecca” serves to emphasize this importance to Muslims of all states.
Corruption: Fuel for Femicide’s Fire
On January 31, 2022, hundreds of protesters took to the streets of La Paz, Bolivia, regarding new revelations about Richard Choque Flores, who had raped upwards of 70 women and committed at least two femicides. (The term “femicide” refers to the intentional murder of women for gender-motivated reasons.) The La Paz protesters were not simply expressing their horror at Choque Flores’ heinous crimes. They were also denouncing the judicial and prosecutorial corruption that had enabled his continued predation. In fact, Choque Flores had already been arrested in 2015 and sentenced to 30 years in prison. His sentence was then reduced to a house arrest in 2019, whereupon he was able to murder two women from the comfort of his own home. How did Richard Choque Flores manage to get his sentence reduced in the first place? With a bribe of US$3,500 and a bottle of whisky.
Sadly, this story is not unique. In Bolivia as well as other Latin American countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), femicides not only occur at appallingly high rates, but they rarely ever get resolved. While femicide is certainly rooted in patriarchy, its rampant scope in Latin America cannot merely be explained by the misogyny of individual perpetrators. In 2021 alone, there were at least 108 known femicide cases in Bolivia, of which only 36% were solved. In Mexico, around 10 women are reportedly murdered per day (though the actual number is likely much higher). The femicide epidemic is by no means “accidental, ‘involuntary,’ or the result of ‘mere institutional incapacity.’” Rather, it is the product of profound and systematic corruption, which allows perpetrators to violate women with impunity, while imposing prohibitive barriers to justice for victims and their families.
Passing Whistleblower Legislation Is the Next Step in the DRC’s Fight Against Corruption
In November of 2021, over 3.5 million documents were leaked from a bank in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This so-called “Congo Hold-Up” leak, which included bank statements, emails, contracts, and corporate records, revealed that former Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his inner circle embezzled at least $138 million in public funds between 2013 and 2018. Investigations by media outlets and NGOs exposed a pervasive network of corruption involving the DRC’s Central Bank and national electoral commission, as well as the country’s minerals-for-infrastructure deal with China, a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic, and more. In response, the head of the DRC’s Inspectorate General of Finance (IGF) condemned the bank’s role in facilitating the corruption, and the Congolese Minister of Justice announced the opening of an investigation to address the allegations.
Complex corruption schemes such as the one described above are often revealed by whistleblowers. The DRC in particular has a history of whistleblowers exposing corruption, often at great personal risk (for example, here and here). Yet instead of being publicly recognized for their contributions and afforded government protection, these whistleblowers are forced to conceal their identities to avoid retaliation by those they exposed. Their fears are well-founded: The DRC offers little to no legal protection for whistleblowers, and many Congolese whistleblowers have been forced into hiding or exile due to threats, intimidation, assault, and even death sentences. This must change. It is high time for the DRC to pass comprehensive whistleblower protection legislation, and there may be an unusual window of opportunity to do so now.
Foreign Law Enforcement Agencies to Get U.S. Beneficial Ownership Information
The cause of financial transparency just recovered some of the ground recently lost when the European Court of Justice struck down the EU directive on public access to corporate ownership data. Last Friday the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published draft regulations prescribing how certain limited — but quite important – members of the public can obtain information on the actual, beneficial owners of U.S. corporations.
The privileged group consists of law enforcement personnel. And significantly for the global fight against corruption, they include those from non-American as well as American agencies.
The rules for domestic agencies are straightforward, those for non-U.S. authorities less so as they incorporate the conditions Congress put on foreign agencies’ access. The request must be for a law enforcement purpose or national security or intelligence activity; it must be transmitted through a U.S. law enforcement intermediary, and the requesting government must have either an “applicable treaty” with the U.S. or else be a “trusted foreign government.”
For corruption-related cases these conditions would appear to pose no real hurdle. Moreover, in fleshing them out, FinCEN was attentive to foreign authorities’ needs. FinCEN defines “law enforcement purpose,” for example, to include civil forfeiture actions.
Between the diversity of foreign laws and the many types of agreements foreign partners have with U.S. counterparts, however, the agency cautions the draft regulations might still interfere with current arrangements. Anticorruption agencies, prosecution services, and other non-U.S. authorities should therefore examine the draft carefully, ideally in consultation with the U.S. agency or agencies with which they work. Comments are due by February 23.
I see one potential issue and have one question about the proposed rules.
Continue readingThe FTX Collapse and the Risks of Crypto Corruption
Last month, the cryptocurrency industry experienced a seismic shakeup as FTX—a Bahamas-based crypto exchange led by the young ex-billionaire Sam Bankman-Fried—collapsed. It turns out that FTX was riddled with fraud, and many of the company’s assets are still hidden or missing. Quite understandably, most of the reporting on FTX’s wrongdoing has focused on how FTX defrauded investors, customers, and the U.S. government. But there is another aspect of the case that deserves further scrutiny: the possibility that FTX corrupted Bahamanian regulators, and that this corruption facilitated the company’s other types of malfeasance.
From the World Cup to the Olympics: Why Are International Sporting Events So Corrupt?
The recently-concluded FIFA World Cup in Qatar has served as yet another reminder of the corruption that seems to accompany the awarding of hosting rights for major international sporting events. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), in 2010 representatives of Qatar bribed three South American FIFA officials to win the run-off vote against the United States to host the 2022 World Cup. And this came after two members of the FIFA selection committee had already been barred from voting after they had been caught agreeing to sell their votes. This was not an isolated incident. The DOJ also alleged that Russia bribed FIFA officials to host the 2018 World Cup, and indeed more than half of those FIFA officials involved in the 2018 and 2022 host country votes—including FIFA’s then-president Sepp Blatter—have been accused of improper behavior. Nor has this sort of behavior been limited to FIFA. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has had numerous similar scandals. The IOC has launched an investigation into nine members who were bribed to vote for granting Brazil the hosting rights for the 2016 Olympic Games; Sérgio Cabral, the former governor of Rio de Janeiro, admitted to paying $2 million to the former president of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) to buy votes to select Rio as the 2016 Olympic host city, and the head of Brazil’s Olympic committee, Carols Nuzman, was sentenced to over 30 years in prison as a result. And when Russia secured the 2014 Winter Olympics bid, it did so with the assistance of the then-vice president of the Olympic Council of Asia, Gafur Rakhimov, an organized crime leader and heroin kingpin.
Why is the process of selecting host cities and countries for major international sporting events so constantly captured by bribery and corruption? There are several inter-related reasons for this ongoing problem:
Risky Wagers: How Lack of Oversight Increases the Odds of Corruption in Sports Gambling
Thanks to the internet, sports gambling—once limited to smoky back rooms and local bookies—has rapidly expanded, and this expansion has fueled growing concerns over the integrity of professional sports. Sports gambling has long been intertwined with sports-related corruption, but the sheer number of gambling transactions made possible by the advent of online betting (through both legal and illegal websites) substantially increases the likelihood that bribery or match-fixing will be used to ensure a “winning bet.”
National regulatory approaches have not kept up with the heighted risks. The United States, for example, continues to rely on outdated regulatory regimes and ill-defined responsibilities shared between state regulators, federal regulators, and professional sports leagues. As more and more states move to legalize sports gambling, the US is in urgent need of a centralized authority that possesses the necessary incentives and requisite capabilities to properly regulate this burgeoning industry.
To see why reform is needed, consider each of the three main actors (or sets of actors) that have some responsibility to deal with the integrity threats posed by online sports gambling in the U.S.: state governments, the federal government, and the professional leagues: Continue reading
The European Court of Justice’s Invalidation of Public Beneficial Ownership Registries: A Translation
One of the most important developments in the fight against corruption—and other forms of organized criminality—over the last couple of decades has been the push for greater transparency in the ownership of companies and other legal entities. An increasing number of countries now require artificial legal entities (“legal persons”) to provide information on their true beneficial owners—that is, the actual human beings (or, in the language of the law, the “natural persons”) who own or control the entity—to the government and to potential investors or potential business partners who need to conduct due diligence on those entities. Many anticorruption activists believe that there should be even greater transparency in corporate ownership, and that the information in these so-called beneficial ownership registries should be made publicly available.
These pro-transparency advocates achieved an important but partial victory back in 2015, when the European Union issued its Fourth Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directive. The Fourth AML Directive instructed EU Member States not only to collect beneficial ownership information in a central register, but to make that information available to anyone who could demonstrate a “legitimate interest” in accessing the information. In 2018, pro-transparency advocates scored an even bigger victory when the EU issued its Fifth AML Directive. The Fifth AML Directive dropped the requirement that those requesting beneficial ownership data show a “legitimate interest”; the directive instead required Member States to make corporate beneficial ownership information publicly available, unless an individual beneficial owner could show an exceptional interest in keeping his or her ownership interest confidential.
Just last month, though, the push for corporate ownership transparency suffered a setback at the hands of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ ruled that the provision of the Fifth AML Directive that required the provision of corporate beneficial ownership information available to any member of the general public was invalid because it violated two provisions of the European Union’s Charter on Fundamental Rights: Article 7, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications,” and Article 8, which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her,” and that “[s]uch data must be processed … on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”
Many anticorruption organizations condemned the ECJ’s decision, though there appears to be some disagreement about just how consequential the ruling will turn out to be. (The ECJ issued a subsequent clarification—also released on LinkedIn—that journalists and civil society organizations concerned with money laundering, corruption, terrorist financing, and related issues would have a “legitimate interest” in accessing beneficial ownership information, and should therefore continue to have access under the terms of the now-reinstated Fourth AML Directive.) I have my own views on the underlying policy dispute—I’ve come out tentatively in favor of making corporate beneficial ownership registers public (see here and here)—but I thought I should read the ECJ opinion carefully to better understand the rationale behind the decision, and what space (if any) it leaves for moving in the direction of greater corporate ownership transparency.
I may try to weigh in on that latter question in a future post, but in this post, I want to focus on the ECJ decision, and I want to do something a bit unusual. Here’s the thing: The ECJ opinion is terrible. And I don’t mean that it’s terrible with respect to the outcome. Though I disagree with that outcome, reasonable people can debate the merits of public beneficial ownership registries, and how to balance the interest in transparency against the interest in privacy. I mean that the opinion is terrible as a matter of reasoning and craftsmanship. The writing is just godawful—full of unnecessary verbiage, awkward phrasing, circumlocution, and obfuscation. And the terrible writing obscures the shocking thinness of the legal reasoning. If I were grading this as a final exam, it would be a B-minus at best, and that’s only because of grade inflation.
It occurred to me that other people who want to better understand and evaluate this decision might find the opinion even more impenetrable than I did. So I decided to take the liberty of translating the ECJ’s decision from English into English. I didn’t bother with all the prefatory material in the first 33 paragraphs of the decision—my translation exercise focused only on paragraphs 34-88, which contains the court’s legal reasoning (such as it is). I’ve also interjected a few snarky comments throughout in italics. Again, this is my paraphrase of the court’s opinion—if you want to see the original, you can find it here. But in all seriousness, I thought it would be helpful to others to have a more readable version of the court’s opinion, so they can draw their own conclusions. And now, without further adieu, here’s my translation: Continue reading
Anticorruption Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Why Do They Fail, and How Can They Succeed?
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has seen both highly unstable party systems and high rates of corruption. As a result, lots of new parties keep popping up, and an anticorruption focus has proven to be a great way for them to get noticed. In fact, studies have found that new parties are more successful when they center their message on fighting political misconduct.
Among those that actually win, some of these anticorruption parties have been modestly successful in passing reforms. But many other anticorruption parties have floundered when in office. Part of the problem is that these parties often make lofty promises but fail to put forward actual, workable plans. Enough voters will still vote for the “anticorruption” party as a way of expressing disapproval for the incumbent government, without necessarily paying close attention to whether the anticorruption party and its leaders are willing or able to follow through on their promises. As a result, numerous CEE countries have had bad experiences with anticorruption parties that, when in office, appear to have little idea how to govern differently from their predecessors—and sometimes little apparent interest in doing so. Consider a few examples: