Klitgaard’s Misleading “Corruption Formula”

I guess I’m engaging in the “ritual slaying of the elders” in which professors often indulge. Having gone after Paolo Mauro in an earlier post, here I want to take on (a small part) of Robert Klitgaard’s work.

Klitgaard, who is one of the giants of academic anticorruption research over the last half-century, once pithily (and influentially) summed up his perspective on the causes of corruption in a “corruption formula”: C = M + D – A, or (to put this back into words): “Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability.”  (The formula originally appeared in Klitgaard’s 1975 1988 book, Controlling Corruption.  You can find a more recent version here.)  Much as I respect Klitgaard’s work, I think this anticorruption “formula” is not merely trite, but affirmatively misleading and therefore dangerous.

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Update from Mexico: PEMEX Reform, Private Investment, and the Government’s Anti-Corruption Gamble

Two days before the Mexican government unveiled draft regulations for its ambitious opening of the state-run energy sector to private participation late last month, Oscar-winning director Alfonso Cuarón published a letter posing ten questions to Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto.  “The reform will result in multimillion-dollar contracts” for private companies, wrote Cuarón. “In a country such as ours with a weak (and often nonexistent) rule of law, how can large-scale corruption be avoided?”  To the surprise of some, the President’s office issued a point-by-point response just a week later, naming a spectrum of anti-corruption measures adopted in the new regulations such as public bidding and agreements, disclosure of contractor expenses, a commissioner code of ethics, and institutional and procedural checks and balances unified under the oversight of the Secretary of Energy.  (Full text in Spanish here.)

The project to reform Mexico’s energy sector – particularly the state oil company PEMEX, which generates one-third of all government revenue and is bestowed of both a powerful workers union and tremendous symbolic importance in Mexican history – was always going to be controversial.  President Peña Nieto’s success in getting the law passed in December 2013 has been his signature achievement, lauded by the Washington Post as turning Mexico into “the Latin oil producer to watch — and a model of how democracy can serve a developing country.”

But both critics and many supporters of the reform recognize that corruption is an elephant in the room. Continue reading

Bharara and the Moreland Commission: Federal Overstep or Legitimate Intervention?

As a reaction to widespread corruption in New York state government, Governor Andrew Cuomo and Attorney General Eric Scheiderman appointed the Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption in July of last year. The members of the Commission were deputy attorneys general with broad powers to investigate violations of bribery, campaign finance, lobbying and election laws. Governor Cuomo disbanded the Moreland Commission last March, purportedly as part of a bargain to pass stricter anticorruption laws made in a larger budget deal. Two weeks later, the federal government stepped in, in a very public way. Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, opened an investigation into Cuomo’s decision to prematurely shut down the Commission and openly questioned Cuomo’s justification for the decision. Last week, the New York Times reported that subpoenas may have been served on the Commission’s former counsel, possibly to root out evidence of interference by the governor’s office in the workings of the Commission.

The federal investigation raises an important question: how involved should federal prosecutors be in corruption at the state and local level? Cuomo’s defensive response to Bharara’s announcement suggests that Cuomo believes involvement in this case is undesirable. However, any umbrage-taking on the part of the governor would be misplaced. For two reasons, Bharara’s intervention stands out as a uniquely well-founded and legitimate example of the increasingly commonplace practice of federal prosecution of state and local corruption.

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What the World Bank Can Do About Bid Rigging

I took the World Bank to task last week for its failure to tackle bid rigging and other forms of collusion in its new procurement framework.  Despite mounting evidence that prices on many Bank-financed projects are jacked up 25%, 50%, or even more thanks to bidder cartels, the new framework does not even mention the problem let alone recommend steps to combat it.  The omission is all the worse because developing country governments and other donor agencies generally follow the Bank’s lead on procurement policy.  With upwards of $1 trillion likely to be spent on power plants, water works, and other big-ticket items in developing nations over the next decade, if the rest of the development community, like the Bank, remains blind to the risk of collusion, the potential losses could be staggering.

What might the Bank do were it to decide to amend the new framework to confront the risk of collusion in public procurement? Continue reading

U.S. v. Esquenazi: Some Knee-Jerk Reactions

As those who follow the world of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement are no doubt well aware, earlier this week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided U.S. v. Esquenazi. The decision affirmed the convictions of two individuals involved in a complicated scheme to bribe officials of Teleco, the Hatian state-owned telecommunications company. Though the appeal involved several issues, the most significant aspect of the case–and the reason it had been so closely followed by so many people–was the defendants’ claim that Teleco was not an “instrumentality” of the Hatian government, and therefore that the Teleco employees whom the defendants bribed were not “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA. Though several district courts had considered (and rejected) claims of this sort before, Esquenazi was the first court of appeals decision to address such a claim.  And, like all of the prior district court cases, the court rejected the defendant’s argument and found that Teleco was indeed an instrumentality of the Hatian government.

Though I’m not sure there’s all that much to say about this that hasn’t already been said, let me make four quick observations about the decision and its potential significance (or lack thereof):

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The TTIP Is an Ideal Opportunity to Strengthen Anticorruption Measures

This week, Europe and the US will be negotiating the fifth round of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Transparency International (TI) has urged the parties to include a transparency and anticorruption chapter in the TTIP. TI is right about this–the US and European negotiators should include something like TI’s suggested chapter in the revised TTIP. Continue reading

Brazilian Anticorruption and the World Cup

The FIFA World Cup is more than “a mere sporting event. It’s a tool to promote social transformation.”  So said Ricardo Teixeira, the President of the Brazilian Football Confederation, after Brazil won the bid to host the 2014 games. Despite initial optimism, however, the buildup to the Cup in Brazil has been marred by widespread protests and accusations of corruption. If there is a basis to these accusations, the World Cup provides an early — and high-profile — opportunity to test Brazil’s new anticorruption law. Maryum’s post earlier this week might be right that the national government has a political incentive to prove that it’s serious about anticorruption, but the World Cup contradicts that narrative. The Cup’s high profile might skew the national government’s incentives: identifying corruption in Brazil’s World Cup could be a national embarrassment.  If the federal government’s incentives are misaligned, the decentralized enforcement powers in the CCA – which Maryum’s post criticizes – offer hope that corruption will be punished. Continue reading

Mauro (1995) Does NOT Show That Corruption Slows Growth

One of the most influential and widely cited economics articles on corruption is Paolo Mauro’s 1995 paper, “Corruption and Growth,” published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (Vol. 110, No. 3, pp. 681-712). It has become a standard citation for the proposition that corruption is lowers investment, and consequently lowers economic growth. The paper is important because it sparked close to 20 years (and counting) of increasingly sophisticated research on the economic effects of corruption. Furthermore, it leant critical academic support to the emerging anticorruption movement in both civil society and international organizations like the World Bank and IMF. And for those reasons alone, I think one could make a strong case that this paper has had a positive impact on the world.

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Crony Capitalism, the Asian Financial Crisis, and the Anticorruption Movement: What Are the Connections?

A couple of weeks ago, I posted a minor diatribe responding to the related claims – which I had perceived in a number of recent blog commentaries – (1) that corruption is not really that big a problem for economic development, and (2) that the emphasis on corruption had more to do with the desire of Western countries to feel superior to the allegedly misgoverned countries in the so-called Global South. One of the targets of my critique, Michael Dowdle, has posted an interesting response that deserves careful consideration.

Dowdle explains that his original post did not claim “that everyone involved in the anticorruption movement is infected by” the impulse to claim moral superiority, did not claim that this impulse “is the only or even the predominant motor behind the global anticorruption movement,” and indeed did not claim that this impulse is “a distinctly Western mindset.” After making these helpful clarifications, Dowdle explains the root of his concern that the desire to claim moral superiority may (partly) explain (some of) the global anticorruption movement: the invocation of a particular kind of corruption – “crony capitalism” – to explain the failures of the neoliberal model of global capitalism, most prominently in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

In a nutshell, Dowdle’s argument goes something like this (and I apologize in advance for what I’m sure will be a bit of an oversimplification, but I think this is basically faithful): (1) the rapid growth of the Asian economies in the 1980s and 1990s, with their allegedly distinctive approach to government involvement in the market, posed a challenge to the purported superiority of American capitalism; (2) the Asian Financial Crisis delegitimized this alleged alternative model of capitalism, and so was greeted “with a clear degree of glee” from many American commentators; (3) commentators (mostly Western) claimed that a root cause of the crisis was “crony capitalism” – the alleged tendency to make loans based on political or social connections rather than expected returns – as part of an emerging narrative about how the “Asian Alternative” had failed; (4) in fact, however, crony capitalism had nothing to do with the crisis; and (5) the global anticorruption movement more generally “was strongly catalyzed by the discourse of corruption that American observers used to describe and explain” the Asian Financial Crisis.

For the moment, let me put aside that last point about the alleged causal relationship between the discourse of crony capitalism in the context of the 1997 crisis and the emergence of the global anticorruption efforts more generally – except to say that I’m skeptical that this was more than a minor factor. (Certainly Dowdle doesn’t point to any evidence, beyond the timing, that would substantiate this claim.) I want to focus instead on his intriguing and provocative arguments (A) that crony capitalism had nothing to do with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, but (B) that the emphasis on crony capitalism in some quarters reflected a desire to delegitimize a perceived Asian challenge to American/Western capitalism. I find this narrower version of Dowdle’s hypothesis much more plausible than the much broader version I (mis)understood him to be advancing in his original post. But I still find myself somewhat skeptical, so in the interests of continuing what at least for me has been a very stimulating exchange, let me push back against certain aspects of Dowdle’s argument here.

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Brazil’s Clean Companies Act: Ineffective for Combating Local Corruption?

In January 2014, the Brazilian Clean Companies Act (CCA) came into effect. Under the CCA, Brazilian companies and foreign entities with a Brazilian registered office, branch, or affiliate can be sanctioned (civilly and administratively) for the bribery of domestic or foreign public officials, with penalties up to 20% of a company’s gross billings. The Act may be cause for optimism that Brazil is going to get serious about the corruption that has hampered its development, undermined trust in government, and provoked riots.

But despite the CCA’s tough sanctions and sweeping provisions, there are reasons to doubt whether the law will be effective at combatting corruption at the local level (as opposed to national-level officials).  Even if the CCA might go some way toward dealing with corruption at the national level, the new law fails to to adequately address local-level corruption in Brazil — and this is a major limitation, because local corruption in Brazilian business dealings is especially rampant.  There are at least two reasons why it is questionable the CCA will effectively combat local corruption. Continue reading