Multiple Errors in Quantitative Data Analysis, from Site Specializing in Quantitative Data Analysis

Like many people out there, I’m both a huge fan of Nate Silver–and the rigorous quantitative approach to election forecasting that he popularized–and at the same time quite disappointed in his FiveThirtyEight website, where the posts (especially those not by Silver himself) often seem to be slapdash efforts by people who have a smattering of statistical knowledge but don’t really know much about the topics they’re writing about. A depressing recent example, germane to this blog, is a post from last week entitled “It Only Seems Like Politics Is More Corrupt.” I normally wouldn’t bother to comment on something so slight here (especially because the post appears to have been written by an intern, and I generally try to avoid beating up on people who are just starting out), but many of the errors in analysis are both sufficiently elementary, and sufficiently common in discussions of corruption trends in other contexts (and by people with much more experience and therefore less of an excuse), that it’s worth taking a moment to explain what’s wrong.

A quick summary: The author cites recent U.S. Gallup poll data showing that the percentage of Americans who believe that “corruption is widespread” throughout the government in the United States has increased from about 60% in 2006 to a little over 75% in 2013. However, the author argues, the data doesn’t support the idea that corruption in the U.S. has actually worsened. To support that claim, she points to two other data sources:

  1. U.S. Department of Justice statistics from 1992-2012 show that the number of cases prosecuted by the DOJ’s Public Integrity Section (as well as the number of convictions and number of cases awaiting trial) appears to have declined, or at least hasn’t increased.
  2. The U.S. score on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) hasn’t changed very much between 1995 and 2013 (although there’s concededly a slight downward trend).

Do these two data sources disprove the idea that corruption in the U.S. has worsened over the last eight years, or more generally that the U.S. public’s perception of corruption is inaccurate?  In a word, no. There are so many elementary conceptual and statistical errors in this analysis, it’s difficult to know where to begin, but let me take a shot at cataloguing the most egregious problems: Continue reading

Are Less Corrupt Countries More Faithful Enforcers of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention?

The failure of many signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to enforce their new laws against the bribery of foreign public officials has been widely noted, including on this blog. There is no single factor that explains this lack of enforcement across the 30 or so countries (out of 41 total signatories) that have not yet seriously begun enforcing their anti-bribery laws. However, there is a fair amount of descriptive evidence about the extent to which signatories actually do so: Transparency International (TI) has, for the last nine years, released annual reports on progress, which provide a good deal of information on this level.

Continue reading

If It Looks Corrupt, It Is Corrupt

In combatting corruption, how much conduct should be prohibited? This lively issue, implicated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent controversial decision in McCutcheon, is relevant to those drafting reform legislation worldwide. There are two different starting points for analysis. The first approach (call it the traditional view) aims to eliminate only “actual” corrupt behavior: the FCPA, for example, requires that to violate its anti-bribery provision, an act must be done “corruptly.” The second method bans acts that create the appearance of corruption: in the United States, for example, this standard governs the behavior of federal employees and federal judges (except the Justices of the Supreme Court).

My position is that anticorruption law should adopt appearance-based rules that prohibit behavior and relationships giving rise to a (reasonable) appearance of corruption. Under traditional thinking, these laws might be deemed too over-inclusive. However, this post highlights two crucial insights missing from the traditional calculus:

(1) The appearance of corruption creates a real harm to society, independent of the harm from “actual” corrupt behavior; and

(2) Recent empirical work shows that maintaining appearances is important: a decline in the public’s trust in government brings forth an array of nasty behavior from citizens.

Continue reading

More on Compliance Certification–A Response to TRACE International

In a recent post, which built directly on a report from Transparency International USA, I raised some questions about the value of the compliance program “certifications” that certain private firms offer to provide.  (In a follow-up post, I also expressed even greater skepticism about current efforts to generate an International Organization for Standards (ISO) anti-bribery compliance program standard.) I won’t repeat everything in the original post here, but to summarize quickly: I expressed concern that “certifying” a compliance program (as distinct from reviewing and assessing it) could prove counterproductive because (1) the certification would not (or should not) be treated as significant by government enforcers or third parties, and (2) the certification might lead companies either to do too little or too much.

TRACE, one of the leading firms that offers compliance certification services (and also, through a separate but affiliated nonprofit, provides anti-bribery compliance support to member companies), has provided a thoughtful, thorough, and enlightening response to my post on the TRACE blog. The TRACE post takes issue with my criticisms, and also uses my post as an opportunity to “address head-on some common assumptions and misunderstandings that … surround anti-bribery certifications.”

I highly recommend that readers interested in this debate — which TI-USA deserves credit for kicking off — read TRACE’s post; I won’t try to summarize it here.  Let me say a few words about where I think we actually agree, then highlight what I think are the most significant points of disagreement, and then highlight one particularly intriguing aspect of the TRACE post that may deserve more extensive consideration. Continue reading

The Perry Indictment: Not So Farfetched

Texas Governor Rick Perry was indicted August 15 for engaging in what most Americans think of as politics as usual — or at least usual as practiced in Texas.  Perry was charged with abuse of office and coercing a public servant because he threatened to veto funding for an anticorruption unit attached to the Travis County District Attorney’s office unless DA Rosemary Lehmberg resigned.  Lehmberg, a Democrat, had been convicted of drunk driving and a video of her inebriated while in police custody had gone viral.  As Perry explained in vetoing the legislation after she refused to step down, he could not “in good conscience support continued State funding for an office . . . at a time when the person charged with ultimate responsibility of that unit has lost the public’s confidence.”

While Democrats saw a darker motive in Perry’s threat, the chance to replace a Democrat who had been a thorn in Republicans side, few think his threat was illegal.  The Washington Post and New York Times editorial pages, neither enthusiastic backers of Perry’s firebrand Texas conservatism, both sharply questioned the indictment as did President Obama’s former top political adviser David Axelrod.  Veto threats are part of the everyday give-and-take between governors and state legislatures and between Presidents and the Congress.  Indeed, as recently as the 2013 confrontation over the shutdown of the federal government President Obama used the threat of a veto to get his way with the  Republican Congress.  How can that be illegal?   And if it wasn’t, why is Perry’s?

But before politicians write the Perry indictment off as farfetched, they best consult a lawyer.  Continue reading

Procedural Safeguards and Corruption-Resistant Institutions

Rick has blogged previously about how disclosure programs and transparency measures alone will not solve public sector procurement corruption.  Though these measures may be better than nothing, releasing information accomplishes little unless there are mechanisms in place with the resources to review it, corroborate it, and act on red flags.

Continue reading

The Prosecution of Bribery: What Lawmakers Can Learn from Bavaria and Virginia

Prosecutors thinking about whether to pursue a case against the recipient or payer of a bribe will surely think twice given events of the past weeks in the German state of Bavaria and the American state of Virginia.  In Bavaria the bribery prosecution against Formula One impresario Bernie Ecclestone collapsed mid-trial after the judge expressed strong doubts the case could be proved.  In Virginia prosecutors are slogging through the third of what is expected to be a six week trial as they try to show that Robert McDonnell, the state’s former governor, was paid to shill for a local business.  To prosecutors, the two cases remind that bribery is no easy crime to prove and that losing carries risks both personal and professional.  To lawmakers, the two cases should prompt a scrub of their nation’s bribery laws to see whether the bar they have set for proving a case is too high. Continue reading

More Confused & Confusing Commentary on Corruption, Earmarks, and Campaign Finance

When a prominent platform like the New York Times Op-Ed page features a piece on corruption, I feel like I should say something about it.  (Furthering the public dialogue and all that.)  But it’s hard for me to come up with something productive to say about Thomas Edsall’s rambling editorial on “The Value of Corruption,” published last week. So far as I can make out, Edsall makes three main points:

  1. The Congressional ban on legislative earmarks, intended as a means of fighting one form of perceived “corruption,” has in fact undermined one of the key tools legislators can use to build compromise and overcome gridlock.
  2. The Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions in cases like Citizens United and McCutcheon have given wealthy interests more power to influence elections (which some characterize as “legalized corruption”).
  3. Sometimes corruption can be “good” — the “honest graft” praised and defended by George Washington Plunkitt — particularly when it helps certain excluded groups overcome barriers established by entrenched interests.

If your first reaction to this is that these points have little to do with one another — other than the fact that they all use the word “corruption” — then we’re on the same page. But instead of just trashing the Times Op-Ed page (much fun as that is), let me see if I can try to say something substantive.  Not sure if I’ll succeed — here goes: Continue reading

E-Government and Corruption: Evidence from India

From the Open Government Initiative for data sharing in the United States to the plurilateral Open Government Partnership abroad, online government or “e-government” is an important trend in global public administration.  In addition to improving government efficiency and citizen access, studies suggest that e-government can also facilitate accountability and reduce corruption.  Of course, there is reason to be skeptical as to whether successes of e-government champions such as Estonia and South Korea can translate to developing countries, where resources are more limited and corruption is often most severe.  But a 2009 study that excluded OECD countries found that a significant increase in the services supplied online could account for as much as a 13 percentile improvement in a country’s ranking in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index, even after controlling for changes in gross domestic product and press freedom.

Continue reading

The OECD Convention and Extraterritorial FCPA Jurisdiction

I suggested in an earlier post that a major reason for the increase in foreign anti-bribery prosecutions in other countries since the passage of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is increased enforcement of the FCPA against foreign companies by the US government. In this post, I will set out, in a little more depth, one factor that contributed to bringing this effect about, namely a broadened scope for enforcement jurisdiction under §78dd-3 of the FCPA.

An important effect of the entry into force of the OECD Convention was that it provided “cover” for expansive US enforcement of the FCPA. Equally important, though, was the contribution it made in providing the legal means by which the US Department of Justice was actually able to undertake this expansion. Broader enforcement has helped to push standards for anti-bribery enforcement into convergence around the world, and has encouraged other countries to start enforcing their own laws more seriously.

Continue reading