The Perry Indictment: Not So Farfetched

Texas Governor Rick Perry was indicted August 15 for engaging in what most Americans think of as politics as usual — or at least usual as practiced in Texas.  Perry was charged with abuse of office and coercing a public servant because he threatened to veto funding for an anticorruption unit attached to the Travis County District Attorney’s office unless DA Rosemary Lehmberg resigned.  Lehmberg, a Democrat, had been convicted of drunk driving and a video of her inebriated while in police custody had gone viral.  As Perry explained in vetoing the legislation after she refused to step down, he could not “in good conscience support continued State funding for an office . . . at a time when the person charged with ultimate responsibility of that unit has lost the public’s confidence.”

While Democrats saw a darker motive in Perry’s threat, the chance to replace a Democrat who had been a thorn in Republicans side, few think his threat was illegal.  The Washington Post and New York Times editorial pages, neither enthusiastic backers of Perry’s firebrand Texas conservatism, both sharply questioned the indictment as did President Obama’s former top political adviser David Axelrod.  Veto threats are part of the everyday give-and-take between governors and state legislatures and between Presidents and the Congress.  Indeed, as recently as the 2013 confrontation over the shutdown of the federal government President Obama used the threat of a veto to get his way with the  Republican Congress.  How can that be illegal?   And if it wasn’t, why is Perry’s?

But before politicians write the Perry indictment off as farfetched, they best consult a lawyer.  Continue reading

The Prosecution of Bribery: What Lawmakers Can Learn from Bavaria and Virginia

Prosecutors thinking about whether to pursue a case against the recipient or payer of a bribe will surely think twice given events of the past weeks in the German state of Bavaria and the American state of Virginia.  In Bavaria the bribery prosecution against Formula One impresario Bernie Ecclestone collapsed mid-trial after the judge expressed strong doubts the case could be proved.  In Virginia prosecutors are slogging through the third of what is expected to be a six week trial as they try to show that Robert McDonnell, the state’s former governor, was paid to shill for a local business.  To prosecutors, the two cases remind that bribery is no easy crime to prove and that losing carries risks both personal and professional.  To lawmakers, the two cases should prompt a scrub of their nation’s bribery laws to see whether the bar they have set for proving a case is too high. Continue reading

Don’t Give Back that Glove General Holder!

Although few readers likely can find Equatorial Guinea on a map (hint: it’s that small square wedged between Cameroon and Gabon), many have heard its name in connection with the annual contest to identify the “most corrupt country.” For despite the always stiff competition from the likes of such states as Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, year-in-year-out Equatorial Guinea always manages to place at or near the top.  Observers attribute its perennially strong showing to a combination of two factors: 1) the country’s vast mineral wealth and 2) its rulers’ skill and ruthlessness in keeping it all for themselves. Continue reading

Some Successful Initiatives by Civil Society to Prompt Corruption-Related Litigation

In an earlier post I promoted a conference on corruption the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and the Open Society Foundations’ Justice Initiative had planned for June 2014 to discuss ways civil society could stimulate corruption-related litigation, be it criminal investigations or private actions for damages.  The conference was held June 28 with some 100 individuals from civil society, academia, law firms, and governments attending, and one of the highlights was presentations describing successful efforts by civil society groups in India, Nigeria, France, and Switzerland. Continue reading

Quid Pro Quo: The Deus Ex Machina of Bribery Law?

In a recent post Phil spotted an apparent anomaly in U.S. anticorruption laws: these laws make it is easier to get away with bribing an American politician than a non-American one.  As Phil explains, the difference arises from what seems to be the higher burden the prosecution must meet to prove that what is ostensibly a campaign contribution is in reality a bribe when the recipient is an American politician rather than a non-U.S. officeholder.

When the payment is to an American politician, the prosecution must, in the words of McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision interpreting the Federal Election Campaign Act, prove “quid pro quo corruption,” which the Court defines as “a direct exchange of an official act for money.” By contrast, when the challenged payment is to a non-American office holder, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act merely requires that the prosecution establish that the money was “corruptly” given for the purpose of “influencing any act or decision [taken in an official capacity].” Phil takes the absence of an express requirement of a quid pro quo in the FCPA as easing the prosecutor’s burden. But is Phil’s reading of the two laws correct? Continue reading

Fixing the Mutual Legal Assistance Regime: Some Thoughts on Reform

Last week I reported that the United States was often slow to respond to requests from other nations for evidence needed to prosecute corruption cases in their courts and that as a result some cases have had to be dismissed.  I also noted that, as of spring 2013, 4500 requests awaited processing, a backlog the Justice Department blames on a shortage of personnel.  In a comment on the post. Matthew asks two questions:  1) are there other ways besides adding staff that countries can reduce the delay in responding to requests for legal assistance and 2) is the U.S. the only country with a large backlog of requests.

Continue reading

America’s Broken System for Helping Friendly Nations Prosecute Corruption Cases

Gaborone, Botswana, is not the place one would expect to find a group advocating that the United States government get tough on crime, but then the advocates were not the typical Washington cabal of interest group representatives, activists, lawmakers, and media.  Rather, they were investigators and prosecutors from 14 African anticorruption agencies attending a workshop on corruption investigations sponsored by the Association of Anticorruption Agencies in Commonwealth Africa.  Why the advocacy?  What is the complaint with the U.S.?

Especially in the smaller African countries, any significant corruption case almost inevitably requires a cross-border investigation.  The alleged corrupter is in one jurisdiction, the alleged corruptee in a second, and what may be the proceeds of the crime in a third.  Although the U.S. would seem to be a long way from Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, and other Sub-Saharan nations, workshop participants explained that not only are corrupters sometimes located in the U.S., but many African elites favor parking assets acquired corruptly in American banks, real estate, and financial assets.  Hence the anticorruption authorities of Sub-Saharan states frequently seek help from the U.S. to locate stolen assets, obtain business records, and depose witnesses.  In a session devoted to the mechanics of investigating cross-border cases, however, not one of the 30 participants identified a single instance where the U.S. had timely responded to their request to provide evidence they needed to help convict corrupt public officials or freeze or seize his or her assets.  Indeed, several said they had been forced to dismiss charges or allow freezing orders to lapse because the U.S. had failed to reply to their requests. Continue reading

Illicit Financial Flows: Tax Fraud, Evasion, Avoidance, Abuse, Mitigation, and Planning

Thanks to high profile reports by Global Integrity, Eurodad, the OECD, and the African High Level Panel spotlighting losses developing countries suffer from the manipulation of tax laws and other forms of illicit financial flows, questions about “tax fraud,” “tax evasion,” “tax avoidance,” and “tax abuse” are now on the development policy agenda.  These terms and their equivalents in other languages are, with the exception of “tax fraud,” ambiguous — sometimes used to mean actions that are unlawful and sometimes used to refer to legal ones.  Before the debate on how to ensure developing countries receive the tax revenues they are due goes any farther, it may be helpful to explain how the ambiguity arises. Continue reading

Corruption Risk Assessments: Some Observations on Private Sector Analyses

As the pressure to curb corruption has grown, so too has the demand for “corruption risk assessments,” efforts to predict what form corruption in a public agency or private firm is likely to take and what can be done to reduce if not to eliminate it.  In the private sector risk assessments have been fueled by national laws that reduce penalties for corruption violations if a firm has a risk management program in place.  In the public sector risk assessments help assure citizens that their money is not being stolen and provide an agency leader unlucky enough to be at the helm when a corruption scandal breaks at least a partial defense to charges of incompetence or venality.

Public sector assessments come in several varieties: those which examine the risks faced by a single organization, say the Albanian tax agency, others which assess risks in a publicly-funded program, for example a de-forestation project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and still others which consider overall risk in a sector with a large public presence such as water or education.  While public sector assessments are almost always readily available, private sector assessments are not, presumably for proprietary or competitive reasons.  What is available on private sector risk assessment are hundreds (thousands?) of tomes advising firms on how to conduct a risk assessment — often written by those looking to assess the corruption risks a corporation faces for a fee.

A Google search for “corruption risk assessment” produced 300,000 hits, one for “assessing corruption risks” 48 million!  I won’t pretend to have read even a representative sample of the reports or “how to” manuals, but the many I have read so far have been a disappointment. Continue reading

Corruption Measurement: A Primer

In an early post Matthew predicted that the measurement of corruption was likely to be a major topic of discussion on this blog.  So far his prediction has proved correct.  Ten of the sixty plus posts that have appeared since this blog was launched in mid-February have been devoted in whole or part to measurement issues:  Are perception measures accurate?  Useful whether accurate or not?  What’s the source of the $1 trillion bribe estimate?  Shouldn’t someone develop sub-national corruption perception measures?   And so forth.

This eleventh post steps back from the policy issues examined in earlier ones to address a much more straightforward question:  What are the different ways corruption can be measured? Continue reading