Although few readers likely can find Equatorial Guinea on a map (hint: it’s that small square wedged between Cameroon and Gabon), many have heard its name in connection with the annual contest to identify the “most corrupt country.” For despite the always stiff competition from the likes of such states as Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, year-in-year-out Equatorial Guinea always manages to place at or near the top. Observers attribute its perennially strong showing to a combination of two factors: 1) the country’s vast mineral wealth and 2) its rulers’ skill and ruthlessness in keeping it all for themselves. Continue reading
Author Archives: Richard Messick
Some Successful Initiatives by Civil Society to Prompt Corruption-Related Litigation
In an earlier post I promoted a conference on corruption the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and the Open Society Foundations’ Justice Initiative had planned for June 2014 to discuss ways civil society could stimulate corruption-related litigation, be it criminal investigations or private actions for damages. The conference was held June 28 with some 100 individuals from civil society, academia, law firms, and governments attending, and one of the highlights was presentations describing successful efforts by civil society groups in India, Nigeria, France, and Switzerland. Continue reading
Quid Pro Quo: The Deus Ex Machina of Bribery Law?
In a recent post Phil spotted an apparent anomaly in U.S. anticorruption laws: these laws make it is easier to get away with bribing an American politician than a non-American one. As Phil explains, the difference arises from what seems to be the higher burden the prosecution must meet to prove that what is ostensibly a campaign contribution is in reality a bribe when the recipient is an American politician rather than a non-U.S. officeholder.
When the payment is to an American politician, the prosecution must, in the words of McCutcheon v. FEC, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision interpreting the Federal Election Campaign Act, prove “quid pro quo corruption,” which the Court defines as “a direct exchange of an official act for money.” By contrast, when the challenged payment is to a non-American office holder, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act merely requires that the prosecution establish that the money was “corruptly” given for the purpose of “influencing any act or decision [taken in an official capacity].” Phil takes the absence of an express requirement of a quid pro quo in the FCPA as easing the prosecutor’s burden. But is Phil’s reading of the two laws correct? Continue reading
Fixing the Mutual Legal Assistance Regime: Some Thoughts on Reform
Last week I reported that the United States was often slow to respond to requests from other nations for evidence needed to prosecute corruption cases in their courts and that as a result some cases have had to be dismissed. I also noted that, as of spring 2013, 4500 requests awaited processing, a backlog the Justice Department blames on a shortage of personnel. In a comment on the post. Matthew asks two questions: 1) are there other ways besides adding staff that countries can reduce the delay in responding to requests for legal assistance and 2) is the U.S. the only country with a large backlog of requests.
America’s Broken System for Helping Friendly Nations Prosecute Corruption Cases
Gaborone, Botswana, is not the place one would expect to find a group advocating that the United States government get tough on crime, but then the advocates were not the typical Washington cabal of interest group representatives, activists, lawmakers, and media. Rather, they were investigators and prosecutors from 14 African anticorruption agencies attending a workshop on corruption investigations sponsored by the Association of Anticorruption Agencies in Commonwealth Africa. Why the advocacy? What is the complaint with the U.S.?
Especially in the smaller African countries, any significant corruption case almost inevitably requires a cross-border investigation. The alleged corrupter is in one jurisdiction, the alleged corruptee in a second, and what may be the proceeds of the crime in a third. Although the U.S. would seem to be a long way from Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, and other Sub-Saharan nations, workshop participants explained that not only are corrupters sometimes located in the U.S., but many African elites favor parking assets acquired corruptly in American banks, real estate, and financial assets. Hence the anticorruption authorities of Sub-Saharan states frequently seek help from the U.S. to locate stolen assets, obtain business records, and depose witnesses. In a session devoted to the mechanics of investigating cross-border cases, however, not one of the 30 participants identified a single instance where the U.S. had timely responded to their request to provide evidence they needed to help convict corrupt public officials or freeze or seize his or her assets. Indeed, several said they had been forced to dismiss charges or allow freezing orders to lapse because the U.S. had failed to reply to their requests. Continue reading
Illicit Financial Flows: Tax Fraud, Evasion, Avoidance, Abuse, Mitigation, and Planning
Thanks to high profile reports by Global Integrity, Eurodad, the OECD, and the African High Level Panel spotlighting losses developing countries suffer from the manipulation of tax laws and other forms of illicit financial flows, questions about “tax fraud,” “tax evasion,” “tax avoidance,” and “tax abuse” are now on the development policy agenda. These terms and their equivalents in other languages are, with the exception of “tax fraud,” ambiguous — sometimes used to mean actions that are unlawful and sometimes used to refer to legal ones. Before the debate on how to ensure developing countries receive the tax revenues they are due goes any farther, it may be helpful to explain how the ambiguity arises. Continue reading
Corruption Risk Assessments: Some Observations on Private Sector Analyses
As the pressure to curb corruption has grown, so too has the demand for “corruption risk assessments,” efforts to predict what form corruption in a public agency or private firm is likely to take and what can be done to reduce if not to eliminate it. In the private sector risk assessments have been fueled by national laws that reduce penalties for corruption violations if a firm has a risk management program in place. In the public sector risk assessments help assure citizens that their money is not being stolen and provide an agency leader unlucky enough to be at the helm when a corruption scandal breaks at least a partial defense to charges of incompetence or venality.
Public sector assessments come in several varieties: those which examine the risks faced by a single organization, say the Albanian tax agency, others which assess risks in a publicly-funded program, for example a de-forestation project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and still others which consider overall risk in a sector with a large public presence such as water or education. While public sector assessments are almost always readily available, private sector assessments are not, presumably for proprietary or competitive reasons. What is available on private sector risk assessment are hundreds (thousands?) of tomes advising firms on how to conduct a risk assessment — often written by those looking to assess the corruption risks a corporation faces for a fee.
A Google search for “corruption risk assessment” produced 300,000 hits, one for “assessing corruption risks” 48 million! I won’t pretend to have read even a representative sample of the reports or “how to” manuals, but the many I have read so far have been a disappointment. Continue reading
Corruption Measurement: A Primer
In an early post Matthew predicted that the measurement of corruption was likely to be a major topic of discussion on this blog. So far his prediction has proved correct. Ten of the sixty plus posts that have appeared since this blog was launched in mid-February have been devoted in whole or part to measurement issues: Are perception measures accurate? Useful whether accurate or not? What’s the source of the $1 trillion bribe estimate? Shouldn’t someone develop sub-national corruption perception measures? And so forth.
This eleventh post steps back from the policy issues examined in earlier ones to address a much more straightforward question: What are the different ways corruption can be measured? Continue reading
America’s Pursuit of Absolute Integrity
Attempts to control corruption have a long history in the United States. Since the late 19th century numerous laws have been enacted at the federal, state, and local level to end patronage and nepotism in government employment, control conflicts of interest by public servants, and reduce opportunities for bribery and kick-backs. Although the current corruption landscape differs from that of 20th century America, policymakers considering anticorruption legislation today can profit from a look at the U.S. experience.
A useful, if sobering, place to start is with Professors Frank Anechiarico and James B. Jacobs’ 1997 analysis based on New York City’s century long effort to combat corruption supplemented by the federal government’s more recent experience with ethics laws. Useful because the authors analyze many of the same interventions now commonly advocated to combat corruption around the globe: conflict of interest legislation, financial disclosure requirements for public servants, whistleblower protection, the creation of inspectors general, the reduction of officials’ discretion. Sobering, not only because they conclude these reforms have done little to combat corruption, but also because the authors contend that together these laws have contributed to the current dysfunctional state of American government. In short, they say, America’s effort to suppress corruption has produced little benefit at great cost.
The New Chinese-Backed Infrastructure Bank: Will it Tame the Corruption Dragon?
Asian governments are welcoming China’s recent decision to establish a bank to finance infrastructure across Asia. As Devex reported June 2, China plans to capitalize it with an initial $50 billion with the possibility of increasing it by an additional $100 billion. For China, the bank is one more way to assert leadership in the Asian region. For Asian states leery of relying on the Western-led World Bank and Asian Development Bank for financing public works, the bank is a chance to diversify. For both the lender and borrowers alike, the bank offers the chance to profit from Asia’s economic dynamism.
The Chinese-led bank will have to overcome many challenges to realize these objectives, the most difficult of which may well be preventing corruption from infecting the projects it finances. Infrastructure corruption produces half-built roads, dilapidated ports, and white elephants of all kinds. It leaves borrowing governments indebted for under-performing, over-priced assets while stirring a backlash against the lender. Will the new bank and its principal backer be able to keep the corruption dragon at bay? There are at least three reasons to worry that it won’t. Continue reading