For all the effort development agencies invest to help developing states combat corruption, recent reports of corruption in Japanese and Norwegian development aid projects along with an earlier paper on corruption in World Bank projects remind that the development community does little to attack corruption in the one area where it has the most control: the projects it funds. Continue reading
We’ve spent a fair amount of time, in the early days of this blog, talking about the challenges of measuring corruption cross-nationally. The well-known perception measures are useful to a point, but suffer from well-known drawbacks, chief among them concerns about how accurately perceptions capture reality. A recent working paper by Laarni Escresa and Lucio Picci, “A New Cross-National Measure of Corruption,” tries to get around these difficulties. Using data on enforcement of foreign anti-bribery laws like the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), Escresa and Picci they derive a new index, which they call the Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI), to make more objective cross-country comparisons in corruption levels. The paper is really clever and creative—but in the end I think it doesn’t work. Let me first say what I think is so cool about the idea, and then explain what I think are the biggest flaws. Continue reading
Is it possible for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other domestic anti-corruption regimes to influence the outcomes of international investment arbitrations? In my last post, I showed how allegations of corruption could be relevant in investment treaty arbitration, both as a “sword” wielded by investors, and as a “shield” used by sovereign states. In this post, I consider how evidence from domestic anti-corruption proceedings could be used in arbitration, and what effects its use might have on the international system. Continue reading
Daniel Dudis, Senior Policy Director for Government Accountability at Transparency International USA contributes the following guest post:
The United Nations is currently working towards developing a set of sustainable development goals (SDGs) that will provide the framework for whatever new global commitments are agreed upon as a replacement to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which expire in 2015. Many development priorities have been identified for potential inclusion among the SDGs–indeed, the most recent document from the U.N. SDG working group lists no fewer than 19 “focus areas” for potential inclusion. As is now widely recognized, the achievement of many of the traditional development goals (poverty eradication, nutrition, education, etc.) requires honest and effective governments. But it is important to go beyond that recognition and make good government–government that is both effective and free of corruption–a development goal in and of itself. In considering which development priorities to enshrine for inclusion among the future SDGs, UN member states should insist on the inclusion of “good governance” as a specific, standalone governance goal.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission – which struck down limits on the aggregate amount any one individual could contribute to multiple candidates during a single electoral cycle – has attracted a great deal of attention. Indeed, it has already generated so much discussion that I’m not sure I have much to add (particularly given that I’m not a campaign finance expert). But one piece of commentary on the decision caught my eye: on the Wall Street Journal’s blog, Jacob Gershman argues that McCutcheon is not just about the clash over the value of political speech and the effect of money on political integrity, but “at a more basic level” the decision is about “how to define the concept of ‘corruption.’” Many of my colleagues in the legal academy – several of whom are quoted in Mr. Gershman’s post – agree with that assessment, as does Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion in McCutcheon. But I don’t think it’s quite right—or at least it’s only partly right.
Two weeks ago I wrote about the growing disparity between transnational prosecutions for paying bribes and those for receiving bribes. The number of cases where OECD countries have prosecuted their nationals or firms subject to their jurisdiction for bribing developing country officials has been growing steadily, but there are disappointingly few cases where a developing state has gone after its nationals for accepting bribes. Last week I suggested one way to increase the number of cases against bribe-taking officials is to publicize whenever a firm or individual has been convicted of paying a bribe in a developing state. For every payer, there is a taker, and if the details of the case are widely publicized, my contention was that civil society, the media, and the political opposition would then press the authorities to prosecute the taker.
The World Bank has tried something similar when an investigation reveals corruption in one of its projects, and the experience suggests that, though not a silver bullet, the effort is worthwhile.
I recently came across a couple of interesting blog posts about corruption and the “revolving door” in the U.S. government (the cycling of individuals from the private sector to government and back again—often as representatives of the same industries they used to regulate while in government).
First, last month Chandu Krishnan (who served as Executive Director of Transparency International UK from 2004-2012) published an insightful post on the Safra Center’s blog, noting how the revolving door—and in particular the promise of lucrative post-government employment—may lead government officials to make laws that reflect the preferences of “industry lobbies” rather than the “will of the people.” Mr. Krishnan adds his voice to the chorus of calls for reform; in particular, he recommends lengthening the legally-required “cooling off” period (during which former government officials are prohibited from lobbying) from one to three years (or longer for positions involving especially high risk, such as procurement).
Around the same time, Mike Koehler, who runs the FCPA Professor Blog, posted a comment on Charles Duross’s recent departure from his position as head of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement division to take up a position at the law firm Morrison & Foerster. In this post, Professor Koehler reiterated his earlier calls for extending and expanding the “cooling off” period, so that former government FCPA lawyers could not provide any FCPA defense or compliance services for five years after leaving government service.
What struck me about reading these two posts in rapid succession was the fact that although Mr. Krishnan and Prof. Koehler seem in agreement on the problem and the solution, in fact their hypotheses about the effect of the revolving door on government officials’ incentives are not only different, but polar opposites. Mr. Krishnan worries that the prospect of future employment at private sector firms will cause government officials to go too easy on those firms—leading to overly passive or timid enforcement of U.S. law. (He views this as a kind of “institutional corruption.”) Prof. Koehler worries that the prospect of future private sector employment causes government officials to be too aggressive in their enforcement of the law—creating or augmenting the demand for the defense & compliance services these ex-government officials then provide.
Is social media the next great tool in fighting corruption, or is its role more limited? As Matthew noted in his last post, some anticorruption activists have used blogs and other online platforms to circumvent traditional media, and there’s some limited evidence they may have had an effect. Perhaps even more exciting, the launch and the early successes of the website I Paid A Bribe, started by an Indian nonprofit, suggested that the egalitarian internet could take advantage of “crowdsourcing” approaches to provide information on corrupt activities, disincentivize bribe-taking, and educate the public. Anticorruption reformers in other countries took note of I Paid A Bribe’s achievements, launching their own country-specific spinoff websites.
But those websites have not been universally successful. One of the most notable recent disappointments has been in China, where I Paid A Bribe and similar crowdsourced antibribery platforms failed, and ultimately folded. Recent research by Yuen Yuen Ang examines the short-lived existence of China’s crowdsourced antibribery platforms and offers some explanations for why the Chinese efforts failed to accomplish their objectives. While she stops short of offering broader takeaways on the role of social media in combating bribery, we can draw some conclusions using her work as a starting point. Broadly speaking, her conclusions suggest that social media is only effective in combating bribery where an adequate educational, social, and political framework exists to support its use. Continue reading
We usually imagine that democratic accountability serves an important anticorruption function: since voters presumably do not approve of corruption, a benefit of democracy is the ability to give untrustworthy pols the boot. Yet in a recent op-ed in the Washington Post, Hilary Krieger provocatively claims that American voters don’t really care if a politician engages in corrupt acts, so long as “a political leader has otherwise furthered the public good.” In addition to this descriptive claim, she also makes the normative argument that Americans voters are right not to reflexively vote out politicians tainted by corruption.
Although both her descriptive and normative claims have some truth to them–elections are multi-faceted, and corruption is not the end-all-be-all issue–both the descriptive and normative arguments have serious flaws.
GAB | The Global Anticorruption Blog 