When countries apply for membership in the European Union (EU), the EU has substantial leverage to insist on various economic, political, and governance reforms—including anticorruption reforms. The EU has used this leverage, mandating (among other things) various anticorruption measures as a condition for accession. Has this worked? Does this form of conditionality help galvanize meaningful improvement in the corruption situation in candidate countries?

One of the most systematic attempts to answer this question, a 2014 study by Mert Kartal, compared corruption trends from 1995-2012 in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that did and did not apply for EU membership. The study found that applicant countries made significant progress during the accession process—but after accession, these countries’ anticorruption performance tended to deteriorate substantially. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the EU loses its leverage after accession takes place. Nevertheless, the finding is disheartening, in that it casts doubt on whether the EU was able to spur meaningful, lasting anticorruption reform. Notably, though, the results were not uniform across the twelve applicant countries studied: In some, the improvement that occurred prior to accession almost completely reversed after accession, but in others, the improvements appeared more sustainable. Diving into individual stories of accession suggests several factors that may have played an important role in the success or failure of EU attempts at using the carrot of membership to spur sustainable anticorruption reform. Continue reading →