Why Governance Failures Are the Real Root Cause of Financial Crime

That’s the title of an insightful article on financial crime just posted on NYU’s Compliance and Enforcement blog.  In it author Arun Maheshwar, Executive Director-Head of Model Risk Control, Legal and Compliance at Morgan Stanley, uses the conclusions of numerous enforcement actions across multiple American and foreign jurisdictions to explain why so many organizations private and public are failing to curb employees’ fraud and corruption.

The article is also one more reason why Compliance and Enforcement, sponsored by NYU Law’s Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement, is essential reading for corruption fighters.

To whet GAB readers appetite to click on this link to Maheshwar’s post, excerpts appear below.

“Financial institutions have invested billions of dollars in advanced compliance technology. . . . Yet despite this unprecedented investment, enforcement actions continue to rise in both frequency and severity. . . .

“Across the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union, regulatory findings repeatedly identify the same root causes: unclear accountability, weak escalation, ineffective oversight, fragmented ownership, superficial risk assessments, misaligned incentives, and leadership cultures that treat compliance as a regulatory obligation rather than a core control function. . . .

“Financial crime is a leadership problem. It reflects the values an institution prioritizes, the trade-offs management is willing to make, the incentives that drive behavior, and the accountability structures that shape decision-making.”

The UK’s Failure-to-Prevent-Bribery Offense Has Succeeded in Preventing Bribery

The UK Bribery Act 2010 has been widely heralded as “the gold standard” of anti-bribery laws, an “exemplary” statute that is “a lodestar for other countries.” That the UK is now seen as a “world leader” in the fight against foreign bribery, after years of being seen as a laggard, is due in no small part to UK Bribery Act’s most innovative aspect: the failure to prevent bribery offense under section 7. This section makes commercial organizations doing business in the UK criminally liable if they fail to prevent a person associated with their organization from bribing another for the purpose of obtaining or retaining an advantage for the organization. “Associated” persons are defined broadly as including anyone who performs services on behalf of the organization, including employees, contractors and agents. But companies can avoid liability for failure to prevent bribery if they can show that they had adopted “adequate procedures” to prevent such wrongdoing. This feature of the Act has received growing international endorsement. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted similar provisions (e.g. Australia, Kenya, Bermuda, Ireland, South Africa) or are considering doing so (New Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong). Moreover, within the UK itself, this failure to prevent framework has been expanded to contexts such as tax evasion and fraud offenses, and is also being considered for tackling human rights harms, mistreatment of vulnerable persons and computer misuse offenses.

Yet despite such widespread praise, section 7, and the UK Bribery Act more generally, have their detractors. The main criticisms tend to fall into two categories. First, some have argued that section 7 has not been as effective in changing corporate behavior as might have reasonably been expected. Second, some have argued that section 7’s “adequate procedures” defense is too vague. Both of these criticisms are overstated. Continue reading