Guest Post: Reaching Bribery’s Victims (Part 3)

This month GAB is delighted to feature a series of guest posts from Andy Spalding, Assistant Professor at the University of Richmond School of Law and Senior Editor of the FCPA Blog.  This is the third and final post in the series on how to compensate the victims of transnational bribery:

I began this series of guest posts by applauding the StAR Initiative’s recent report, Left Out of the Bargain, for calling attention to the need for settlements in anti-bribery cases to provide more compensation to the overseas victims of bribery. In my last post, I explored a series of encouraging, but perhaps not quite promising, ways of doing so in the specific context of US FCPA enforcement actions.

What we’re looking for is an enforcement mechanism that satisfies these criteria: 1) it benefits the citizens of the bribed government; 2) it funds initiatives to remedy past bribery (to the extent possible) and to curb future bribery; 3) it reallocates a portion of the penalty money, rather than relying on recovered assets; 4) the money goes to private-sector organizations and programs, rather than the host governments; and 5) the mechanism is authorized under existing US law, requiring no new statutes or regulations.

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Guest Post: Reaching Bribery’s Victims (Part 2)

This month GAB is delighted to feature a series of guest posts from Andy Spalding, Assistant Professor at the University of Richmond School of Law and Senior Editor of the FCPA Blog.  This is the second in the series of three posts on how to compensate the victims of transnational bribery:

In my last post, I weighed in on the discussion concerning whether the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Article 53(b) (or any other provision), establishes a duty to allocate anti-bribery penalty money to the overseas victims. I’d like to suggest now that regardless of how one answers that question, using enforcement monies to benefit those victims is a good idea. We could engage any number of ethical, economic, foreign policy, or other arguments on this point; I’ll save those for another day. For the remainder of my post, I’ll assume that: 1) the citizens of corrupted governments are the principal victims of transnational bribery; and 2) enforcement should somehow benefit them. The next question, which is no less difficult, is how.

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