Guest Post: What Trump’s FCPA Enforcement Pause Means for Accountability in Europe

Today’s guest post is by the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation. Established following the assassination of Maltese anticorruption journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, the foundation seeks to ensure full justice for Daphne’s murder, advance her work, support and protect investigative journalists, and promote public interest litigation. It coordinates the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE), administers the Public Interest Legal Network (PILN), is a Transparency International chapter-in-formation, a partner of OCCRP, and a member of the UNCAC Coalition.

Here on the little Mediterranean island of Malta, located just south of Sicily, news of a Department of Justice investigation into Texas-based Steward Healthcare was met with a collective sigh of relief – “the Americans will help to get it done” – some thought to themselves. “It” in this case refers to the act of achieving accountability for one of the biggest corruption scandals to rock the country.

The scandal centers around Steward’s takeover of a fraudulent concession to develop and manage three of Malta’s public hospitals. The hospitals were left in a state of disrepair and under-resourced, as public funds intended for their development and upkeep by-passed them almost completely, landing instead inside the pockets of a well-positioned few through a carefully organized international network of consultancy agreements and intermediaries. In Malta, these few allegedly included Maltese former Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, Minister Konrad Mizzi, and Chief of Staff Keith Schembri. In the US, Steward executives allegedly     did their best to collect all they could of the money hemorrhaging from the concession.

So what did Maltese citizens hope the result of the Department’s FCPA investigation would be?

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Guest Post: Getting into the Weeds of Victim Compensation in Foreign Bribery Cases

Today’s guest post is from Sam Hickey, a lawyer and former regular GAB contributor:

Given the Trump Administration’s decision to pause FCPA enforcement and disband the DOJ’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, the United Kingdom has become an even more important actor in international efforts to remediate those most impacted by foreign bribery, and the global fight against corruption more generally.

Together with the Basel Institute on Governance, I have written a report on the UK’s use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) to compensate the victims of foreign bribery. Given the inherent difficulties in seizing, forfeiting, and repatriating illicit wealth through traditional asset recovery frameworks, DPAs possess immense potential to remediate the victims of corruption in low-income countries. But this practice also raises a number of questions and challenges, which the report seeks to address. Here are some of the more serious ones: Continue reading

Guest Post: State of Corruption in Mongolia and Government’s Plans to Address It

The fight against corruption in Mongolia, a fledgling democracy wedged between Russia and China, is especially challenging. Not only must corruption fighters in government and allies in civil society contend with constant meddling in its internal politics by its powerful neighbors, but its vast resources of copper, coal, and other minerals create enormous incentives for home-grown corruption. GAB is pleased to publish this guest post on the current developments in the fight against corruption fight by Mongolian lawyer Battsengel Bayarbaatar, an expert in intellectual property law and long-time good governance, anticorruption advocate and due diligence expert.

Mongolia is currently grappling with significant corruption issues, a central concern for both the public and the government. The situation has intensified due to several high-profile corruption scandals, particularly within the mining sector, a cornerstone of Mongolia’s economy.

One of the most prominent cases is the so-called “coal theft” scandal, which erupted in late 2022. This scandal involves allegations that large quantities of coal were illegally transported to China, leading to an estimated loss of up to $12 billion for the Mongolian economy (here). High-ranking officials and influential business figures were implicated in this scheme, triggering widespread public outrage and protests. The Mongolian government responded by launching several criminal investigations and reforming laws related to strategic minerals. However, despite these efforts, enforcement remains weak, and the institutional coordination necessary to address these issues effectively is lacking.

The public’s dissatisfaction with how corruption is being handled reached a boiling point in December 2023 when massive protests broke out in Ulaanbaatar’s Sukhbaatar Square. These protests were primarily driven by youth and various civil society groups demanding transparency and accountability from the government, particularly concerning the coal theft case. The protests are reflective of broader frustrations within Mongolian society over issues such as inequality, unemployment, and environmental degradation. The government has responded to some demands, such as declassifying information related to state-owned enterprises like Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi, but many in the public remain skeptical of the government’s commitment to genuine reform.

In response to these challenges, the Mongolian government has introduced a new anti-corruption strategy, which aims to tackle corruption comprehensively by 2030.

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Guest Post: Italy’s Misguided, and Possibly Illegal, Repeal of the Abuse of Office Offense

Today’s guest post is from Roberta De Paolis, a post doctoral fellow in Criminal Law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies of Pisa.

For nearly a hundred years, the Italian criminal code included an “abuse of office” offense. Public officials committed this crime when, in the course of performing their duties, they acted in a way that was otherwise unlawful or entailed a conflict of interest, and in so doing secured a monetary advantage to themselves and/or inflicted monetary damage on others. For example, if a public official rigged a public procurement auction, steering a government contract to a relative or friend, that public official would not only have violated the rules on competition procedures, but would also have committed the crime of abuse of office. But the crime could apply more broadly. For example, if a local official denied a citizen a building permit for self-interested reasons, the official may have committed the abuse-of-office crime.

On its face, the abuse of office offense seems like a potentially powerful anticorruption tool. But it had proved to be controversial. Many, including Justice Minister Carlo Nordio, claimed that the crime was too vague, and potentially too broad. For example, in many small Italian towns, many people—particularly at the elite level—know each other socially and often have family ties, and as a result many decisions that local politicians make could be characterized as helping their friends or relations or otherwise involving a conflict of interest. Consider a mayor who announces a tender for public construction project, and the best bid comes from an acquaintance of the mayor. If the city government accepts that bid, the local political opposition could report the decision to the authorities and assert that the mayor abused her office by favoring an acquaintance in the tender procedure. As a result, according to critics of the abuse-of-office offense, many local public officials were discouraged from implementing socially valuable public works projects, out of fear of ending up under criminal investigation. The critics also pointed out that, despite the large number of prosecutions for abuse of office, these prosecutions rarely produced convictions: the most up-to-date statistics report that about 5,000 criminal prosecutions for abuse of office resulted in only nine convictions. This is suggestive evidence that many of the investigations were meritless, and possibly politically motivated tools of harassment.

That, at least, is what critics of the law argued, and this past August, those criticisms carried the day: Parliament voted to repeal the abuse-of-office offense. But was that the right decision? Many experts say no. Notably, the President of Italy’s National Anti-Corruption Authority, Giuseppe Busia, asserted that repealing the abuse of office offense leads to impunity in cases of conflict of interest like favoritism in public competition or tenders. Similarly, a spokesman for the European Commission claimed that the repeal of this law “decriminalizes an important form of corruption and may have an impact on the effectiveness of the European fight against corruption.” (Indeed, it is worth noting that 25 of the 27 EU countries have criminal laws prohibiting abuse of office.) Supporters of the repeal respond that these concerns are overblown because other provisions of the criminal code, as well as Italian administrative law, still apply to the egregious cases. But that is not obviously true, and, worrisomely, the repeal of the criminal abuse of office offense has not been counterbalanced by the introduction of new administrative offenses to address the problematic conduct. Continue reading

Guest Post: Embracing and Enhancing IMF’s Governance Conditionalities To Fight Corruption

Today’s guest post is from Beauty Emefa Narteh, the Executive Secretary at the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, and Leslie Tsai, General Counsel at the Chandler Foundation and lead for the organization’s efforts to support good governance, increased transparency and accountability, and robust international and national integrity ecosystems

 IMF bailouts of countries in financial distress often come with unpopular strings attached—strict conditionalities related to fiscal policy that often force countries to make deep spending cuts and to increase taxes on food, healthcare, and fuel. These painful austerity measures have often proved counterproductive, plunging countries into recession and sparking anti-government riots and protests.

But while IMF conditionalities have gotten a deservedly bad reputation, a relatively new category of IMF conditionalities, focused on governance reforms, presents the 3.3 billion people living in countries swept up in the current global debt crisis with something precious: hope and the possibility of a true pathway to financial stability. The IMF’s expanded the use of governance-related conditions is a based on a belated acknowledgement of a point that civil society leaders and anticorruption champions around the world have long emphasized: that governance issues are as macroeconomically critical as fiscal policy, and that when corruption bloats and distorts government spending, a narrow focus on economic policy alone will be insufficient to pull countries out of chronic economic crisis. Notably, the IMF’s governance conditionalities are far more popular among ordinary citizens than their standard austerity measures. This is not only because corruption is widely seen as a scourge that most heavily burdens the poor, but also because anticorruption systems that protect government coffers can blunt the need for cuts to social spending over the long term.

The IMF’s governance conditionalities provide a powerful if imperfect tool for savvy civil society leaders who have long advocated for increased government accountability and stronger anticorruption systems. When governments are in discussions with the IMF about bailouts, domestic civil society groups in those countries can use this opportunity to press for much-needed progress on anticorruption. Continue reading

Guest Post: Lessons from the Extractive Sector for Fighting Corruption in Green Energy

Today’s guest post comes from Mark Robinson, Executive Director of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and Maja de Vibe, Senior Vice President at Statkraft, Europe’s largest producer of renewable energy. They write in a personal capacity, building on a joint research paper published by the Basel Institute on Governance.

In response to the global climate crisis, countries around the world are seeking to shift to clean energy. The result is massive pressure to invest in solar, wind, hydropower, and green hydrogen projects. As this critical investment moves forward, it is more important than ever to address the corruption and governance risks around issues like supply chains, licensing, land leases, community consultation, tax and royalties. After all, as investment in the renewables sector grows, so does its attractiveness to those seeking to exploit opportunities for bribery and fraud. Making good governance and anticorruption a priority can help the green energy sector mitigate the risks to communities and the environment, and ensure more equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of renewable energy development

Yet while companies are increasingly aware of governance and corruption risks in the renewables sector, there has been insufficient action to address them so far. There are numerous reasons for this, including the fact that companies might prioritize more immediate needs, such as securing finance or community support, or they may lack the knowledge and capacity to analyze and address corruption risks. Continue reading

Guest Post: First Country Ratifies the Asset Declaration Treaty

Requiring public official to disclose their assets, income, and other information about their personal finances can be an important tool for curbing corruption — as any number of posts on this blog have shown (examples here, here, and here. The program’s effectiveness depends crucially on the ability to verify the disclosures’ accuracy and in particular the ease with which verifiers can determine if an official has hidden assets abroad. A new Treaty greatly facilitates this task. Its ratification should be at the top of national anticorruption authorities to do list.

GAB is pleased to publish this guest post explaining the Treaty and its origins authored by Tilman Hoppe, an international expert on asset declarations, who played the critical role in the Treaty’s development.

Effective August 23, 2024, North Macedonia has ratified the “International Treaty on Exchange of Data for the Verification of Asset Declarations.” By doing so, North Macedonia has written history. The Treaty is the first and only mechanism for cross-border data exchange for the verification of asset declarations. Three more countries have signed the Treaty and will now have to catch up in ratifying. Other countries are about to sign – any country may join the Treaty, as may the European Union as a bloc.

The Treaty addresses the following gap: Corrupt public officials hide their wealth abroad. At the same time, bodies verifying asset declarations lack access to data abroad. This is the number one reason cited by verification bodies to explain why they can only unlock a fraction of asset declarations’ potential: Following wealth usually stops at domestic borders. Neither the UNCAC nor any other international treaty address this problem.

A significant advance in international efforts to curb corruption, the Treaty emerged from an unlikely set of circumstances:

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Guest Post: The Need for Better Monitoring and Evaluation of Anticorruption Projects

Today’s guest post comes from Tom Shipley, a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Corruption at the University of Sussex.

While the anticorruption field is rife with disagreements and debates about “what works,” one thing that pretty much everyone can agree on is the need for more and better evidence. This is why it is so important that governments and other organizations engage in appropriate monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities to assess the impact of their anticorruption work. Lots of organizations conduct M&E activity—but how good is it? A new report developed at the Centre for the Study of Corruption and published with the U4 Anticorruption Resource Centre seeks to provide a comprehensive review of anticorruption M&E in development cooperation. The report, which is based on a structured review of 91 evaluation reports published by 11 development agencies and non-governmental organizations, examines the M&E evidence available for a range of anticorruption measures implemented in a wide range of countries.

The findings are disappointing. Although there are some high-quality evaluations, the review demonstrates there are systematic problems with the quality of the evidence produced through M&E. Continue reading

Guest Post: From Revolution to Reform — Tracing Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Landscape

It is now two decades plus since the fight against corruption emerged as a major issue. One that has been a particular challenge in nations still struggling to overcome the legacy of communism. Today’s Guest Post tracks recent progress Armenia, where voters in 2018 traded a deeply corrupt, semi authoritarian government for one promising both less corruption and more democracy. Its authors: Jeffrey Hallock, a PhD candidate at American University researching anti-corruption reform strategies, and a researcher at the Accountability Research Center utilizing open government data to analyze U.S. foreign funding trends, and Karine Ghahramanyan, a senior at the American University of Armenia pursuing a degree in Politics and Governance.

Armenia, a landlocked country of 2.8 million, sits in the middle of a region defined by political uncertainty. Six years after Nikol Pashinyan spearheaded Armenia’s Velvet Revolution with a promise to eradicate systemic corruption, many regard Prime Minister Pashinyan’s efforts as stalling. Although corruption has noticeably decreased since 2018 (here), the government’s initial emphasis on anti-corruption measures has been overtaken by urgent security considerations, its 2020 defeat by neighbor and long-time adversary Azerbaijan followed by unsettling developments in neighbors Georgia, Turkey, and Iran.

Armenia’s burgeoning democracy and recent reforms have helped strengthen its position amid broader volatility, contributing to economic growth and deepening relations with democratic allies. Yet the government is under mounting pressure to recommit to the principles of transparency and accountability that gave legitimacy to the 2018 revolution.

The Pashinyan administration offers lessons on how to capitalize on a window of opportunity to advance consequential anti-corruption gains, as well as insights on when the spark of the revolution fades into the reality of quotidian government reform.

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What the Next UK Government Likely to do About Corruption

If polls are to be believed, on July 4 the Labour Party will take control of the government of the (still!) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Professor Robert Barrington (Centre for the Study of Corruption) was one of the architects of the Cameron government’s Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016. Below he reviews a recent speech from Labour MP David Lammy, almost certain to be Foreign Secretary in a Labour government. Given the UK’s role in the international fight against corruption, Lammy’s remarks will be of interest to more than just UK voters.

Somewhat lost in the noise of the UK’s general election announcement was a major speech by Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy at the think-tank IPPR.  It was reported here in the Financial Times, but hardly anywhere else.  As Mr Lammy is likely to be the UK’s new Foreign Secretary on July 5th, anti-corruption experts should be paying close attention to what he said.  Moreover, this is the most significant speech made to date by a senior politician in the opposition party, and so gives the best clue as to what might happen should they win the election.  This analysis contains lengthy quotations, as the speech does not seem yet to be easily accessible.

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