Guest Post: Italy’s Misguided, and Possibly Illegal, Repeal of the Abuse of Office Offense

Today’s guest post is from Roberta De Paolis, a post doctoral fellow in Criminal Law at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies of Pisa.

For nearly a hundred years, the Italian criminal code included an “abuse of office” offense. Public officials committed this crime when, in the course of performing their duties, they acted in a way that was otherwise unlawful or entailed a conflict of interest, and in so doing secured a monetary advantage to themselves and/or inflicted monetary damage on others. For example, if a public official rigged a public procurement auction, steering a government contract to a relative or friend, that public official would not only have violated the rules on competition procedures, but would also have committed the crime of abuse of office. But the crime could apply more broadly. For example, if a local official denied a citizen a building permit for self-interested reasons, the official may have committed the abuse-of-office crime.

On its face, the abuse of office offense seems like a potentially powerful anticorruption tool. But it had proved to be controversial. Many, including Justice Minister Carlo Nordio, claimed that the crime was too vague, and potentially too broad. For example, in many small Italian towns, many people—particularly at the elite level—know each other socially and often have family ties, and as a result many decisions that local politicians make could be characterized as helping their friends or relations or otherwise involving a conflict of interest. Consider a mayor who announces a tender for public construction project, and the best bid comes from an acquaintance of the mayor. If the city government accepts that bid, the local political opposition could report the decision to the authorities and assert that the mayor abused her office by favoring an acquaintance in the tender procedure. As a result, according to critics of the abuse-of-office offense, many local public officials were discouraged from implementing socially valuable public works projects, out of fear of ending up under criminal investigation. The critics also pointed out that, despite the large number of prosecutions for abuse of office, these prosecutions rarely produced convictions: the most up-to-date statistics report that about 5,000 criminal prosecutions for abuse of office resulted in only nine convictions. This is suggestive evidence that many of the investigations were meritless, and possibly politically motivated tools of harassment.

That, at least, is what critics of the law argued, and this past August, those criticisms carried the day: Parliament voted to repeal the abuse-of-office offense. But was that the right decision? Many experts say no. Notably, the President of Italy’s National Anti-Corruption Authority, Giuseppe Busia, asserted that repealing the abuse of office offense leads to impunity in cases of conflict of interest like favoritism in public competition or tenders. Similarly, a spokesman for the European Commission claimed that the repeal of this law “decriminalizes an important form of corruption and may have an impact on the effectiveness of the European fight against corruption.” (Indeed, it is worth noting that 25 of the 27 EU countries have criminal laws prohibiting abuse of office.) Supporters of the repeal respond that these concerns are overblown because other provisions of the criminal code, as well as Italian administrative law, still apply to the egregious cases. But that is not obviously true, and, worrisomely, the repeal of the criminal abuse of office offense has not been counterbalanced by the introduction of new administrative offenses to address the problematic conduct. Continue reading

Guest Post: Embracing and Enhancing IMF’s Governance Conditionalities To Fight Corruption

Today’s guest post is from Beauty Emefa Narteh, the Executive Secretary at the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, and Leslie Tsai, General Counsel at the Chandler Foundation and lead for the organization’s efforts to support good governance, increased transparency and accountability, and robust international and national integrity ecosystems

 IMF bailouts of countries in financial distress often come with unpopular strings attached—strict conditionalities related to fiscal policy that often force countries to make deep spending cuts and to increase taxes on food, healthcare, and fuel. These painful austerity measures have often proved counterproductive, plunging countries into recession and sparking anti-government riots and protests.

But while IMF conditionalities have gotten a deservedly bad reputation, a relatively new category of IMF conditionalities, focused on governance reforms, presents the 3.3 billion people living in countries swept up in the current global debt crisis with something precious: hope and the possibility of a true pathway to financial stability. The IMF’s expanded the use of governance-related conditions is a based on a belated acknowledgement of a point that civil society leaders and anticorruption champions around the world have long emphasized: that governance issues are as macroeconomically critical as fiscal policy, and that when corruption bloats and distorts government spending, a narrow focus on economic policy alone will be insufficient to pull countries out of chronic economic crisis. Notably, the IMF’s governance conditionalities are far more popular among ordinary citizens than their standard austerity measures. This is not only because corruption is widely seen as a scourge that most heavily burdens the poor, but also because anticorruption systems that protect government coffers can blunt the need for cuts to social spending over the long term.

The IMF’s governance conditionalities provide a powerful if imperfect tool for savvy civil society leaders who have long advocated for increased government accountability and stronger anticorruption systems. When governments are in discussions with the IMF about bailouts, domestic civil society groups in those countries can use this opportunity to press for much-needed progress on anticorruption. Continue reading

Guest Post: Lessons from the Extractive Sector for Fighting Corruption in Green Energy

Today’s guest post comes from Mark Robinson, Executive Director of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and Maja de Vibe, Senior Vice President at Statkraft, Europe’s largest producer of renewable energy. They write in a personal capacity, building on a joint research paper published by the Basel Institute on Governance.

In response to the global climate crisis, countries around the world are seeking to shift to clean energy. The result is massive pressure to invest in solar, wind, hydropower, and green hydrogen projects. As this critical investment moves forward, it is more important than ever to address the corruption and governance risks around issues like supply chains, licensing, land leases, community consultation, tax and royalties. After all, as investment in the renewables sector grows, so does its attractiveness to those seeking to exploit opportunities for bribery and fraud. Making good governance and anticorruption a priority can help the green energy sector mitigate the risks to communities and the environment, and ensure more equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of renewable energy development

Yet while companies are increasingly aware of governance and corruption risks in the renewables sector, there has been insufficient action to address them so far. There are numerous reasons for this, including the fact that companies might prioritize more immediate needs, such as securing finance or community support, or they may lack the knowledge and capacity to analyze and address corruption risks. Continue reading

Guest Post: First Country Ratifies the Asset Declaration Treaty

Requiring public official to disclose their assets, income, and other information about their personal finances can be an important tool for curbing corruption — as any number of posts on this blog have shown (examples here, here, and here. The program’s effectiveness depends crucially on the ability to verify the disclosures’ accuracy and in particular the ease with which verifiers can determine if an official has hidden assets abroad. A new Treaty greatly facilitates this task. Its ratification should be at the top of national anticorruption authorities to do list.

GAB is pleased to publish this guest post explaining the Treaty and its origins authored by Tilman Hoppe, an international expert on asset declarations, who played the critical role in the Treaty’s development.

Effective August 23, 2024, North Macedonia has ratified the “International Treaty on Exchange of Data for the Verification of Asset Declarations.” By doing so, North Macedonia has written history. The Treaty is the first and only mechanism for cross-border data exchange for the verification of asset declarations. Three more countries have signed the Treaty and will now have to catch up in ratifying. Other countries are about to sign – any country may join the Treaty, as may the European Union as a bloc.

The Treaty addresses the following gap: Corrupt public officials hide their wealth abroad. At the same time, bodies verifying asset declarations lack access to data abroad. This is the number one reason cited by verification bodies to explain why they can only unlock a fraction of asset declarations’ potential: Following wealth usually stops at domestic borders. Neither the UNCAC nor any other international treaty address this problem.

A significant advance in international efforts to curb corruption, the Treaty emerged from an unlikely set of circumstances:

Continue reading

Guest Post: The Need for Better Monitoring and Evaluation of Anticorruption Projects

Today’s guest post comes from Tom Shipley, a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Corruption at the University of Sussex.

While the anticorruption field is rife with disagreements and debates about “what works,” one thing that pretty much everyone can agree on is the need for more and better evidence. This is why it is so important that governments and other organizations engage in appropriate monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities to assess the impact of their anticorruption work. Lots of organizations conduct M&E activity—but how good is it? A new report developed at the Centre for the Study of Corruption and published with the U4 Anticorruption Resource Centre seeks to provide a comprehensive review of anticorruption M&E in development cooperation. The report, which is based on a structured review of 91 evaluation reports published by 11 development agencies and non-governmental organizations, examines the M&E evidence available for a range of anticorruption measures implemented in a wide range of countries.

The findings are disappointing. Although there are some high-quality evaluations, the review demonstrates there are systematic problems with the quality of the evidence produced through M&E. Continue reading

Guest Post: From Revolution to Reform — Tracing Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Landscape

It is now two decades plus since the fight against corruption emerged as a major issue. One that has been a particular challenge in nations still struggling to overcome the legacy of communism. Today’s Guest Post tracks recent progress Armenia, where voters in 2018 traded a deeply corrupt, semi authoritarian government for one promising both less corruption and more democracy. Its authors: Jeffrey Hallock, a PhD candidate at American University researching anti-corruption reform strategies, and a researcher at the Accountability Research Center utilizing open government data to analyze U.S. foreign funding trends, and Karine Ghahramanyan, a senior at the American University of Armenia pursuing a degree in Politics and Governance.

Armenia, a landlocked country of 2.8 million, sits in the middle of a region defined by political uncertainty. Six years after Nikol Pashinyan spearheaded Armenia’s Velvet Revolution with a promise to eradicate systemic corruption, many regard Prime Minister Pashinyan’s efforts as stalling. Although corruption has noticeably decreased since 2018 (here), the government’s initial emphasis on anti-corruption measures has been overtaken by urgent security considerations, its 2020 defeat by neighbor and long-time adversary Azerbaijan followed by unsettling developments in neighbors Georgia, Turkey, and Iran.

Armenia’s burgeoning democracy and recent reforms have helped strengthen its position amid broader volatility, contributing to economic growth and deepening relations with democratic allies. Yet the government is under mounting pressure to recommit to the principles of transparency and accountability that gave legitimacy to the 2018 revolution.

The Pashinyan administration offers lessons on how to capitalize on a window of opportunity to advance consequential anti-corruption gains, as well as insights on when the spark of the revolution fades into the reality of quotidian government reform.

Continue reading

What the Next UK Government Likely to do About Corruption

If polls are to be believed, on July 4 the Labour Party will take control of the government of the (still!) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Professor Robert Barrington (Centre for the Study of Corruption) was one of the architects of the Cameron government’s Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016. Below he reviews a recent speech from Labour MP David Lammy, almost certain to be Foreign Secretary in a Labour government. Given the UK’s role in the international fight against corruption, Lammy’s remarks will be of interest to more than just UK voters.

Somewhat lost in the noise of the UK’s general election announcement was a major speech by Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy at the think-tank IPPR.  It was reported here in the Financial Times, but hardly anywhere else.  As Mr Lammy is likely to be the UK’s new Foreign Secretary on July 5th, anti-corruption experts should be paying close attention to what he said.  Moreover, this is the most significant speech made to date by a senior politician in the opposition party, and so gives the best clue as to what might happen should they win the election.  This analysis contains lengthy quotations, as the speech does not seem yet to be easily accessible.

Continue reading

Guest Post: Watching Watch Wearers: More on Thailand’s Watchgate Case

GAB welcome back Craig R. Arndt, an American lawyer now living in Bangkok. Craig has advised a variety of clients on corruption-related matters and represented corruption victims in damage actions. Below he offers a coda to Government Leaders Should Watch Who Watches Them Wearing Their Pricey Watches

In 2018 the Thai public was mesmerized by a photo showing retired General and then Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan wearing a luxury watch. Activists soon found other photos of him sporting a variety of watches together worth $1.5 million. General Prawit was widely mocked for his explanation that they had been loaned to him by a wealthy now deceased friend and that he was not required to report them on his asset declaration form (here and here).

Thailand’s National Anticorruption Commission (NACC) did investigate the non-disclosure claim, it found nothing wrong. Prawit continued his political career, unfazed and unaffected by what had been short-lived damage to his reputation (here). He was the candidate for Prime Minister for the current ruling party in the recent election. Although that party split, his party still gained 40 seats in the face of a resounding defeat of the generals and their allies (here).

Although the NACC concluded that Prawit failure to report the watch collection did violated the asset disclosure law lot violated the law requriwas willing The agency, however, offered no justification for letting Prawit off the hook (here). Thailand’s increasingly assertive civil society was not ready to let the matter drop.

Political Activist Veera Somkwamkid asked the Administrative Court to order NACC to disclose its findings in the Prawit case. The first level administrative court agreed, and April 2023 the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) upheld the decision and ordered full disclosure of the NACC Prawit files (here).

The SAC’s decision in the Prawit case does not set a precedent under Thai law. The NACC can thus refuse to disclose its reasoning in future cases, meaning those seeking their disclosure will have to tread the path Veera took in Prawit’s. It may a be a slow and treacherous one, but the NACC and Thai officials are on notice it’s a path determined civil society activists are willing to take.

Prawit may still find it easy to find the time of day given his glitzy watch collection, but in Thailand time may be running short on politicians of his ilk

Gibraltar Government on Trial for Corruption

Today’s Guest Post is by Robert Barrington, Professor of Anti-Corruption Practice at the Centre for the Study of Corruption, University of Sussex (UK); and formerly the Chair of Transparency International’s International Council.

With a population of a mere 34,000 and a parliament of 17 elected members, Gibraltar seldom attracts the world’s attention, except in the periodic spats between Britain and Spain as to its territorial status.  One of Britain’s Overseas Territories, like the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands, it’s part of the remnants of the Empire which never became independent.  Like those other territories, Gibraltar has become a financial centre – particularly known for online gambling – and is officially ruled by a hands-off Governor on behalf of the British crown.

Small states have a very mixed record when it comes to corruption.  Some, like Singapore and Hong Kong (prior to the recent ‘Chinafication’), have in the past successfully led crackdowns on corruption, backed up by powerful and effective anti-corruption agencies.  But small states can all too easily be captured by vested interests and go in the opposite direction – see, for example, Wouter Veenendaal’s article on ‘How smallness fosters clientelism; a case study of Malta.’

The picture in Britain’s Overseas Territories is relatively obscure.  They are so small that they do not generally feature  on global indices of corruption. There is usually a non-existent, or at best government-friendly local media and civil society; independence – in the judiciary, police, or other pillars of the state – is hard to achieve when everyone knows everyone.  Ideal conditions for state capture.

Many of the Overseas Territories dance on the edges of the FATF greylist, periodically creeping on and off. Gibraltar was added to the list in June 2022 and removed in February 2024.  The British Virgin Islands, Turks & Caicos and Cayman Islands have all had corruption scandals at the heart of government, often related to dirty money.  In fact, it is thanks to those scandals and the subsequent attention they garner (via the international media, public enquiries, and occasionally prosecutions) that we have at least a partial picture of what is going on.

So what is happening in Gibraltar? 

Continue reading

Guest Post: Model Open Government Partnership Commitments for Fighting Kleptocracy

Today’s guest post is from Jodi Vittori, Professor of Practice at Georgetown University:

This past January, I authored a report, co-sponsored by the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the National Democratic Institute, entitled “Committing to Combat Kleptocracy: A Guide for Open Government Partnership Members.” The report explains how various kleptocrats and their “enablers” move illicit assets from the country where they were stolen to the locations where they will be stored and enjoyed. The report also discusses how kleptocracy undermines not only the countries where the assets were stolen, but also the transit or destination points for kleptocratic money, people, and other resources.  While it might seem like an infusion of money, assets, and rich people into a given country might be a benefit for that country (putting aside the moral issues), it turns out that these inflows have real drawbacks for the host state, contributing to governance backsliding, facilitating real estate manipulation and industrial asset stripping, exacerbating migration challenges, and undermining national security. The role of Russia’s kleptocracy in election interference in the West, as well as the corruption associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, have helped put the role kleptocratic inflows play in receiving states in the spotlight.

The OGP’s open government principles—to which all OGP member governments commit—are a set of norms that, if honored and implemented, will help countries fight back against inflows of kleptocratic assets. At the most basic level, the OGP stresses the importance of making relevant, usable, and timely information on governments available to citizens and civil society to hold their governments accountable. This helps ensure that public resources are managed transparently, fairly, and equitably. The report develops this further by outlining a series of model OGP commitments for consideration by governments and citizen activists, including the following: Continue reading