Author Archives: Jack Haynie

Cautious Optimism: Leveraging Free Trade Agreements as Anticorruption Tools

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The international trading system has had a dire decade. There has been a stunning drop-off in the growth of global trade, and the most recent World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference did little, if anything, to halt the multilateral trading system’s decline. Yet anticorruption policy’s place in international trade negotiations has never been stronger. Many of the most prominent regional free trade agreements (FTAs) that have either come into force or been the subject of intense negotiations over the last half-decade have featured remarkably strong anticorruption provisions. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which came into force in 2020 as a replacement for NAFTA, included entirely new anticorruption protections alongside only modest, technocratic tweaks to actual barriers to cross-border trade. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the post-2016 replacement for the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), includes almost all of the anticorruption provisions that the U.S. championed in the TPP. The negotiations for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), though much maligned for their failure to coalesce around meaningful trade liberalization, nevertheless produced a “Fair Economy” pillar that includes substantial initiatives aimed at fighting corruption. And these are not the only examples: Indeed, there has been a general increase in anticorruption provisions in FTAs and bilateral investment treaties.

Of course, lumping all of these different provisions together is a bit misleading, because the “anticorruption” provisions in FTAs take a wide variety of forms. Many, including the anticorruption provisions of the USMCA and the CPTPP, commit members to adopting laws that either directly criminalize certain behavior (bribery, facilitation payments, etc.) or require that firms adopt transparency measures, such as regular financial disclosures. Other FTAs, like the IPEF or the World Customs Organization’s Anti-Corruption and Integrity Promotion (A-CIP) Program, focus on capacity building through information sharing, technical assistance, and training programs. Still others, like the African Continental Free Trade Area (which is still being negotiated), attempt to tackle corruption in trade through measures like simplifying and automating the customs process. Yet despite this diversity, it is fair to say that anticorruption is now firmly part of the international trade agenda—thanks in large part to sustained advocacy by pro-transparency and anticorruption advocates since the 1990s.

While the incorporation of anticorruption provisions in FTAs has obvious symbolic importance, we don’t yet know as much about the practical impact of these provisions. This is partly because it’s just too soon to make such assessments: Other than a few exceptional cases, the inclusion of anticorruption language in FTAs is a relatively recent phenomenon). Very few studies have engaged in empirical assessments of how FTA anticorruption commitments actually fare as anticorruption tools in practice. But the limited evidence we do have appears encouraging:

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Fiddling While the Rainforest Burns: The KPK, Indonesia’s Natural Resources Sector, and Global Environmental Crisis

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Indonesia, the world’s fourth most-populated country and third largest democracy, has attracted global media attention for its fight against high-level political corruption. Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK), which was established in 2004, has successfully prosecuted officials across the political spectrum and at levels ranging from corrupt city council members to the well-connected relatives of high-ranking central government officials. Yet despite the KPK’s many successes, corruption remains pervasive in resource extraction industries in Indonesia’s outlying islands. This entrenched corruption is a matter of concern not just for Indonesia but for the whole world, because corruption in this sector could kneecap efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions and could threaten the global transition to a green economy. The two sectors where this threat is most serious are nickel ore mining and palm oil farming:

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Working Smarter, Not Harder: Using Secondary Sanctions to Strengthen the Global Magnitsky Act

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Arkady Rotenberg, Vladimir Putin’s childhood judo partner, is living large. Despite using his relationship with Putin to facilitate state capture, gaining lucrative contracts for everything from constructing the bridge between Russia and Crimea to hosting spurious “anticorruption trainings” for state employees, and being subject to American sanctions since 2014, Rotenberg maintains extensive links with the global economy. He has used Deutschebank to move millions of dollars out of Russia, channeled investments through a technology firm co-owned with a member of the British royal family, and hired a well-connected Monegasque lawyer to manage his taxes and PR. Rotenberg is not alone: Corrupt officials around the world, and their cronies, use Western professional service providers to facilitate their use of corrupt funds.

The United States has a powerful and under-utilized tool to control connections between corrupt officials and the professionals service providers who enable them: the Global Magnitsky Act (sometimes shortened to “GloMag”), which authorizes the U.S. government to impose targeted sanctions on individuals engaged in serious human rights abuses and/or high-level corruption. To date, the U.S. has imposed GloMag sanctions on 299 persons deemed to have been involved in official corruption. Yet despite some high profile successes (see here, here, and here), critics have pointed out that GloMag remains too limited in scope to seriously impact many of its targets. Sanctions against corrupt officials remain mostly unilateral tools, with governments often failing to coordinate their sanctions, leaving opportunities for evasion (see here and here). And while GloMag has inspired similar efforts by 35 additional countries, many of these governments—and the European Union—use GloMag-inspired programs only to target human rights abusers, not those engaged in grand corruption (see here and here).

There have been proposals to increase the comprehensiveness of GloMag sanctions, ranging from simply listing more corrupt officials to convincing the EU to broaden its sanctions regime to cover those engaged in high-level corruption. While these are worthwhile efforts, the United States possesses an extremely powerful tool that it could use unilaterally to drastically increase the heft of GloMag sanctions, one which is already authorized by statute and executive order: secondary sanctions. Secondary sanctions are sanctions that are imposed on a set of persons or entities that transact with an individual who is subject to primary sanctions under GloMag or a comparable regime. The U.S. can and should impose secondary sanctions on the professional service providers (such as accountants, wealth managers, bankers, and real estate agents) that provide individuals covered by GloMag sanctions with the services they need to launder the proceeds of their corruption. Under such a regime, for example, if Deutchebank helps Arkady Rotenberg (already the target of sanctions) to move his money around the world, then the U.S. would also sanction Deutschebank—restricting its ability to transact using U.S. dollars, a disastrous outcome for many firms.

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